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Abstract 
 
                   The Suharto New Order was born out of ethnic conflict around religious, 
ideological and regional/cultural issues that were threatening national chaos.  As a pre-
requisite to pursuing the socio-political and economic developmental agendas deemed 
necessary to legitimize their hold on power, the new regime committed the resources of 
the state behind forging national unity and stability out of potentially antagonistic ethnic 
and cultural diversity.  This study examines how the Suharto New Order sustained the 
processes that organised the Indonesian nation behind its agendas through an exclusive 
representation of the state ideology Pancasila, as the ideological pillar of socio-political 
and economic development.   
                      The Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, viewed social politics as an 
arrangement that inextricably linked pluralism, political participation and ideological 
supremacy and placed critical emphasis on the methods by which a ruling order deployed 
ideology and culture to craft mass consensus that would underwrite the moral and 
intellectual legitimacy of hegemonic rule.  The study is original in that it contrasts 
Gramsci’s insights into ideology as a discourse of hegemonic legitimacy, in the context 
of the Suharto New Order’s exclusive representation of Pancasila as the ideological pillar 
of the regime’s arrangement of Indonesian life.  The study also examines whether the 
Gramscian model of hegemonic order is robust when employed to explain the Suharto 
regime’s decline and collapse, as well as the prospects for socio-political and economic 
stability during the post-Suharto transitionary phase and the pressures of Islamic socio-
political resurgence, which were accompanied by demands for more liberal democratic 
processes and participation.   
                        Antonio Gramsci provides the analytical framework for the study, and the 
Suharto New Order the behavioural perspective, with the prime purpose of the research 
being to test Gramsci’s model of hegemonic order and ideological legitimacy against a 
contemporary context.  With Indonesia comprising the world’s largest Islamic 
population, the Suharto New Order’s endeavours to construct national consensus and 
unity around Pancasila’s secular-nationalist orientation suggest prima facie a highly 
 iv
appropriate perspective in which to test Gramsci’s theories.  The post-Suharto era of 
transition, also offers a timely opportunity to test the Italian Marxist’s thoughts on 
crafting national consensus to underwrite a ruling arrangement’s ideological legitimacy in 
the contemporary environment of Islamic socio-political resurgence accompanied by a 
global spread of secular, liberal democratic ideals.    
 v
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ICMI                                              (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia) 
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Persatuan Pembangunan (Development Unity 
Party), but thereafter functioned as a social 
organisation to improve the circumstances of 
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Abdurrahman Wahid. 
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                                                               Pancasila – Guidance to the Comprehension and 
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PAN  Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate 
Party) … the political party of Amien Rais and 
associated with the modernist Islamic community 
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Pancasila Five political philosophical principles that 
constitute the official state ideology of Indonesia 
originally formulated by Sukarno in 1945.  The 
five principles are belief in one god, national 
consciousness, humanism, social justice, and 
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Pembarua         Renewal and revitalisation of Islamic faith. 
 
 xvii
Pesantren  Rural Islamic boarding school: Education facility 
teaching both Islamic and secular subjects. 
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society. 
 
PKB  Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National 
Awakening Party).  Founded on the initiative of 
Abdurrahman Wahid in July 1998 after Suharto’s 
fall, drawing heavily for support from the 
traditionalist Islam of Nahdlatul Ulama. 
 
PKI  Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian 
Communist Party).  Banned after the 1965 coup. 
 
PNI  (Partai Nasional Indonesia) Indonesian 
Nationalist Party. 
 
Politika-Islam    Islamic politics.  
 
PPP  Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Development 
Unity Party).  Muslim-based political party, one 
of two political parties allowed under the New 
Order and formed in 1973 as an amalgam of four 
Islamic parties. 
 
Pribumi  Indigenous Indonesian.   
 
Priyayi    Aristocratic or senior official class of Javanese 
                                                                viewed as the Javanese ruling class. 
 
P4                                 Pancasila refresher workshops intended to 
upgrade understanding of the doctrine.  
Compulsory attendance required by all civil 
servants.  
 
Reformasi dan demokrasi  Reform and democracy drive led predominantly 
by students from 1996.  
  
Santri  Pious Mulsims.   
 
Sapta Marga       Soldiers’ sacred oath. 
 
SARA  An anachronism representing the Indonesian 
terms for ethnicity, religion, race, and other 
‘conflictual’ groups.  Intended to identify those 
 xviii
extremely sensitive issues not to be publicly 
discussed or politicised.     
 
‘Scriptualists’ and  
‘Accommodationists’       A dichotomy polarising Islamic intellectual  
stances increasingly relevant socio-politically 
from the mid-1980s.  The former referring to 
those adherents committed to Islamic scripture 
towards the extreme of ‘fundamentalism’ and the 
later assuming a position accommodating the 
Pancasila-ist Indonesian New Order state.   
 
Shura        Islamic ‘mutual consultation’. 
 
Syari’a                                                   An Arabic word for Islamic law that governs both 
                                                               public and private lives of those living within an 
   Islamic state. 
 
Tanah Negara       State owned. 
 
Ulama        Muslim theologist/teacher. 
 
Yayasan                                                 Charitable foundation and non-profit welfare 
                                                               organisations that attract donations and not liable 
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2. Antonio Gramsci   
 
The Gramscian intellectual. 
An ‘interpretive’ category that enabled Gramsci to “analyse social change in 
terms of the recomposition of society around intellectual divisions of labour 
specific to different economic classes.”1  
 
“Every social group (ie economic class) being born on the original terrain of an 
essential function in the world of economic production, creates alongside itself, 
organically, one or more groups of intellectuals who give it homogeneity and 
awareness of its own function not only in the economic sphere but also in the 
social and political spheres.”2  The official function of the intellectual in 
hegemonic development is to contribute to the agenda-setting discourse of its 
sponsoring class.   
 
                                            
1 James Martin Gramsci’s Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction, (McMillan, London, 1998) p. 39. 
2 Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, notebook #12, paragraph #1 translated by J. Buttigieg, (Ed.), 
(Columbia University Press, New York, 1992). 
 xix
 
The organic intellectual.  
Individuals with a direct role in the economic activity of a class (eg economists, 
military doctrinaires and religious leaders allied to the ruling order) that provide a 
‘social identity’ for their sponsoring class.  The closer to the structure (economy) 
an intellectual is, the more organic is its relationship to a class.3  
 
The traditional intellectual.  
A “pre-existing social category” representing an “historical continuity 
uninterrupted by even the most complicated and radical changes in social and 
political forces” (eg ecclesiastics and ‘philosophers’ within the broader meaning 
of the term).4  The historical significance and social identity of the traditional 
intellectual places potential restraints on the organic order and requires that, for 
the sake of hegemonic legitimacy, traditional intellectuals be assimilated into the 
hegemonic order.5 
 
Gramscian hegemony.  
Refers to the function that the dominant group exercises over the entirety of 
society and its “direct domination” or command expressed in the “state and 
juridical government.”6  Gramscian hegemony is linked to the notion of popular 
consent to the domination of certain social groups and classes.  The hegemony of 
a class is derived from the relative balance of force and consent (from 
Machiavelli) “protected by [an] armour of coercion”.7    
 
The historical bloc. 
A historical-social formation organically linked and articulated through economic 
and political factors (as the content) and ideologies (the form) from which 
hegemony grows.8  The Gramscian concept of hegemony needs to be understood 
as a class developing through an economic system into a hegemonic order (by 
implication Marx’s historic materialism).  The systematic nature of the historic 
bloc’s processes, and the complex power relations that such a development 
entails, should be viewed as one class dominating other groups in a social system 
over an historic period.9  Because it draws attention to the process and 
development of ‘power relations’ Gramsci on occasion uses the alternative term 
‘power bloc’ which usefully describes state-class “accommodations and the 
ideological negotiations” power relations entail over a historical phase.10   
 
 
                                            
3 Martin (1992) p. 46. 
4 Martin (1992) p. 46. 
5John Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism, Hegemony and the New Opposition, (Zed Books, New York, 2001) 
p. 12.  
6 Prison Notebooks, notebook #12, paragraph #1. 
7 Prison Notebooks, notebook #6, paragraph # 88. 
8 Prison Notebooks, notebook #8, paragraph #182. 
9 Esteve Morera, Gramsci’s Historicism: A Realist interpretation,(Routledge, London, 1990) p. 190.  
10 A. Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci’s Politics, (Croom Helm, London, 1980) p. 121. 
 xx
Gramsci’s direzione 
As used by Gramsci the term translates to leadership that emphasises direction or 
guidance.  Direzione covers the various meanings of the word ‘direction’ in 
English but is also the normal word for ‘leadership’ and is usually translated as 
such in Gramsci’s writings.  Some writers argue that a better English version 
would be achieved, without distorting Gramsci’s thoughts, by regarding direzione 
and egomonia (hegemony) as interchangeable.11    
                                            
11 Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (Eds. and translators), Selections from the Prison Notebooks 
of Antonio Gramsci, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971), p. 55.  
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Introduction 
 
1.   Preface 
                   I recall my father talking many years ago about the two men he regarded 
as the greatest of all Italians: Giuseppe Garibaldi, for single-handedly uniting Italy 
and, my favourite, Antonio Gramsci the Sardinian communist who gave his life 
fighting for the Italian workers.  The stories about the workers’ takeover of the Turin 
works, the fights in the streets with the Fascisti, and Gramsci’s furtive trips back and 
forth between Italy and Moscow, constantly trying to evade Mussolini’s bullies 
enthralled me.  Years later I came to understand the life and intellectualism of the 
little Sardinian gobo,1 the hardship and trials of his young life, his frustrations and 
disappointments and, finally, his tragic last ten years in Mussolini’s damp and cold 
prisons, suffering extraordinarily difficult conditions of severe neglect and 
deteriorating health, scribbling his political thoughts into dozens of notebooks until in 
1937 he lost his battle with tuberculosis and died.   
                      Researching a Master’s dissertation on Indonesia’s role in ASEAN’s 
formation and evolution led to a growing fascination with the Suharto New Order 
power structure and in particular the pervasive role of the state ideology Pancasila in 
Indonesian life.2  The research also led me unexpectedly back to Gramsci.  Reading a 
recently published work by R. William Liddle on Indonesian political leadership and 
culture I came upon reference to what Liddle called the “currently popular Gramsci-
influenced approach” to cultural and class inequality that argued against class attitude 
and behaviour as strictly determined by socio-economic position.3  Following this line 
of thought led to Roger Simon’s introduction to Gramsci’s political thought and 
Gramsci’s notions on the relationship between hegemony and ideology.4  The 
implication of a Gramsci-influenced approach became clear but equally so was its 
irrelevance to my work at that stage on Indonesia’s role in ASEAN.  Gramsci and 
Indonesia was going to have to be a project for the future.   
                                                           
1 Gobo: hunchback. 
2 Ross O. Casci, Master’s Dissertation, Is there a long-term role for ASEAN in the aftermath of the 
Asian economic crisis?, 28 March 2001. 
3 R. William Liddle, Leadership and Culture in Indonesian Politics, (Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1996), 
p. 225. 
4 Roger Simon, Gramsci’s Political Thought: An Introduction, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1991). 
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                     As a powerful enabling discourse of unity and development, particularly 
appropriate to New Order Indonesia’s complex pluralist society and its potential for 
division and instability, Pancasila appeared to perform the vital Gramscian 
legitimising function of providing the means by which the New Order could 
effectively craft mass socio-political consciousness and support for its developmental 
agendas.  With their emphasis on economic breakdown and political collapse, 
contemporary writings understate the role of ideology in explaining the cataclysmic 
events of 1997/8 leading to President Suharto’s resignation and the end of his New 
Order.  The central purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that Gramsci’s 
ideologically-based theories of social politics provide the means to explain fully the 
end of Suharto’s New Order; that Gramsci’s hegemonic historic bloc model, with its 
clearly delineated overlapping and mutually inclusive economic, political, and 
ideological components, each powerfully informed by class-articulated ideology, 
offers a powerful and timely analytical framework to explain the rise and fall of 
Suharto’s New Order.  This thesis also provides an appropriate typology to explain 
the techniques of hegemonic refurbishment by which a dominant class crafted mass 
consciousness to sustain its ideological legitimacy.   
                     In 2003 after two years researching Gramsci’s understanding of 
hegemony as a means of explaining the rise and fall of the Suharto New Order, and 
Gramsci’s particular emphasis on the utility of ideology as hegemonic discourse, I 
read John Hilley’s 2001 publication Malaysia, Mahathirism, Hegemony and the New 
Opposition.5  In terms of this thesis testing the value of a Gramscian perspective to 
explain the rise and fall of the Suharto New Order, Hilley’s Mahathirist project offers 
some key insights.6  Hilley’s analysis of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad’s Malaysian 
hegemonic bloc not only provided a timely insight into the socio-political and cultural 
influences that inform an emergent counter-hegemony in the contemporary Southeast 
Asian context of Islamic resurgence and growing demands for neo-liberal reforms, but 
also tested Gramsci’s political theories in a parallel socio-political environment to this 
Indonesian research.  As well as testing the Gramscian perspective in a contemporary 
setting, Hilley’s Mahathirist project also provided significant insights into a critical 
                                                           
5 John Hilley, Malaysia, Mahathirism, Hegemony and the New Opposition, (Zed Books, New York, 
2001). 
6 Detailed Chapter 1, section 2, p. 47 to section 2.2, p. 55. 
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aspect of this research: hegemonic refurbishment in response to potential counter-
hegemonic challenge.   
                     It is hardly surprising, given his state of health and the harsh conditions 
under which he laboured, that Gramsci’s prison writings have been described as 
disjointed and not only difficult to interpret but tending to lend themselves to different 
interpretations and thus contradiction.7  His approach to social politics, that prioritised 
the needs of leaders by emphasising processes of cultural unification against a 
background of order, discipline, and unity, hinted strongly at authoritarianism.  Yet 
while Gramsci’s management of consent implies authoritarianism and seemingly 
contradicts his emphasis on the need to satisfy the general will his techniques of 
consent management find strong resonance with the empirical realities of socio-
politics under Suharto’s New Order Indonesia.  There are, prima facie, strong reasons 
for examining Gramsci in the Suharto New Order context.  For example, although it is 
important to remember that Gramsci’s concepts of hegemonic order were developed 
in a particular historic period, like his Italy of the 1920s and 1930s, the nation over 
which General Suharto imposed his New Order was in deep crisis, struggling to 
rationalise the roles of state and society, and came to be increasingly dominated by 
intrusive monopoly and investment capital.8  Moreover, the powerful role the New 
Order was to allocate to ideology, through the regime’s representation of the state 
doctrine Pancasila to sustain their domination of Indonesian life for some three 
decades, mirrors Gramsci’s ideological approach that addressed the issue of power 
and domination through the ‘lens of culture and ideology’.9      
                     Transferring Gramsci’s ideas to the contemporary world also faces the 
problem that his writings concerned crises of his particular time but there are 
nonetheless parallels between Gramsci’s Italy of the 1920s and Suharto’s New Order 
Indonesia.  The Risorgimento had unified Italy’s former disparate assemblage of 
independent states only fifty years earlier and Italy was still struggling with issues of 
socio-political and economic cohesion and they were occurring in Gramsci’s time 
against a background of regime-imposed fascism.  Suharto’s Indonesia struggled with 
similar issues and the New Order solution was to impose upon its people an exclusive 
representation of the state ideology Pancasila.  Notwithstanding the broad range of 
                                                           
7 James Martin, Gramsci’s Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction, (Macmillan Press, London, 
1998), p. 4.   
8 Anne Showstack Sassoon, Approaches to Gramsci, (Writers and Readers, London, 1982), p. 97. 
9 Martin, (1998), p. 2. 
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issues that informed his social and political thoughts (and the irrelevance of much of it 
to contemporary realities)10 at the very heart of Gramsci’s social politics, therefore, 
are theories attuned to post-independence Indonesian politics: the use of power and its 
close association with ideology and culture.  Gramsci’s concept of hegemony - 
intellectual and moral leadership through political alliances underpinned by a struggle 
for ideological domination - stands out from much of his writings and carries 
relevance to a socio-political analysis concerning Indonesia where the social politics 
of power, cultural identity and unity have dominated the mass politics of post-colonial 
development.   
                     Gramsci’s preoccupation with state-building and cultural unification, 
although originally set in the specific environment of post-World War One Italy, 
nonetheless, powerfully compliments contemporary analysis of similar issues in the 
context of post-independence Southeast Asia as Hilley has shown in his study of 
Mahatharist Malaysia.  Aspects of Gramsci’s theories on power and its relationship to 
ideology similarly underpin the nation-building/ideological/cultural rationalisation 
perspective this thesis employs to explain Suharto’s New Order Indonesia.  When the 
realities under enquiry are firmly premised, as they were under the Suharto New 
Order, on a hegemonic duality of political power and the crafting of the people’s 
socio-political consciousness through ideological discourse, it is no less appropriate to 
reconstruct and reassert Gramsci to analyse the processes involved: representing the 
politics of the past in modern terms by reasserting Gramsci’s socio-political model 
can only but expand the contemporary explanatory framework.   
                  By contrasting the Gramscian model with the Indonesian context, this 
thesis offers an explicitly ideological approach to explain the basis for the Suharto 
New Order’s formation in 1967, the regime’s domination of Indonesian life for some 
                                                           
10 The factory movement (Roger Simon, Gramsci’s Political Thought: An Introduction, (Lawrence and 
Wishart, London, 1991), pp. 78-86, Quinton Hoare, (Ed.), Antonio Gramsci: Selections From Political 
Writings, (Intervention, New York, 1977), pp. 310-321), the philosophy of praxis (Adolfo Sanchez, 
The Philosophy of Praxis, (Merlin, London, 1977), the role of ‘super-structures’ in capitalist society, 
the political party as the modern ‘Prince’ (Martin, (1998), pp. 89-114,  Benedetto Fontana, Hegemony 
and Power: on the Relationship Between Gramsci and Machiavelli, (University of Minnesota Press, 
London, 1993), Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, translated by J. Buttigieg, (Ed.), (Columbia 
University Press, London, 1966), No. 5, para. 127, Simon, (1991), pp. 100-107), the Southern Italian 
question,  Quinton Hoare  and Nowell Smith, (Eds.), Antonio Gramsci: Selections From the Prison 
Notebooks, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971), pp. 70-4, 92-9), Marxist revolutionary transition to 
socialism (Joseph Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness and the 
Revolutionary Process, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981), Chantal Mouffe, (Ed.), Gramsci and Marxist 
Theory, (Routledge and Keegan Paul, London, 1979), Simon, (1991), pp. 47-51, A. Showstack 
Sassoon, (Ed.), Approaches to Gramsci, (Writers and Readers, London, 1982), the study of philosophy 
Hoare, (1971), pp. 323-77), and on Americansim and Fordism (Hoare, (1971), pp. 277-316).   
 5
three decades, and eventual collapse in 1997/8.  The thesis is premised on the notion 
that Antonio Gramsci’s socio-political theories based upon the crafting of mass 
consciousness through ideology provide a more comprehensive model for explaining 
the rise and fall of the Suharto New Order than the prevailing twin economic and 
political transition crises approach; the twin-crises approach neglects the profound 
influence of consensual societal subordination through the representation of ideology, 
specifically the New Order’s rendering of the state ideology Pancasila, and the 
doctrine’s deep institutionalization of the processes that dominated all aspects of 
Indonesian life.11  Through his social politics of hegemony and hegemonic order, his 
theoretical construct the historic bloc, and his ideas on the use of ideology as an 
enabling discourse to organize hegemonic moral and intellectual legitimacy, Antonio 
Gramsci provides a powerful analytical perspective for such research.   
                     Gramsci’s observations on hegemonic order offer highly useful and 
appropriate insights into explaining the behaviour of the Suharto New Order.  
Gramsci’s theories focus on the processes by which power is shared between those at 
the centre and those on the periphery of socio-political and economic influence but 
what is specific about his model and heightens its relevance in the Indonesian context 
is the essential role he attributes to ideology.  Ideology in the Gramscian schema plays 
a vital validating role in establishing and sustaining processes that rationalize power 
allocation between the centre and the periphery that, on the face of it, is not dissimilar 
to the techniques employed by Suharto’s New Order in representing the state ideology 
Pancasila to legitimize his regime’s authority.  As Fontana puts it, Gramsci provides 
insights into the techniques and machinations of ruling elites as they employ the 
“causatory agents of consensual persuasion legitimized by ideology” and directive 
                                                           
11 Pancasila consists of five principles originally included in the Indonesian constitution of 1945: belief 
in God, a just and civilized humanitarianism, national unity, Indonesian democracy through 
consultation and consensus, and social justice.  The first principle of Pancasila, belief in God, was a 
proclamation of Indonesia as a ‘religious’ state, though not based on any particular faith.  Indonesia 
would be a religious state but not ‘secular’ or ‘Islamic.’  Secularism had been thoroughly discredited by 
its association with communism and in recent years negatively associated with liberal democracy.  The 
second principle called for a just and civilized humanitarianism.  The third principle, national unity, 
demanded that regional and ethnic loyalties be foregone and that allegiance is to the unitary Indonesian 
state.  The fourth principle committed the state to an Indonesian style democracy featuring 
musyawarah (consultation) and mufacat (consensus) representing patterns of behaviour derived from 
traditional Javanese village life.  Being both Islamic terms they assured those wanting an Islamic-
orientated state that their concerns and beliefs would be accommodated within a Pancasila state.  As 
interpreted by both Sukarno and Suharto, the principle argues that Western forms of parliamentary or 
party democracy are incompatible with traditional forms of Indonesian decision-making.  The fifth 
principle, social justice, assumes a goal of economic and social egalitarianism and prosperity for 
Indonesia.  According to the principle, the state exists for the well-being of the collective rather than 
the individual and ideologically justifies a direct role for the state in the national economy.   
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moral and intellectual leadership to establish and sustain their hegemony.12  A ruling 
elite’s use of such processes and techniques are highly relevant to this research 
because they appear to closely match the behaviour of the Suharto New Order in its 
quest for social stability and conformity to underpin its developmental agendas.  
Moreover, the Suharto New Order’s use of Pancasila as the discourse of ideological 
legitimacy by evoking the powerful symbolism of tradition and culture provides an 
important contemporary context in which to test the Gramscian model.  Weighing the 
Gramscian model in the Suharto New Order context also offers valuable insights into 
what would appear to be a legitimate means of arriving at mass cohesion and socio-
political development in the face of potentially problematic ethno-cultural diversity.  
Gramsci’s social politics focus on the domestic realm of culture and ideology as the 
site upon which political contestation takes place and when it becomes necessary to re-
configure and rationalise cultural and political demands he looks to the nature of 
effective ideological leadership in that arena for solutions.13  Prima facie Gramsci’s 
ideologically-based model also offers a relevant methodology for explaining the 
Suharto regime’s rise and fall: it was the New Order’s representation of the state 
ideology as discourse across the sum of Indonesia’s socio-political, economic and 
cultural life that enabled their authority to be established and unite Indonesia’s 
potentially problematic diverse society behind modernization and developmental 
agendas.  While global issues contributed dramatically to domestic economic and 
political crises during the mid-1990s they were, nonetheless, in Gramscian terms, 
secondary and his insights suggest that they should have been countered through 
techniques and processes of hegemonic refurbishment.   
                     Gramsci’s emphasis on the cultural/ideological, formulated in the context 
of early Twentieth Century Italy, may appear dated in the contemporary context but 
the perspective is prima facie highly appropriate to the Suharto New Order where 
elements of the cultural/ideological, carefully crafted by the ruling order, legitimized a 
unified secular-nationalist-development-state approach in the socio-political 
environment of a significant majority Muslim society split by profound theological 
divisions.  Moreover, Gramsci’s insights into a schema by which capitalism could 
survive if not flourish in the modern bourgeoisie democracies he saw blossoming in 
                                                           
12 Benedetto Fontana, Hegemony and Power: on the Relation between Gramsci and Machiavelli, 
(University of Minnesota Press, London, 1990), p. 140.  
13 James Martin, Gramsci’s Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction, (St. Martin’s Press, London, 
1998), p. 166. 
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the industrializing West of his time readily transfer to the post-WW 2 era of Southeast 
Asian capitalist development.14  The political neutrality of his model of hegemonic 
order also continues to be borne out today by its acceptance in right-wing circles as a 
legitimate method by which strong leaderships of modernizing states might gain 
political legitimacy to acquire and hold on to political power.15  As a contemporary 
Gramsci-ist elegantly puts it, the right has seemingly grown comfortable with the array 
of methods used by modern institutions of the state to sustain hegemonic order 
through civil society by “shaping the cognitive and effective structures” through which 
contemporary societies are obliged to perceive and evaluate “problematic social 
reality”.16  The crafting of culture and ideology into an exclusive rendering of 
Pancasila as the official state ideology provided the Suharto New Order with the 
means to influence all aspects of mass socio-political behaviour:  Gramsci’s politics of 
the “newly emergent yet marginalized rather than the powerful and prestigious” where 
everything, including economics and ideology, becomes political, offers highly useful 
insights into understanding the nature of the processes such influence required.17   
                     In the Gramscian schema, the search for hegemonic legitimacy took place 
across the totality of economic, political, and cultural/ideological life.  This research 
therefore needs to establish the extent to which Suharto New Order structures 
processes and behaviour contrasted the Gramscian model of hegemonic order in 
demonstrating legitimacy across each of the regime’s economic, political and 
ideological forms.  The strong ideological orientation of a Gramscian perspective also 
provides a series of useful explanatory processes relevant to the impact of the 
contemporary resurgence of socio-political Islam and the global spread of liberal 
democratic ideals.  Both issues had a profound impact upon Indonesia during the late 
1980s, ultimately challenging the regime’s legitimacy and leading to hegemonic 
obsolescence and the Suharto New Order collapsing in 1998.   
 
 
 
                                                           
14 David McLellan, Marxism after Marx, (McMillan, London, 1998), p. 204. 
15 Rob van Kranenburg, ‘Whose Gramsci?  Right-wing Gramscism’, International Gramsci Society 
Newsletter, March 1999, Number 9, pp. 14-8. 
16 van Kranenburg, (1999), p. 16. 
17 Dante Germino, Antonio Gramsci: Architect of a New Politics, (Louisiana State University Press, 
London, 1990), p. 253. 
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2.  Thesis 
                 It is standard among writers and scholars on the Suharto New Order that 
collapse in 1998 came about through twin crises of economic breakdown, initiated by 
a currency ‘contagion’18 spreading from Thailand in 1996 through Southeast Asia into 
Indonesia from 1997,19 and political collapse following overwhelming mass societal 
demands for economic, political, and human rights reform and regime change.20  New 
Order economic and socio-political cohesion had come under increasing strain during 
                                                           
18 The term ‘contagion’ was employed by various economic analysts to describe the currency and 
banking crisis that swept out of Thailand.  The term usefully described the transmission of the 
corrupting influence of neighbouring currencies contacting each other in the manner of a disease.    
19 Meitzner describes the economic crisis that led to Suharto resigning on 21 May, 1998 as having 
deepened from mid-August 1997 in four phases; first the massive devaluation of the Rupiah in August, 
second, further financial shocks in December 1997 with rumors about Suharto’s failing health, a third 
phase in late February 1998 brought about by massive student reaction to the failing economy, and a 
fourth phase in the first week of May 1998 when the IMF-directed abolition of fuel subsidies triggered 
popular riots in Medan.  Marcus Meitzner, ‘From Suharto to Habibie: the Indonesian Armed Forces 
and political Islam during transition’, in Geoff Forrester, (Ed.), Post-Suharto Indonesia: Renewal or 
Chaos? (Crawford House Publishing, Bathhurst, 1999), pp. 66-76; Michael Vatikiotis, Indonesian 
Politics under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order, (Routledge, London, 1998), pp.xvii-xix; 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 22, May, 4. 11, 18, September, 23, October, 13, 20, November, 18 
December, 1997, (p.70), 22, 29, January, 19, February, 16, April, 1998 (p.59); H. W. Arndt and Hal 
Hill, Southeast Asia’s Economic Crisis: Origins, lessons, and the Way Forward, (Allan and Unwin, 
Singapore, 1999), pp. 16-28; M. T. Daly and M. I. Logan, Reconstructing Asia: The Economic Miracle 
That Never Was, The Future That Is, (RMIT University Press, Melbourne, 1998), pp. 13-22; Clark D. 
Neher, Southeast Asia in the New International Era, (Westview, Oxford, 1999), pp. 113-4; Philippe F. 
Delhaise, Asia in Crisis: The Implosion of the Banking and Finance Systems, (Wiley and Sons, 
Singapore, 1998), pp. 131-141; Francois Godement, The Downsizing of Asia, (Routledge, London, 
1999), pp. 82-91 and pp. 161-2; Andrew MacIntyre, ‘Political Institutions and the Economic Crisis in 
Thailand and Indonesia’, in T. Pemple, The Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis, (Cornell, London, 
1999), pp. 158-60; David Bourchier and Vedi R. Hadiz (Eds), Indonesian Politics and Society: A 
Reader, (Routledge Curzon, London, 2003), pp. 18-21; Ahmad D. Habir, ‘Conglomerates: All in the 
Family?’ in Donald K. Emmerson (Ed), Indonesia Beyond Suharto; Polity, Economy, Society, 
Transition, (M. E. Sharpe, London, 1999), pp. 197-201; Peter Searle, ‘Ethno-religious Conflicts; Rise 
or Decline? Recent Developments in Southeast Asia’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 24, No. 1, 
April 2002, pp. 6-12; Jamie Mackie, ‘Tackling the Chinese Problem’, in Geoff Forrester, (Ed.), Post-
Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos? (Crawford House, Bathurst, 1999), pp. 10-15.   
20 Fear of mass unrest panicked the elites and contributed to both sides of the political establishment 
(power-holders and opposition) withdrawing their support for Suharto.  Young, (1999), p. 76; 
MacLane, ‘Mass Politics and Political Change in Indonesia’, in Arief Budiman, Barbara Hartley, and 
Damien Kingsbury (Eds), Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia, (Monash Asia Institute, 
Clayton, 1999), pp. 239-50.  On the inadequate ‘establishment’ and elite response to the crisis; Max 
Lane, ‘Mass Politics and Political Change in Indonesia’, Budiman, Hartley and Kingsbury, (1999), 
pp.240-250; Watson, (2002), pp. 120-1; Vincent Boudreau, ‘Diffusing Democracy? People Power in 
Indonesia and the Philippines’, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 31, No. 4, 1999, pp. 3-18; 
Young, (1999), pp. 70-73; Walters, (1999), p.60; Metzner, (1999), pp. 85-7; Hara, (2001), p. 320.  For 
the politics of the crisis see MacIntyre, (1999), pp. 143-162; FEER, 12 February, 1998, pp. 16-7, 14 
May, 1998, pp. 22-4; Daly and Logan, (1998), p. 21; Delhaise, (1998), p. 136-7; Godement, (1999), p. 
162-4; Vatikiotis, (1998), pp. 218-232; Bourchier and Hadiz, (2003), pp. 278-283; R. William Liddle, 
‘Regime: The New Order’, in Donald K. Emmerson (Ed), Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, 
Society and Transition, (M. E. Sharpe, London, 1999), pp. 68-70; editorial, Jakarta Post, 8 January, 
1998; Edward Aspinall, ‘The broadening base of political opposition in Indonesia’, in Gary Rodan 
(Ed), Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia, (Routledge, London, 1996), pp. 228-231; J. 
Kristiadi, ‘The Future Role of ABRI in Politics’, in Geoff Forrester (Ed), Post-Soeharto Indonesia: 
Renewal or Chaos? (Crawford House, Bathurst, 1999), pp. 55-06. 
 9
the previous decade21 from demands for regime change and economic and socio-
political reform and these issues contributed to the regime’s eventual collapse in 1998.  
The catalyst for economic failure was the Thai currency ‘contagion’ stimulating a 
growing economic crisis in Indonesia from early 1996, reinforcing the socio-political 
unpopularity of the Suharto regime and ultimately leading to the end of the Suharto 
New Order with his resignation in 1998.  On their own these events neither adequately 
nor fully explain the failure of the Suharto regime after three decades of domination, 
relative social stability, and economic progress.  This thesis argues that the failure of 
the ‘twin-crises’ theme to adequately explain what occurred is that prevailing views do 
not take into account vital factors of ideology and culture and their use in crafting 
consensual mass subordination, specifically the significance and influence of the New 
Order regime’s representation of the state ideology Pancasila as an instrument of 
hegemonic discourse to legitimize its nation-building agendas.  The prevailing twin-
crises explanation therefore neglects the profound role ideology played over some 
thirty years in morally and intellectually legitimizing New Order hegemony and 
enabling socio-political stability and a high level of socio-political and economic 
development.  This thesis examines the argument that the twin-crises approach does 
not adequately address the shortcomings in the New Order’s representation of 
ideology and its contribution to the circumstances that led to Suharto resigning and 
proposes that it is to Gramsci and his model of hegemonic order that we should turn 
for a more comprehensive explanation.     
                     Antonio Gramsci’s social politics dynamically link ideology and culture 
to creating and sustaining regime hegemonic legitimacy and this thesis tests his 
approach in the context of the socio-political events that reached their cataclysmic 
conclusion in Indonesia during 1997/8.  Explaining the rise and fall of the Suharto 
                                                           
21 For the origins of the economic crisis in the late 1980s and subsequent calls for market reform and 
deregulation see: Soestrato, (1998), p. 853; A. MacIntyre (Ed), Business and Government in 
Industrialising Asia, (Allen and Unwin, St., Leonards, 1994), pp. 11-2; Richard Robison, ‘Politics and 
Markets in Indonesia’s Post-oil Era’, in Gray Rodan, Kevin Hewison and Richard Robison (Eds), The 
Political Economy of Southeast Asia: An Introduction, (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1997), 
pp. 34-63; Anthony Rowley, ‘Who’s who in Jakarta?’ FEER, 1 September, 1987, pp. 72-3; Soestrato, 
(1989), pp. 858-9; Richard Borsuk, ‘Markets: The Limits of Reform’, in Donald K. Emmerson, 
Indonesia Beyond Suharto; Polity, Economy, Society, Transition, (M. E. Sharpe, London, 1999), pp. 
140-2; H. W. Arndt and Hal Hill, Southeast Asia’s Economic Crisis: Origins, Lessons and the Way 
Forward, (Allen and Unwin, Singapore, 1999), p. 16; Neher, (1999), pp. 110-112; Delhaise, (1998), 
pp. 129-131; David Martin Jones, Political Development in Pacific Asia, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 
1997), pp. 122-128; Vatikiotis, (1998), pp. 138-189; Habir, (1999), pp. 183-197; Richard Borsuk, 
‘Markets; the Limits of Reform’ in Donald K. Emmerson (Ed), Indonesia Beyond Suharto; Polity, 
Economy, Society and Transition, (M. E. Sharpe, London, 1999), pp. 136-67; editorial Republika, 30 
March, 1998.  
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New Order using Gramsci’s acute sensitivity to the relationship between culture, 
ideology, hegemony, counter-hegemony and the phenomenon of mass consciousness 
over a distinct historic period offers a means of prioritizing domestic and cultural 
factors that tend to be neglected in the simplistic twin-crises approach that over 
emphasizes external global factors.22  Gramsci’s socio-politics of hegemonic 
construction, containment, and challenge and, in particular the vital role of ideology as 
a ‘binding glue’23 of socio-political unity to institutionalize and legitimize class 
domination and societal cohesion (Gramsci’s ‘historic bloc’),24 offers the ideal model 
against which to contrast the rise and fall of the Suharto New Order in the face of 
socio-political and economic challenge.  The research centres on Gramsci’s notion that 
hegemonic continuance requires ongoing reaffirmation of moral and intellectual 
leadership constantly readdressed on the basis of new and changing patterns of socio-
political and economic alliances that responded to change.  In Gramsci’s analysis, a 
hegemonic order must remain prepared and able to reconstruct itself when challenged 
by new socio-political circumstances and new realities.   
                     As well as renegotiating and re-balancing societal forces and alliances, a 
crisis of regime hegemony (in the face of a latent counter-hegemony) suggests 
hegemonic obsolescence or decay and requires what Gramsci describes as ideological 
refurbishment through re-articulating a regime’s ideological legitimacy.25  To 
Gramsci, a class cannot achieve or maintain its hegemonic position if it confines itself 
merely to its own class interests; it must go outside immediate self interest and attract 
to its cause “popular and democratic aspirations” through ideological persuasion 
which might in itself demand the re-adjustment and re-negotiation of both intra-regime 
                                                           
22 Carl Boggs, ‘What Gramsci Means Today’, in Douglas Dowd, (Ed.), Understanding Capitalism: 
Critical Analysis From Karl Marx to Amartya Sen, (Pluto Press, London, 2002), pp. .57-8. 
23 Esteve Morera, Gramsci’s Historicism; A Realist Perspective, (Harvester Wheatshaft, London, 
1990), p. 190. 
24 A Gramscian ‘historic bloc’ represents the hegemonic activity of a historic period during which the 
economic affairs of Marx’s ‘structure’ and the politics and ideology of his ‘superstructure’ overlap into 
an organic system of social alliances held together by a common ideology and a common culture.  As 
such, the ‘historic bloc’, an analytical construct comprising three overlapping forms (its economic, 
political, and ideological), represents hegemonic order in which a ruling class ‘leads’ its allies and 
supporters while ‘dominating’ its opponents.  Without the element of consent implied in leadership, 
society is left with no ‘ethico-political’ direction but is merely under a form of ‘precarious domination’ 
that is continually , and disharmoniously, questioned by those dominated.  The Gramscian historic bloc 
is explained in further detail in Chapter 1, section 1.7, pp. 37-39.  Luciano Pellicani, Gramsci: An 
Alternative Communism? (Hoover Institute Press, Stanford, 1981), pp. 31-2; Anne Showstack Sassoon, 
Gramsci’s Politics, (Croom Helm, London, 1980), pp. 121-2.  
25 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, translated by Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith, (Eds.), (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1977), pp. 180-3.  
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and top down key societal alliances.26  Power relations in the context of regime 
hegemony generally necessitate some kind of societal trade-offs but an emergent 
counter-hegemony would not necessarily require, as Chantel Mouffe puts it, replacing 
the hegemonic order’s world-view with a “completely new” one.27  In the context of 
the Suharto New Order, faced as it was with a crisis of moral and intellectual 
legitimacy, a transformation of existing ideological elements would have sufficed had 
those processes been adequate to address and ameliorate the economic and socio-
political challenges of the 1990s by offering a more inclusive re-articulation of the 
state ideology Pancasila.  The necessary socio-political and economic concessions on 
the face of it appear to have been deemed unacceptable to regime agendas and in 
particular Suharto’s continued Presidency.   
                       From a Gramscian perspective, countering the serious crisis of 
hegemony that confronted the New Order during the 1990s (and catalyzed the twin 
economic and political crises) required re-balancing political forces and ideologies 
with a concurrent restructuring of the relevant state institutions.  Gramsci’s insights 
shed light on whether it was the regime leadership’s inability to do so that resulted in 
the New Order bloc failing to reinvigorate and thus sustain itself before ultimately 
collapsing.28  The state’s exclusive possession of the state ideology Pancasila had set 
the necessary ideological arrangements in place but this thesis will determine whether 
the regime’s profound inability to carry out the essential Gramscian function of 
renegotiation and refurbishment through ideological persuasion and assimilation to 
counter new and challenging socio-political circumstances ultimately proved 
disastrous for Suharto.  Rather than the overly simple blame attached to twin economic 
and political crises, Gramsci’s theories on hegemonic refurbishment will be used to 
establish the extent to which it was the New Order’s unsuccessful ideological 
responses to both the economic crisis from early 1996, and demands for reformasi dan 
demokrasi from the early 1990s, that effectively catalyzed the circumstances of 
Suharto’s resignation in 1998.     
                                                           
26 Roger Simon, Gramsci’s Political Thought: An Introduction, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 
1991), p. 43.  It is within these systems of alliances, called by Gramsci the ‘historic bloc’ that 
hegemony resides.   
27 Chantal Mouffe, ‘Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci’ in Mouffe, (Ed.), Gramsci and Marxist 
Theory, (Routledge, London, 1979), pp. 168-204.  Aroel Heryanto, ‘Indonesian middle-class 
opposition in the 1990s’ in Gray Rodan, (Ed,), Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia, 
(Routledge, London, 1996), p. 241. 
28 Hoare and Nowell Smith, (1991), p. 30.  
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                     The economic crisis that struck Southeast Asia in 1997 catalyzed an 
unravelling of the New Order’s socio-political and economic legitimacy but it is 
necessary, for a full understanding of their effects, to consider both external and 
domestic factors when examining their impact on the Suharto New Order.  While an 
onslaught of global market forces and predatory global capital speculation clearly 
contributed to Indonesia’s financial crisis, it was the domestic realities of minimal 
financial transparency, cronyism, and nepotism, contradicting the legitimizing 
egalitarian tenets of a Pancasila-ist economy that were largely responsible for the 
Indonesian economy’s subsequent vulnerability.  The global spread of liberal 
democratic ideals and emergent international socio-political Islam from the late 1980s 
also compromised the legitimizing tenets of the New Order’s representation of 
Pancasila demokrasi.  Both elements of the twin-crises approach therefore invite 
consideration in Gramscian terms of the New Order’s rendering of Pancasila and its 
derivatives suffering hegemonic obsolescence and suggesting the regime was loosing 
its ideological legitimacy.    
                   Hilley points out that Gramscian hegemonic discourse is essentially a 
nation-building artifice and this thesis argues that the Suharto New Order’s 
representation of Pancasila as state ideology performed precisely this nation-building 
function.29  As a genuine representation of the national-popular will ideology’s appeal 
to hegemonic legitimacy lies primarily in its response to internal demands.  Over some 
thirty years the Suharto New Order maintained a strong sense of popular association 
between the ideas of collective egalitarian economic development and a Pancasila-ist 
economy, unity/societal stability in ethnic diversity, Pancasila as an ideologically-
unifying discourse, and the political egalitarianism implied in Pancasila demokrasi.  It 
is questionable whether the two of Pancasila’s five pillars of moral and intellectual 
legitimacy directly relevant to the regime’s economic and political forms met their 
intentions.  ‘Pillar’ four, Mufacat demokrasi, that implied unanimous, consensual 
democracy, required an emphasis on consultation and consensus, while pillar five, 
Kesejahtaraan social, called for prosperity through equitable economic and social 
development.   
                    Gramsci warned that hegemony must never be taken for granted and this 
thesis questions whether failure in these terms defined the short-comings and ultimate 
                                                           
29 Hilley, (2001), p. 6. 
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failure of the regime.  Questioning ideological failure (in terms of Pancasila as 
Gramscian hegemonic discourse ideologically legitimizing hegemonic order) as a 
comprehensive explanation for the demise of the Suharto New Order must therefore 
not only explore hegemony’s internal (or domestic) shortcomings but also examine 
hegemony’s shortcomings in coming to terms with hitherto quite unexpected external 
challenges.  While greatly enhanced by an Islamic global revival during the 1980s 
heightened Islamic consciousness came, to a great extent, from a new Muslim middle-
class having benefited from thirty years of New Order’ economic development and 
education agendas coming to question Pancasila’s secular basis for the Indonesian 
state.  Demands for political reform, inspired by Western notions of liberal democracy 
and human rights, applied external standards that were adopted to challenge the 
regime’s exclusive use of ideology and employed to capture the language of Pancasila 
its self in legitimizing calls for demokrasi reformasi.  Externally imposed challenges 
thus became internalized and from the late-1980s provoked growing contradictions 
between the appropriateness of Western liberal democratic notions of political 
participation, open markets and human rights on the one hand, and Islam as practiced 
through Pancasila in Indonesia on the other.   
  
3.  The themes and issues 
3.1  Regime political survival in Southeast Asia   
                  Since 1945 Asia has experienced civil war, armed insurgency, coup d’etat, 
regional rebellion, revolution, and considerable ethno-religious unrest, with regimes 
and political systems throughout the region remaining under constant challenge.  
Muthiah Alagappa observed that regime concern with political survival in Asian 
countries has required adopting a more internalized approach towards security to 
prioritize socio-political stability.30  Colonial rule destroyed traditional systems of rule 
so Western political ideas were called upon to guide the de-colonisation phase with 
variants of democracy, socialism, and communism providing rallying points from 
which to challenge regimes that were in turn obliged to seek popular legitimacy 
through international support and economic development.31  It is hardly surprising that 
political survival became a prime security concern and to achieve political authority 
                                                           
30 Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, (Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 1998), pp. 611-6. 
31 Alagappa (1998) p. 616. 
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national elites were obliged to pursue national unity, political stability, societal 
harmony and law and order, if they were to protect incumbent political systems and 
governments.32  With national identity and political legitimacy under persistent 
contestation the problem of political survival required addressing such issues as the 
appropriate political organization of the state, how to hold ruling regimes together, and 
how to maintain socio-political acquiescence and stability.  Political elites came to 
view regime survival and economic prosperity as intimately related and were prepared 
to permit limited forms of democratic participation even though the major threat to 
political survival tended to come from the competing political and socio-cultural 
values that popular political participation enabled.  Because of their adverse 
consequences for regime agendas that relied upon political stability for economic 
development, as well as the challenges they posed to the political legitimacy of the 
incumbent elite, overly liberal political ideas and human rights came to be viewed as a 
prime threat to political survival.33   
              It is hardly surprising a highly developed form of political system that 
comprised elements of democracy balanced with a solid contribution of 
authoritarianism, evolved in Southeast Asia, with the limited form of democracy 
allowed by the region’s political elites, to borrow from Walzer, little more than the 
minimum required to legitimise the political allocation of power.34  Mahathir 
Mohammed of Malaysia and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore strongly defended political 
systems based on minimal open political participation as a distinct improvement on the 
form of liberal democracy practiced in the West where the needs of the individual 
tended to be placed above those of the group and by implication detrimental to the 
broader interests of society.35  In their view a strong state should not be feared so long 
as it is united behind egalitarian political and economic development in an 
environment of socio-political stability or, as Gramsci would put it, by a hegemony 
that can lay claim to an intellectual and moral legitimacy based on national consensus 
to mass subordination.  Even when the collective is emphasised over individual rights 
(or a strengthening of individual rights) to enhance ideological legitimacy, there needs 
                                                           
32 Alagappa (1998) p. 625. 
33 Alagappa (1998) p. 682-3. 
34 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality, (Basin, New York, 1983) 
p. 310. 
35 There is a general belief among Southeast Asian political leaders – regularly voiced – that the 
individualism of Western democracy has contributed to a wide range of serious social problems in 
those countries. 
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to be a subtle balance of the two.  While there was considerable dialogue about Asian-
style democracy from the late-1980s (and Pancasila demokrasi was its Indonesian 
variant) the financial crisis of 1997 clearly demonstrated the fragility of soft-
authoritarian rule and the irrelevance of any so-called Asian way.  The crisis and its 
aftermath also showed how ill-equipped soft-authoritarian regimes were in containing 
the mass socio-political forces that arose out of economic trauma following decades of 
inequitable growth.   
                The spread of capitalism that followed World War 2 was not paralleled by 
an emergence of liberal democracy among the post-colonial societies of the Third 
World.  In the case of Indonesia, capitalist development was driven by what Robison 
described as a “military bureaucratic state”.36  Successful economic and social 
development did not commence in Indonesia until General Suharto’s authoritarian 
New Order regime established itself in 1967 and determined that national stability 
needed to be enforced as an essential prerequisite to economic development.  Robison 
credits the Indonesian New Order ruling elite with the capitalist transformation of the 
Indonesian economy and a prime purpose of this thesis is to examine the proposal that 
a Gramscian perspective comprehensively describes the processes by which the New 
Order underwrote its authority through the infusion of a moral and intellectual 
legitimizing ideology into an all-embracing socio-political culture that effectively 
stabilized and unified the nation behind Indonesia’s successful capitalist evolution.37  
                    The socio-political power of Suharto’s New Order military bureaucratic 
state emanated essentially from its ability to appropriate the power of bureaucratic 
office to control and determine market access for the benefit of favoured elites.38  To 
solidify its preferred arrangement of Indonesian life, from its assumption of power in 
1967, the New Order empowered a hegemonic duality of socio-political resources 
(organic intellectuals) that Herbert Feith most usefully describes in his analysis of 
Indonesian post-independence social politics as ‘administrators’ and ‘solidarity-
makers’.39  The binding glue of moral and intellectual authority necessary to legitimize 
                                                           
36 Richard Robison, ‘Toward a Class Analysis of the Indonesian Bureaucratic State,’ in Indonesia, 
Number 25, April, 1978, p. 17. 
37 Robison, (1978), p. 17. 
38 Robison, (1978), p. 18. 
39 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, (Cornell University Press, 
New York, 1962), pp. 24-5.  Feith ‘s ‘administrators’ are those whose administrative, legal, technical 
and financial skills are necessary for the running of a modern state and qualify them to take charge of 
the highest levels of state service.  Also included within the category are those military personal 
necessary for the tasks of military organization and strategy.  His ‘solidarity-makers’ are those with the 
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the New Order’s subsequent domination of Indonesian society derived, on the one 
hand, from the solidarity-maker’s exclusive representation of the state ideology 
Pancasila and, on the other, they and the administrators’ effective balancing of state 
coercion with societal co-operation and consensus to attain prime socio-political 
agendas.  Until the ideological challenges of the early 1990s, President Suharto not 
only remained the omnipotent head of the solidarity-making elites, but his symbol 
wielders were able to sustain pre-eminent authority over the administrative techno-
bureaucratic civil and military classes.      
                     
3.2  Indonesia and liberal democracy 
                          Both General Sukarno (upon independence) and General Suharto 
(following Sukarno’s ousting in 1967) took power aware that stability and cohesion 
among Indonesia’s plethora of conflicting cultural and value interests required firm 
socio-political control.  Serious doubts existed among Indonesia’s elites as to the 
practicality of liberal democracy in the Indonesian context so neither Sukarno nor 
Suharto gave it high priority in their visions of a future Indonesia.  The modernist 
Islamic political party (PAN) leader Amien Rais’ statement in 1998 that he included 
among Indonesia’s five national assets the “manageability of the Indonesian people by 
their leaders” says much about elite perceptions as to whether the Indonesian masses 
might be capable of making the rational choices implied by Western-style liberal 
democratic participation.40  The Islamic scholar’s observation moreover tends to 
vindicate Islam’s traditional guidance to the faithful that they obey Allah’s Messenger 
and “those charged with authority” amongst God’s followers rather than the more 
modern exhortations of a secular-nationalist orientated leadership.41  Rais’ comment 
may have appeared a little glib, but represents a further key theme of the thesis by 
reflecting the reality of behaviour and consciousness among Indonesia’s 
predominantly Islamic masses.    
             Indonesia’s only experience with liberal democracy before Suharto’s 
resignation in 1998 occurred during the 1950s and ended in abject failure when 
                                                                                                                                                                          
integrative skills of symbol manipulation, ideological persuasion, cultural mediation and mass 
organization able to exercise leadership on the basis of traditional and/or charismatic authority.  The 
category includes those able to craft mass ideological consciousness and those authorized to determine 
military doctrine.     
40 Jakarta Post, August 3, 1998. 
41 Dr. H. Tarmizi Taher, quoting the Qur’an (al-Nisa ’59) in Aspiring for the Middle Path: Religious 
Harmony in Indonesia, (Center for the Study of Islam and Society, Jakarta, 1997) p. 122.  
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parliament proved incapable of resolving the two major issues of the time - the 
relationship between Islam and the state, and the elite division of state authority.42  
Following Indonesia’s unsuccessful 1950s’ experiment with democracy, party politics 
submitted to President Sukarno’s ‘guided democracy’ (Demokrasi Terimpin or more 
accurately ‘democracy with leadership’) and then passed, via a bloody transition, to 
General Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime and three decades of systematic 
mass depoliticisation.  Issues of political participation, political Islam, and the unitary 
nature of the state, that remained unresolved following the failure of democracy during 
the 1950s required constant management by the New Order state and remain largely 
unresolved today.  These issues also represent a dominant theme throughout the thesis.   
                Rarely have notions of democracy (notwithstanding that there does not 
appear to exist any single democratic standard) been successfully transferred to 
Southeast Asia.43  From their studies of democratic transition in the former Soviet 
Union, that compare notions of democracy in the East with those of the West, 
Biryukov and Sergeyev argue that democracy can only really be understood in terms 
of the meaning ascribed to it by empowered political agents and not simply by 
references to some “abstractly-defined criteria or indices”.44  To be fair to Indonesia’s 
conservative ruling order, and borrowing from David Hume, elites really want no 
more than sufficient political stability to protect their interests, and realize that too 
much political freedom can simply lead to an upsurge of grass-roots’ political activity 
and inevitable socio-political chaos.45  In this view too much political freedom has the 
socio-political consequence of unleashing Dewiel’s “value pluralism”.46  Hara 
suggests that Indonesia’s recent democratic/regime transition process saw a series of 
compromises taking place between authoritarian and democratic elements of the elite 
that effectively tempered the number of ‘value options’ available and that the potential 
for socio-political chaos was only successfully limited by a multiplicity of powerful 
                                                           
42 This dilemma has carried over into the 21st Century and the post-Suharto era of regime transition, 
and seen an overlapping and continuing struggle between social and political forces over how the 
‘power’ carried over from the openly discredited New Order might be re-apportioned in the new era.   
43 Damien Kingsbury, Southeast Asia: A Political Profile, (Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 43. 
44 David Beetham, (Ed.), Defining and Measuring Democracy, (Sage, London, 1994), Nokolai 
Biryukov and Victor Sergeyev, ‘The Idea of Democracy in the East and in the West,’ pp. 182-199.  
45 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, (Clarendon, Oxford, [1740] 1978), III:ii: p. 9. 
46 Boris DeWiel, Democracy: A History of Ideas, (UBC Press, Vancouver, 2000),  pp. 3-10.  As 
democracy is all about dicensus and fractiousness, and is inherently conflictual, DeWiel argues a value 
pluralism thesis that focuses on the political implications of the various groups that make up society in 
conflict with each other over their values and ideas about the common good.  To put it in his words, 
“value pluralism is the theory that the expanding culture of modernity provides each of us with shared 
conceptions of the good but that these conceptions are irreconcilable.”  (p. 4.) 
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groups and individuals sharing a willingness to accommodate each others interests.47  
Democratic transition turned out to be all about sectoral and political elites, against a 
background of political and economic chaos, successfully mobilizing overlapping 
values and interests to their best interests and removing their support from President 
Suharto.  While pluralism must necessarily recognize the legitimacy and commonality 
of values, priorities inevitably differ and it is generally from within ideology and 
culture that the ultimate conflicts about shared values are found and resolved.  The 
fractiousness and disensus that continues to characterize politics in contemporary 
Indonesia remain largely ideological reflecting the differing values ideology represents 
in that diverse society.  Thus a prominent theme of this thesis is that understanding the 
twin crises of economic breakdown and democratic transition that led to Suharto’s 
resignation and the end of his New Order requires understanding the range of value 
and interest group conflicts that have bedevilled Indonesian society since 
independence.   
 
4.  An analytical framework for the thesis 
                     The twin interests of Antonio Gramsci and General Suharto’s New Order 
regime form the central themes of this thesis.  The inadequacy of conventional 
commentary in accounting for the rise and fall of the New Order gives rise to a more 
comprehensive framework of analysis heavily based on the use of ideology as mass 
discourse.  More sympathetic to the role ideological control played in formulating, 
sustaining (and ultimately failing) New Order domination, Gramsci’s analysis of 
hegemonic order, prima facie, offers a powerful and more comprehensive analysis and 
explanation of both the rise and the fall of Suharto’s New Order.  It is to this analysis 
that this thesis now turns starting, in the following chapter, with an outline of Gramsci 
and his contribution to a framework of political analysis with which to contrast the 
behaviour and ultimate failings exhibited by the Suharto New Order.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
47 Abubakar Hara, ‘The Difficult Journey of Democratisation in Indonesia,’ Contemporary Southeast 
Asia, Vol. 23, No. 2, August 2001, p. 309. 
 19
 
The Suharto New Order and Pancasila: the dialogue of 
ideological legitimacy 
Chapter 1 
 
Antonio Gramsci and the thesis 
 
 
                     This chapter sets out and details key aspects of Gramsci’s political 
theory for testing in a contemporary setting - the Suharto New Order as an example of 
Gramscian hegemonic order.  The chapter then draws attention to John Hilley’s recent 
thoughtful analysis of the Mahathirist ‘bloc’ in neighbouring Malaysia.  Hilley’s 
project employs a Gramscian hegemonic perspective that focuses on political 
legitimacy and the use of ideological discourse to balance class interests in response 
to counter-hegemonic forces.48  By explaining the reshaping of Malaysian state-class 
alignments using the Gramscian historic bloc’s analytically constructed “typology of 
economic, political and ideological forms” Hilley’s critique of Mahatharism provides 
a perspective pertinent to this study of the Indonesian New Order.49  The chapter 
concludes with an outline of the thesis structure highlighting the main insights and 
proposals from the Gramscian model to be tested in the subsequent chapters as to 
whether the model’s predictions are relevant to the Indonesian context.  As discussed 
above50 while Gramsci’s thoughts were developed in the context of post-World War 1 
Italy his model, formulated in an environment of elite-driven industrialisation and 
modernisation and ideological control, advances significant explanatory insights.    
                     This research is primarily informed by the four key elements that 
underpin Antonio Gramsci’s socio-political theories: his concept of hegemony; the 
notion of the historic (or power) bloc; the role of the Gramscian intellectual in 
maintaining moral and intellectual legitimacy by disseminating ideology into the mass 
consciousness on behalf of the dominating class, and the phenomenon of potential 
                                                           
48 John Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism, Hegemony and the New Opposition, (Zed Books, London, 
2001). 
49 Hilley, (2001), p. 14. 
50 Introduction, section 1, p. 3.  
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counter-hegemony.  It is first necessary to explain the essence of the Gramscian 
political theory and his points of departure from Marxist theory.   
 
1.  Gramsci’s contribution   
1.1  Gramsci and ideological legitimacy 
                   Enquiring into the processes of Suharto New Order consolidation, 
continuity, and disintegration, from the Western-orientated perspective of Italian 
Marxist critic Antonio Gramsci, requires examining the means of allocating power 
between those at the centre and those on the periphery of socio-political and economic 
agendas, and the essential role played by ideology in establishing and sustaining the 
legitimacy of those means.  Employing Gramsci’s notions of hegemony through 
ideological legitimacy to explain the Indonesian political imbroglio requires 
contrasting the Suharto New Order’s arrangement of Indonesian life with the 
Gramscian model of hegemonic order across an historic period.  While the relevant 
theoretical aspects of Gramsci’s social politics are explained in detail below, it is 
sufficient to point out at this stage that Gramsci refers to the historical process of 
hegemony as an ‘historic bloc’ comprising three essential overlapping and mutually 
inclusive hegemonic components of political, economic, and ideological forms.  
Because of the critical importance Gramsci applied to ideology in crafting mass 
consciousness to underwrite moral and intellectual legitimacy, the ideological form of 
the bloc becomes most crucial in that it presents the discursive processes by which 
societal acceptance is sought to legitimize class hegemony.  As it provided the 
hegemonic discourse through which the Suharto regime crafted mass consciousness to 
its moral and intellectual legitimacy, and thus its hegemony, the state ideology 
Pancasila therefore represents a central feature of this thesis.    
                     The explanatory utility of the Gramscian model as a contrast to the 
dominant twin-crises approach of economic breakdown and regime transition is that it 
appears to provide coherent emphasis on the issues of cultural and ideological (and 
therefore religious) diversity and mitigating their potential for socio-political chaos.  
Through a schema that evaluates ideological moral and intellectual legitimacy, the 
Gramscian model contrasts the externally-orientated twin-crises approach by 
explaining the rise and fall of the Suharto New Order in terms of institutionalizing 
hegemonic order, processes of hegemonic challenge, maintenance and crisis and, 
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finally, the success or failure of attempts to re-constitute ideologically class 
arrangements to sustain regime legitimacy.  In so doing, the perspective also contrasts 
the twin-crises approach by placing priority on domestic factors rather than external 
influences largely outside the control of the state.   
                    
1.2  Gramsci and the Suharto New Order  
                   After watching his dream of an Italian Marxist-Leninist revolution crushed 
by the Fascists, Italian Marxist critic and political scientist, Antonio Gramsci, spent 
the rest of his short life in Mussolini’s prisons analyzing the failure.  His focus turned 
to finding a place for ideology that he could tie closely to culture within a Marxist 
understanding of political economy and was drawn to the relationship between 
political culture, mass social consciousness and behaviour, ideology, and sustaining 
power in the face of the multiplicity of conflicting values which he saw as tending to 
characterize modern pluralist societies.51  Gramsci’s subsequent approach to societal 
arrangement and order offers an important and practical political theory for explaining 
the type of multi-ethnic setting in post-independence Indonesia.   
                       Gramsci’s political arrangement presents a form of post-liberal 
democratic theory that Golding suggests moves beyond the historical tensions that 
exist between the ideals of liberalism and democracy and the ballot-box mathematics 
that tend to pre-occupy modern social democrats.52  His work and thought links 
pluralism and political participation with ideological supremacy and as well as 
deepening and expanding liberal-democratic ideology, as Laclau and Mouffe put it, 
also offers “radical and plural outcomes more attuned to the modern age”.53  By 
focusing on the particular problems of class dynamics during an historical process of 
socio-political development, transformation, and political crisis, Gramsci shifts 
analysis from Marxism’s “hegemony of the proletariat” to the “hegemony of the 
bourgeoisie.”54  As well as explaining the machinations of elite regimes in achieving 
and maintaining domination over the “uniquely fluid power imbalances” that represent 
                                                           
51 David Forgacs, (Ed.), An Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings, 1916-1935, (Schocken Books, 
New York, 1988). 
52 Sue Golding, Gramsci’s Democratic Theory: Contributions to a Post-Liberal Democracy, 
(University of Toronto Press, London, 1992), pp. 123-4. 
53 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics, (Verso, London, 1985), pp. 176-78, and pp. 192-3.  They do not use the term 
‘radical’ in its classical meaning as ‘revolution’ as that would be incompatible with the plurality and 
‘opening’ which democracy requires.  ‘Radical’ in this context implies ‘dramatic change’. 
54 Christine Buci-Glucksman, Gramsci and the State, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1980), p. 47. 
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socio-political reality in complex pluralist modernizing societies, the Gramscian model 
also offers meaningful insights into understanding mass response to the agendas of 
such socially-diverse, ethico-political, arrangements as the Suharto New Order’s 
response to ideological challenge.55   
                    While Gramsci attributes his original understanding of the concept of 
hegemony to Lenin, his relevance to contemporary theory is his extension of the term 
well beyond its original use and attaching to it a practical understanding of the idea of 
moral and intellectual leadership through ideological persuasion.  Femia suggests 
Gramsci was the first Marxist thinker to address with sensitivity the historical impact 
of “ideologies and consciousness” upon political economy because no one prior to 
Gramsci saw any point in “delving into the intricacies of mass psychology.”56  By 
focusing on hegemony’s cultural and moral features the Gramscian project is able to 
present a conceptual understanding of an intellectual/ideological schema that addresses 
the key issue of assimilating subordinate groups of varying degrees of ideological 
sympathy into a dominant order.  Thus, Gramsci’s advanced understanding of 
hegemony provides an analytical concept to explain how a dominant class striving for 
socio-political legitimacy attains and sustains domination over subordinate groups in a 
modernizing industrialized society through its exclusive rendering of ideology.57   
                   Gramsci’s concept of hegemonic order offers a modern theory of social 
politics built upon power in three specific ways.  Because an emergent leadership 
group lacking the consent of its people is unlikely to achieve hegemony he first used 
the concept of power to describe the leadership of an historic bloc as an historical 
process of power acquisition that negotiated solidarity both within the elite group itself 
and then between it and other sympathetic, yet subordinate, groups.  His understanding 
of hegemonic class domination also describes the various forms of social control (the 
balanced combination of coercion and consensus) available to the dominant social 
class.  His approach to the question of hegemonic domination thus differentiates two 
separate modes of socio-political control; the function of domination as physical 
coercion and the function of “hegemonic direction” as ideological power derived 
                                                           
55 Golding, (1992), p.viii and pp. 123-4.  
56 Joseph Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary 
Process, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981) p. 57. 
57 Paul Ransome, Antonio Gramsci: A New Introduction, (Harvestor Wheatshaft, London, 1992) p. 138. 
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through consensus and political support.58  Gramsci used the concept further, and in a 
way that is prima facie particularly relevant to the late-Suharto era of socio-political 
challenge and economic crisis, by concluding that when hegemonic challenge occurs 
in response to the exigencies of changing mass ideological consciousness, it does so 
broadly across the “political and intellectual terrain” of the legitimate institutions of 
civil society.59  Gramsci’s historic bloc as a hegemonic construct is therefore as much 
political and ideological as it is economic.60   
                     Gramsci’s relevance to understanding the challenges to New Order 
domination from demands for broader political participation and mass calls for 
demokrasi dan reformasi during the decade leading to Suharto’s resignation is 
twofold.  First is the importance Gramsci placed upon the moral and intellectual 
(ideological) arrangements that occur in modern capitalist societies through power 
structures and processes, and the second is the implications for hegemony in failing to 
sustain critical socio-political alliances and mutual interests by assimilating 
subordinate interests from below.  Gramsci’s attention to the socio-political use of 
ideology in sustaining domination through the structures of state, civil society, and the 
economy, highlights the particular relevance of his model to an explanation of the rise 
and fall of the Suharto New Order regime.  Gramsci’s thoughts are also relevant in 
terms of assessing the likelihood of a coherent counter-hegemony evolving during the 
1990s to challenge Suharto’s domination.  In this context, Gramsci’s theories draw 
attention to attempts by oppositional traditional intellectuals from both Islam and 
secular-nationalism to contest the New Order’s exclusive albeit unifying 
representation and meaning of Pancasila to solidify around an alternative, potentially 
cohesive, counter-hegemonic rendering of ideology. 
                  Thus although Gramsci’s Marxist critique was framed by the socio-
political environment of 1920s and 1930s Italy his thoughts were heavily influenced 
by observations of the challenges that confront state-building and cultural unification 
when modernizing states endeavoured to respond to dynamic mass politics.  
Constructing a unitary Indonesian republic on a foundation of societal stability and 
economic growth (through an authoritarian-developmental regime employing the 
unifying ideological doctrinaire of a device such as Pancasila) would seem to sit 
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comfortably upon Gramsci’s intellectual and political terrain.  Moreover, the crisis of 
hegemony that he attributed to the mass politics of challenge was starkly apparent in 
the political scrambling and realignment of interests and values that took place among 
Indonesia’s socio-political elites during the 1990s as establishment interests came to 
contemplate a post-Suharto environment of potential socio-political chaos.   
                   Two factors are important in explaining how the Suharto New Order 
dominated Indonesian society for three decades.  First, the regime determined from the 
outset that socio-political and economic development could not be achieved without 
strict societal control and stability and concluded that control could be achieved 
through legitimate socio-political structures and processes.  The regime also realized 
that creating durable devices would require arrangements among all of Indonesian 
society’s relevant interest groups.  The resulting hegemonic pact of dominance over 
society allied, negotiated, and regularly adjusted key elite interests as well as the 
masses around the sanctity of Pancasila as an instrument of ideological unity.  While 
Gramsci was conscious of Italian middle class fears of mass mobilization and 
working-class revolution during the post-WW1 decades, the Indonesian ruling elites of 
the post-independence era similarly distrusted grass-roots political mobilization.  
While the Italian middle class supported Fascism to counter mass mobilization and 
revolution, the post-Sukarno Indonesian ruling order, expressing similar fears, reached 
out to the traditional political opposition of rural Islam to counter this fear and its 
likely impact upon socio-political stability.  Hegemonic order is able to arrange a 
complex array of forces behind the state and the Gramscian model facilitates 
understanding of the particular characteristics of these forces by offering a perspective 
that accounts for the behaviour of those who choose to rule and the means by which 
they ameliorate potential opposition to their rule.  
                     A Gramscian project implies that a leadership responds to the crises 
before it, such as the Suharto New Order faced during the 1990s, by sustaining itself 
through revitalizing its legitimizing discourse and re-configuring necessary alliances 
horizontally and vertically.  Responding to the changing socio-political realities 
therefore required the New Order to re-negotiate popular understandings of Pancasila 
and, to borrow from Gramsci, re-emphasize the role of the dominant classes’ “active 
political agents” and institutions through culture, intellectuals, state apparatuses and 
 25
ideology rather than employing simple coercion.61  Suharto responded and offered 
unprecedented socio-political influence to previously de-politicized Islam by 
sponsoring the influential modernist Islamic intellectual association ICMI.62  Gramsci 
has therefore as much to say about re-configuring and re-aligning political groups and 
their interests in the face of crisis and transition, as he has to say about political 
domination in general.  In identifying that which is specific and different about socio-
political crisis he shows how different forces can come together to create a new socio-
political environment and shape themselves around new and different socio-political 
realities.63  What the Gramscian model also emphasizes is that hegemonic crisis is the 
time for socio-political reconstruction and that comprehending new socio-political 
environments during times of crisis requires not only necessary shifts within the 
alliances that underpin hegemonic order, but a questioning of the basis of moral and 
intellectual leadership, the formative coercive role of the state and, crucially, 
sustaining the ongoing willing consent of the masses.   
 
1.3  Political ideology: Gramsci and Marx   
                    “[P]olitical ideology is intended to unite people in political organisation 
for effective political action … the goal of ideology is to arouse feelings and to incite 
action, and the power of an ideology derives from its capacity to capture the human 
imagination and mobilise and unleash human energies.”64  
                      A somewhat pernicious view of ideology has it promoting a system of 
thought capable of institutionalising systemic falsehood in the “selfish interest of [the] 
powerful and malign forces” that dominate a particular historic period.65  Ideology 
can be inculcated by the powerful through conscious manipulation as a profitable and 
potentially deceptive tool of civil power.  It would be a mistake to understate the 
symbolism that may be evoked through its use to craft mass consciousness to 
compliance.  As Machiavelli put it: “the general mass of man are satisfied with 
appearances … and many times are moved by the things which appear to be rather 
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than by the things that are.”66  Appropriately, the intellectualisation of ideology as a 
process by which the mind translates material things into ideal forms had an 
inauspicious beginning against the background of the French Terror.  Under its 
academic director, renegade aristocrat and political survivor, Destutt de Tracey, the 
study of ideology was given institutional form at Paris’s Institut de France as 
“Ideologie: the science of ideas”.67   
                      Man’s ideas (his consciousness) are liable to change as a result of the 
conditions of his existence but Marx’s observation is pertinent: the ideas that rule 
during each age have “ever been the ideas of its ruling class.”68  Guided by Marx, and 
his own understanding of the philosophy of praxis, Gramsci formulated a 
methodology that represented social politics as reality rather than the speculative 
dialectic philosophy he felt dominated Marxist thought.69  Gramsci’s alternative 
approach turned to ideology tied to culture and its influence upon socio-political 
behaviour with his analysis advancing an understanding of hegemony beyond what he 
considered to be the inherent limitations placed upon it by traditional Marxism.  
Disavowing the primacy of Marx’s historic materialism and its pre-occupation with 
economic explanations, Gramsci took a basically anti-economistic stance and by 
emphasising the importance of ideology, as Mouffe put it, gave his concept of 
hegemony “intelligibility”.70  Marx had shown little sensitivity to ideology’s cultural 
potential and treated it as a mere belief system, giving little weight to such non-
economic factors as ideology and culture in the reproduction of social relations.71  
Attempting to come to terms with the failure of the Turin workers’ movement 
Gramsci rejected materialist determinism and sought answers to the control the 
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capitalist state appeared to hold over its people from within the nature of ideology 
itself.  His observations advanced a concept of hegemony that, rather than considering 
the ascent of a class to a position of dominance as mere economic affirmation (Marx’s 
historical materialism), offered an understanding of hegemony characterised by the 
moral and intellectual superiority a class acquires by its crafting and disseminating 
ideology to discipline, inform, and govern the masses.72  He did draw from Marx an 
historical understanding of social politics to which he was able to apply the notion of 
ideological crafting in arriving at a more realistic or, as he preferred to put it, 
‘common sense’, way of understanding socio-political interaction.  By so doing, 
Gramsci was exhibiting a more compassionate view of the individual as a human 
being that earned him a reputation as a “humanistic Marxist”.73  Departing from 
Marx’s economistic approach to ideology as just another element of historical 
materialism, Gramsci offers ideology as a “determining practice” when it is firmly 
institutionalised within a society through the state’s legitimate socio-political 
apparatuses.74  What is therefore important about Gramsci’s analysis and pertinent to 
this research is the role ideology plays in framing and sustaining hegemonic order.    
                     Gramsci read into Marx’s 1859 preface to A Contribution to the Critique 
of Political Economy that changing socio-economic circumstances do not of 
themselves actually produce political change, but only set the conditions in which 
such changes can become possible.75  For Gramsci the crucial factor in bringing about 
these changes is the dispersal of political power which is determined by the amount of 
political organization, the combativeness of the opposing socio-political forces, the 
strength of the political alliances that can be conjured up, and the level of mass 
political and ideological consciousness.  Gramsci’s central concept of hegemony 
developed around these issues but it was his understanding that before significant 
change could occur for hegemony to take hold, moral and intellectual leadership 
needed to be willingly established over those ruled.76  Gramscian hegemonic order is 
therefore best defined as actively created direzione across an historic period (an 
historic bloc comprising three distinct economic, political, and ideological 
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“constituent elements”) through which the masses willingly acknowledge the 
legitimacy of the dominant class’s moral and intellectual leadership.77    
                   Organising Gramsci’s socio-political, economic, and ideological 
arrangement of the state required tasking intellectuals with creating and assimilating 
into mass consciousness processes that legitimized a particular hegemony’s ideas and 
politico-economic foundations.78  The process required intellectuals promoting their 
sponsoring class’s hegemony by actively gaining the support of subordinate groups to 
their own effective domination.  As well as complementing the Marxist prerogative of 
close involvement in the broad demands of economic production, Gramsci’s 
intellectual (for example his entrepreneur, religious teachers, economists, and 
professional soldiers) needed to take a prominent role in socio-political affairs.79  The 
resulting hegemonic processes enabled a leadership to weld moral and 
intellectual/ideological acceptance without the distractions of what Gramsci 
considered to be Marxism’s interminable internal contradictions.80   
    
1.4  Gramscian hegemony  
                              Fontana’s definition of Gramscian hegemony succinctly expresses the 
notion’s causal association with ideology:   
“A social group or class can be seen to have assumed a hegemonic role to the extent 
that it articulates and proliferates throughout society cultural and ideological belief 
systems … accepted as universally valid by the general population”.81 
                    Gramsci is best known for his thoughts on hegemony and his concept has 
two related meanings: it is both a “consensually-based political system” but it also 
indicates that a “level of class consciousness” has been achieved wherein class is 
understood both economically and in terms of a common moral and intellectual 
                                                           
77 Ransome, (1992), p.136.  Anne Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci’s Politics, (St. Martin’s Press, New 
York, 1980), p. 14.  
78 Renate Holub, Antonio Gramsci: Beyond Marxism and Postmodernism, (Routledge, London, 1992), 
p. 25. 
79 Within the broad ranks of Gramsci’s intellectuals must be included those ‘that perform 
organizational functions in the broader sense, whether in the field of production, or culture, or public 
administration’, Valentino Gerratana, (Ed.), Antonio Gramsci, Quardeni del Carcere, Vol. 1, (Einaudi, 
Torino, 1975), p. 37. 
80 Hoare and Nowell Smith, (1971), p.168.  Marx’s historic materialism described human behaviour as 
influenced over an historic period by material conditions the circumstances of which had to be altered 
if human nature and thus behaviour was to be modified.  Contradictions arose out of historic 
materialism’s ‘deterministic’ criteria that insisted it all depended upon the particular stage an economy 
had reached.   
81 Benedetto Fontana, Hegemony and Power: on the Relationship Between Gramsci and Machiavelli. 
(University of Minnesota Press, London, 1993), p. 140.  
 29
awareness.82  Not a mere historical and social analytical tool, Gramscian hegemony is 
intended to be a guiding concept for political practice that prioritizes hegemony over 
domination as socio-political control in, significantly, the “arena … of the 
parliamentary regime”.83  Reflecting the influence of Marx’s materialist 
determination, Gramsci’s hegemonic socio-political arrangements require the 
dominant group exercising its authority over the state’s economic processes.  Gramsci 
refused to accept Marx’s implication that social order had to come about entirely 
through coercive processes.  He preferred, as Eugene Genovese put it, to judge a 
ruling class as hegemonic when it convinced the subordinate classes that the moral 
and intellectual legitimacy of its hegemony reflected a “flexible, comprehensive, and 
meditative world-view”.84  A. Gwynn Williams offers a further helpful definition of 
Gramscian hegemony by suggesting that it is an arrangement in which “a certain way 
of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout 
society in all its institutional and private manifestations informing with its spirit all 
taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, particularly in their 
intellectual and moral connotations”.85  Securing such an arrangement required an 
accepted and binding ideology capable of unifying all classes behind the dominant 
order’s world-view by convincing society of its intellectual and moral legitimacy.  
                     To Gramsci the modern capitalist industrial state’s balancing of political 
and civil society (and thus class interests) represented the reality that one particular 
social group had successfully achieved politico-economic and ideological hegemony 
over the entire nation.86  But he did not believe that the nature of the state could be 
fully understood without a thorough understanding of how the state influenced 
societal behaviour.  What was also significant about Gramsci’s observations was that 
hegemonic order could only follow when the power a dominant class and its 
representatives exercised over subordinate classes balanced coercion with persuasion 
without domination coming about predominantly through an emphasis on coercion.  
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Moreover, hegemonic order requires that the prioritizing of consent be organized 
through the artifices of directive political and ideological leadership and the legitimate 
institutions of the state.  Rather than being spontaneous, Gramscian hegemony entails 
a predominantly arranged consensual form of social control actively created through 
direzione or effective leadership.87     
                   Although Gramsci offers the idea of hegemony in a variety of forms and 
contexts he most frequently uses the term to describe social and political control that 
combines physical force (coercion) with intellectual, moral, and cultural persuasion 
(consent).88  This duality of coercion and consent is the very essence of Gramscian 
hegemony and describes how a dominant group in modern society not only 
overcomes opposition forcefully but also how it gains the voluntary and consensual 
support of subordinate groups through such persuasive techniques as co-operation, co-
optation, and compromise.  While hegemonic consent is arrived at largely peacefully, 
physical force can be used to support it against a dissident minority as long as the 
majority acquiesces.  By complimenting direzione with an effectively disseminated 
rendering of ideology, a dominant class is able to claim the legitimacy of its 
ideological leadership.  Acquiring societal support through such a schema implies that 
the dominant group has successfully persuaded subordinate groups to accept the 
ruling order’s norms and values as legitimately dominant.89  By persuading society’s 
subordinate classes “to accept [the state’s] moral, political and cultural values” as 
legitimately representing society’s best interests, the ruling order is deemed to be 
hegemonic.90  Social group (or class) supremacy has thus manifested itself through 
the combination of domination or coercion, with moral and intellectual leadership.  
But it is significant that it is the moral and intellectual aspect of leadership that 
represents the ideological right to domination and constituting the basis of Gramscian 
hegemony.91  The social control necessary to maintain authority has come about 
through two basic processes of influencing behaviour: on the one hand, “reward and 
punishment” and, on the other, a moulding of “personal convictions into a replica of 
[elite-driven] norms”.92     
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                    The balancing of coercion with persuasion that is the substance of 
Gramsci’s hegemonic order, and the means by which the ruling class’s representatives 
exercise control over subordinate classes, not only requires ongoing ideological 
refurbishment processes to sustain moral and intellectual legitimacy but processes 
must respond to actual conditions existing at any particular time.  A dominant order 
must react to new socio-political realities by constantly re-affirming its hegemony.  
As necessary, hegemony must update consent with new and changing patterns of 
alliances through active political and ideological leadership rather than simply 
dominate through force.  As Femia puts it, hegemony can only be sustained by 
constantly reaffirming the consensual arrangements of socio-political control that 
underwrite intellectual and moral leadership.93  As hegemony is first and foremost an 
ongoing historic affair so the hierarchical articulation of social forces representing 
stable hegemony last only as long as the cohesion of the alliances upon which the bloc 
is built can be sustained.94  While a genuine national-popular consciousness of 
ideological unity may exist “energetically defused throughout society” there might, 
nonetheless, be considerable variation between the amount of pervasiveness and 
systemization of the hegemonic state apparatuses and the degree of participation they 
are able to foster.95  While the moral legitimacy defining Gramscian hegemony comes 
from the peoples’ spontaneous consent to the general direction imposed on national 
life by the dominant fundamental group the trust accrued comes primarily through the 
dominant group’s “position and function in [and over] the world of production”.96   
                    Exercised in a parliamentary environment, characterized by a 
combination of legitimate coercion/force and consent/compromise (without the 
former dominating the later) it is implied that society has consented through the 
normal outlets and institutions of public expression to an appropriate level of force 
being used against it when necessary.97  The duality of coercion and consent by which 
the dominant group in a modern society either overcomes opposition with physical 
force, or gains subordinate voluntary and consensual support through persuasive 
techniques (co-operation, co-optation, and compromise) defines Gramscian hegemony 
but because of the societal consent element there must be a moral limit placed upon 
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the use of force and the legitimacy of a ruling order’s right to extensive socio-political 
authority.  Considering how Gramscian hegemonic order demands that the relevant 
institutions reflect all of the values, norms of behaviour, perceptions, and beliefs that 
represent and define the structures of the ruling order’s central authority, such matters 
are important.98  Such considerations, and their analysis, can be problematic 
considering that hegemonically derived consensual social control has not occurred 
spontaneously but through what Gramsci calls direzione or positive leadership.99                   
 
1.5  Hegemony and ideology 
                    Gramsci insisted on identifying culture closely with ideology and saw 
ideology as really an expression of culture expressed to represent and promote the 
interests of a particular class.  For Gramsci the function of hegemony is to transpose 
ideology into culture as a world-view that is regarded as normal and natural by 
everyone from the controlling class to the subordinate classes.  In doing so, Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony possesses two related dimensions, the one identifying the 
consensual basis of social politics within civil society, and the other referring to the 
stage of political development where a dominant order’s view of common culture or 
ideology has attained a collective intellectual and moral acceptance within the 
national consciousness.100  Both dimensions demand that society’s subordinate 
ideologies be transformed and re-articulated into the dominant group’s own over-
riding ideology with the transformed view accepted by society as generally 
representing a “coherent world-view … sufficiently flexible, comprehensive, and 
mediatory” convincing those ruled that their domination is consensual and thus 
legitimate.101   
                    Approaching ideology as a philosophy of praxis (behaviour and practice) 
also enabled Gramsci to identify similarities between religion’s world-view of norms 
of behaviour and socio-political ideology as they both organize the masses into 
collective action.102  Because of its historically roots in civil society, Gramsci saw the 
potential ideology offered to institutionalize hegemony and thus saw ideology as more 
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than a means to simply justify power but, through its ability to collaborate in forming 
new sources of power, an instrument capable of creating a “new history”.103  As 
Gramsci put it, ideologies have the “energies of a material force” and in the 
environment of the historic bloc “material forces become the content [of hegemony] 
and ideologies the form”.104  His conception of hegemonic order thus matured from 
the simple alliance of his earlier writings (and those of Marx) into a complete fusion 
of mutually inclusive economic, political, and intellectual factors drawn together by 
an ideological representation that legitimized a ruling order’s socio-political 
objectives.105   
                   In disavowing Marxism’s historical materialism and diverging from the 
notion that a class’s ascent to rule was merely “an economic affirmation” Gramsci 
went further in arguing that common socio-economic position was insufficient to give 
that class “distinction’ and independence” over the rest of society.106  True hegemony 
could only come about when a class had transformed itself into a “political force of 
national standing” by gaining societal acceptance of their ideological legitimacy.107  
Hegemonic ideology must be comprehensive and reflect more than mere economic 
interests.  It requires that the ruling class escape the confines of its own purely 
corporate and economic interests and extend itself socio-politically to appeal to mass 
consciousness by infusing broader, subordinate, needs and aspirations.  For Gramsci a 
ruling order has not attained hegemony until it has institutionalized the consent of all 
other groups through a managed synthesis of all economic, political, and 
moral/intellectual needs.  Without such consensus society has no ethical/political 
direction and authority is merely one of “precarious domination by force”.108  
Gramscian hegemony, ultimately and essentially, must be based on the consent of the 
subordinate classes.109  Tamburrano puts it tidily by suggesting that Gramscian 
hegemonic consent is best expressed as the masses accepting that the intellectual and 
moral direction, by which they are permanently tied to the political leadership and 
ideology of the state, genuinely represents the mass beliefs and aspirations of the 
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majority.110  Not only must the ruling class co-opt elements from below but it must 
take care to absorb those issues that are potentially problematic for the achievement of 
prime socio-political and economic agendas.111  Only as long as a ruling class is able 
to co-opt and sustain subordinate consent to its agendas does a class remain 
hegemonic.  Because it provides the right to extensive political authority, consensus 
reached through society’s acknowledgement of a dominant order’s moral and 
intellectual legitimacy becomes a solid foundation for hegemony but Gramsci’s 
understandings of the concept does place a moral limit on that authority.  Although 
morally and intellectually restraining, consensus must therefore give some attention to 
such issues as how benefits are to be allocated, the permissible range of societal 
disagreement, and the institutions through which these issues are to be negotiated.  All 
must reflect the values, norms, perceptions, and beliefs that define the structures of 
central authority.112   
                    Gramscian hegemony is therefore based upon two specific arrangements 
of socio-political life: on strategic alliances and concessions to subsidiary groups, and 
through the ruling order articulating the moral, political, and intellectual legitimacy of 
its prime interests and values through ideological discourse.  Leadership of this nature 
is premised upon an acknowledgement by the ruled that the ruler’s exclusively 
derived ideology has assimilated subordinate values and represents a general national 
interest.  Hegemonic ideology must also have drawn constituent elements out of a 
plethora of diverse societal interests and although it is always the prerogative of the 
hegemonic group to articulate the substance of ideology, the result must essentially 
unify.113  As the hegemonic elites retain their own cultural identity (their own values 
and beliefs) as primary, the demands of subordinate groups become little more than 
accommodated by the dominant group.114  In Gramscian usage, hegemony always 
conveys this important aspect of ideological accommodation so that a hegemonic 
class enjoys the self-satisfaction of knowing that the majority of the ruled have 
accepted its version of the “national popular” as best expressing their own, albeit 
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subordinate, interests.115  Hegemonic preferences set by a ruling order through highly 
developed institutions of political socialization can therefore become difficult for the 
general mass consciousness to “demystify” and their ideological subordination 
difficult to question.116     
   
1.6  Hegemonic legitimacy and counter-hegemony   
                     The leading groups strive for moral legitimacy and through compromise 
and the assimilation of subordinate groups’ more acceptable ideas and values, 
negotiate the direction their leadership is taking.  But hegemonic legitimacy demands 
that the leading social group not only influence the plethora of interests that inform 
mass consciousness but also constantly respond to them.  Hegemony must not merely 
reflect elite interests but offer an elite construct of ideas that acknowledges moral and 
intellectual leadership and unless the dominant group continues to appear to represent 
the values of the national will its hegemonic legitimacy suffer obsolescence and 
decay.117  Permanent, stable hegemony can only be assured if that national will is 
sustained by the dominant groups’ ongoing willingness to re-negotiate its particular 
cultural and moral view into the national consciousness whenever necessary.118  When 
Gramsci links hegemonic legitimacy to the idea of popular consent in the domination 
of particular social groups and classes, he seems to be echoing Machiavelli’s notion of 
hegemonic legitimacy also derived from a relative balance of force and consent.  
Gramsci’s more balanced concept of hegemony, however, is protected by what he 
describes as the veritable “armour of coercion” inherent in the institutions of the 
modern state.119     
                      Critical to ongoing consent in maintaining bloc legitimacy is the use of 
ideology as the discourse of re-negotiation.  As well as being primarily responsible for 
morally and intellectually underpinning Gramscian hegemonic order, ideology not 
only possesses a material nature but also constitutes a series of practices that are quite 
compatible with the institutions of the contemporary capitalist state.120  As discussed 
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below, Gramsci’s intellectual provides the discourse that enables ideology to 
effectively bind the economic, political, and intellectual/moral leadership legitimizing 
a hegemonic arrangement.121  Hegemony acquired through the ideological unity of a 
national collective consciousness can effectively transform the ideologies of society’s 
subordinate groups and re-articulate them as those of the dominant group.  Re-
articulated ideology, “sufficiently flexible, comprehensive, and mediatory”, may then 
be mediated to convince those ruled that they continue to consent to their domination 
and thus rule remains legitimate.122  But the ruling order’s hierarchical re-articulation 
of social forces lasts only as long as it is able to sustain the cohesive ideological 
alliances on which its hegemony is built.123  Should hegemonic challenge actually 
take place, it does so within the socio-political terrain of political and ideological 
debate.   
                     Gramsci’s goal, one he realized would be an enormously complicated 
and difficult task, was to build an understanding of a stabilizing and unifying method 
of going about participatory politics in a modern, pluralist, capitalist society.  His 
understanding of hegemony, wielded by the power of the state through an intricate 
interweaving of culture and politics offered a theoretical tool that could enable 
explaining and evaluating how a disparate, divided, social reality could be 
legitimately drawn together into a cohesive unity.  In Gramsci’s schema the 
ideological component of hegemony implied that the majority of the people viewed 
the way hegemony was being wielded as a common sense approach to going about 
modern politics or, put another way, that their society’s disparate array of interests 
had been organized and unified in a way that benefited the majority of the people.  
Using the familiar Marxist language of class, Gramscian hegemony was therefore 
complete when one class had succeeded in persuading subordinate classes to accept 
the hegemonic order’s moral, political, and cultural ideas as representing the best 
interests of society at large.  Gramsci constantly pointed out that hegemony must 
never be taken for granted.  The broad, diverse, and dynamic plurality of interests that 
are a feature of modern industrializing societies require hegemony’s constant 
readjustment and only through ongoing renegotiation will the masses remain 
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voluntarily assimilated into an organized world-view that has been imposed upon 
them by the dominant classes.   
                     Gramsci thus has much to say about the likely emergence of an effective 
counter-hegemony based upon an alternative rendering of ideology.  Only as long as 
hegemonic order is able to sustain subordinate consent to its agendas and the cohesive 
ideological alliances upon which hegemony has been constructed, does it remain 
hegemonic.124  Counter-hegemony can evolve out of such issues as a questioning of 
the allocation of benefits, the allowable range of societal agreement based upon the 
legitimacy of the hegemonic representation of ideology, and the effectiveness of the 
institutions through which societal agreement is negotiated.125  For Gramsci, a 
coherent counter-hegemony can nurture itself in a socio-political environment where 
the collective consciousness has come to “demystify their ideological 
subordination”.126  But a successful counter-hegemony would not necessarily, as 
Mouffe put it, require replacing the hegemonic order’s representation of ideology, its 
world-view, “with a completely new and already formulated one”; processes that 
transformed and re-articulated “existing ideological elements” would suffice as long 
as they could be organized socio-politically and legitimately.127  The likelihood of an 
emergent counter-hegemony is therefore tied to the issue of hegemonic legitimacy 
which in turn is tied to the effectiveness of hegemonic response to changing socio-
political and economic realities.  To be successful, an emergent counter-hegemonic 
social group or alliance must compete for, and win, the hearts and minds of the 
masses across all three levels of economic, political, and ideological consciousness.  
   
1.7  Gramsci’s temporal power arrangement: his ‘historic bloc’  
                     Gramsci’s historic bloc provides a temporal analytical concept for 
explaining hegemonic order’s domination of subsidiary groups in contemporary 
developing capitalist/industrial societies across all aspects of socio-political order.128  
According to Gramsci, the type of state that arises out of a specific economic era must 
in the first instance assuage the contradictions and antagonisms existing between the 
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classes that possess the means of production with those that do not.129  He defines this 
era during which the creative energies of ideology form the intellectual structure of 
the state, as an historic bloc.130  The Gramscian historic bloc denotes a hegemonic 
unity, and for methodological and analytical purposes comprises overlapping, yet 
distinct, economic, political, and ideological forms.131  It is the latter form, the 
ideological bloc that represents the terrain upon which Gramsci’s society undergoes 
the conscious intellectual struggle and competition out of which hegemony evolves.  
Stressing as it does the economic, political, and ideological expressions of a particular 
society, his historic bloc expresses hegemonic concepts not only through each of the 
three sphere’s (or form’s) impact upon each other, but through processes by which 
each represent “partial totalities of potentially equal significance” that come together 
(and drift apart) depending upon socio-political forces at a particular time.132     
                     As a Marxist, Gramsci depicted the subject matter of history as politics, 
culture, and morality, underpinned by an economic continuity defined by complex 
and contradictory relations and struggles around “social relations of production”.133  
Although he accepted Marxist understanding of the historic bloc as hegemonic order 
constructed around complex historical processes of economic-based interaction 
among elites and sub-elites, Gramsci’s historic bloc departs sufficiently from 
economics to place emphasis on the power aspect of societal relationships.  On 
occasion Gramsci actually replaces the term ‘historic bloc’ with the alternative ‘power 
bloc’ to describe the type of socio-political relationships that he believes state-class 
accommodations and ideological negotiations entail.134  Rather than accepting the 
Marxist/Leninist idea of the state as a mere coercive tool, Gramsci sees the necessary 
accommodations and negotiations of hegemonic order that take place across the 
historic bloc as determined through a combination of authoritarianism and an 
emphasis on his more benign hegemonic legitimacy.     
                   As a cohesive and purposeful alliance of social groups and their 
aspirations over a time period, Gramsci’s historic bloc has three mutually inclusive, 
overlapping, elements or components: economic, political, and intellectual/ideological 
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forms.  In other words, the historic bloc is a temporal sequence of transient alliances 
incorporating economics, politics, to explain “different social forces relat[ing] to each 
other” in hegemonic alliance arrangements.135  For Gramsci, hegemonic order evolves 
out of an organically linked historical-social formation that is articulated through 
economics and politics (the content) and ideologies (the form).136  Across a broad 
array of economic, ideological/intellectual, and coercive/consensual (mixed with 
democratic procedures) influences the historical/structural configuration of the 
historic bloc enables power holders to organize the nation in a way designed to 
legitimize the ideological superiority of their rule.   
                It is therefore necessary to understand the processes of Gramsci’s historic 
bloc as an elite class advancing its hegemony through the political economy of its 
choosing legitimized by its ability to maintain socio-political consensus and cohesion.  
While the systemic nature of the historic bloc and the complex power relations 
entailed are those of an elite class dominating other groups in a social system over an 
historic period, what is particular about the bloc is that its constituent elements are 
bound together by Gramsci’s dominant class sustaining its moral and intellectual 
supremacy through their representation of ideology.137   
 
1.8  The site of hegemonic contestation   
                     Gramscian hegemony exercises its coercive power through repressive 
state apparati, but its predominantly consensual aspects occur through the institutions 
of everyday life (civil society), political parties, trade unions, the church, and the 
media.138  The site of hegemonic contestation, the terrain in which an ascendant social 
group or alliance nurtures its hegemony by constructing dual coercive/consensual 
strategies, is the twin, overlapping, realms of civil society and political society (the 
state).139  To Gramsci, civil society was the private world and where consensual 
hegemony was to be nurtured, while political society/the state was the public world of 
coercion and domination.  Direct command takes place through the representations of 
“state and juridical government” while the ruled consensually perceive, evaluate, and 
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manage everyday socio-political reality in a civil society broadened by a vast 
assortment of associational institutions.140  Gramsci further distinguishes between the 
public institutions of the state and civil society by pointing to the latter as where class 
hegemony is actually exercised: within civil society among political parties, religious 
organizations, trade unions, and intellectual and cultural organizations, and through 
civil society by a combination of the willing alliance and subordination of key 
upwardly mobile political groups.141  Specifically it is through organized religion and 
the political parties, the key institutions of civil society and constituent components of 
the state apparatus, that the exploitative and manipulative nature of the historic bloc 
directs and sustains hegemonic socio-political reality.142   
                       When the regime wants agreement to an unpopular action or policy it 
first organizes support from within the spheres of political and civil society and 
establishes a suitable or appropriate public stance.  As Forgacs wryly puts it, it is 
amidst ongoing competitive activity within these two spheres that the prize 
(hegemonic order) becomes the right to regulate state power and “turn it in any 
particular direction and manipulate it at any time in accordance with the bloc’s 
economic and political agenda”.143  Given the inter-penetration and close 
collaboration of the two spheres, Gramsci’s distinction between civil and political 
society tends to be largely analytical.  With both sets of institutions closely inter-
woven (and tending to overlap) separating them and locating where influences begin 
and end poses analytical difficulties.  Force and consent occur within both state and 
civil society, and while the state does not necessarily hold a monopoly on coercion, 
neither do the institutions of civil society necessarily monopolize the means of 
ideological control.144  But as Gramsci’s hegemony is primarily ethico-political, his 
Marxism demands that ideological superiority (the binding element of Gramscian 
hegemony) maintains firm roots in the realm of economic activity.145  
 
1.9  Gramsci’s intellectual       
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                  “[E]very social group … creates alongside itself, organically [permanently and 
fundamentally], one or more groups of intellectuals who give it homogeneity and 
awareness of its own function not only in the economic sphere but also in the 
social and political spheres”.146   
                     His contemplations of history convinced Gramsci that certain powerful 
intellectuals were able to strongly influence politics and he arrived at two significant 
understandings of their role in society.  Unlike those commonly associated with the 
term, Gramsci’s intellectuals were more generally the entire strata that exercised 
organizational functions in the wider sense, whether in the field of culture, 
production, or political administration.  Being the groups most able to influence mass 
behaviour and consciousness they tended to form into arrangements most likely to 
influence social stability and social change.147  In a general sense, Gramsci’s 
intellectuals represented an intelligentsia with an organizational capacity and 
positioned appropriately to enable a ruling order to exercise its hegemony by 
transmitting on its behalf a system of beliefs that are accepted to the extent that the 
masses “do not question the activities of their rulers”.148  Again, Gramsci’s Marxism 
demanded that he acknowledge an economic imperative and that the mass 
consciousness intellectuals engendered had its origins in a social order dominating 
production and economics.149        
                       In the Gramscian schema, a successful hegemony could not take root 
unless the level of active consensus reached was sufficient that the subordinate masses 
believed the ruling order had genuinely adopted their broader popular interests.  Even 
though considerable genuine national-popular will (Gramsci’s binding glue of 
ideological unity) might be energetically defused through society, overly intensive 
state pervasiveness and systemization could put to question the actual degree of 
participation the intellectuals had fostered.150  As hegemony’s hierarchical articulation 
of social forces was an historic imperative it would only last as long as its intellectuals 
remained able to sustain the national-popular mass consciousness upon which the bloc 
is built.151  Gramsci’s use of the term intellectual is therefore clearly a complex 
theoretical affair but offers a useful interpretive category to explain social change in 
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terms of society’s ideological arrangement “around intellectual divisions of labour 
specific to different economic classes.”152  Gramsci’s intellectual can thus best be 
described as a producer and disseminator of ideas and ideology on behalf of the 
dominant class controlling production and the economy.153  While Gramsci uses the 
term ‘intellectual’ to describe those who have any organizational or ideological role in 
society (academics, foreign trained economists, clerics, military professionals, civil 
servants, and bureaucrats) he goes further by separating their roles into the two 
temporal categories of organic and traditional intellectual.   
 
1.9.1  The organic intellectual 
                      In general terms, Gramsci’s ‘organic’ intellectual refers to those playing 
significant contemporary roles as reproducers of a particular desired societal construct 
and the ‘traditional’ those of an historical nature functioning within traditional 
intellectual communities.  The category of organic intellectual can also be loosely 
sub-divided into loose groupings of more directed administrators and ideologically 
driven symbol-wielders.  Gramsci’s organic intellectual has an important function to 
carry out on behalf of the ruling order by giving that class homogeneity and crafting 
society’s acknowledgement of that class’s “particular position and functions in the 
economic, socio-political, and cultural order”.154  They are also closely bound to the 
classes that make up the ruling order by functional association, for example a military 
leadership.155  As well as constantly re-affirming their patron class’s moral and 
intellectual (ideological) right to rule, the organic intellectual is expected to perform 
the vital role of resolving the conflict and contestation that inevitably occurs between 
alta cultura (the culture of the higher ruling groups) and cultura populare (the culture 
of the subordinate masses).  This is achieved by tasking the organic intellectual with 
translating the interests and values of a particular dominant social group, as Gramsci 
put it, into “general and common values and interests” acceptable to broader 
subordinate interests.156  More than mere orators, the intellectuals must actively 
participate in practical life as “constructors, organizers, and permanent persuaders” at 
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the behest of their sponsoring class.157  However, the most important role Gramsci’s 
organic intellectuals perform is that of integrating their patron class into society and 
providing their sponsors with the necessary “measure of [moral] leadership” to rule.158   
                     A class aspiring to hegemony breeds its own organic intellectuals and 
through their collective efforts the ruling order is able to maintain its hegemony and 
sustain moral and intellectual leadership that is acknowledged as legitimate by the rest 
of society.  Closely linked to the dominant social order, therefore, the organic 
intellectual has an organizational role that not only requires universalizing its 
sponsor’s ideas but also carries responsibility for giving the bloc coherence and 
legitimacy by ensuring that appropriate elements of traditional ideas and values are 
assimilated into societal arrangements.159  Being an active process of communication 
and co-operation Gramscian hegemony is thus sustained by the organic intellectuals 
directing activities to preserve and self-perpetuate the bloc by arranging and 
managing both psychological and socio-political national consciousness.  The crucial 
role that Gramsci’s organic intellectuals play, over and beyond their prime function of 
concerning themselves with the economic organization and political power of their 
sponsoring class, is to preserve their sponsor’s hegemony over the whole of society.   
                       Functionally connected to the entire hegemonic apparatus of the state 
by concrete institutional arrangements the organic intellectual is ideally placed to 
manipulate mass behaviour and consciousness.160  From within both the area of civil 
society (where hegemony is constructed) and the area of political society (or the state 
where hegemony is asserted) the organic intellectual is given sufficient authority to 
perform their “organizational and connective” functions.161  As the dominant order’s 
veritable deputies, the organic intellectuals facilitate the subaltern functions of social 
hegemony and political government.  Gramsci assigns the organic intellectuals as 
much an ideological function as an organizational one and in so doing is stressing 
ideology’s organizational potential.162  A bloc thus formed is more than a mere 
alliance incorporating the three integral (and overlapping) forms of economic, 
political, and ideological hegemony, but is an arrangement strengthened and bound by 
ideological legitimacy.  
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                 Legitimizing the process requires that some form of enabling discourse be 
available and able to be constructed into a “justifying ideology” over which the 
superior group’s organic intellectuals can remain the sole agents.163  Hegemony thus 
arranged becomes a cohesive organization of economic, political, intellectual and 
moral leadership through the intermediary of ideology crafted into pervasive and 
permeating binding glue that overlays the entire historic bloc.  Given that Gramscian 
hegemony combines strong political leadership with intellectual and moral guidance, 
hegemonic leadership is deemed to occur when the leadership’s ideology has spread 
throughout the whole of society and come to determine “not only economic and 
political objectives but also intellectual and moral unity”.164  Ideology’s range is 
broad and Gramsci has its promulgating intellectuals located across the entire socio-
political and economic terrain upon which “men move, [and] acquire consciousness of 
their position”.165  As well as a class dimension, the process must also introduce a 
national-popular dimension if it is to unite social diversity into a national-popular (or 
collective) will.  This consensual collective will, generated by the organic intellectual 
and combined with active (or coercive) political leadership, defines Gramscian 
hegemony.166  Through the efforts of its organic intellectuals, the superior group’s 
world-view must become so thoroughly diffused that their particular view permeates 
the national consciousness with what Gramsci calls common sense accepted by the 
whole of society as a reflection of popular will.  The idea is that hegemonic order 
requires the dominant class successfully expressing its own interests in such a way as 
to generally reflect the best interests of society and, most importantly, be 
acknowledged by the majority as such.167     
                    In Gramscian terms, organic intellectuals belonging to the social group 
aspiring to hegemony negotiate socio-political legitimacy by balancing two processes; 
domination (or coercion) with the form of supremacy that defines Gramscian 
hegemony, consensual, willingly acknowledged, intellectual and moral leadership.168  
The necessary social control, without which these processes cannot be balanced, takes 
two basic forms.  Socio-political behaviour is both influenced externally through 
rewards and punishments, and internally (or hegemonically) through society’s general 
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agreement that the dominant order speaks a “common socio-moral language” and that 
the particular concept of reality it represents informs “all modes of thought and 
behaviour”.169  For hegemony to become a fact the dominant group must also 
acknowledge the prime (non-negotiable) interests of subordinate groups in the 
interests of, what Gramsci describes as, a “stable juridical equilibrium” but it is 
always the dominant group that prevails.170   
                  Gramsci broadens his organic category to include what he describes as the 
new organic intellectual of the modern capitalist order, the “intellectual community of 
capitalism” that defines the values of the economic class among the upper reaches of 
capitalism.171  This category includes the modern industrial technician, the organizers 
of a new culture, managers of the new legal systems, and a range of “specialists in 
political economy”.172  The official and prime function of the organic intellectual in 
hegemonic development remains one of prioritizing the ruling order’s agendas and 
reconstituting, as necessary, the appropriate enabling discourse to do so.   
                     Dramatic social development brings intellectuals in many guises to the 
forefront of those that aspire to rule, and the dynamic process stimulated by major 
social upheaval and change can make a contemporary category of intellectual (a 
particular historic period’s organic intellectual) irrelevant and organic intellectuals 
can be superseded in their influence and revert to the category of traditional 
intellectual described below.173  An organic response to earlier economic and socio-
political arrangements can be overtaken by new socio-political realities and the task of 
challenging the counter-hegemonic tendencies of traditional intellectuals sited outside 
bloc influence and power may need to be assigned to a reconstituted assortment of 
organic intellectuals.  This is a further example of the Gramscian hegemonic 
imperative of re-negotiating alliance arrangements to be more inclusive of subordinate 
ideas and values in response to changing socio-political and economic realities.  Such 
a socio-political progression (or reversal) in reaction to a changing environment 
results in what Ransome calls “intellectual regeneration” as former influential organic 
intellectuals are “displaced in terms of authority, power, and leadership [moving] 
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from central to increasingly peripheral positions”.174  New organic intellectuals can be 
generated in response to economic progress or changing economic practices that 
demand new specializations, but once the ruling order’s immediate economic 
requirements have been met the hegemonic leadership can initiate new experts to 
address the next priority which may require a re-focusing of earlier more intellectual-
political dimensions of social control.175  Such re-focusing can be in defensive 
response to either hegemonic obsolescence or even an awareness of an emergent 
counter-hegemony.  An organic intellectual residue from a former historic bloc 
(academics, judges, clerics, military officers, and politicians) can also form the 
traditional base of a future counter-hegemony.   
 
1.9.2  The traditional intellectual 
                      Gramsci wrote that one of the most important struggles for any group 
striving towards hegemony was that they must “assimilate and … conquer 
ideologically the traditional intellectuals”.176   
                      The traditional intellectual represents a generally conservative historic 
continuity that tends to behave autonomously and independently from (as well as 
countering) the dominant group.177  Representing subordinate interests as a moral and 
intellectual alternative to hegemonic legitimacy the traditional intellectuals function 
separately from the immediate interests of the dominant class.178  Claiming historic 
consistency, traditional intellectuals such as clerics and scholars can continue 
uninterrupted by even the most complex socio-political changes and upheaval.179  
These groups are marked as traditional because they belong to a different historical 
time from the organic intellectuals created by a hegemonic ruling order.180  As they 
represent a threat to hegemony their non-negotiable views and values must be 
assimilated into the hegemonic order’s representative of ideology to ensure they 
remain on the peripheries of socio-political legitimacy.  Gramsci also made a further 
distinction in his depiction of the traditional intellectual (arrived at through his 
understanding of the Italian urban clerics that he placed in this category) as those not 
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yet having been “elaborated and set in motion by the capitalist system” underpinning 
the state.181  This category of intellectual often stands between the peasant masses and 
local and state administrations and thus their activity carries important socio-political 
relevance.182           
                       
2.  Hilley’s Malaysian study             
                       As noted above,183 Gramscian hegemony implies two specific 
arrangements of social politics: strategic alliances and concessions to subsidiary 
groups, and the ruling class articulating its prime interests and values as hegemonic 
discourse through moral and intellectual (ideological) leadership.  John Hilley is 
concerned with similar issues in the Malaysian context and turns for an explanatory 
framework to Gramsci’s approaches to social politics that are, as Hilley puts it, 
“conceptually different from those posed by liberal analysis”.184  By testing the 
Gramscian model of political legitimacy and hegemony against Mahathir’s Malaysian 
project his study parallels this thesis’s interest in the Suharto New Order.  Hilley 
offers the Gramsci’s historic bloc as an appropriate construct to explain the evolving 
“frameworks of power” that have informed Malaysia’s development during the post-
colonial era.185  Examining Mahathirist Malaysia’s problematic socio-political and 
economic development beyond colonialism, through Alliance, NEP, and the 
contemporary Vision 2020 program to explain the processes involved, Hilley has 
turned to Gramsci’s notions of hegemony and the realization of active consent.  Hilley 
suggests Mahathirism reflected a broad “accumulation of ideas and values” extending 
beyond the ruling order’s narrow interests and agendas and their negotiated 
acceptance by the Malaysian masses implied the political legitimacy implicit in 
Gramscian hegemonic order.186  Hilley’s Mahathirism called upon hegemonic 
discourse narrated as language, images and, most profitably, ideology to 
institutionalize societal cohesion and hegemonic legitimacy but cautions that the 
capability of traditional values to challenge hegemonic discourse must never be 
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underestimated.187  Hence his description of how the historical importance and 
pervading social presence of traditional intellectuals placed potentially problematic 
restraints on the organic hegemonic order but how Mahathirism succeeded in 
assimilating traditional discourse into the Malaysian ruling schema thereby 
ameliorating the threat to hegemonic continuance.188   
                    Hilley’s study’s use of a Gramscian perspective describes how Mahathir 
reconstructed regime legitimacy over twenty years from one of coercive domination 
and ethnic manipulation into a more consensual hegemony.  The theme, a constant 
throughout Hilley’s study, defines the tension between the state’s consensual and 
coercive strategies to reflect the paradox of Mahathirism’s mix of popularism and 
authoritarianism.189  Hilley’s project examines how, stunned by the 1997 economic 
crisis and the ascendance of a nascent counter-hegemony around a resurgent Islam 
and increasing demands for socio-political reform articulated as reformasi, Mahathir 
sustained support for his hegemonic agendas.  Mahathir offered a progression of 
images to symbolize growth, nation building, a shared vision of prosperity, national 
integration, and social community to bolster hegemonic discourse; the New Economic 
Policy (NEP), Look East, Malaysia Inc. and, more recently, his Vision 2020.  As 
nation-building constructs, Mahathir’s visionary projects called for communal 
alliance, territorial and ethnic integration, and harmony and fair partnership through 
an evolving mature society practicing a consensual, community-orientated Malaysian 
form of democracy.  The challenge, as he articulated it, was to build a tolerant moral 
and ethical society, strong in religion and spiritual values, in which the welfare of the 
people would not evolve around the state or the individual, but through a strong and 
resilient family system.  Essentially the vision he articulated called for development 
fairly and equitably distributing the nation’s wealth and economic progress in full 
partnership.190   
                    As a discourse of civil persuasion, Mahathir’s Vision 2020 represented an 
increasingly crucial aspect of his bloc’s legitimization process.  The political reality 
Mahathir faced was that an increasingly contested Malaysian civil society, enticed by 
images of modernity, had come to expect new forms of “populist consensus, political 
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co-optation, and intellectual enterprise”.191  The new realities represent the essence of 
Hilley’s investigation: that economic transition and the onset of growing demands for 
socio-political reform in the face of “ascendant neo-liberal practices” had made 
Malaysian society “an increasingly contested site” that demanded more consensual 
forms of hegemonic control.192  The necessary hegemonic realignments confronting 
Mahathir needed to be made in an environment debating the validity of more liberal 
democratic practices in the context of heightened Islamic values.  What emerged was 
hegemonic refurbishment based more on morally and intellectually legitimate societal 
consent than the previous emphasis on state coercion.    
                      Hilley offers three main Gramscian themes as central to his discussion 
on rationalizing the realities of Malaysia’s contested civil space, the emerging 
tensions questioning the Mahathirist vision and the likelihood of an emergent counter-
hegemony; the power (historic) bloc, hegemony, and the role of the intellectual.  The 
historic/power bloc construct enabled Hilley to explain the developing framework of 
power that had evolved from Malaya’s independence into the Mahathir era and its 
accompanying “changing configuration of state-class relations”.193  Gramsci’s 
understanding of hegemony offered Hilley the means to understand the processes of 
alliance structuring and realignment, concessions to subsidiary groups, and the 
“conscious cultivation” of the dominant order’s interests through “civil, moral, and 
intellectual processes”.194  Gramscian hegemony also provided Hilley with a means of 
explaining, on the one hand, the leading group’s articulation of “national-popular 
constructs” in the national interest and, on the other, the “quality of its consensual 
legitimacy (hegemony)” derived through the nation accepting the Mahathirist 
vision.195  As Hilley understands Gramsci, one of the important hegemonic functions 
of the state is to “raise the great mass of the population” to a level that “corresponds 
to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the 
ruling classes”.196   
                    In explaining the increasingly contested civil space within which the 
Mahathirist project took place, Hilley turns to the “integrated role of the intellectual in 
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constructing national-popular discourse to facilitate that process”.197  Hilley points out 
that the Gramscian concept of the organic intellectual effectively gives practical 
meaning to the interactive processes extending from Mahathir’s ruling party, the 
United Malays National Organization (UMNO), into its associated networks of 
business, economic, and religious organizations, and cultural forums.  The category of 
traditional intellectuals posing increasing restraint upon the organic order with their 
intellectual struggle, are identified: modernist Islamic interests, the Malaysian Islamic 
Party (PAS), growing regional demands for sharia law and Islamic codes, and both 
Islamic and secular demands for a more moral, less corrupt, society.  But there is 
limited space in Mahathir’s Malaysia for critical intellectualism.  Hilley puts it that, 
“to be on the outside is to be not only oppositional, but dysfunctional” and as this 
“culture of reluctant opponent” permeates all parts of the Malaysian social order, 
notwithstanding the increasingly influential roles of liberals and social reformers, the 
likelihood of a cohesive counter-hegemony taking root was remote.198   
                    Hilley’s enquiry examines the Mahathirist bloc through a three-fronted 
view of hegemony that adopts the typology of economic, political, and ideological 
forms: the economic bloc is assessed as a reward system with the responsibility for 
organizing capital allocation through corruption, cronyism, and nepotism; the political 
component considers legitimacy at the political level of the UMNO system; and the 
ideological form examines the bloc’s exclusive control and representation of 
intellectual discourse to craft and rearrange societal consensus.199  Hilley also has 
much to say about Gramsci’s notions on counter-hegemony in terms of Mahathir’s 
successful efforts to mitigate challenge.  Mahathir’s realignment of the bloc following 
the 1987/8 UMNO split, his negotiation of the “shift towards civil consensus” during 
the 1990s, and his moves to achieve political consensus in the face of neo-liberal and 
neo-corporatist pressures from the mid-1990s should be seen, therefore, in the light of 
hegemonic refurbishment in the face of potential counter-hegemony.200  Hilley 
commits several chapters to considering the intellectual effectiveness of counter-
hegemonic deliberations constructed around alternative liberal, reformist, and Islamic 
discourse on political cultural identity vis-a-viz Mahathir’s hegemonic developmental 
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visions.201  Particularly salient is Hilley’s view on the “fresh opportunities for 
meaningful counter-hegemony” offered by the 1997 regional economic crisis and 
Mahathir’s role in the fall from grace of his heir apparent Deputy Prime Minister 
Anwar Ibrahim in 1999.   
 
2.1 Towards crisis and hegemonic challenge   
                     Hilley makes much of the opportunity for hegemonic refurbishment 
privatization offered Mahathir.  Business community co-operation with the regime 
was strengthened by the transfer of wealth and resources to selected politico-corporate 
elites thereby reminding the private sector of the value of co-operation with the 
regime.202  In terms of hegemonic refurbishment, privatization enabled alliance 
interests to be re-aligned through the patronage process and as state control tightened 
by transferring wealth and resources to selected politico-corporate elites.203  
Privatization nevertheless carried its own pragmatic logic in that by reflecting the neo-
liberal/monetarist orthodoxy ascendant in the West during the late 1980s, Mahathir’s 
privatization agenda encouraged FDI-led development by improving international 
confidence in Malayasia’s domestic economic adjustments.204  Neo-liberal reforms, 
and the proliferation of portfolio-based FDI investment through the 1990s alongside 
endemic corruption and cronyism were themselves key contributors to the economic 
crisis that hit Malaysia during 1997 and aroused the most significant challenge 
Mahathir’s hegemonic agendas had faced.  Meeting domestic and international 
demands for liberal reform highlighted for Mahathir the dilemma implicit in 
balancing more open markets with preserving politico-business control.  By offering 
new and broader patronage opportunities that included benefiting Chinese corporate 
interests, the privatization process was able to be represented as conforming to 
Mahathir’s Vision 2020 legitimizing priorities of “social accommodation across the 
ethnic spectrum” to ensure more equitable inter-ethnic distribution and thus fortifying 
regime legitimacy.205   
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                       Mahathir sought to build consensus and manage tensions within the 
political bloc by reforming social ideas as necessary; his harnessing of the global 
Islamic resurgence that had taken root in Malaysia during the 1980s typified the 
approach.206  The hegemonic crisis created by the UMNO split in 1988 arising out of 
differing policy perspectives towards economic development207 revealed in its 
aftermath a fundamental shift in the intra-regime alliance arrangement of the 
Mahathirist political bloc.208  From Hilley’s Gramscian view point, Mahathir’s 
resolution of the UMNO was treating the situation as a hegemonic opportunity to 
remodel the political basis of the party and the bloc in his favour.  As a consequence 
Mahathir was required to return to active consensus-building to consolidate the bloc’s 
electoral basis but, by the mid-1990s, bloc stability was coming to depend largely 
upon the positioning of such senior party figures as his heir apparent, Anwar Ibrahim.   
                           In terms of a Gramscian ideological bloc, Hilley explains the 
oncoming counter-hegemonic crisis as arising out of compounding differences 
between Mahathir and Anwar’s alternative representations of Mahathir’s Vision 
project against the background of the succession issue.  Although he had designated 
Anwar as his successor, Mahathir insisted upon controlling the timing of the 
accession and while differences were apparent between the two they were kept muted.  
Essentially, Anwar’s superior Islamic intellectual qualities and credentials and 
Mahathir’s unquestionably pre-eminent political dexterity accentuated the differences.  
The basis of their differences was that Mahathir’s version of his Vision 2020 required 
“restrained liberal development” and contradicted Anwar’s tentative shift towards 
free-market liberal reforms.209  The socio-political substance of Anwar’s counter-
hegemonic stance was his association with the theme of cleansing Malaysian society’s 
propensity for collusion, cronyism, and nepotism.210   
                    When the economic crisis hit Malaysia in 1997 the main concern among 
the Malaysian elites was that the economic woes would deteriorate into political and 
ideological crises.  Put in Gramscian terms, “an organic crisis of hegemony” was 
threatening and heeding the Gramscian imperative that as “hegemony is always a 
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three-fronted affair, a crisis at one level may be offset at another”211 as the crisis 
deepened Hilley suggests Mahathir responded by strengthening the political bloc and 
using his “ideological network” to tighten control.212  The subsequent public emphasis 
on sustaining Bumiputera rights and business privileges, a corresponding and 
offsetting strengthening of Chinese capital, and Mahathir’s role in Anwar’s arrest and 
character assassination, can be seen in these terms and, as such, necessary techniques 
of Gramscian hegemonic adjustment.213             
 
2.2  An emergent counter-hegemony?   
                     The intellectual base of the counter-hegemonic alternative to Mahathir’s 
Vision 2020 project consolidated around three prime issues: an alternative Islamic 
model of development, the inherent Malay-Islamic dialectic, and Islam’s socio-
political linkage to reformasi.214  In discussing the tensions the issues aroused, Hilley 
uses an approach consistent with Gramsci’s understanding of the roles of the organic 
and traditional intellectuals.215  The resulting political counter-hegemony was linked 
to reformasi but also united sympathies beyond Malaysian Islam.  The treatment of 
Anwar and his family by the police, other law enforcement agencies, and the courts 
themselves, brought the judicial system into growing disrepute and forced brooding 
Malay resentment into a “moral camp” that was Islamic and secular, both finding 
voice in the growing calls for reformasi.216   
                     To constitute an effective Gramscian counter-hegemony, popular dissent 
must be led by intellectuals who can bridge the feelings of people and their leaders 
and be capable of combining with mainstream elements to work together as an 
organic entity by thinking strategically and avoiding narrow party interests.217  Hilley 
argues that by late 1999, although a shift in popular consciousness was apparent and 
opening new challenges to the prevailing bloc, a counter-hegemonic intellectual 
leadership had not yet become strong enough strategically to take control of reformasi 
and displace Mahathir.218  The nucleus of an alternative bloc was nevertheless 
                                                           
211 Cited in Hilley, (2001), p. 101. 
212 Hilley, (2001), pp. 117-46. 
213 Hilley, (2001), pp. 101-2. 
214 Hilley, (2001), PP. 186-201. 
215 Hilley, (2001), pp. 178-249. 
216 Hilley, (2001), pp. 206-13. 
217 A. Showstack Sassoon, (1980), pp. 162-80. 
218 Hilley, (2001), p. 249. 
 54
evident, and Mahathirism was beginning to suffer the feared three-fronted crisis of 
hegemony.219  Although a significant level of economic recovery was taking place by 
mid- to late 1999, small business was still resentful of Mahathir’s bail-out of big 
corporate capital and foreign capital had become increasingly estranged.  Mahathirism 
was still experiencing a crisis of economic hegemony.220  Hilley points out that 
because of the high public regard for Mahathir’s handling of the economic crisis the 
consensual element of the political bloc could not be dismissed and kept Mahathir 
from sharing Suharto’s fate.  Nevertheless, with the popular shift away from UMNO, 
the political bloc had also come under crisis and reformasi was drawing increasing 
support, particularly in the rural areas.221   
                      Although the economy was recovering, Mahathir’s Vision 2020 project 
was also facing new forms of political pressure in the form of growing ideological 
dissent.222  Hilley notes that the validity of the Gramscian project requires that the 
leading discourse be accepted “as internal to the system, whether through passive 
resignation or common-sense approval”.223  There were thus two essential reasons for 
the gathering ideological crisis.  First, ongoing public anger at Anwar’s treatment and 
the way hegemonic discourse was used to facilitate Anwar’s fall had brought 
Mahathir’s Vision 2020 to a new level of public disrepute.224  Second, the crisis of 
ideology had resulted in a loss of moral authority.  Many Malaysians were now 
supporting Mahathir on the economy, but backing reformasi “on the moral front”.225   
                    Following a snap poll on 29 November 1999, Mahathir secured a fifth 
successive term in office, albeit with significant inroads cut into UMNO’s majority 
and the Muslim party PAS emerging as the main parliamentary opposition, picking up 
much of the new Malay floating vote.226  Hilley sees the result as confirming a 
broadening cleavage across Malaysian society that suggested a growing rural-urban 
divide, a rejection of Vision 2020 developmentalism, new impetus for a PAS-Islamic 
counter-vision committed to cleansing corruption and a real alternative to the UMNO 
system.227  Despite Mahathir’s victory the bloc was still in evident crisis and Hilley 
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offers four main reasons for this.  First, notwithstanding the economic recovery and 
their 1999 electoral victory, UMNO remained seriously damaged.  Second, a coherent 
opposition was now in evidence as an alternative to the UMNO system.   Third, with 
Mahathir having secured a further secure mandate, the problems of corruption and 
cronyism within the system were likely to remain.  And, fourth, UMNO now faced a 
coherent and organized Islamic counter-force with the potential of becoming a 
realistic counter-bloc if it could develop a coherent and consensual alternative to 
Mahathirist “ethnic politics and the class basis on which they were built.”228         
                      In terms of testing the value of a Gramscian perspective to explain the 
rise and fall of the Suharto New Order, Hilley’s Mahathirist project offers a number 
of key insights.  First, and foremost, to achieve desired socio-political and economic 
ends, Mahathirism exercised the Gramscian prerogative of preparedness, as necessary, 
to negotiate with the masses’ ideas and values beyond his ruling order’s own interests 
and agendas.229  Second, while Mahathirist hegemonic discourse placed a necessarily 
heavy emphasis upon ideology, Mahathir never lost sight of the potential for 
challenge from traditional values and hegemonic refurbishment ensured that they 
were appropriately assimilated into regime agendas.  Third, the Mahathirist project 
also highlights the Gramscian requirement that regime ideological legitimacy be 
constantly reconstructed to ensure that the consensual aspects of hegemony balance 
the need for elements of domination and ethnic manipulation.  To face each new 
crisis, Mahathirism therefore rebuilt support for hegemonic agendas by refining the 
imagery of hegemonic ideological discourse.  Fourth, Hilley’s Mahathirist project was 
highlighted by an ability to manage opportunities, as they arose, so that a meaningful 
counter-hegemony did not emerge around the issues of leadership transition, 
reformasi, and the 1997 regional economic crisis.  This was achieved by regularly 
renegotiating civil consensus through a strategic approach to hegemonic 
refurbishment.  Moreover, Mahathirist hegemonic discourse proved able to mitigate 
the ideological tensions aroused by the evolving Islamic-secularism dialectic and, by 
splintering the forces of reformasi, prevented a cohesive counter-hegemony being 
formed.    
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2.3  Comparing the constitutional basis of hegemony: Malaysia and 
Indonesia  
                   While a comprehensive comparison of Malaysia’s federal constitution and 
that of the unitary Indonesian Republic is beyond the scope of this research, it is 
useful to identify those aspects that provide the core frameworks for the maintenance 
of hegemony in each case.  As will be outlined in chapter 2, by institutionalizing an 
exclusive representation of the state ideology Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia provided the Suharto New Order a means to balance coercion 
and consensus to legitimize their domination of all aspects of Indonesian life.  By 
returning to the original spirit of Pancasila, formalized in the preamble to the 1945 
Constitution, Suharto’s New Order were provided with the most vital function of 
hegemony: the means to achieve the ideological conformity that could institutionalize 
their moral and intellectual right to rule.  As Suharto put it, his regime’s return to the 
1945 Constitution, together with its pure implementation of the state ideology, 
enabled ordering the entire life of the nation.  Moreover, legitimized by the Pancasila 
derivative dwi fungsi, it would be the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia 
(ABRI)230 that would carry the responsibility for upholding and protecting both the 
Constitution and Pancasila and thus the role of fulfilling the coercive aspects of New 
Order hegemony.   
                        The fundamental feature of Malaysian constitutional policy has been a 
social contract that accorded special privileges to the indigenous bumiputera majority 
in return for citizenship and fundamental freedoms for the non-bumiputera 
population.231  The strategic alliance that evolved from this arrangement effectively 
underpinned the consensual aspect of Mahathirist hegemonic authority by 
legitimizing the leadership at the national-popular level.  The constitutional positive 
discrimination derived in favour of bumiputera has not so much been to protect the 
minority as to advance the position of the majority.232  The coercive aspects of 
Mahathirist hegemony, while not benefiting from a military as highly empowered as 
that of the Armed Forces in Indonesia, have been no less effective through 
constitutional means.  The Internal Security Act (1960) designed to combat terrorism 
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and subversion after the end of the 1948 emergency, remains in force today and 
defines the basis of Mahathirism’s hegemonic coercion.233  Checks on the Act’s 
emergency powers continue to rest in the hands of the executive office.234  To assume 
the emergency powers permitted under the Constitution, the government merely needs 
to proclaim the existence of an emergency.  Effectively, the emergency powers 
granted under the Malaysian Constitution are such that unless the executive can be 
trusted to act wisely and constitutionally, they could be used to create a “coercive 
dictatorship under the guise of Constitutional action.”235  Moreover, although the 
Constitution grants all citizens the right to freedom of speech and expression plus the 
right to associate peacefully and form associations, Parliament may impose on these 
rights “such restrictions as it deems necessary or expedient in the interests of the 
security of the federation or any part thereof.”236      
                    Clearly both the Malaysian and Indonesian Constitutions provided 
adequate means to satisfy both the coercive and consensual demands of Gramscian 
hegemonic legitimacy.  The Suharto New Order’s rendering of Pancasila as civil 
persuasion, however, remained passive, albeit subject to reactive impulses when 
changing circumstances demanded, but Mahathirist hegemonic imagery showed itself 
to be a dynamic affair.  The Mahathirist vision was able to evolve in line with the 
changing perceptions of Malaysia’s demanding modernizing society and the 
increasingly contested site that Malaysian society had come to represent, yet was still 
able to sustain its own basic hegemonic agendas.   
 
3.  The Propositions 
                     From the outline and analysis of Gramsci’s writings, four propositions 
have been derived to test the extent to which Gramsci’s analytical/theoretical 
framework, developed in the context of post-Marxist thought and Italian politics of 
the 1920s and 1930s, provides a significant explanation of the more contemporary 
situation of a rapidly industrializing and changing Indonesia in the three decades of 
the Suharto New Order.  For Gramsci’s ideas and analysis, which do not rely on a 
                                                           
233 The Act’s sweeping powers include the right to; restrict movement and residence, prevent 
publication, prevent the promotion of hostility between races, prevent any act prejudicial to the national 
interest, and impose indefinite preventive detention.  Harry E. Groves, The Constitution of Malaysia, 
(Malaysia Publications Ltd., Singapore, 1964), pp. 208-10. 
234 Harding, (1996), p. 159. 
235 Harding, (1996), p. 166. 
236 Harding, (1996), p. 189. 
 58
particular geographic region, social cultural or political-economic context, to have 
continuing relevance they need to be able to explain to a significant extent the 
developments in a situation such as Suharto’s New Order in Indonesia.  
 
3.1  Proposition 1: That the Gramscian historic bloc – through its 
economic, political and ideological forms – explains the Suharto New 
Order regime’s hegemonic domination.  
                      Proposition 1 draws upon Gramsci’s understanding of the historic bloc 
(comprising three overlapping and mutually inclusive economic, political and 
ideological forms) as an historical process within which hegemony is negotiated and 
sustained (above, section 1.1, p. 20 and section 1.7, pp. 37-39).  Hegemonic order thus 
derived becomes legitimate when solidarity has been negotiated both within the 
dominant elite groupings and then between them and sympathetic, yet subordinate, 
groups by differentiating two separate forms of socio-political control: domination as 
physical coercion and hegemonic direction as ideological power through consensus 
and socio-political support (above, section 1.2, p. 22).  The proposition also draws 
upon Gramsci’s insistence on the need to balance coercion with persuasion through 
ongoing ideological refurbishment sustaining the historic bloc and thus hegemonic 
order (above, section 1.4, pp. 30-31).  Gramsci’s writings (above, section 1.4, pp. 28-
29 and pp. 31-32) explain how hegemonic order is associated with ideology and 
primarily practiced in the arena of the parliamentary system characterized by a 
combination of legitimate coercion/force and consent/compromise, without the former 
dominating the later.  Finally, the Proposition draws upon Gramsci’s views on how 
the historic bloc directs and sustains its hegemonic socio-political realities by its 
organization through the bloc’s organic constituency (above, section 1.9, pp. 40-42) 
of religion and political parties (above, section 1.8, pp. 39-40).    
 
3.2  Proposition 2: That Gramsci’s theories on hegemonic crisis and 
counter-hegemony explain, to a substantial degree, the hegemonic 
obsolescence and decay that led to the Suharto New Order collapsing in 
1997/8.  
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Proposition 2 draws upon Gramsci’s writings (above, section 1.6, pp. 35-37) on the 
likelihood of hegemonic decay and obsolescence resulting when hegemonic 
legitimacy is able to be questioned thus enabling a coherent counter-hegemony 
emerging.  Only so long as the dominant class is able to co-opt and sustain 
subordinate consent to its agendas does that class remain hegemonic (above, section 
1.5, p. 34).  Hegemonic domination remains legitimate only so long as the ruling 
arrangement is able to sustain the cohesive ideological alliances with subordinate 
groups on which its hegemony has been built (above, section 1.6, p. 36).  Hegemony 
must never be taken for granted and the broad and diverse pluralities of interests that 
are a feature of modernizing industrial societies require hegemony’s constant 
readjustment and renegotiation (above, section 1.6, pp. 36-37).  The Proposition also 
draws upon Gramsci’s insistence that as a result of hegemonic decay and 
obsolescence should hegemonic challenge actually take place, it does so within the 
socio-political environment of legitimate political and ideological debate (above, 
section 1.6, p. 36).  Finally, the Proposition draws upon Gramsci’s views that 
hegemonic obsolescence and decay can evolve into a coherent counter-hegemony out 
of such issues as a questioning of the allocation of benefits, the permissible range of 
societal disagreement based upon the legitimacy of the hegemonic representation of 
ideology, and the effectiveness of the institutions through which societal agreement 
has been sustained (above, section 1.6, p. 37). 
 
3.3  Proposition 3: That the Suharto New Order’s representation of 
Pancasila as the ‘ideological pillar’ of the Indonesian state, to a large 
degree fulfils the function of a Gramscian discourse of ideological 
legitimacy.  
                     Proposition 3 draws upon Gramsci’s approach to influencing socio-
political behaviour that tied the hegemonic use of ideology to national culture (above, 
section 1.1, p. 20 and section 1.3, p. 26). When a ruling order has articulated and 
proliferated cultural and belief systems throughout society to the extent that they are 
accepted as universally valid by the general population, that class ruling arrangement 
can be seen to have assumed a hegemonic role over society (above, section 1.4, p. 28).  
Because of the critical importance Gramsci’s writings applied to the use of ideology 
in crafting mass consciousness so as to establish moral and intellectual legitimacy, 
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understanding the nature and workings of the ideological bloc is important to the 
Proposition (above, section 1.1, p. 20).  Pancasila’s deployment by the New Order as 
an instrument of ideological unity is the over-riding theme of this Proposition and 
draws strongly on Gramsci’s theories on the use of ideology in this manner (above, 
section 1.2, pp. 24-26).  Gramsci’s hegemonic use of ideology to offer a flexible and 
comprehensive world-view that would underwrite a particular way of life, coupled 
with the socio-political force of strong leadership (Gramsci’s direzione) provides the 
Proposition strong analytical validity (above section 1.4, pp. 29-32).  The Proposition 
also draws upon Gramsci’s views as to how culture and ideology can be employed to 
institutionalize hegemony and underpin the interests of a dominant class’s socio-
political arrangements (above, section 1.5, pp. 32-33).  True hegemony, Gramsci 
argues, can only come about when a dominant class’s socio-political arrangements 
have gained societal acceptance of that class’s ideological legitimacy as a reflection of 
more than simple economic interests (above, section 1.5, p. 33).  Gramscian 
hegemony is based upon a combination of strategic alliances with subordinate groups 
and ruling arrangements that articulate the legitimacy of the ruling order’s prime 
interests and values through ideological discourse (above, section 1.5, p. 34).  Finally, 
the Proposition draws from Gramsci’s insistence that ongoing, direct, leadership 
requires the ruling order’s exclusively derived rendering of ideology constantly 
assimilating subordinate values as necessary to ensure it continues to represent a 
general national interest (above, section 1.5, p. 34).     
 
3.4  Proposition 4: That the Gramscian model of hegemonic order, with 
its emphasis on ‘ideology and culture’, substantially explains Indonesia 
during the post-Suharto era in the context of the global spread of 
liberal democratic ideals and resurgent socio-political Islam.  
                        Proposition 4 derives from Gramsci’s thoughts on counter-hegemony 
and contrasts them in the New Order context of the oppositionally-enclined traditional 
intellectuals of Islam, from the perspective of a resurgent Islam with its potentially 
counter-hegemonic, alternative rendering of the state’s ideological underpinnings, 
challenging the regime’s conservative secular-nationalist socio-political stance 
(above, section 1.2, p. 23).  The proposition also calls upon Gramsci’s views as to the 
site of hegemonic contestation – the institutions of civil society including the political 
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system, political parties and religious groupings – wherein an alternative hegemony 
can form around an alternative coherent rendering of ideology (above, section 1.8, pp. 
39-40).  Gramsci’s theories on the role of intellectuals in influencing mass behaviour 
and consciousness by forming arrangements able to influence social stability and 
effect social change (above, section 1.9, pp. 40-41) are drawn upon to support 
Proposition 4, as are his views on the potential for ideological conflict between 
organic intellectuals, that transmit a system of beliefs on behalf of their hegemonic 
sponsors (above, section 1.9, p. 41 and section 1.9.1, pp. 42-46) and traditional 
intellectuals, that offer a traditional historic constituency representing mass 
subordinate interests in conflict with the immediate interests of the dominant order 
(above, section 1.9.2, p. 46).   
    
4.  Thesis structure 
                      Testing the Gramscian model against the Suharto New Order and 
offering the regime as an example of Gramscian hegemonic order (an historic bloc) 
focuses on two specific issues: first, the language of an elite-driven social politics 
advanced through ideological discourse over an historic period and second, the 
machinations and manipulations of economic, political, and ideological hegemony in a 
quest for legitimacy and continuity in the face of potential ideological challenge.  The 
focus is on the means and devices through which an historic bloc gains national 
acceptance of the moral and intellectual legitimacy of its socio-political and economic 
dominance.  The thesis addresses the first issue by explaining the relationships 
between state and society through political agents and relevant enabling social 
processes that combine elements of both domination and consent.  This requires 
explaining the ruling establishment’s two major socio-political strategies of 
structuring and stabilization through centralized decision-making in the context of a 
Gramscian historic bloc’s three specific forms.  The Gramscian perspective tests the 
second issue of hegemonic legitimacy by explaining the New Order’s use of Pancasila 
(the official state ideology) as hegemonic discourse in establishing and sustaining the 
moral and intellectual legitimacy of regime dominance.   
                  It is the contention of this thesis that the Suharto New Order’s domination 
of Indonesian life for some thirty years and its subsequent failure offers a highly 
relevant context in which to test Antonio Gramsci’s model of social politics and 
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hegemonic legitimacy.  The contrast requires assessing the Suharto New Order’s 
orderly balancing of economic, political and ideological power through “an integrated 
set of state-class accommodations and ideological mediations” over an extended 
historic period defined by Gramsci’s insights into the dualities of coercion and 
consensus.237  This enables determining how closely the New Order is explained by 
the essence of Gramscian hegemonic order in subordinating the Indonesian nation to 
the legitimacy of their “certain ideal of collective life”.238  In terms of testing 
Gramscian hegemonic refurbishment, the research examines the New Order’s need to 
realign its hegemonic arrangements by assimilating subordinate interests into its 
alliance structure in the face of new and changing socio-political realities and 
challenge.  Gramsci’s theories of the relationship between ideological discourse, 
hegemonic challenge, hegemonic crisis, and counter-hegemony, prima facie suggest a 
close match leading to valuable insights into the consequences for regime hegemony 
of political Islam’s regeneration in Indonesia from the mid-1980s and to question the 
ideal meaning and intent of the state ideology Pancasila, subsequent resurgent 
secular-nationalism and growing demands for reformasi dan demokrasi through the 
1990s and the collapse of the New Order bloc in 1998.239   Focusing on the ‘how’ and 
‘why’ of New Order development and collapse, the research addresses four issues in 
terms of the Gramscian model of hegemonic order, obsolescence, crisis, and counter-
hegemony.  The thesis therefore considers four Propositions:   
• Proposition 1: That the Suharto New Order historic bloc - through its 
economic, political and ideological forms - matches the Gramscian model in 
terms of the regime’s representation of ideology in legitimizing its moral and 
intellectual leadership and reshaping societal perceptions of the mutual 
conditions of socio-political and economic existence;240     
• Proposition 2: That Gramsci’s theories on hegemonic crisis and refurbishment 
and emergent counter-hegemony explain, to a substantial degree, the 
hegemonic obsolescence and decay that led to the Suharto New Order 
collapsing in 1997/8 in contrast to the twin-crises explanation;   
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• Proposition 3: That the New Order’s representation of Pancasila as the 
‘ideological pillar’ of the Indonesian state, to a large degree fulfils the 
function of a Gramscian discourse of ideological legitimacy;   
• Proposition 4: That the Gramscian model of hegemonic order, with its 
emphasis on ‘ideology and culture’, substantially explains Indonesia during 
the post-Suharto era in the context of the global spread of liberal democratic 
ideals and resurgent socio-political Islam. 
                    In contrasting the New Order’s three decade socio-political progression 
against the Gramscian model of hegemonic order this thesis employs the 
methodological construct of his historic bloc.  The Introductory chapter has detailed 
the background to the research, the arguments put forward for testing within the 
thesis’s Gramscian perspective and the themes and issues examined.  Chapter 1 has 
identified and discussed the theoretical detail of the key elements of the Gramscian 
model for testing in this thesis: his theoretical association with the ideas of Karl Marx, 
hegemony and hegemonic order, the historic bloc, his ideological and legitimizing 
functionaries (intellectuals), and counter-hegemony.  The chapter included a review of 
John Hilley’s recent Malaysian project that contrasts Mahathirism with the Gramscian 
model of hegemonic order and concludes by arguing that Gramsci’s insights remain 
highly relevant to a contemporary context and will be robust when tested against the 
behaviour of the Suharto New Order.  The Gramscian perspective informing the 
research requires identifying a critical link between Gramscian hegemonic discourse 
(reflecting the search for intellectual and ideological leadership) and the official 
ideology of the New Order Indonesian state, Pancasila.  Chapter 2, therefore, 
underpins Proposition 3 by explaining the Suharto New Order’s exclusive 
representation of the state ideology and its use as dialogue and symbolism to unify the 
state behind regime socio-political and economic agendas and define the parameters of 
ideological conformity.  The chapter observes doctrinal interpretation and articulation 
as elite discourse that reflects the Suharto regime’s interests and values to legitimize 
the moral and intellectual substance of their socio-political leadership.  Gramsci 
observes a close relationship between ideology and culture and Chapter 3 observes the 
particular nature of Indonesian political culture and outlines the ideological, political 
and economic background of the research.   
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                      Chapters 4, 5, and 6 underpin Proposition 1 by explaining the three 
overlapping economic, political, and ideological aspects of the New Order’s 
arrangement of Indonesian life and contrast each with the Gramscian model of 
hegemonic order.  Underpinning all three is the key element of Gramscian ideological 
legitimacy.  Each chapter compares New Order behaviour with the Gramscian 
imperative that ideology be effectively assimilated into the national consciousness by 
balancing a duality of coercion and electoral and democratic procedure (consensus) 
without the former dominating in sustaining consensual subordination to regime 
leadership agendas.  Chapter 4 examines the economic form of the bloc and describes 
the New Order’s corporatist/developmental-state model and its hegemonic schema of 
coercion, co-optation, consensus, and patronage to achieve economic legitimacy, 
stability and ultimately, successful economic development.  In terms of the moral and 
intellectual (ideological) legitimacy that underpins Gramscian hegemony, the chapter 
focuses upon the Pancasila-ist nature of the New Order economy.   
                    Chapter 5 examines the construction and maintenance of the New Order’s 
political arrangement of Indonesian society and the organization of political legitimacy 
through a balancing of socio-political consensus with coerced conformity, unity, and 
stability.  The chapter explains how, by rationalizing socio-political interests in its own 
image, the New Order actively depoliticized the majority of society through an agenda 
of persuasion, co-optation, and consensus based on an exclusive representation of 
Pancasila and its socio-political derivatives.  In the Indonesian context, a Gramscian 
perspective raises two specific issues; the extent to which New Order hegemony was 
morally and intellectually legitimate and, in terms of the regime’s disintegration in 
1997/8, whether failure was one of hegemonic obsolescence due to an inability to 
refurbish legitimacy in the face of a nascent counter-hegemony.  In political terms 
both issues relate to whether the New Order political bloc represented political 
legitimacy merely through arrangements of elite class interests or whether the bloc 
was able to successfully and broadly consensualise the New Order’s ruling class ideas 
on political objectives.241  Explaining political control as a consensual crafting of 
national-popular support therefore requires examining the political organization of the 
bloc, the tensions imposed upon it by opposing socio-political forces, the shifting 
alliances required within the bloc to accommodate these forces, and the level of 
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political and ideological consciousness Pancasila demokrasi sustained at the mass 
level.242   
               Chapter 6 outlines the bloc’s ideological form and in reference to 
Gramscian terms examines the processes by which the New Order obtained the active 
consent of those it governed and to the legitimacy of their moral and intellectual 
leadership through their exclusive rendering of the state ideology Pancasila.  Chapter 
7 provides substance to Proposition 2 by examining critically the processes of 
challenge and crises leading to the eventual collapse of the Suharto New Order in 
1998 and provides a narrative account of the events that led to Suharto’s New Order 
collapsing.  The research’s explicit ideological approach emphasizes a Gramscian 
approach which requires expression through the three overlapping components of a 
Gramscian historic bloc as being a more effective analytical alternative than the 
popular ‘twin-crises’ approach.  It is therefore appropriate that following the narrative 
summary of the New Order collapse there follow an explicit summary of the bloc’s 
failure in terms of each of its three Gramscian components.  Chapter 7 concludes thus 
with a comment as to how effectively the New Order’s demise is explained through a 
failure of ideological legitimacy within each of the blocs’ economic, political and 
ideological forms.   
               The concluding chapter 8 evaluates the sturdiness of the match between 
the Gramscian model of hegemonic order and New Order socio-political 
arrangements and argues that the collapse of Suharto’s New Order is explained more 
appropriately as hegemonic failure through obsolescence and decay due to the 
regime’s loss of moral and ideological legitimacy.  Moreover, advancing beyond the 
twin economic and political crises explanation and adducing the Gramscian model, 
the conclusion argues that regime collapse was a consequence of ideological 
obsolescence through the failure of Pancasila, the bloc’s binding ideological glue, to 
respond to counter-hegemonic interpretations and challenge.  Thus, sensitive to the 
Gramscian determinism that underwrites the thesis, the efficaciousness of New Order 
hegemony is qualified in terms of the degree of ideological legitimacy consensually 
acknowledged by Indonesian society through the regime’s exclusive possession of the 
doctrine of Pancasila as its only effective means of fabricating ideological conformity 
and socio-political unity.   
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4.1  Methodology and literary sources   
                        This study employs research methods synonymous with accepted 
historical and political science analysis requiring investigation of both prime and 
secondary sources of information contained in academic publications, journals and 
media articles.  The relevant literature forms two groups: those applicable to Antonio 
Gramsci and his works, and those concerning Indonesia.  Qualitative assessment 
separated the literature further, into political theory and the case study to which it was 
applied.  Theoretically, Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks formed the major primary 
literary source, supplemented by Gramsci specialists, chroniclers and critics providing 
the secondary sources.  Publications on contemporary Indonesian history and politics 
comprised the secondary sources for the Indonesian case study, and proved to be of 
varying quality in terms of objectivity.  Although taken on their merit, and the 
objectivity of their authors’ scholarship and experiences, this study has applied 
qualitative consideration to origin of publication, assessing validity of those outside of 
Indonesia, or within the Republic during Suharto’s Presidency.  The veracity of 
Indonesian media articles and local publications of the Suharto era, therefore require 
qualitative judgment, and the writer has endeavoured throughout the study to 
emphasize this point.      
                        
5.  Summary  
                   The aim of this thesis is to test the Gramscian model of hegemonic 
order in a contemporary context against the three decade socio-political and economic 
behaviour of Indonesia’s Suharto New Order.  Gramsci’s understanding of hegemonic 
order, that views the participatory politics of a modern pluralist capitalist society as an 
intricate relationship between culture and politics legitimately drawing a disparate 
social reality into a cohesive unity, offers an ideal framework within which to explain 
New Order domination.243  Gramsci’s insights on the likelihood of hegemonic 
obsolescence and decay opening the way for a counter-hegemony forming about an 
alternative cohesive rendering of ideology clearly have much to offer in helping to 
explain the challenges faced by the Suharto New Order during the 1990s.  Gramsci’s 
insights also strengthen the thesis’s implicit ideological approach to explaining the 
challenges New Order legitimacy faced from resurgent Islam, the global spread of 
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liberal democracy from the late-1980s and the twin economic and political crises that 
led to the New Order collapsing in 1998.  The Gramscian model is timely in that the 
very essence of Gramscian hegemony - strong socio-political decision-making based 
upon ideological (moral and intellectual) leadership functioning as legitimate state 
activity - offers a powerful means of approaching social politics in the contemporary 
era of Islamic socio-political resurgence.  Gramsci’s observations also, significantly, 
emphasize an element of caution.  Although hegemonic discourse built around an 
exclusive rendering of ideology might engender a degree of genuine national 
consciousness and ideological unity, Gramsci reminds that on the one hand hegemony 
must never be taken for granted and requires constant re-assessment and, on the other, 
that there might be considerable variation between the pervasiveness of the state’s 
hegemonic efforts and the degree of active participation fostered.244     
                Hilley’s project and his insights into the Mahathirism’s hegemonic 
project also provides valuable assistance to the thesis by validating the perspective 
employed through its demonstration that Gramsci’s theories can be applied readily 
and effectively to a contemporary Southeast Asian developmental-state context.  He 
demonstrates how robust the Gramscian model can be today by the way he was able 
to employ it in explaining Mahathirism’s use of hegemonic discourse to rationalize 
the highly dynamic issues of ideology and culture and their socio-political impact on 
contemporary Malaysian development.  Moreover, Hilley has demonstrated that 
considerable value can be drawn from the Gramscian model’s implication that 
leadership prepared to assimilate traditional interests into regime agendas to 
ameliorate tensions between coercive and co-optive state strategies can effectively 
sustain consensual hegemonic legitimacy.     
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Chapter 2 
 
The Suharto New Order and Pancasila: the dialogue of 
ideological legitimacy 
 
1.  Introduction  
                     Alagappa notes that since the end of World War 2, the principle concern 
for most Asian countries has been regime political survival.245  Since 1945 this 
concern has been evinced in the proliferation of civil war, armed insurgency, coup 
d’etat, regional rebellion and revolution coupled with considerable ethno-religious 
unrest challenging incumbent regimes.  Colonial rule invariably destroyed traditional 
political systems so new regimes were under almost constant pressure to construct 
new political systems more attuned to hegemonic agendas to maintain their socio-
political legitimacy.  In traditional life across the region inequality existed alongside a 
spirit of partnership and common consultation and while government had authority 
over village life, it did not have so within the village where the over-riding emphasis 
was upon community and co-operation.246  Western influence did little to alter this 
traditional way of life and the newly empowered indigenous classes, often themselves 
with roots in the former colonial system, became heavily influenced by Western 
political ideas.247  Constitutional parliaments and national assemblies formed an 
“almost automatic component”248 of newly independent Asian states, but the resulting 
democratic institutions were often merely intended to gain international respectability 
and, as in the case of the Indonesian parliament that functioned from 1950 to 1955 
without an electoral mandate, many were patently “rotten”.249  Western political ideas 
embracing variants of democracy, socialism, and communism fed the de-colonisation 
phase but as well as legitimising new political systems they also provided rallying 
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points to challenge incumbent regimes.250  Revolutionary independence movements 
tended to master parliamentary processes once they were in power but decisions came 
to be made by the movement’s chief executive, thus, notwithstanding outward 
appearances, many functioned more as monocracies than democracies.  Democracy’s 
inherent shortcomings were further reflected in the fluctuating quality and liberality 
they exhibited through such variants as Malaysia’s participatory democracy, 
Sukarno’s guided democracy in Indonesia, and the peoples’ democracy of communist 
North Vietnam.  Shortcomings were invariably rationalised by power-holders 
claiming that their version of democracy merely reconciled the demands of 
modernisation with their peoples’ respective cultures.251   
                       Western traditions of communism and Marxism were also reinvented 
around local conditions to both challenge new political systems and even work in 
uncomfortable partnerships with them.  The often self-interested manoeuvrings of 
party politics in the region resulted in militaries expressing varying degrees of 
influence over national affairs and regime legitimacy.  A United States’ Senate 
Committee report in 1959 suggested that it should be United States policy to assist the 
officer corps of newly independent Southeast Asian states in acquiring sufficient 
“administrative and managerial skills … [to guarantee] their countrys’ stability”.252  
The balance between military and civil politics tilted back and forth with the public 
regarding the military as either a representative of the national will or as an executor 
of societal oppression.  Regime legitimacy thus tended to rest not so much upon the 
conventions of Western democracy but upon the trust the dominant order managed to 
engender among their people.253  Political security became the prime concern of most 
regimes and to legitimise their socio-political dominance national elites were required 
to stamp their authority on traditional life by placing a high premium upon economic 
development built upon national identity and unity, political stability, societal 
harmony, law and order.     
                      With protecting the incumbent political system the first priority and 
national identity and political legitimacy under persistent challenge, the problem of 
political survival required addressing important questions.  How the state was to be 
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organised politically and held together, and how the social and political stability 
necessary for economic development to legitimise regime authority could be 
maintained, were major issues.  Political elites came to equate regime survival with 
economic prosperity and recognised that the most likely source of threat would come 
from competing political ideas built about competing socio-cultural ideas and values.  
Because of their potentially adverse consequences for socio-political stability (and 
thus economic development) Western democratic political ideas and liberal notions of 
human rights came to be viewed generally in terms of a challenge to political 
legitimacy and thus regime survival.  Where such ideas were incorporated into regime 
agendas their processes were selective and their use exclusive to the pragmatic needs 
of ruling orders ever conscious of the potential for societal instability in socio-
political challenge built upon contrasting values and norms.  Political power thus 
came to be shaped by intricate inter-relationships between power, morally legitimate 
rule, a strong state, a single dominant political party, and the national 
consciousness.254  Political power also tended to rest upon a simultaneous use of 
coercive and consensual socio-politics.  While an in-depth critique of the doctrine of 
Pancasila is beyond the scope of this thesis, this chapter will rather describe how the 
collection of ideas (the synthesis of traditional culture and contemporary political 
thought) represented by the doctrine came to address these intricate relationships by 
creatively institutionalising the Suharto New Order’s dominance over Indonesian 
society.  The focus here is to outline and explain the role played by Pancasila in the 
‘rise and fall’ of the Suharto New Order leadership’s socio-political legitimacy. 
                      Together with the 1945 Indonesian Constitution, Pancasila demokrasi 
provided the New Order with a “formulaic representation” of how Indonesian socio-
political life could be managed to compel the Indonesian people to build a unitary 
nation based upon an exclusive interpretation of the human values of ethnicity, 
religious and regional tolerance, and social justice.255  Over some three decades, the 
New Order effectively appropriated in its entirety the meaning of the doctrine of 
Pancasila in a manner designed to legitimise the regime’s total domination of 
Indonesian life.  An extraordinary tool of mass socio-political control, the New 
Order’s exclusive interpretation of the doctrine left no doubts in the minds of the 
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Indonesian people as to the allowable extent of socio-political debate and 
contestation.  From the powerful position of an official state ideology, Pancasila was 
able to organise the most vital function of domination: by gaining social acquiescence 
to ideological conformity the doctrine conspired to institutionalise the regime’s moral 
and intellectual legitimacy to rule.  The chapter will first explain the origin and debate 
that surrounded Pancasila’s institutionalisation as the ideological foundation of the 
newly independent unitary Indonesian Republic.    
 
2.  The Sukarno ‘old’ order: Pancasila as the socio-political 
foundation of the independent unitary Indonesian state   
                  With the support of the Japanese during the last months of Japanese 
occupation a committee of prominent Indonesian nationalists was charged with 
preparing Indonesia for independence.  From the outset the committee was polarized 
between those who preferred a future independent Indonesian state based on secular-
nationalist principles, and those wanting an Islamic state.  Sukarno broke the impasse 
on June 1 1945 and in a speech thereafter known as Lahirnya Pancasila offered a 
compromise: independent Indonesian would be neither an Islamic nor a secular state 
but a Pancasila state arranged about the doctrine’s ‘five pillars’, or ‘five principles’, 
arranged in a specific order: 
1. Kebangsaan Indonesia (Indonesian nationhood or nationalism). 
2. Internationalism/Perikemanusiaan (Internationalism/humanitarianism). 
3. Mufakat/Demokrasi (Unanimous/ Consensus/Democracy). 
4. Kesejahteraan Sosial (Social Welfare). 
5. Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa (The One Lordship).256  
The document resulting from the Lahirnya Pancasila, and formalising the 
compromise, was referred to as the Piagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter) and signed in 
1945 by an ad-hoc committee drawn from the original investigating committee that 
included both Sukarno and his future vice-president Hatta.  The order the Jakarta 
Charter listed Pancasila‘s five principles subsequently changed from that of 
Sukarno’s June speech and the principle of One Lordship was elevated to the top of 
the order.  By prioritising the principle of One Lordship the tenet was seen as 
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implying a ‘guiding’ principle to which the other principles would be subordinated.  
Compounding future controversy, the Jakarta Charter also added to the first principle 
the phrase: “… with the obligation to carry out the Islamic syari’a for its 
adherents.”257  The extra phrase seemed to further imply that the state would assume 
responsibility for encouraging, if only among Muslims, the eventual realisation of 
Islamic law.    
                  Pancasila thus became a compromise between those who wanted an 
Islamic state and those desiring a secular state and, as represented by the Jakarta 
Charter, was intended to guide the drafting of Indonesia’s first constitution in 1945.  
To placate those non-Muslims seriously concerned by the One Lordship implications, 
the Constitution’s preamble omitted the obligation that the state enforces Islamic 
syari’a for Muslim adherents.  When the 1945 Constitution was finally ratified the 
meaning of Pancasila therefore differed from that of the Jakarta Charter.  While the 
first section of Article 29 of the Constitution affirmed the state would be based on the 
principle of One Lordship, the second section diluted the principle by guaranteeing 
the freedom of every person “to profess his/her own religion and to worship according 
to his/her own religion and belief”, which merely implied fealty to a single deity.258   
                   Eventually, after three years of military hostilities, the Dutch agreed in 
December 1948 to recognise the sovereign Republic of Indonesia and work began on 
a new, albeit provisional, 1950 Constitution that was intended to be ratified by an 
elected Constituent Assembly.  As the first general election was not held until 1955 
after some ten years of theoretical independence, an elected Constituent Assembly 
finally began work on the new constitution in November 1956.  The Assembly was 
immediately, and irreconcilably, divided into three factions.  There were those who 
wanted the amended Pancasila to underpin the state (mostly nationalists, Christians, 
and Hindus), those who wanted to exchange Pancasila for an Islamic foundation to 
the state (Islamic groups), and those who wanted to build the state upon Pancasila as 
a simple socio-economic construct (the communist and socialist groups).  After three 
years of debate and stalemate President Sukarno broke the deadlock on July 5 1959, 
dissolved parliament, and decreed a return to the original 1945 Constitution.   
                  Returning to the 1945 Constitution without the refinements of the Jakarta 
Charter was clearly a defeat for the Islamists but the move seemed to have the support 
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of the majority of the Indonesian people including the ABRI leadership.  The inability 
of the Constituent Assembly to reach consensus and the machinations that informed 
political debate disturbed most Indonesians and the generals saw parliament’s lack of 
cohesion as a likely flow-on to disunity and social instability.  ABRI also favoured the 
1945 Constitution as it represented the nation symbolically returning to the ‘pure 1945 
revolutionary spirit’ that had given painful birth to the Republic and their growing 
importance within it.  Dissolving the Constituent Assembly also ended Indonesia’s 
brief experiment with liberal democracy and the beginning of Sukarno’s Guided 
Democracy.  Guided Democracy was Sukarno’s practical application of a national 
spirit of gotong rojong (co-operation) intended to unite the forces of Nationalism, 
Religion and Communism, but failed to reconcile the diverse interests that the 
working acronym NASAKOM represented.259  By 1966, unable to unify the nation 
and settle sectarian differences, NASAKOM had come apart, forced the military with 
the help of the student movement and rural Muslims to end President Sukarno’s 
authority, and opened the way via a coup attempt to establishing a new socio-political 
order.            
 
3.  The Suharto New Order and Pancasila as an ideology of 
integration, unity, and conformity 
                  Conscious of the abject failure of the earlier flirtation with liberal 
democracy, and the more recent experience of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, the 
secular-nationalist leaning, predominantly Javanese, military leadership of the Suharto 
New Order returned to the original spirit of Pancasila as formulated in the preamble 
to the 1945 Constitution.  The New Order generals viewed the right and left 
deviations away from the original spirit of Pancasila, represented first by liberal 
democracy and then later by Sukarno’s NASAKOM, as dangerous extremism and that 
the primordial consequences of future similar misinterpretations of the doctrine had to 
be avoided at all cost.  Pancasila could not be allowed to lean too far to the left or 
right as before and returning to the original spirit of the doctrine enabled the New 
Order generals to re-invent the doctrine as an ideological construct that could 
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legitimise their direct control over the conduct of every citizen, official, and state and 
social institution.260   
                    By reaffirming Pancasila’s five principles the New Order drew directly 
from the foundation of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution and the Indonesian state.  
The first principle, belief in God, while proclaiming Indonesia to be a ‘religious’ state, 
insisted that the state would not be based on any particular faith.  Secularism had 
unfortunately been associated with Communism and earlier negatively associated 
with liberal democracy so while Indonesia was to be a religious state it was not to be 
specifically secular or Islamic.  The second principle called for a just and civilised 
humanity.  The third principle, national unity, demanded that regional and ethnic 
loyalties be foregone in favour of allegiance to a unitary Indonesian state, and the 
fourth principle committed the state to an Indonesian-style democracy (Pancasila 
demokrasi) which would re-emphasise traditional Javanese musyawarah 
(consultation) and mufakat (consensus).  By emphasising the two Islamic terms the 
New Order was assuring those wanting an Islamic-oriented state that their concerns 
and beliefs would be broadly accommodated within Pancasila.  As interpreted by 
Suharto (and Sukarno earlier in his Guided Democracy period) Pancasila demokrasi 
acknowledged that the Western form of parliamentary/party democracy was 
incompatible with traditional forms of Indonesian decision-making.  The fifth 
principle, social justice and welfare, assumed a goal of prosperity through economic 
and social egalitarianism and that the state would exist for the well being of the 
collective rather than the individual.  Through its interpretation and representation of 
the principle of social justice and welfare the New Order was able to justify 
ideologically a direct role for itself in the national economy and economic 
development.   
                Pancasila came to pervade virtually every aspect of Indonesian 
socio-political discourse during the three decades Suharto ruled Indonesia and the 
regime consistently represented the creed’s five principles to convince the Indonesian 
people that their leadership remained responsive to the peoples’ general wishes.  
Adhering to the requirements of the 1945 Constitution, and holding five-yearly 
elections, gave an impression of democracy (albeit not a very liberal form) and 
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strengthened the regime’s appearance as the legitimate aspiration of the Indonesian 
people.  In theory, all social groups had an official voice in the political process and 
although after 1975 confined to a restricted grouping of highly manipulable political 
parties, political representation functioned to address, however conservatively, all of 
the permitted subjects of debate and criticism.  It had been the Republic’s founding 
fathers’ intention that the Indonesian state would be totally integrated with all 
elements of state and society co-existing as an organic singularity.  In such a schema 
emphasis was given to social obligations, rather than to individual rights that would 
limit the state’s powers of intervention.  As such, the idea of Pancasila as an all-
embracing national creed stressing the importance of social obligations gained favour 
with the military leadership.  Portrayed as a fully-fledged ideology Pancasila became 
central to the regime concept of a totally integrated society.   
 
3.1  Pancasila and ideological conformity   
                      The predominantly Javanese establishment elites of the New Order were 
determined that the liberal, competitive, political-party system, implied by Western-
style parliamentary democracy, was inappropriate to Indonesia’s complex pluralist 
diversity.  The socio-political chaos of the earlier Sukarno regime convinced the New 
Order leadership that if the Indonesian state became linked formally and politically to 
Islam, national unity would be difficult to achieve.  As an ideological pillar upon 
which they might construct a unified Indonesia an exclusive interpretation of 
Pancasila’s somewhat nebulous ideals, logically extended into political form as 
Pancasila demokrasi, provided an ideal framework for socio-political conformity and 
cohesion.  As the basis upon which the regime intended to build its relationship with 
Indonesian society Pancasila provided ideological justification for rejecting liberal 
democracy.  Because of its propensity for adversarial and oppositional politics that 
tended to sharpen ideological differences causing conflict and suspicion the Western 
understanding of liberal democracy was viewed by the New Order as deviating from 
Pancasila’s true meaning and intent as a path to stability.261   
                        In late 1967 Suharto outlined the key role the New Order intended to 
attribute to Pancasila in ensuring ideological conformity.  He would legitimize his 
regime by returning to the 1945 Constitution and a “pure implementation” of 
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Pancasila but he warned that the process would require nothing less than the 
arrangement and ordering of the “entire life of the people, nation, and state.”262  While 
the ABRI would be called upon to play the key role in upholding and protecting both 
Pancasila and the Constitution they would not, Suharto emphasised, impose a 
military dictatorship against the people’s will.  The sacred soldier’s oath, he reminded 
Parliament, swore allegiance to ABRI’s role as strict defenders of the “fundamental 
institutions of the state”.263   
                    From the outset, rather than occupy themselves with conventional 
understandings of external threat, the new regime regarded their own socio-political 
survival as the principle security concern to be faced so they chose a strategy that 
defined security as an all-inclusive political, economic, and social concern.  From its 
very inception, the New Order thereafter rejected participatory politics in favour of 
direct state political and ideological control to achieve what they viewed as the 
“inextricably linked objectives of political stability and economic growth”.264  To 
create the social stability deemed an essential pre-requisite for an independent, 
unitary, sovereign, just, and prosperous nation, Suharto’s New Order appropriated the 
socio-political obligations of Pancasila and the Constitution through the combined 
coercive power of the state and the consensual acquiescence of society.265  Aware that 
Pancasila provided the only means of unifying Indonesia’s ethnic and cultural 
diversity within a single political system and ensuring the integrity of the unitary 
state, the New Order also realised that society had to be convinced to accept the 
doctrine’s precepts in their entirety.266   
                    To represent Pancasila in a format that would gain ideological 
acceptance, the New Order was obliged to employ three progressive strategies: it had 
to insist on strict ideological conformity, it needed to place society under tight socio-
political control by limiting political participation and, importantly, the New Order 
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had to be seen to bring about successful economic development.267  Ideological 
conformity required gaining total acceptance of the regime’s exclusive rendering of 
Pancasila as the only ideological basis upon which political parties and social 
organisations could operate.  The necessary socio-political control came about 
through the rationale of the ‘floating mass’ theory that intellectually justified the total 
de-politicisation of Indonesian society.268  Appalled by the bloody post-coup events of 
1965-6, that starkly evinced the causal relationship inherent in Indonesian society 
between ideology and violent political behaviour, the New Order determined to de-
ideologise society so that elite politicians might never be able to mobilise the masses 
to violence around “ideological orientations”.269   
                    To protect simple villagers from being confused or misled, political 
parties would not be permitted to operate below the district level but the official state 
political organ GOLKAR was exempt and permitted to campaign direct to villagers at 
the grass roots of Indonesian society.270  The requirement that all civil servants 
(including the military, district and village officials and functionaries) be members of 
GOLKAR extended regime access directly to every level of Indonesian society and 
virtually guaranteed GOLKAR success at every New Order election.  GOLKAR 
subsequently polled in excess of 60% of the popular vote at every election run by the 
New Order.  With the legislative and judicial branches of government firmly under 
executive control the instruments of total socio-political subjugation were firmly in 
place and it only remained for successful economic development to rubber-stamp the 
legitimacy the regime sought to justify its strategies.  The restrictions placed on all 
social, political, and economic organisations required official sanction before they 
could operate which served to broaden executive control to the extent that most 
organisations became mere extensions of executive authority able to be manipulated 
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in controlling and mobilising society behind regime-led national development.271  
Until the regional financial crisis of 1997, and with the exception of a small, albeit 
steadily growing, educated middle class, the majority of the population nevertheless 
remained reasonably content to accept their manipulation and to trade political 
liberties for economic growth.    
 
3.2 Pancasila and its symbolism in achieving socio-political control 
and conformity   
3.2.1  Dwi Fungsi   
                     The state employed a variety of institutions and symbols to manage the 
potential instability inherent in Indonesia’s social and ethnic diversity.  In maintaining 
socio-political control and ethnic balance, the most potent instrument was the 
military-initiated doctrine of dwi fungsi (‘twin functions’; dual military and socio-
political roles), an off-shoot and derivative of Pancasila demokrasi’s all-
encompassing system of governance.  Dwi fungsi’s dual capability effectively 
legitimised an intrusive military role within Indonesian society that gave the regime’s 
coercive inclinations direct access into every level of socio-political life.272   
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                  From the earliest years of independence the predominantly Javanese, 
secular-nationalist orientated, military leadership was determined that Indonesia be 
not an Islamic theocracy but a state in which all forms of religious observance, 
including Islam, would be permitted.  The constant clash of religious and nationalist 
interests, and the Islamic-backed Darul Islam revolts of the first decade of 
independence, convinced Sukarno and his generals that Pancasila, being essentially a 
doctrine of unity, carried immense potential as a counter to Islam’s social and political 
divisiveness.  Having proved their indispensability during the earlier rebellions and 
revolts, the military demanded a permanent role in governance and the influential 
General Nasution’s ‘middle way’ concept (whereby, as he put it, the military would 
neither seek to take over government nor remain politically naïve) institutionalised the 
military as the nation’s prime socio-political force responsible for “ameliorating 
religious and nationalist differences”.273  Drawing political value from the regime’s 
interpretation of Pancasila that treated Indonesian society as a depoliticised ‘floating 
mass’ and legitimised ABRI’s role, dwi fungsi carried vast potential for ensuring 
ideological conformity through every level of society.  Justifying military intervention 
into every aspect of Indonesian socio-political life, dwi fungsi enabled state officials 
and military officers to monitor the activities and inclinations of all political parties 
and social organisations down to the very grass-roots of society in the name of 
national security.                    
 
3.2.2  Sara   
                     An additional powerful tool of socio-political control and rigid 
conformity was the state’s proscription of unacceptable subjects of debate and 
expression through the acronym Sara.274  The term clearly defined the range of 
sensitive socio-political issues that the regime felt should never, under any 
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circumstances, be publicly discussed or employed as issues of political mobilisation 
and action.275  Sara was directed at identifying those groups within society that the 
regime considered likely sources of conflict and thus potential instruments of socio-
political instability.  Mobilisation about elements of the acronym was therefore 
strictly off limits during New Order election campaigning because of a fear that they 
could instigate communal violence.  Deemed totally unacceptable, were such 
tendencies as questioning the state ideology Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, 
promoting socialist or Marxist thinking, calling for an Islamic state, and any other 
matter deemed socio-politically offensive around the sensitive subject of religion.276    
 
3.2.3  Pancasila demokrasi: tightening New Order political control through the 
rationalisation of the political party system  
                  A further important instrument complimenting the New Order socio-
political management was the strategy Liddle refers to as “organisational co-
optation”, an example being the 1973 redesign of the electoral system to ensure the 
government political party GOLKAR maintained its commanding position within the 
New Order version of participatory politics called Pancasila demokrasi.  In 1973 the 
regime effectively dismantled and then reconstructed the political party system.  
GOLKAR was formalised as the official state party and the remaining parties forced 
into subordinate, politically-manageable, amalgamations that relocated religious and 
nationalist inclinations to a controlled political periphery where their activities could 
be tightly controlled.  Concerned that a re-assertive politika-Islam might once again 
pose political challenge, the 1973 dismantling of the old political party system was 
intended to establish GOLKAR as a dominant, unchallenged, political expression able 
to effectively represent all socio-political aspirations.277  By combining the political 
parties into two groups that adjusted and limited politics in line with their vision of a 
de-politicised and de-ideologised form of mass politics, the regime effectively 
completed the institutionalisation of Pancasila’s political derivative Pancasila 
demokrasi.  While GOLKAR remained the party of all civil servants and government 
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employees (including ABRI), the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or 
Development Unity Party) fused Islamic political interests into a single political outlet 
for all Indonesian Muslims.  To dilute Muslim aspirations even further the PDI 
(Partai Demokrasi Indonesia) combined the old PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia or 
Indonesian National Party that had been identified primarily with upper class 
syncretic Muslim Javanese), the two small nationalist parties, and the two Christian 
parties, into a grouping of political interests that generally represented opposition to 
militant Islam.278  Liddle suggests that the reconstitution of the party system was 
intended to reflect the regime’s desire to offer the PPP as representing the “spiritual 
aspirations” of the Indonesian people, the PDI as reflecting the peoples’ “material 
aspirations”, and the state party GOLKAR as representing a “harmonious joining” of 
the two.279  Forcing the nine pre-New Order parties into the groupings of PDI, PPP, 
and GOLKAR, not only tightened New Order control over the entire political system 
but extended GOLKAR influence into an unassailable electoral position.   
 
3.2.4  ‘Upgrading Course on the Directives for the Realisation and Implementation 
of Pancasila’ (P4)   
                     The regime’s tightening of ideological conformity took an extraordinary 
turn in 1978 when the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) made the decision to 
force all civil servants below the rank of cabinet minister to attend a series of 
Pancasila refresher workshops, or doctrinal upgrading courses, referred to as P4.280  
Attendance was compulsory and because of the mass absence of civil servants from 
their work, proved immensely disruptive and costly for everyone.  Missing one day of 
the two-week courses required repeating the course from the beginning.  The refresher 
course showed that the upper levels of the regime had decided a general reaffirmation 
of the state ideology was necessary and took P4 extremely seriously with neither 
illness nor family bereavement being sufficient excuses for non-attendance.   
               The compulsory nature of the P4 programme, and its obvious costs, 
indicated the importance the regime placed upon reaffirming both the basis of socio-
political unity and the instrument that underwrote the regime’s ideological legitimacy.  
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The overall purpose of the programme was clearly to reiterate the New Order’s 
singular interpretation of the state creed as a sensible expression of traditional 
Indonesian (or certainly Javanese) philosophies of life and P4, in terms of 
emphasising ideological conformity, represented the “clearest and most self-conscious 
articulation” to date of the New Order’s ideological vision for Indonesian society.281  
While Parliament stressed P4’s purpose as enhancing civil service understanding and 
enthusiasm for the regime’s development programmes, the courses also reminded 
civil servants and bureaucrats of Pancasila’s importance in ideologically justifying 
their employer’s policies.  Because motivation behind the program of indoctrination 
came from the President himself, and the courses re-affirmed the Armed Forces’ 
responsibility for sustaining ideological harmony as a precondition for development, 
the New Order was giving clear indication that they were little inclined towards any 
changes to the social order in the immediate future.  A policy of overt conservatism, 
P4 updated Pancasila as socio-political ‘containment’ rather than, as formerly, one of 
‘mobilisation’ and in an obvious reference to approaching general elections the 
President was reminding ABRI of their responsibilities to both GOLKAR and the 
‘popular-participatory’ aspects of Pancasila demokrasi.282      
 
3.2.5  Further tightening the screws on socio-political control:  azas tunggal   
                   By the early 1980s the leadership apparently felt that Islam remained the 
only social force not totally in line and corrected the anomaly with the most 
controversial Pancasila initiative to date.  Given that the decision to continue holding 
parliamentary elections posed one of the few remaining threats to the regime’s hold 
over the political system, tightening socio-political control even further limiting the 
potential for partisan mobilisation removed this anomaly.  Through a controversial 
process called azas tunggal (literally ‘sole foundation’) the New Order completed its 
socio-political control processes and, through legislation proposed in 1982 and 
formally adopted in 1985, the two non-government parties and all mass-based 
organisations were obliged to acknowledge the state ideology Pancasila in their 
organisational charters as their associations’ principle raison d’etre.  From the late 
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1980s into the 1990s, and largely in response to azas tunggal’s coercive implications, 
differing intellectual perceptions of the preferred relationship between the state and 
Islam came to proliferate.  Although all political parties and social organisations 
formally acknowledged azas tunggal there nevertheless remained a number of 
alternative interpretations of Pancasila and its demands upon the relationship between 
Islam and the state, among different segments of society.  While the ‘real’ meaning of 
the doctrine continued to be contested the regime maintained its firm line on what it 
intended the ideal to represent but, faced with challenge to the basic ideological tenets 
by which the nation was governed, from the early 1990s a dramatic attitudinal shift 
towards Islam took place extending to the highest levels of New Order power.    
 
4.  Pancasila: Islam and azas tunggal   
              During the early years of the New Order, even though the generals were still 
cautiously establishing their authority, the leadership demonstrated open hostility 
towards Indonesian Islam.  Their refusal to resurrect the Jakarta Charter and its 
ambiguous promise of Islamic law for the Islamic community, their refusal to 
rehabilitate the Muslim modernist party Masyumi (notwithstanding the enthusiastic 
part many of its members played in exterminating the PKI during the 1966/7 post-
coup retribution), and the political restrictions placed upon former Masyumi leaders, 
evinced the New Order’s implacable opposition to Muslims developing any form of 
independent political power base.  Yet compared to this earlier attitude, from the late 
1980s the regime shifted dramatically towards Islam generally and in particular the 
modernist intellectual stream of Islam organised as Muhammadiyah.  Azas tunggal’s 
conception and implementation coincided with an Islamic resurgence from the early 
1980s and Suharto himself was acknowledging that the relationship between the state 
and Islam needed updating.  With azas tunggal in theory removing the only remaining 
likely threat to New Order authority, and acknowledging changing social realities, the 
leadership calculated that a shift towards Islam was not only justified but offered an 
opportunity for socio-political advantage.  Highly indicative of this change in attitude 
was the President’s support in 1991 for the formation of the modernist Association of 
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI, Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia).   
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                 There were a number of ways of interpreting the President’s shift towards 
Islam.  Conceivably the President was playing a traditional power game and balancing 
a perceived slip in ABRI’s support for his leadership by seeking a new constituency 
from within the increasingly pious and growing, generally modernist, Muslim middle 
class.  It was also possible that the President was simply becoming pious in his old 
age.  Whatever the reasons, the President was finding popular traditionalist Islamic 
leader Abdurahman Wahid’s sustained criticism from the relative safety of his mass 
NU (Nahdhatul Ulama) power base, and now legitimised by his organisation’s having 
accepted azas tunggal, increasingly disconcerting.  Frustrated by his inability to 
influence political events Wahid had withdrawn NU from official politics in 1984 in a 
move that gained him considerable political credibility among traditionalist Islam’s 
some 40 million adherents.  His populist secular-nationalist message denying the 
desirability of an Islamic state but insisting Islam to be a necessary pre-requisite for 
democracy in Indonesia, annoyingly contradicted and turned the language of 
Pancasila against the New Order regime itself.   
                    The more likely reason for the President’s about-face towards Islam, and 
the modernist stream in particular, was political pragmatism and the political potential 
of the dramatic increase in piety over the recent decade within the huge, and volatile, 
constituency of some 30 million predominantly urban modernist middle-class 
Muslims.  The broadly beneficial changes that had taken place under New Order 
development had contributed to the generally progressive and deepening Islamisation 
of the influential constituency that the urban middle class had become.  By giving 
ICMI his support the President was seemingly confident that modernist Islam had 
given away their earlier idea of an Islamic state and, importantly, that they were 
satisfied they could live a pious and modern life within the guidelines imposed upon 
them by Pancasila.283  But the fact remained that, notwithstanding the President’s 
perceptions of its political utility, ICMI as an organisation was firmly committed to a 
deepening Islamisation of both Indonesian society and state and its formation implied 
a confusing ideological contradiction.  
                    The extensive social changes brought about by the New Order and the 
corresponding growth in urban wealth had, as mentioned, given rise by the 1980s to a 
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new, culturally robust, predominantly Javanese modernist Muslim urban middle class.  
During the decades of economic development and social stability, urban Muslims had 
acquired a piety far beyond their Javanese-syncretist roots and were taking increasing 
comfort from the ethical disciplines and restraint implied in the variant of Islam 
associated with modernism.  Socio-politically influential, they had the potential to 
threaten the critical balance that defined the relationship between New Order 
Pancasila demokrasi and Indonesian Islam.  A reassessment of New Order policy was 
clearly timely and to ensure that this new, and potentially dangerous, urban force 
remained within the ideological parameters of the Pancasila state, Suharto fell back 
on his traditional, and previously successful, techniques of co-optation and 
compromise in response to potential socio-political challenge.  His support for ICMI 
therefore needs to be understood in these terms and the ‘corporatist’ style of 
‘inclusion and control’ that had characterised New Order social management 
(epitomised in the role of the regime’s vote-amassing institution GOLKAR) was 
clearly evident in ICMI’s formation, administration, and regime-controlled 
discoursory agenda.284   
                The New Order had provided the circumstances for this increasingly pious 
Muslim middle class to come into existence in the first place and therefore expected 
that it would be ‘faithful’ (mempunyai kesetiaan) to Pancasila’s implicit secular-
nationalism in return.  Now an increasingly visible socio-political reality the new 
middle class realistically expected a more participatory role in Indonesia’s political 
life and a rejection of this reality had the potential to push Islam into opposition to the 
New Order.  As Muslims of varying degrees of piety represented 90% of Indonesia’s 
population it was apparent to the increasingly pious Suharto (having made the haj and 
been to Mecca) that Islam had to be given a greater role in socio-political life.  ICMI 
fulfilled this role in typical New Order tradition and the activities and operation of the 
new Islamic voice given to the organisation were rapidly, and effectively, co-opted by 
the regime.   
                  Criticism of ICMI’s formation and its likely socio-political agendas was 
widespread.  The organisation appeared to legitimise exclusivism and sectarianism 
thereby contradicting the inter-religious tolerance and democratic nationalism 
enshrined in Pancasila.  It also seemed to represent an attempt to politicise a 
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significant section of Indonesian Islam that was susceptible to manipulation by the 
regime.  The loudest critic of ICMI’s overt sectarian and exclusivist position was 
Abdurrahman Wahid, the chair of both NU and Forum Democracy, but senior ABRI 
elements opposed the organisation’s formation from the very outset and influential 
army officers had firmly petitioned the President against ICMI’s formation.  Their 
main line of criticism was that some factions within ICMI might merely use the 
organisation, and thus Islam, as a means to gain personal political advantage.  When 
the degree of Presidential support for the organisation became apparent overt criticism 
from ABRI ceased but to the amazement of the organisation’s critics, within months 
of its formation, ICMI activists had access to the media discussing Islamic socio-
political issues to an extent that would have been regarded as subversive a few years 
earlier.  Notwithstanding early efforts by a number of the association’s reform-minded 
independents to establish positions opposing the regime, an influx of new members 
from the ranks of the government bureaucracy began to dominate and gradually 
undermined the organisation’s autonomy.  By 1996 influential ICMI luminaries had 
moved into the GOLKAR leadership and ICMI’s director, Suharto protégé B. J. 
Habibie, was using the organisation to acquire a solid modernist Islamic base for 
himself and any future political aspirations the President might have held for him.  By 
taking over administrative and secretarial control of the organisation, Habibie aides 
and staffers established a line of control and influence that linked ICMI’s affairs 
directly to the President’s office.                 
 
4.1  Azus tunggal: societal consensus and ideological conformity   
                                   There were four notable aspects to the New Order’s 
maintenance of ideological conformity in the face of the 1980s Islamic resurgence.  
While the regime’s behaviour in providing modernist Islam a controlled socio-
political outlet through ICMI reinforced conformity the organisation’s sectarian 
implications also gave rise to a questioning of the New Order hold on power.  While 
New Order legitimacy had been buoyed by a decade of successful economic 
development and the regime had successfully institutionalised ideological conformity 
with all politics now based on Pancasila demokrasi, ABRI’s privileged position over 
Indonesian society since independence, and the institution’s influence over the 
nation’s leadership, was now the subject of intra-regime rivalry, as well as being 
 87
questioned by most Indonesians.  In general though religious elite discomfort with the 
restrictions placed upon them by Pancasila itself appeared to be easing, under 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s leadership, and voicing the aspirations of traditionalist 
Indonesian Islam, NU had emerged as a dynamic element for ideological conformity 
and, refreshed spiritually by his haj, the President’s agreement to the formation of 
ICMI, had clearly endorsed a participatory voice for Islamic thought.  Nonetheless, 
while a new generation of Islamic scholars were supporting Wahid in their depiction 
of Islam as inclusive and democratic (without necessarily demanding an Islamic state) 
the sectarian nature of ICMI and NU with their mass followings, hinted darkly at a 
possible return to the earlier primordialism of mass-based politika-Islam.  Any such 
politicisation of sectarian interests would clearly contradict the secular commitment 
inherent in Pancasila demokrasi and thereby the stability the establishment elites had 
come to rely upon.  
                       Four distinct, potentially oppositional, ‘voices’ adopted Pancasila as 
ideological discourse to promote their interests during the post-azas tunggal era; 
traditionalist Islamic opinions and views centered about Wahid chairing both NU and 
Forum Democracy; modernist Islamic views associated with ICMI; ABRI’s views; 
and, with growing enthusiasm and also linked to Forum Democracy, a broad range of 
secular-nationalist voices finding establishment support through the PDI claiming 
nationalism and democracy as their political motif.285  All four voices took advantage 
of the new and complex political environment heavily influenced by Islam’s domestic 
and international revival, the increasing appeal of democratic ideas, and the socio-
political changes demanded by the beneficiaries of successful economic development.  
In what had become a more open socio-political environment compared with the 
previous decades of repression an increasingly vocal and diverse range of societal 
interests had discovered there was utility in appropriating Pancasila to support their 
claims to a greater say in national life.    
  
4.1.1  Pancasila and ‘traditionalist’ Islam in the post-azas tunggal era 
                  While a pragmatic representation of Pancasila continued to underpin the 
regime’s socio-political and economic legitimacy, the doctrine had also become an 
                                                           
285 Ramage (1995) p. 5. 
 88
ideal vehicle for legitimising NU’s political activities and Wahid’s loyalty to the 
doctrine and his avowed commitment to secular democracy strengthened his 
nationalist credentials.  As leader of NU, Wahid was appropriating Pancasila to his 
own worldview by calling for an Indonesian Islam firmly committed to a politically 
secular, nationalist, state.  Alternatively, as head of Forum Democracy, he represented 
the ‘official’ voice of secular-nationalist challenge to the New Order’s interpretation 
of Pancasila.  Formed in March 1991 by a group of forty-five prominent intellectuals 
the Forum, while claiming to have been a reaction to ICMI, was clearly a challenge to 
the Muslim association.286  As the public face of secularism, the Forum encouraged a 
committed return to the national unity believed under threat from a growing tendency 
towards religious and ethnic disharmony.  By calling for the elimination of sectarian-
orientated groupings such as ICMI, Wahid claimed to represent the Forum’s genuine 
Pancasila-nationalist orientation.  The Forum saw the New Order’s involvement in 
ICMI as confirming the disconcerting rise in sectarianism and, ominously, the 
likelihood that the regime was manipulating racial and religious issues for political 
gain.  While the regime tried to counter Forum Democracy by portraying its activities 
as contrary to Pancasila, Wahid was careful to stay within the doctrine’s framework 
even though he tended to appropriate it somewhat differently as leader of NU than as 
the Forum’s leader.  His NU strategy was one of ‘de-confessionalism,’ while as leader 
of the Forum he placed emphasis on promoting democracy and specifically the need 
for a religiously tolerant society as a pre-condition to eventual enhanced democracy.  
But secular-nationalist credibility suffered in that although they included some 
prominent Muslims within their ranks the majority of their supporters were non-
Muslim.  Unable to channel their political aspirations of a more democratic society 
through Islam or its organisations the secular-nationalists therefore found themselves 
increasingly vulnerable to Islam’s growing politicisation.  Secular-nationalists also 
faced the dilemma that guaranteeing their rights under Pancasila might in the future 
force them to seek the protection of the military.  Thus, the post-azas tunggal period 
left secular-nationalists wedged between popular demands for an Islamic society (or 
even an Islamic state) on the one hand, and continued domination by a military-
backed regime (albeit one more attuned to their interests) on the other.   
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                   Pancasila continued to be appropriated during the 1990s by an array of 
political interests for often-contradictory purposes.  Mainstream Muslim activists 
became more prepared to drop their previous opposition to Suharto and his 
interpretation of Pancasila in return for a chance to work within the establishment 
through ICMI for a society in which politics and government policy might better 
reflect Islamic values.  So that they could effectively promote their vision of a more 
Islamicised society (in apparent contradiction of the regime’s understanding of 
Pancasila demokrasi) ICMI activists used Presidential support to gain influential 
positions in the bureaucracy and government.  But the most provocative development 
of the era was Wahid and NU’s blatant appropriation of Pancasila to express values 
and ideas that offered a more accessible and inclusive interpretation of Pancasila as a 
political compromise to enable all Indonesians to live together, as he put it, in a 
“rational, unitary, non-Islamic state.”287  There were, nevertheless, problems in 
Wahid’s more accessible conception of Pancasila as his stance drew opposition from 
elements within the military as well as sections of the Islamic community itself.  In 
contrast to Wahid, who saw Pancasila as a necessary precondition if Islam was to be 
rational in the national sense, there was the problem that many Islamic modernists 
wanted to ‘Islamicise’ Indonesia as their vital and necessary precondition for 
democratisation.   
 
4.1.2  Pancasila and modernist Islam in the post-azas tunggal era   
                NU was not the only non-state actor appropriating Pancasila to question 
New Order legitimacy.  ICMI’s establishment in December 1990 not only brought 
Islamic modernism onto the political stage but also accentuated the growing rivalry 
between Indonesia’s religious elites.  Largely staffed and run by government 
bureaucrats, Habibie associates and staffers, ICMI members reflected the aspirations 
of several groups of Muslim theologians and scholars, and included Islamic activists, 
politicians and government bureaucrats.  ICMI’s political significance was its signal 
that the President’s attitude and approach towards the relationship between Islam and 
the New Order was dramatically changing.  While, on the one hand, Suharto appeared 
to have sensed that he was losing ABRI support for a further Presidential term, on the 
other, he apparently felt less threatened by a resurgence of political Islam and was 
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prepared to gamble on its compliance and willingness to accommodate his 
representation of Pancasila if he could exploit the modernist constituency to his 
advantage.  Had not azas tunggal ensured that all organisations and political 
groupings fell into line behind Pancasila demokrasi?  ICMI therefore provided 
Suharto with a legitimate opportunity to offer an alternative, more acceptable, Islamic 
voice to the rhetoric of challenge and potential societal disharmony the regime felt 
Wahid, NU and the PDI offered.   
                    As a legitimate establishment organisation, ICMI was well placed to 
effectively represent the new urban, middle-class, increasingly pious, educated, 
Muslims that were benefiting from the regime’s successful development programme 
(pembangunan).  Muslim activists and intellectuals involved in the organisation may 
have been politically naïve and were being cynically used by Suharto to strengthen his 
socio-political position.  But whether the ICMI initiative was a response to an 
increasing divergence of interests between the President and ABRI (and other 
elements within the ruling establishment), or simply a reflection of Suharto’s 
acknowledgement of an emerging political constituency that he could not dare ignore, 
many ICMI activists felt the opportunity to enter politics and talk openly about 
political issues outweighed accusations from the regime’s Islamic opponents that 
ICMI was merely another corrupt tool of Suharto’s ambitions.   
                    While ICMI’s creation had shown that Wahid and NU were no longer the 
only strong voice speaking on behalf of Islam, the organisation’s makeup suggested 
that the Islamic voice it represented was supportive of the President’s desire to 
prolong his Presidency.  ICMI was the only significant official Islamic organisation 
created during the New Order and its theoretical commitment to Pancasila provided 
Suharto with a high profile, socio-politically acceptable, balance to ABRI support.  
The President’s patronage and support for the organisation needed therefore to be 
understood in terms of socio-political realities.  While Islam was clearly undergoing a 
cultural resurgence, many of the influential Muslim figures involved in ICMI were 
finding few problems with the New Order’s representation of Pancasila and appeared 
comfortable with the regime’s continued strict proscription of explicit Islamic 
political activity.  From 1985 it was also apparent to many influential Indonesian 
Muslims that the problems Indonesian society faced was not necessarily the fault of 
azas tunggal and Pancasila but the consequence of specific New Order policies and 
society’s growing antipathy towards the regimes unitary interpretation of the state 
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doctrine.  Many Muslims also felt that Pancasila could comfortably satisfy their 
religious interests in the context of an Islamic society rather than an Islamic state.  
Moreover, during the post-azas tunggal era, because of their moderate and 
modernizing inclinations, Muslims were generally being regarded much less 
suspiciously by the regime.  ICMI, therefore, presented an opportunity for Islam to 
show that Muslims need not be a threat to the New Order generally and Suharto’s 
continued Presidency in particular.  Even though ICMI spokesmen carefully avoided 
any negative references to Pancasila wider Muslim apprehension towards Pancasila 
remained, as did the belief among a pious Islamic minority (increasingly frustrated by 
what they regarded as the excesses of development and modernity) that only Islam 
could ever truly unify the Indonesian state.  In such terms, the pious minority viewed 
Pancasila as little more than a convenient, relatively unproblematic, means by which 
politika-Islam might be resurrected in the changing socio-political environment of the 
1990s.   
 
4.1.3  Pancasila, democratisers, and ABRI during the post-azas tunggal era 
                       Most leading Indonesian democratisers disagreed with the regime view 
that liberal democracy was contrary to Pancasila and maintained that the doctrine’s 
powerful ideologically unifying tenets meant the doctrine was an essential 
prerequisite to any future deepening of the democratisation process.  Pancasila had 
initially been captured by the New Order as their discourse of moral and intellectual 
legitimacy, but the doctrine was now being used by a diverse and increasingly vocal 
opposition to rationalise more open political debate within the otherwise highly 
restrictive political system.  Whereas the New Order’s institutionalised 
depoliticisation of Indonesian society had long denied even moderate sectarianism a 
channel for political expression, through the 1990s the floodgates began to open to 
broader political expression and Pancasila became the preferred ‘enabling’ discourse 
of oppositionists and reformists alike.  NU and Muhammadiyah could claim support 
from some 80 million Indonesian Muslims between them from both ends of the class 
spectrum but it was the latter, given socio-political expression through ICMI, that had 
gained access to the elite power structure.  While Pancasila’s constraining structures 
still left little space for secular-democratic voices, the religious elites (both NU and 
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ICMI factions) were now showing that there was some leeway available for so-called 
‘non-political’ organisations such as theirs to bring Islam into the reformist debate.   
                    ABRI’s main concern with ICMI (and also with NU) was the 
organisations’ potential to organise and legitimise Islamic appeals to ‘primordial’ 
loyalties that might lead to a resurrection of the ideological problems that had plagued 
the new Republic before the military had been forced to take charge and restore order.  
That the military had long viewed the form of liberal democracy associated with the 
more ‘democratic’ members of ICMI as incompatible with Pancasila also made the 
organisation politically suspect.  With ICMI activists calling for less ABRI political 
influence and interference in societal affairs tension developed to the extent that most 
military officers remained suspicious of both the organisation’s agendas and in 
particular its chairman, B. J. Habibie’s political aspirations.   
 
5.  Pancasila’s relevance to Indonesian life   
       Independence had enabled differing streams of thought to entertain 
conflicting interpretations as to the relevance of Pancasila to Indonesian life.  In 1956 
the eminent Indonesian sociologist, Professor van der Kroef, identified three ways of 
understanding Pancasila: from the standpoint of traditional communalism, from an 
Islamic (both its traditional and modernist forms) perception, and from a neo-liberalist 
perspective.288  He characterised traditional communalism as a strong sense of linkage 
between community and patrimonialism and the idea of a close interconnection 
between all spheres of human activity (be they political, economic, or social) by 
which no action could be possible in one area of society without decisively affecting 
others.  Dominating the tradition has been a pervasive sense that the supernatural 
exists alongside an animistic world-view that views every event and natural object as 
divinely ordered.  This communalistic/patrimonalistic world-view also relies strongly 
upon traditional territorial affiliations of kinship where the village is a large family 
that forms an inseparably linked community.  Van der Kroef made the important point 
that if a doctrine such as Pancasila was to be successful as the basis of a binding 
national ideology it had to be formed upon some modicum of common agreement 
linking popular contemporary opinion with traditional thought.289  As more than 70% 
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of the Indonesian people shared a traditional communalist/patrimonialist pattern of 
thought, without such a linkage Pancasila is difficult to explain satisfactorily and the 
doctrine would carry little relevance to Indonesian life.    
        It is difficult to generalise Indonesia’s diverse range of communal, 
cultural and social patterns yet van der Kroef’s notion that the idea of 
humanitarianism implicit in Pancasila tends to be over-shadowed by other more 
traditional virtues makes sense.  A collective community that permits differences of 
opinion and views contrary to those of the majority seems far removed from the form 
of participatory democracy (largely derived from Western political thought) implied 
for example in Pancasila demokrasi.  The types of power structures that underpin 
traditional Indonesian communal life also seem quite alien to the socio-political 
egalitarianism implied in Pancasila.  Moreover, a predetermined and rigid traditional 
communal social order “sanctioned by religious authoritarianism” has none of the 
flexibility associated with the secular democracy implicit in Pancasila demokrasi.290  
The traditional village-based unity of social, religious, economic, and political 
functions shares little with the idea of Pancasila demokrasi and representative 
government.  Traditional authority did not arise out of popular delegation but was 
conferred upon those who earned and gained legitimacy through some special, sacred, 
patrimonial, or traditional, competence, rather than allegiance to vague doctrine.   
  When the issue of cultural conflict arises, Indonesian society is also broadly 
divided on the question of democratic resolution of disagreement.  Defined in 
traditional Javanese terms as mufacat (consensus and agreement) and musjawaret 
(consultation or discussion) the idea of democracy implicit in Pancasila demokrasi 
becomes somewhat vague and abstract, merely hinting at some future just and fair 
arrangement that will somehow resolve differences and conflict.  Included in the idea 
of Pancasila demokrasi (and a living reality of village life constantly evoked by both 
Sukarno and Suharto) was gotong rojong (mutual assistance and co-operation) that 
suggested individuals had an obligation to serve the collective interest of the 
community and implied organised opposition to be not only anti-social but clearly out 
of place in the cultural schema of traditional life.  Among the more Western-
orientated (generally non-Javanese) who see themselves as threatened by Javanese 
dominance and desire more individualism, democracy is seen as a liberating force that 
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can release the people from more traditional authoritarianism.  To them democracy 
actually implies institutional checks on authority, the Western political idea of 
regulatory checks and balances, individual rights, the rule of law, and institutionalised 
political opposition.    
  While Indonesia is nominally an Islamic country the majority of its adherents 
are abangan and practice their faith in a haphazard manner that barely observes the 
five main religious duties required of a Muslim.  Islam’s liberating message that man 
was no mere pawn in some vast cosmic game, but a unique creature of intelligence 
and capacity able to shape the world he lives in, is at odds with traditional belief.  
Traditional village authority still maintains its hold over the majority of the people 
and most Javanese have been reluctant to forgo their “richly, imaginative, intimate 
mythology” for the solitude of man and his creator as implied in Islam.291  Moreover, 
to the devout, the difficulty with Pancasila can be theologically profound.  The 
Muslim belief in the absolute unity of God (that Allah is the sole, personal and 
complete manifestation of the divine) allows no compromise with animism, ancestor 
veneration, spiritualism, and the many supernatural forces and influences that are 
indispensable to traditional Javanese communal life.  Any such divergence from basic 
Islamic tenets is, in Islamic theory, theologically impossible to rationalise.292  The 
decidedly mystical orientation of Indonesian Islam existing within communal 
religious life, and by which most indigenous Muslims (especially those in Hindu-
influenced Java) regard the position of Allah is blasphemous within Islamic 
orthodoxy.  There is thus sharp variance between communalism and orthodox Islam 
in the idea of the ‘oneness of God’ when traditional life views the notion of the 
relationship as much more than a mystical union between man and Allah.  Nor does 
the idea of nationalism or Indonesian unity find a comfortable home in orthodox 
Islamic thought.  The only traditional Sunni theory of the state is that of an Islamic 
state under the Caliphate that has in itself a less than unified, despotic, history.  The 
idea of freedom of religion within Islamic orthodoxy does not permit freedom for 
heresy.  There is also a deep contradiction between orthodox Islam and traditional 
communal life in the final pillar of Pancasila that insists upon social justice over the 
basic issue of equality between the sexes.  Any likelihood of the majority of 
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Indonesians being able to exist in the modern world implied in Pancasila, and yet 
remain truly Muslim, is decidedly problematic.      
                   A proposed national ideology that places such importance on the terms 
nationalism, democracy, humanitarianism and social justice does not deny some 
influence from Western-European historic liberalism yet Pancasila, as put forward by 
successive Indonesian ruling elites, has exhibited some very illiberal tendencies.  
Before Suharto’s economic about-turn in 1967 when he unabashedly, although 
pragmatically, embraced capitalism and the global economic order, Indonesia’s ruling 
elites had totally eschewed the form of capitalist economy usually associated with 
traditional liberal doctrine.  The hyper-nationalist and totalitarian variance of 
democracy experienced under the rubric of Pancasila demokrasi placed few 
restrictions on a form of governance that promoted and highlighted paternalistic 
dispensation of all political and economic wisdom.  As interpreted by the Westernised 
Indonesian, secular-nationalist, ruling elite of the Suharto New Order, Pancasila 
demokrasi carried distinct illiberal overtones of totalitarianism totally incompatible 
with many of the fundamental features of both traditional Indonesian communalism 
and Indonesian Islam.293  Rather than provide a new unity, Sukarno’s use of 
Pancasila increased the extent of existing disunity.  When the PKI (Communist Party) 
placated Sukarno by seemingly accepting Pancasila during the Guided Democracy 
period a deep, and ultimately murderous, cleavage resulted between the PKI’s version 
of post-Liberal-Marxist ideology on the one hand and Islam on the other.  The idea of 
Pancasila as a unifying national ideology is somewhat perverse considering the 
ideological competition between ABRI and the Communists unleashed by Sukarno’s 
Guided Democracy.     
           Pancasila thus has a curious, if not questionable, communalistic and 
cultural basis.  Its contrivance as a unifying national ideology is clearly at odds with 
both traditional Indonesian society and the key tenets of Indonesia’s predominant 
religion Islam.  A Western view might, with reason, have it that Pancasila has been 
little more than an empty slogan employed by successive authoritarian regimes to 
fabricate a unifying national ideology that justified intrusive socio-political control.  
More generously, the doctrine might be viewed as a mere mantra, or formula, easily 
adjusted to the specific needs of any socio-political situation.  The early, somewhat 
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questionable, liberal parliamentary democracy followed by Sukarno’s largely 
authoritarian system of Guided Democracy, and later, Suharto’s military-dominated 
New Order, sought justification and legitimacy under the mantra of Pancasila.  From 
Sukarno’s Old Order to Suharto’s New Order, and the New Order progression from a 
multi- to a single-majority party system, successive ruling orders have nonetheless 
been able to successfully re-express Pancasila to create a surprisingly high degree of 
national unity out of the potential chaos inherent in Indonesia’s broad social and 
ethnic diversity.294  In the name of Pancasila, Sukarno justified a fusion of 
nationalism, religion, and communism (through his working acronym NASAKOM) 
while Suharto and his generals, pursuing their own pure interpretation of the doctrine, 
cursed NASAKOM, banned communism and, in the immediate aftermath of the 
abortive 1966 coup, abetted ideological competition to the extent that rural Muslims 
and urban students were encouraged to lead the way in slaughtering more than half a 
million ideological opponents.  To explain Pancasila as a tool of socio-political 
control in a format that might underwrite regime ideological legitimacy, the historical 
development of the creed’s interpretation and representation needs to be appreciated 
as well as the role attributed to it in Indonesia’s post-colonial development.  Doing so 
requires understanding Pancasila within the context of independence struggle, the 
difficulties inherent in creating a new unitary state, and the New Order’s need to 
achieve political stability and economic development virtually from scratch, all in the 
midst of immense, potentially problematic, socio-political diversity.   
 
6.  Pancasila: a doctrine of convenience and contrivance   
                   Notwithstanding the serious contradictions that van der Kroef suggests 
between various understandings of Pancasila, and its political derivative Pancasila 
demokrasi, the doctrine was usefully represented by the Suharto New Order as a 
modern political ideology that drew upon tradition to offer itself as a “modern, 
forward thinking creed”.295  While formally holding up the Western civil society 
principles of freedom, justice, and human dignity, the Suharto New Order was able to 
incorporate into its Pancasila-ist rendering such traditional, collective, foundations of 
society as “the need for tolerance, a strong sense of community, collective discipline, 
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respect for leadership, and spirituality”.296  Adjusted as necessary, Pancasila’s 
meaning was employed to meet the specific needs of each socio-political situation that 
confronted the leadership of the day until the problems of the 1990s.  Over the course 
of New Order socio-political development this required little more than shrewdly 
manipulating mass consciousness.  Pancasila was often used merely to strengthen a 
particular sectoral interest’s argument or to silence an opposing view to the point 
where the pure meaning of Pancasila came to be less important than its existence as a 
sacred doctrine that could be invoked for specific and diverse socio-political ends.  
Imbued, as it was, with sufficient selected Western and liberal ideas its representation 
adequately met the hegemonic demands of a legitimising, modern and forward-
thinking ideology of unity and development, but Pancasila nevertheless required re-
interpretation and re-negotiation by successive elite alliances to ensure that it was 
seen as benefiting the majority of the Indonesian people.   
                    Ever conscious of the potential for immense challenge religious 
disagreement posed to societal unity, Sukarno had intended the doctrine to be a 
compromise between the idea of an Islamic state and a secular one.  In keeping with 
his independence movement’s nationalist nature Sukarno’s Pancasila offered 
Indonesian nationalism as the first principle, but pressure from the Muslim 
community forced a reformulation of the doctrine into the Jakarta Charter to 
acknowledge the reality that Islam (or some form of it) was the religion of the 
majority of Indonesians.  The principle of One Lordship was then placed first in 
priority (along with the obligation of Islamic syari’a for its followers) ahead of the 
principle of nationalism.  Pressured by the nationalist leaders, the Jakarta Charter was 
altered in the preamble to the 1945 Constitution and its Islamic emphasis diluted by 
omitting the syari’a obligation and dropping the requirement that the President be a 
Muslim.  Socio-political pressures forced the principle of One Lordship back to the 
first position in the formulation of the 1950 Provisional Constitution but the socio-
political deadlock that ensued moved President Sukarno to decree a return to the 
diluted Islamism of the original 1945 Constitution.  In an attempt to unify the three 
divisions of nationalism, religion, and Communism, by this time vying for socio-
political power, and following the abject failure of the parliamentary process, Sukarno 
dissolved the Constituent Assembly in 1959 and re-deployed the spirit of Pancasila to 
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bolster gotong royong through an expression of unification that he represented as 
NASAKOM.  Finally, in its most recent depiction, President Suharto and his generals 
reinvented Pancasila around the original form upon which the 1945 Constitution had 
been based and steered a middle course that institutionalised the socio-political 
balance required for New Order socio-political and economic development.297 
                 Although President Suharto’s voice on Pancasila did not significantly 
change until the post-azas tunggal period of the mid-1980s, he remained true to his 
Pancasila-ist position.  He certainly did not abandon the concept of a nationalist, non-
Islamic, state as the most appropriate representation of the doctrine to legitimise his 
regime’s authority but his support for modernist Islam (although an attempt to bolster 
his personal political legitimacy) nevertheless weakened what had been a strong 
secularist position on religious politics.  As the post-azas tunggal era progressed, 
Muslim interests remained in little doubt that vocal opposition to Pancasila, certainly 
as the New Order chose to represent it, could effectively result in their voice being 
removed from what had become a more amenable climate for socio-political 
discourse.  While the President continued to set the parameters of permitted socio-
political debate, those parameters nevertheless become increasingly blurred and the 
populist NU, together with an officially sanctioned and equally vocal ICMI (both 
having appropriated Pancasila discourse to their own ends), concerned ABRI’s 
leadership and other secular-nationalist interests by hinting at a likely revival of the 
old ideological issues and a return to divisionary mass politics.  Growing concern 
spread across different ideological shadings within the elites (both in and out of 
power) that the more open environment might force the military to overstate a socio-
political threat from Islam as an excuse to hinder efforts at promoting more 
democracy.  Such concerns reflected not so much the fear of a re-emergence of 
sectarianism in contemporary politics as a general distrust of party-politics and the 
possibility - even the inevitability - that these processes might conjure up problematic 
links with the masses.298   
                    The New Order represented itself as ideologically politically-secular 
(while at the same time vigorously promoting Islamic culture) and continued during 
the post-azas tunggal era to strictly proscribe the use of religion as an instrument of 
political mobilisation in Islamic intellectual and cultural life.  Although the 
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immensely popular Wahid continued to offer a vision of Islam as a force for tolerance 
and democracy, fear persisted among the elites that some elements within Islam were 
prepared to manipulate the more open political environment to their own ends.  Such 
fears raised the spectre of Wahid’s oft-used Algerian analogy whereby a duly elected 
Muslim majority government might legislate to pass over democracy in favour of an 
Islamic state.  The early 1990s saw the New Order continuing to use Pancasila to 
control and limit the allowable space for political discourse but the doctrine was 
providing more general use outside the regime as a populist, more inclusive, national 
ideology capable of unifying across a multiplicity of religious, ethnic, and regional 
affiliations.299  Wahid represented Pancasila as a religiously neutral ideology, 
essential for national unity (and a necessary pre-requisite for democratisation) but he 
was skilfully appropriating and rivalling the New Order’s ideological, intellectual, and 
moral position.  His often complex political manouveuring seemed perverse and no 
less than a subtle re-politicisation of a very large segment of Indonesian Islam.  
Wahid and NU’s resurgence, together with the high level sanctioning of ICMI, 
confirmed that politika-Islam had re-emerged and, most importantly, could be 
thoughtfully accommodated within a true meaning of Pancasila.  Many among the 
establishment elite, and not only the President and the generals, were troubled by 
these events.  A conservative Islam seemed to be looking towards a future with 
greater democratisation, less military socio-political influence, and possibly without 
Islamic fundamentalism, but the irony was that the New Order’s definition of 
Pancasila was being appropriated to show the way.   
       Pancasila’s meaning needed constant adjustment to the needs of specific 
socio-political situations and none less so than in maintaining the requirement that the 
Suharto New Order sustain the socio-political stability necessary for political and 
economic development and thus legitimise its authority.  During the 1990s a diverse 
range of opposition to the New Order came to redefine the doctrine’s meaning to 
justify their, at times, conflicting agendas and in doing so placed strain on intra-elite 
alliance structures.  Notwithstanding the changing interpretations placed upon 
Pancasila in the face of changing socio-political circumstances, the approach of 
necessary adjustment nevertheless found cultural substance in the important 
traditional Indonesian ethical concept of cocok (suitability).  What is deemed correct 
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and good is that which is cocok to the immediate si-kon (an acronym for situasi dan 
kondisi – literally situation and condition).  The New Order rendition of Pancasila 
persisted in using traditional Indonesian culture to cope with modern problems but the 
doctrine was becoming anachronistic and problematic.  The tolerance implied in the 
Pancasila principle of One Lordship, had given way to regime intolerance, and a 
rational, modern, understanding of the principle of a Just and Civilised Humanity to 
regulate inter-human relationships, had been treated by successive regimes as 
extremist or radical.  Nationalism had assumed a xenophobic tendency, Pancasila 
demokrasi came to depend on the kebijaksanaan (or will) of an increasingly 
authoritarian leadership, and the tenet of Social Justice, intended to set limits to the 
use of private property, was unable to slow the widening socio-economic gap between 
a privileged, increasingly corrupt, minority and a vast underprivileged majority.300   
 
7.   Summary   
                        This chapter has described in general terms Pancasila’s origins and the 
doctrine’s association with traditional cultural values but more specifically, the 
chapter has described the doctrine’s exclusive representation by Suharto New Order 
as a state ideology able to underpin the regime’s developmental objectives by 
providing critical elements necessary for a unifying and stabilising national identity 
that could underwrite regime socio-political and economic legitimacy.  By blending 
traditional culture with pragmatic contemporary political thought and simultaneously 
building into the doctrine both coercive and consensual potential, the New Order had 
at its disposal the means to represent Pancasila to creatively institutionalise and thus 
legitimise their total domination of Indonesian life.  The doctrine’s derivatives, 
creatively formulated to sustain and when necessary tighten ideological conformity, 
are discussed301 as are the contradictory tensions aroused by a diverse and 
increasingly vocal array of alternative meanings and interpretations in the changing 
socio-political environment of the late 1980s and early 1990s.302  In particular, the 
discussion points to the growing cleavages within Indonesian Islam highlighted by 
debate as to Pancasila’s true meaning and intent as a secular-nationalist doctrine of 
unity in a predominantly Muslim society.  Moreover, notwithstanding the Suharto 
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New Order’s exclusive rendering and representation of Pancasila as state doctrine to 
underpin its hegemonic legitimacy, the doctrine carried questionable traditional and 
cultural legitimacy and the chapter concludes with a discussion on this issue.303     
                   At the heart of the Gramscian model of hegemonic order is ideological 
legitimacy derived by crafting mass consciousness through directive moral and 
intellectual leadership.304  By providing the Suharto New Order with the enabling 
discourse of ideological legitimacy Pancasila represents the substance of New Order 
legitimacy and thus this thesis.  Gramscian hegemony’s causal association with 
ideology is profound and as Fontana puts it above,305 a ruling order has not achieved 
true hegemony until it has articulated and proliferated its own cultural and belief 
system as to be universally valid to the general population.  In terms of testing the 
Gramscian model of hegemonic order against the Suharto New Order’s behaviour, the 
value of Gramsci’s insights into the Suharto regime’s moral and intellectual 
legitimacy therefore stands or falls on the degree to which the Indonesian people 
acknowledged without openly challenging the cultural and ideological validity of the 
New Order’s rendering and representation of Pancasila as the state’s official ideology 
of unity and development.       
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Chapter 3 
 
Indonesian political culture and its historical 
background 
 
                   The key issue informing this research is the intricate relationship that 
existed under the Suharto New Order between political power and the moral and 
intellectual legitimacy of its rule.  The thesis tests the processes that defined this 
relationship against Gramsci’s model of hegemonic order and in particular his focus 
on establishing and sustaining socio-political legitimacy.  The Gramscian model is 
also examined to explain the collapse of Suharto’s New Order by enquiring as to the 
extent to which the collapse was a failure of hegemonic legitimacy due to decay and 
obsolescence notwithstanding the inability of a coherent counter-hegemony to emerge 
in opposition to the regime.  As the Gramscian project focuses attention on the use of 
ideology as hegemonic discourse and the close relationship Gramsci identifies 
between ideology and culture it is therefore necessary that the nature of political 
power as a ‘culture’ specific to the Indonesian context is understood.  While the 
preceding chapter looked closely at the New Order’s ideological underpinnings 
through its exclusive representation of the state ideology Pancasila this chapter will 
look to cultural factors to identify the tensions the regime’s rendering of ideology 
imposed upon traditional Indonesian politics.       
                   Aspects of both regional and Javanese political culture dominate 
Indonesian life but it is the latter that is dominant.  Elite Javanese-specific class 
politics during the Suharto New Order were surprisingly successful considering the 
trying socio-political conditions and ethnic diversity within which they took place and 
notwithstanding their often questionable ‘top down’ processes, high levels of socio-
economic development were achieved.  Informed by Javanese understandings of the 
meaning and use of power, a tendency towards centrally-controlled societal 
conformity and a rejection of individualism and multi-party participatory politics, a 
distinctive political culture evolved following independence.  Indonesian socio-
political development has also suffered the contradictory tensions of rigid 
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authoritarian class structures and a burgeoning Islam imbued with a faith that 
acknowledges only the authority of the one God.  This chapter is separated into two 
parts and the first section examines these issues and explores the influence of socio-
political culture on elite classes’ exclusive representation of the state ideology 
Pancasila to legitimise their socio-political dominance.  The second section examines 
the historical context that backgrounds this research.   
 
1.  Indonesian political culture 
1.1  Elite politics in Southeast Asia 
                   The end of its colonial period saw Southeast Asian politics in disarray and 
chronically unstable military and civilian governments compelled to create centralised 
nation-states within inappropriate frameworks that had been inherited from earlier 
colonial administrations.306  Elite politics in post-colonial Southeast Asia nonetheless 
proved remarkably flexible and innovative in confronting the pressing need for 
national unity that required an adept balancing of political control with political 
participation while balancing the tensions imposed by regionalism, ethnic rivalry, and 
the pervasive influence of global politics.  Leaderships were confronted with a 
dilemma in that as a consequence of their stultifying colonial history their societies 
lacked the integrating social, political, and economic institutions generally available 
to mature states.  Daunted by the magnitude of their integration tasks many Asian 
leaders chose authoritarian styles of political control rather than confront the complex, 
and troublesome, problem of institutionalising broad political participation.307  The 
tendency towards authoritarianism resulted in often repressive and manipulative 
policies that saw political parties and other participatory organisations attempting to 
balance alien forms of political participation with those more appropriate to 
exclusionary nationalist-elite agendas.  Indonesia was to suffer three different 
experiments with political participation during the post-independence era: 
parliamentary democracy under General Sukarno through the 1950s, his Guided 
Democracy until the October 1965 coup attempt and thereafter the repressive 
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military-bureaucratic-corporatism of the New Order until General Suharto’s 
resignation in 1998. 
                    Long-term observer of New Order political culture, William R. Liddle, 
blames Asia’s colonial experience for a legacy of only “rudimentary governmental 
institutions” and “even less-formed political parties and interest-group organisations” 
charged with channelling a plurality of socio-political interests.308  To establish socio-
political legitimacy among diverse competing societal interests, ruling classes were 
forced to choose policies that promised development but also required significant 
elements of constraint to achieve regime agendas.  The culturally deprived 
environments formed inevitably prioritised personal rule and in Suharto’s Indonesia 
found institutionalised form in what Liddle usefully describes as the New Order 
“power pyramid”.309  As a veritable pact of dominance the New Order power pyramid 
dispersed political power downwards from the dominant President standing astride a 
loyal, albeit politically active, military thoroughly permeating a strong bureaucratic 
decision-making process.  The techno-bureaucracy was, in turn, empowered by the 
executive to dictate state/society arrangements through a combination of consensus, 
co-optation and corruption balanced by varying degrees of repression and coercion.  
To maintain their political positions amidst ever-shifting balances of domestic power, 
the Suharto New Order power structure institutionalised its interests through 
fluctuating alliance structures held together by combining elements of coercion with 
the consensual techniques of co-optation, co-operation and corruption.   
                      This top down perspective of Southeast Asian politics formalised 
corruption, nepotism and violence but prescribed a culture that has its origins in both 
traditional political culture and the “novel pressures of modernisation”.310  Negatives 
surround such a perspective and, as former Korean Presidential candidate Kim Dae 
Jung puts it, suggestions that Western concepts of democracy might be culturally 
inappropriate to the region, have tended to be used by some Asian leaders to justify 
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political autocracy.311  Criticism has been matched nevertheless by a constant and 
firm defence of Asian-style authoritarianism from the region’s most influential 
leaders, namely Suharto, Lee Kwan Yew, and Mahathir.  They argue that Asian socio-
political culture is in fact different, and somewhat vaguely that fundamental human 
and civil rights as defined in the West are inappropriate to the Asian political context.  
Rodan suggests rather dryly that while a so-called triumphant liberal democracy 
might have been one possibility for these societies as they emerged from colonialism, 
because of their backgrounds, it might “not necessarily [have been] the most 
likely”.312  
 
1.2  Indonesia, Javanism and power    
                             It is argued in this research that the New Order elite classes arranged 
socio-political order by manipulating ideological control to sustain the moral and 
intellectual legitimacy of their socio-political power arrangements.  The Javanese 
concept of the term ‘power’ therefore needs to be explained.  Indonesian, or more 
specifically Javanese, notions of power have deeply influenced the process of 
Indonesian political development since independence.  As Kingsbury and others put 
it, it must be understood that the idea of power in the Javanese context differs 
significantly from the general understanding of the term in the West.313  Galbraith 
identifies three general types of power - condign, compensatory, and conditioned – 
that are identified by Liddle in the Indonesian context as the commonly used 
“political resources” of coercion, persuasion, and material exchange.314  The closest 
Javanese word to the Western meaning of the term power is kasekten and implies a 
meaning that combines power with legitimacy through, significantly, charisma.  The 
important point about kasekten is the term’s eschewal of moral implications in that the 
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notion places little actual value on legitimacy or illegitimacy; if in fact kasekten exists 
it simply exists unquestioned.315  Perhaps Benedict Anderson’s description of the four 
main differences between the Javanese idea of power and those of the European 
(Hobbsian and Machiavellian) tradition is the most concise.316  Rather than the 
Western view of power as abstract (a quality generally inherent in certain 
interpersonal relationships) he suggests that in the Javanese context, power actually 
exists in the real world and is a concrete phenomenon irrespective of who has 
temporary possession of it.  Instead of deriving from a multitude of sources (wealth, 
office, station, weapons) Javanese power is homogenous and emanates from the 
single source of divine energy that enervates the universe.  Thus, while the European 
view places no limits on the accumulation of power, its available quantity in the 
Javanese concept is a constant and the more one possesses, the less remains for others 
to acquire.  Power is therefore morally ambiguous in the European sense where some 
usage has it as legitimate and good while some as illegitimate and therefore bad.  In 
the Javanese view power has nothing to do with morality and thus the question of 
legitimacy does not necessarily arise over its possession.  Moreover, in contrast with 
Western traditions of political theory, the Javanese concept of power tends to attach 
more importance to the process of its accumulation than its actual exercise.  Clearly, 
as the general Javanese idea of power differs significantly from that of the West, some 
important issues require consideration when relating power to political legitimacy in 
the context of Indonesia’s predominantly Javanese political culture.   
                   As well as the Javanese mystical and individualistic attachment to power, 
a further important Javanese influence upon Indonesian political culture is its 
tendency towards unification and the need to centralise control.  Traditionally a ruler 
at the centre personifies the unity of the people he rules over.  An obsession with 
unity, expressed as a search for societal oneness, has been behind constant appeals 
(under both Sukarno and Suharto’s New Order) for the sanctity of national unity and 
violently resistance of any societal forces that threaten the unitary Indonesian state.317  
Moreover, the Javanese idea of power does not define the state by its perimeter but by 
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its centre which leads to the idea that a ruler’s power is not equally distributed 
through his realm but diminishes as it radiates towards the periphery.  The Javanese 
obsession with oneness holds an important place in Indonesian political culture and 
goes some way to explain the deep “psychological power of nationalism” that has 
emanated out of Jakarta since independence and informed development strategy 
during times of economic stress.318  Traditionally the relationship between the ruler 
and the ruled is overseen by a governmental structure (commanded by the ruler) and 
the relationship the ruler has with his administration (and evinced in the contemporary 
New Order patrimonial state) is in turn dominated by what Anderson calls “stratified 
clusters of patron-client” dependency.319  As Magnis-Suseno puts it, Javanese cultural 
dominance of Indonesian political life clearly leaves little room for democratic 
structures to function.320  New Order leaders were thus able to get away with a gross 
abuse of power largely by crafting the use of Javanese culture which accepted that so 
long as kept within certain limits, corruption, crony capitalism and an exhibition of 
arrogance by power holders, fitted “traditional expectations”.321   
 
1.3  Political culture, ideology, and participation   
               A further, and highly distinctive, aspect of Javanese power has been the 
political influence the Javanese aristocratic and senior officials’ class, the priyayi, 
have been able to wield.  The priyayi dominate the bureaucratic class representing an 
important intellectual within the New Order and are distinguished by their somewhat 
pretentious demonstration of sophisticated, practical, self-discipline, and, at times, 
self-consciously exaggerated systems of values.  The ethical hallmark of the priyayi is 
attained through discipline and education, tantamount to searching for a key that 
might “open the door between ignorance and enlightenment”, and this tendency might 
explain the appeal of the “explicitly ideological thinking” that exists towards socio-
political organisation among contemporary Indonesian ruling elites.322  In terms of 
ideology, at no point did a dominant Islamic culture develop in colonial Java.  While 
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the opening of the Suez Canal in the late Nineteenth century greatly aided Indonesia’s 
contact with the Islamic world, the fundamental assumptions of reformist Islam 
departed dramatically from traditional Javanese thought.  A spiritual gap, possibly 
compounded by Indonesian Islam’s weak socio-economic and political position, 
actually broadened between pious reformist Muslims and their fellow Javanese during 
the Twentieth century.323  The Javanese understanding of power as being part of the 
world of man, and the lack of spiritual separation between the earthly and 
transcendental worlds, makes little sense of the Islamic belief in the absolute power of 
a God far distanced from man.  Furthermore, the Muslim belief that all men are equal, 
and as such, equally insignificant before God poses, as Anderson puts it, problems for 
any political theory that attempts to legitimise political inequality and power.324  How 
can the political rule of one man over another be justified if all men are equally 
insignificant before God and all real power lies in God’s hands?  How then can power 
be distributed?  Such concerns underline the difficulties surrounding the idea of 
Indonesia’s Islamic society evolving into an Islamic state.   
                     Indonesia’s diverse social plurality has required emphasising social 
harmony and, to counter the destabilising distractions of everyday life, Indonesian 
political culture has been forced to place great importance upon balance, consensus 
building and co-operation.325  Traditionally, diversity has required balancing through 
societal consensus or, more specifically, through defining requirements for “respectful 
consensus building” (musyawarah mafekat).326  Thus achieving the societal stability 
required to meet New Order social, political, and economic agendas has necessitated 
adjusting the people to their “required role” within society through such traditional 
cultural concepts as “apparent agreement” (gotong rojong) and a tendency of the 
Javanese masses towards political “passivity and acquiescence”.327  Mirroring the 
traditional relationship between rulers and the ruled, political actors have also tended 
to lack decisiveness or commitment, have emphasised politeness in political and 
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formal relationships, and preferred to see how situations unfold before committing 
themselves to a positive course of action.  Such a propensity was apparent in General 
Suharto’s emergence from relative obscurity, his cautious acquisition of power over a 
three-year period after President Sukarno’s removal from effective power, and his 
constitutional caution in accepting total power.   
                     Indonesian life has also been separated and influenced by two great 
socio-political divides.  There is the split between santri (pious Muslims) and 
abangan (syncretic or relatively un-pious Muslims), and the gap between the 
dominant Javanese that tend to centralise power and decision-making processes, and 
those inhabiting the rest of the archipelago that they regard as outsiders.  While the 
Javanese are predominantly syncretist, the outer islanders tend to be more pious 
Muslims.  It was this abangan/priyayi Javanese political elite, described as being 
among the most “status-conscious and hierarchy-minded in the world” with their 
preoccupation for subordinate benevolence and obedience, that dominated the politics 
of the Suharto New Order.328  The demonstrated cultural proclivity for hierarchy 
reproduced in the New Order authoritarian system of political stratification, 
constructed around a combination of military and civilian bureaucratic forms 
balancing instruments of reward and punishment, effectively sustained the Javanese 
abangan/priyayi elite patronage system.329   
                     The Javanese-dominated corporatist-patrimonial model of Indonesian 
political life that evolved as the Suharto New Order was characterised by a 
preponderance of elite factionalism and an intensely personalised use of power able to 
insulate itself from many of the demands of its broader society.330  Replacing 
traditional patrimonialism (that exchanged protection for loyalty) with a modern neo-
patrimonialism (that traded material resources for political support) the political elites 
of the Suharto New Order effectively manipulated ethnicity and community as an 
ideological weapon to maintain their hold on state power.  Three mutually inclusive 
cultural tendencies aided the central elites in this process: the traditional acceptance of 
Javanese power, the inherent importance of patron-client links as the basis of social 
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relationships, and rural society’s prevailing culture of deference towards authority.331  
But the elite’s pragmatic manipulation of ethnicity through patronage evoked inherent 
contradictions: having to constantly redistribute resources to maintain political 
loyalty, the fragility implicit in the practice of political favouritism (more specifically 
the Javanese abangan bias), and the need to balance some degree of political 
participation with the potential primordialism inherent in mobilising mass political 
support.332  Each of the four major Sukarno era political parties drew mass support 
from their own particular communal/ethnic grouping but the trauma of the late-
Guided Democracy period remained a painful reminder of the problems that could 
arise in harnessing communal/ethnic based political support.  The PNI (nationalists) 
drew their support from within the Javanese priyayi bureaucracy, the PKI 
(communists) from the poorer Javanese abangan, the traditionalist Nahdatul Ulama 
from among the rural santri, and the modernist Masyumi relied for support on the 
Muslim commercial and urban groups.333  The unstable political coalition at the centre 
tried to link local and national issues but the attempt merely compounded primordial 
social cleavage and hostility.  After Sukarno’s overthrow the Suharto New Order 
returned to the traditional patrimonial techniques of mass political exclusion by 
thoroughly depoliticising mass society and ruling through authoritarian and 
bureaucratic means.  The New Order schema for managing communal/ethnic 
demands constructed and institutionalised an exclusive Pancasila-based ideological 
framework that security planners used to develop suitable corporatist strategies 
through which they could steer political participation.  Rather than the political party 
system that had proven uncontrollable in the past, New Order socio-political strategies 
steered participation through Pancasila-ist state-controlled representative bodies 
differentiated merely on the basis of their necessary function in society.334   
 
1.4  The political conservatism of the Javanese ruling elites   
                   Javanese elite politics have also always tended towards latent 
conservatism and the Suharto New Order’s imposition of the state ideology Pancasila 
(through its political derivative Pancasila demokrasi) typified conservatism in action.  
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Bourchier suggests that Javanese “conservative political ideologising” occurred in 
“four waves”.335  Under Dutch colonial rule, politics took a romantic, traditionalist 
view rejecting liberalism in favour of integralism that emphasised the interests of the 
collective over those of individuals and groups.  This approach regarded any future 
constitution that might provide for broader political rights as running counter to 
traditional principles of unity.  In fact the principle of integralism became the 
mainstream of secular-nationalist political thought for decades to come.  Bourchier’s 
second wave, Sukarno era conservatism, a form of “corporatist anti-partyism”, sought 
consensus among the elite themselves rather than the disrupting “proliferation of 
political organisations” that appeared to undermine traditional Javanese networks of 
patronage and obligation.336  Elite aversion to party politics intensified when the PKI 
(Partai Komuni Indonesia) won 16% of the vote in Indonesia’s first genuine election 
in 1955, but corporatist distrust of political parties was equally antagonistic towards 
political liberalism.  By the mid-1950s, and concerned that the plural party interests 
plaguing the political system were an irrevocable impediment to parliamentary 
consensus, Sukarno accepted that the democratic experiment had been a failure.  
                      Rather than the participatory politics of the first decade of the Republic, 
built, as Sukarno put it, around “opposition for opposition’s sake”, a new political 
system was built around a pragmatic interpretation of traditional deliberation 
(musyawarah).337  Guided democracy, as Sukarno outlined it to parliament on 
February 21, 1957 would represent a new form of government better suited to the 
national character and based on mutual cooperation (gotong rojong) among what the 
regime regarded as society’s legitimate functional groups (military, intellectual, 
labour, student, professional, business, and youth etc.).338  Significantly, it was 
Sukarno who steered Guided Democracy and the strong discretionary powers he 
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assumed suggested that Indonesia had inherited from the Dutch, and refined under the 
Japanese, all of the “instincts, tradition, and legal machinery” of a police state.339  
When he realised during the early 1960s that the military and their conservative allies 
were attempting to hijack his corporatist agenda he tried too late to reverse course.  340   
                    Bourchier’s third conservative wave, the Suharto New Order’s 
“integralist-developmentalism” model, recast Indonesia’s political culture in a 
comprehensive conservative mould.341  By centralising power around the executive, 
dismantling mass organisations and political parties to silence criticism, the New 
Order placed extensive socio-political authority in ABRI’s hands.  To address their 
self-interested aims and agendas the conservative elites of the New Order, through 
their exclusive representation of Pancasila, selectively appropriated indigenous 
values of hierarchy, harmony, and order.  Conservative political ideology became the 
exclusive property of elite upper levels of the military and civil service groupings 
whose agendas appealed for national unity, demanded minimal mass political 
participation, and condemned sectarianism.  It is significant that a fourth wave of 
conservatism has characterised the post-Suharto era and the reformist presidential 
regimes of Habibie, Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputra, and General Yudhoyono, have 
kept in place and retained significant support from, influential conservative elements 
that have survived the former discredited Suharto New Order.   
 
2.  Indonesia: historical and contextual outline   
2.1  Background: Indonesia’s Dutch colonial experience and its legacy   
                    By the first decade of the twentieth century Dutch colonial power had 
completed the basic structure of a modern bureaucratic state across the vast 
archipelago they called Netherlands India.  Staffing the colonial administration 
required the colonial masters providing selected Indonesians, generally from 
traditional ruling families, Christians, and other minorities such as the Sino-
Indonesians, with an appropriate, albeit limited, Western-style education.  By 1920 a 
small but significant core of this new social group of Western-educated 
predominantly indigenous Indonesians were beginning to see themselves as the 
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vanguard of a nationalist movement and came to believe that they would ultimately 
lead the drive for independence from their Dutch masters.342  Their goal gained 
substance and momentum and by 1928 the idea of a unitary Indonesian state emerged 
when youth leaders from across the archipelago met and declared their allegiance to 
the idea of one homeland, one nation, one language (satu nusa, satu bangsa, satu 
bahasa).  Their struggle gained momentum when Malay was acknowledged as the 
common Indonesian language bahasa Indonesia and came to represent the unifying 
language of anti-Dutch resistance and suffering in national struggle.  Spread through 
education, bahasa Indonesia became a means of uniting the people of a future nation 
and broadening the debate about independence.   
                        By the last years of Dutch rule, before the outbreak of World War 2 
and Japanese occupation, the upper echelons of the Western-educated Indonesian 
native bureaucracy had reached the apex of indigenous political power.  As well as 
sharing a common educational background with the radical nationalists, the 
conservative natured indigenous bureaucratic elites also shared a distrust of religious 
politics and a cautious uncertainty as to the role of Islam in some future independent 
Indonesian state.343  The two key nationalist leaders, the unsophisticated but 
charismatic soldier General Sukarno and the educated civilian Mohammad Hatta, 
defended their 1945 declaration of independence from the Dutch with both a national 
army and a civilian government but both institutions were internally divided and in 
almost constant mutual conflict.  Following four years of struggle, in late 1949 
sovereignty was transferred to a federal republic and in 1950 to a unitary Republic of 
Indonesia.  The prolonged revolution and struggle from 1945 to 1950 had created an 
intensely secular-orientated, nationalistic, predominantly Javanese, military elite that 
by the end of the 1950s was the most powerful institution of the state and the only one 
capable of challenging even President Sukarno's authority.  Newly independent 
Indonesia also inherited a number of problematic legacies from centuries of Dutch 
administration.  The Dutch colonial system’s deeply entrenched bureaucracy had 
isolated indigenous politicians from practice in the arts and techniques of political 
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influencing and denied them experience in such important participatory processes as 
constructing and maintaining political parties, taking part in elections, and legislative 
procedures.  While the overly centralised bureaucracy had met the demands of the 
colonial system by enabling the colonial authorities to closely control the indigenous 
bureaucracy when the Dutch administrative level departed the newly independent 
bureaucracy was left administratively weak.  Moreover, the Dutch-colonial version of 
a plural society had effectively racially-defined Netherlands India into three levels of 
hierarchy that placed European colonial administrators and businessmen at the top, 
Sino-Indonesian traders and entrepreneurs in the middle, and the indigenous Muslim 
majority at the bottom.  Independence required that indigenous Indonesians replace 
European administrators, the political leadership, and some of the businessmen in the 
top layer, but the lower levels remained little changed.   
 
2.2  Context 
2.2.1  Sectarian interests and tensions 
                   Indonesia is a multi-ethnic society and all issues are influenced to some 
extent by three pronounced social cleavages: cultural/regional, racial, and religious.  
The most significant cultural/regional grouping is the Javanese who represent close to 
50% of the Indonesian population.  Javanese/non-Javanese tensions are deep-seated 
and immensely significant socio-politically.  Non-Javanese ‘outlanders’ suspect that 
the Javanese elites view the centralisation of decision-making in Jakarta that enables 
them to impose their proclivity for ‘feudal’ values of hierarchy and deference towards 
authority upon all peoples of the vast archipelago as justifying Javanese political 
power.  Further compounding tensions, secular-nationalist Javanese leaders 
dominated the independence struggle and as a cultural grouping came to dominate 
ABRI’s senior officer corps.  The most profound racial cleavage, and one that carries 
serious economic and socio-political implications, is the distinction between Sino-
Indonesians and the indigenous (pribumi) people.344  While representing a mere 4% of 
the population Sino-Indonesians are generally and, largely incorrectly, believed by 
most of the population to dominate the national economy.  The most complex array of 
cleavages arises out of the issue of religion.   
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                   The Indonesian state recognises five religions: Protestantism, Catholicism, 
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam.  Although they comprise some 90% of the 
population, and thus represent an overwhelming majority, Muslims are themselves 
deeply divided by theological cleavages and degrees of piety.  The three broadest 
groupings loosely separate them into Javanese syncretists, traditionalists, and 
modernists (or reformists).345  Even though they formally adhere to Islam, Javanese 
syncretists mix their beliefs and practices with elements of animism, Hinduism, and 
Buddhism and in political terms are generally regarded as secular-nationalists.  The 
more orthodox traditionalists adhere to the Syafi’i school of legal interpretation within 
Sunni Islam and live in the small towns and villages of Java and in large communities 
in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi.  Modernism arrived in Indonesia out of the 
Middle East late in the nineteenth century and rejected the four traditional Sunni legal 
schools preferring a direct interpretation of the Koran more attuned to modern living.  
Modernists also tend to live in urban areas and favour Western-style educations.  
Indonesian Muslims are also differentiated in terms of degrees of piety; the less pious 
are referred to as abangan, and the more pure adherents of the faith are santri.  
Significantly, traditionalists and modernists are political opponents and their 
followings have taken organisational form since the independence era as the two 
organisations Muhammadiyah (modernists) and Nahdlatul Ulama (traditionalists).  
During the Suharto New Order each came to claim membership in excess of 20 
million.     
 
2.2.2  The independence era and the Sukarno ‘old order’ elites  
                         Independence failed to resolve disagreement among the vast 
archipelago’s plethora of interests over the key issue of a desirable relationship 
between religion – specifically Islam – and the new unitary Republic, nor did 
independence resolve the problematic relationship between minority racial groupings 
and the nation state.346  The new ruling order that dominated the early decades of 
independence comprised a tense alliance of bureaucratic, business, political, and 
military elites and approached ethnic diversity with its potential for disharmony and 
conflict from different perspectives.  Ethnic diversity was approached from the 
                                                           
345 R. William Liddle, ‘Coercion, Co-optation, and the Management of Ethnic Relations in Indonesia’ 
in Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly, (Eds.), Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia 
and the Pacific, (MIT Press, London, 1997), pp. 274-281. 
346 Liddle (1997) p. 285.  
 116
optimistic view that an open system of party competition around parliamentary 
representation and majority-government representative democracy might satisfactorily 
settle any conflict and enable the diverse range of ethnic interests to express 
themselves through discussion and compromise.347  But sectoral interests tended to 
prioritise political self-interest and merely incited regional dissatisfaction and Islamic 
disquiet that the fledgling democratic process failed to mediate.  When economic 
stagnation compounded a growing political crisis President Sukarno was compelled to 
take matters into his own hands and, in 1959, supported by ABRI’s senior command, 
declared martial law, a return to the 1945 Constitution and, taking personal 
responsibility for the direction of state affairs, introduced a unique totalitarian 
political form he called Guided Democracy (Demokrasi Terimpin or more literally 
‘Democracy with leadership’).  By 1960 the military had brutally ended Islamic-
supported regional rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi and the regime had banned the 
modernist Islamic Masyumi party, the Islamic political party closely associated to the 
idea of an Islamic state.  Sukarno’s new political arrangement was intended to 
accommodate all socio-political interests (those of syncretic and traditional Muslim 
nationalists, Christians and Communists) and through skilful oratory and symbol 
waving, and promising a measure of status, influence, and participation, Sukarno 
persuaded all key groupings to accept his Guided Democracy.348   
                   By effectively institutionalising the management of ethnic demands 
through policies that combined and balanced coercion with techniques of persuasion 
and co-optation, Sukarno’s Guided Democracy dealt firmly with the two major 
ethnic-related issues challenging his unitary Republic: Islamic state-hood and regional 
autonomy.  Inter-elite rivalries between 1950 and 1965 were played out through 
party-politics but effectively did little more than promote and place sectarian 
representatives into influential positions in the administration, government 
departments, and the military, thereby creating a new grouping of Indonesian power 
elites.349  The Sukarno regime’s connection with mass society became a tenuous one 
based on little more than his links with the highly organised military and their 
ideological opponents the mass-based, Communist PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) 
that both controlled organisational networks among labour, student, and peasant 
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organisations.  Both organisations were riven by deeply rooted ideological 
factionalism but having no organisational base of his own, and in a desperate attempt 
to maintain his authority and power, Sukarno was forced to play one faction against 
the other skilfully exploiting antagonisms among Islamic interests opposing the 
secular basis of the state, parliamentary groups challenging his dictatorial practices, 
and demands for regional autonomy.    
 
2.2.3  Suharto’s New Order, its ruling class, and the modernising national elites  
                      Sukarno’s balancing act collapsed when a coup attempt in 1965 was 
blamed on the communist PKI.  ABRI took control and in March 1968 Major General 
Suharto became the second President of the Republic of Indonesia, his regime to be 
known as the New Order.  A sharp build-up in political confrontation and intra-elite 
competition had preceded the 1965 coup and, upon taking power, Suharto and his 
advisers began to reorganise the state political structures and arrangements they felt 
responsible for the political turmoil and socio-political polarisation of the early 
independence and Guided Democracy periods.350  Enthusiastically supported by rural 
Muslims and student groups, the military eliminated the PKI with more than half a 
million Indonesians slaughtered in the process.  The purge and its aftermath left ABRI 
the new President’s sole power base and totally removed the legitimacy and 
organisation of the socio-political left.  Having removed the potential for challenge 
the regime moved to ensure the state would never again have to accommodate mass 
dissent or protest.  When they banned campus politics in the late 1970s the regime had 
removed the only other organised source of political opposition with institutionalised 
resources and limited the likelihood of a corporate foundation being formed on which 
future anti-regime activity might be based.  The only remaining dissident activity – 
separatism - continued unabated but although committed to various causes the 
separatists remained on the political periphery and impotent.  Having removed the 
potential for organised social challenge to its authority, it therefore remained for the 
New Order to embed itself socio-politically and concentrate on managing its own 
internal rivalries.351   
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2.2.4  Institutionalizing New Order power and influence 
                  The Suharto New Order comprised four key players: a strong President; 
his loyal, organised power base, ABRI; a strong civilian bureaucracy committed to 
implementing the executive office’s policies and directives; and a wealthy, 
substantially Sino-Indonesian, business class prepared to allot part of its wealth to the 
political process in return for economic and socio-political favours.  To resurrect the 
battered economy he had inherited from his predecessors President Suharto selected 
market-orientated economic development policies that encouraged domestic and 
foreign investment, stimulated the manufacturing sector without neglecting 
agriculture, and without totally neglecting a relatively small collection of influential 
pribumi (indigenous) businessmen, heavily advantaged the growing Sino-Indonesian 
conglomerates and trading companies.  Enterprise management required heavy state 
involvement in the economy but with the high concentration of Sino-Indonesian 
entrepreneurs suspended in a permanent state of political vulnerability, the regime 
found business easy to control.  Moreover, the Sukarno-era long period of import-
substitution had required a general industrial dependence on state intervention and 
subsidies so the state’s hold over business was already firm.  The substantial personal 
investment interests of a multitude of well-connected medium-level New Order 
functionaries further strengthened the relationship between the regime and the 
business community.  The general neo-patrimonial nature of the Suharto New Order 
encouraged close, commercially advantageous, personal links between key officials 
and business interests that benefited the business community, in particular, the Sino-
Indonesian conglomerates.  Almost all of the major corporations that were blossoming 
under the New Order were owned by Sino-Indonesian interests, the exceptions being 
the relatively small number of successful pribumi corporations enjoying close ties to 
the regime and, in particular, the Suharto family and their domestic and international 
associates.  Well-connected elite interests also secured equity arrangements with the 
big Sino-Indonesian conglomerates in the new business environment.   
                From 1970 the New Order political arrangement was changing and with it 
the composition of the establishment elites.  Concerned that a revived politicised 
Islam might threaten the political arrangement Suharto dismantled the old political-
party system through a process of forced amalgamations that left secular-nationalist 
GOLKAR, the New Order’s political machine, dominating the political process.  
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Because of their religious scholarship and respect within the community, the Muslim 
elites enjoyed regime and social deference but were of little political significance.  
With the political influence of both Islamic modernists and traditionalists continuing 
to decline through the 1970s, the administrative elite, closely associated with the 
regime political machine GOLKAR, grew in power and a new middle class of 
professionals and elements of the business elite began to exert an increasing influence 
upon politics.  Through the 1980s the economy itself came increasingly under the 
direction of the burgeoning urban elite that was drawing growing influence from 
linkages between influential businessmen and serving or retired military figures.  But 
growing middle class influence increasing came at the detriment of the military 
elite.352  Across the vast archipelago, away from the centre of power in Jakarta, the 
situation was different and remained balanced more in favour of the military.  
Although New Order influence penetrated deep down into Indonesian society through 
its GOLKAR political network, its ability to influence at the village level was 
somewhat tempered by ABRI’s unique territorial command structure legitimised and 
institutionalised by the Pancasila derivative dwi fungsi.  Military territorial 
arrangements gave local garrisons considerable independent authority and powerful 
influence over localised grass-roots politics.   
 
2.2.5  ABRI and the New Order ‘Pancasila state’   
               The New Order system of governance represented a form of governance that 
the regime referred to as Pancasila demokrasi.353  Pancasila’s five principles 
originally included in the 1945 Indonesian Constitution came to pervade virtually 
every aspect of Indonesian socio-political life and ideological discourse during the 
New Order.354  The regime intended Pancasila’s Five Principles to convince the 
Indonesian people that the state’s pre-eminence was responsive to its people’s general 
wishes.  Pancasila demokrasi’s structure, while represented as a uniquely-Indonesian 
form of democratic government, merely empowered the state to use its own discretion 
to suppress any social behaviour they regarded as contrary to exclusive, and 
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unquestioned, regime interpretation of the doctrine.355  Moreover, as will be discussed 
further in the following chapters, the representative institutions that came to underpin 
Pancasila demokrasi could well be described as the “mere instruments of tyranny” J. 
S. Mill referred to one hundred and fifty years earlier and while “[p]opular election 
was practiced”, instead of a security against misgovernment, it “[was] but an 
additional wheel in its machinery”.356   
                  At the vanguard of their nation’s independence struggle ABRI were 
always political having realised from the earliest days of rebellion that their future 
role would be largely socio-political.357  The ABRI leadership regarded the early 
attempts at democratic civilian government as a failure and inappropriate to 
Indonesian life, convincing the officer corps that they were the only social force 
capable of ensuring order and stability.  Moreover, from the early days when the 
military took over the Dutch companies and turned them into major state enterprises 
run by military-dominated boards, the military as an institution remained deeply 
integrated into the state economy.  Their socio-political role not only protected the 
military’s domestic interests by compensating for the perceived weakness of civilian 
government but their adopted function also enabled them to keep a watchful eye over 
growing Sino-Indonesian corporate interests.  They directly intervened in politics on 
three occasions.  Need and opportunity converged during the 1945-8 independence 
struggle and also when martial law was declared following democratic and civil 
breakdown in the late 1950s before Sukarno took control of the political process and 
imposed his Guided Democracy.  Need and opportunity again arose in response to the 
somewhat questionable coup attempt by leftist officers in 1965.358  Not only was 
ABRI the largest socio-political organization in the country, their self-ordained 
doctrine dwi fungsi (dual function) legally and ideologically justified their deep 
                                                           
355 Liddle (1997), p. 294. 
356 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, (Longmans, Green, and Co., 
London, 1867), pp. 3-4. 
357 Harold Crouch, ‘Indonesia’ in Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia, in Zakaria Haji Ahmad 
and Harold Crouch, (Eds.), (Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1985) pp. 49-51. 
358 The independence movement regarded the central government’s indecision over creating a national 
army to fight for independence as gross negligence and took the initiative upon themselves.  Their 
reentry into politics in 1957 followed unwanted intrusions by civilian politicians the military regarded 
as lacking social legitimacy, and in response to the 1965 coup their moves were defensive.  In 1965 
they saw their move as justified by the need to both protect their hold on internal security and resist the 
ideological challenge of Sukarno’s NASAKOM-isation of society;  Sukarno’s fusion of what he saw as 
the three major socio-political forces in Indonesian society: nationalis (nationalism), agama (religion), 
and komunis (communism). 
 121
penetration into every level of Indonesian society and their pervasive role in all socio-
political affairs.   
                Until brutally put down by the military, the Darul Islam revolts between 
1948 and 1962, convinced the ruling elites, particularly ABRI’s leadership, of 
Pancasila’s utility in countering any likely push for an Islamic government.  The 
Darul Islam affair also convinced the military that if not contained, threats from the 
extreme right (where they located radical Islam as opposed to the Communists located 
on the extreme left) could continue to threaten their hegemonic socio-political 
agendas.  The revolts provided the ruling order (and others among the establishment 
elites) with the pretext for some thirty years of anti-Islamic politics, thinking, and 
behaviour, and convinced the military leaders of the dire consequences of any 
ideological divergence from Pancasila as the state’s philosophical basis (dasa 
negara).  Thus ABRI’s dwi fungsi doctrine, as an essential ingredient of Pancasila 
demokrasi, guaranteed that the military could never be apolitical.  As Crouch put it, 
by proving their indispensability in putting down the Muslim-supported regional 
rebellions, the military leadership had “underpinned its claim to a more permanent 
role in the government.”359  The violent aftermath of the 1965 coup attempt was the 
conclusive proof ABRI’s leadership needed of the righteousness of their cause in de-
politicising Indonesian society and bringing it under firm control.  Thus, from its very 
inception Pancasila had a clear socio-political mandate to legitimise authority and 
enable ABRI to presume legitimacy in their self-appointed role as defenders of a non-
Communist, non-Islamic, unitary, secular, Pancasila-ist Indonesian state.   
  
2.2.6  Relations of power, political organisation and a resurgent Islam    
               Although the vast majority of the Indonesian population are Muslim, only a 
minority maintain high degrees of piety and most citizens prefer a non-confessional 
form of government to that of an Islamic state.360  Nationalist, democratic, and 
socialist ideas, strongly orientated towards secularism, implanted within the majority 
Javanese during the independence struggles, goes someway towards explaining why 
the influence of politika-Islam was unable to match the large Muslim population.  A 
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pre-independence appeal that Muslims and secular-nationalists balance their interests 
had resulted in the contentious Jakarta Charter.  However, while the Charter, in 
promising that the new state would officially remain non-confessional with the 
guarantee of freedom to worship as one wished, represented compromise, the 
document had also included the obligation, considerably concerning to secular-
nationalists, that the state work towards implementing Islamic law within the Muslim 
community.  Rather than alienate secular-nationalists and risk disunity, Sukarno and 
Hatta quietly dropped the Charter from the Declaration of Independence causing the 
Constitution’s lack of the Islamic syari’a obligation to be an object of bitter concern 
for decades to come.361  The 1955 elections, now regarded as the most democratic 
ever held in Indonesia until the post-Suharto era, failed to give Muslims an electoral 
majority with the vote split between modernist Muslim Masyumi and traditionalist 
Muslim NU on the one hand, and the secular grouping of the Indonesian Nationalist 
Party (PNI) and the Communist PKI on the other.362   
                     Muslim-led regional rebellions during the 1950s and early 1960s earned 
ongoing ABRI distrust towards Islam’s intentions and permanently stigmatised 
politika-Islam.  Enthusiastic rural Muslim support for the military against the PKI 
during the blood-letting that followed the 1965 coup attempt did little to advance the 
Islamic political agenda as might have been expected when Major General Suharto 
took power.  Expecting rehabilitation, and inclusion within the new political 
arrangement, Muslim political aspirations were disappointed.  Masyumi remained 
banned and, in 1973, Muslim political interests were forcefully merged into one 
political party, the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP).  Generous official support 
tilted the electoral system in favour of the New Order party GOLKAR and politika-
Islam was consigned to the political periphery.363  1984 legislation that demanded all 
socio-political organisations accept the state ideology Pancasila as their sole 
foundation (azas tunggal), proved to be the final blow to any pretensions Islam may 
have had to political autonomy.   
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                      Politika-Islam’s clear failure to unify a political constituency during the 
1950s and 1960s provoked different reactions from intellectual Islam but generally 
encouraged adherents to focus their obligations of faith through cultural development.  
The most common strategy pursued by Muslim intellectuals refused to deny that 
Islam had some form of role to play in Indonesian politics but encouraged Muslims to 
place priority on deepening their faith.  Political change, they argued, would follow in 
due course.  However, a grouping of young intellectuals from the Islamic Students 
Association (AMI) disagreed, arguing that an Islamic state was irrelevant to Islam 
anyway and that the notion should be set aside in favour of a move towards Muslim 
renewal in a comprehensive spiritual, intellectual, and economic sense.  Still another 
strain of Islamic intellectual thought, and one generally associated with those from the 
banned modernist Masyumi party, saw any cultural drive as merely a temporary 
diversion from the key issue of their valid struggle for eventual control of the 
Indonesian state.  Disappointed at their continued political peripheralisation, even 
though many had not been overtly fundamentalist or authoritarian, members of the old 
Masyumi party claimed that their only sin in the past had been constant criticism of 
Sukarno’s policies so Masyumi’s New Order successors felt deeply frustrated that 
Suharto’s New Order was not prepared to allow them space on his political stage.364   
                  From the late 1960s the New Order had begun to expand the network of 
Muslim universities and by the 1980s growing numbers of graduates were finding 
employment within both the state and private sectors were coming to represent the 
coming of age of a new generation of middle-class citizens enriched with a sound 
understanding of their Islamic faith.  Indonesian Islam therefore underwent an 
astonishing cultural renewal during the 1980s and into the 1990s but the political 
implications of growing Muslim piety was not readily discernable and, given 
Indonesian Islam’s theological and cultural diversity, the likelihood of a single form 
of politika-Islam emerging still seemed remote.    
      Although power remained firmly within the executive and the Presidency, 
and although ABRI continued to set the limits on political discourse and participation, 
the permitted parameters of expression became increasingly blurred from the early 
1990s.  Establishment elites, on the inside as well as the peripheries of New Order 
power, became troubled by a number of issues.  Suharto’s succession preoccupied 
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elite concerns as did a growing fear that improving political and institutional links 
between Islam and government might revive the old ideological issues that carried the 
potential for a recurrence of the primordial politics of the violent mid-1960s.  
Thriving Islamic intellectual life through the 1990s was nonetheless heartened by 
Islam’s international revival and activism and increasingly conscious of its more 
pronounced political potential.  A dramatic turning point in Islamic socio-political 
activities occurred in 1991 with the founding of the modernist Islamic ICMI (The 
Association of Muslim Intellectuals).  Backed by the President himself, directed by 
his protégé Josef Habibie, and in accord with Suharto’s apparent newfound piety, 
ICMI was seen as a strategic ploy to gain modernist Islam’s support to balance a 
presumed diminution in ABRI’s support.  Nevertheless, regardless of its proclaimed 
intention as a forum for Islamic debate and discussion - an Islamic think-tank - ICMI 
firmly, albeit possibly unintentionally, placed Islam back onto the political stage, and 
together with the issue of Presidential succession and the growth of what was 
cynically referred to as Cendana politics, added to a growing concern and subsequent 
polarisation among the establishment elites.365  The idea that contemporary politics 
might head in a sectarian direction and arouse the masses about exclusionary issues 
(or even democratic and human rights issues) deeply concerned the ruling 
establishment.  Secular nationalists, ever conscious of the causal links between 
emotional ideological issues and violent mass behaviour, remained politically 
cautious and impotent, excluded from political expression by the regime’s continued 
restrictive interpretation of Pancasila demokrasi.  As the 1990s progressed, while the 
religious elites were able to demonstrate that the so-called non-political organisations 
of traditionalist NU and modernist Islamic ICMI could effectively operate in the 
changing socio-political environment, to the secular-nationalists, sectoral political 
participation evoked an uncomfortable image of influential Islamic political 
organisations acquiring mass support behind their agendas and the potential to incite 
societal instability and violence to achieve them. 
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2.3  Suharto’s fall and the end of the New Order    
2.3.1  Uncertainty among the New Order establishment elites 
                        From the late 1980s and through into the 1990s a broadening range of 
dissent emerged to criticise and challenge the regime that had hitherto seemed 
impervious to change.  The exclusionary socio-political system the New Order had 
created left little space to accommodate the changing intellectual aspirations of key 
sectors of Indonesian society.  Designed to preserve the status quo, the political party 
system underpinned by Pancasila demokrasi could not allow direct parliamentary 
challenge but during the early 1990s the PDI, led by the popular Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, openly defied the system.  A heavy-handed government and thuggish 
ABRI response fuelled the growing public dissatisfaction and cynicism towards the 
un-democratic nature of the regime.366  Income disparities had visibly increased by 
the 1990s, particularly in the crowded urban areas, and with it social intolerance.  
Regular rioting carried ethnic and religious undertones and ethnic resentment drew on 
longstanding tensions between the clearly more affluent Sino-Indonesians and the 
indigenous Muslim masses, focusing on the Sino-Indonesians’ general linkage to the 
regime.  Intra-military rivalry and doctrinal differences, and tension between the two 
mass intellectual streams of Islamic modernism and traditionalism exploited by the 
President at every opportunity for socio-political gain, added to the growing societal 
unease as elements among the elites manoeuvred themselves in anticipation of 
Suharto’s inevitable succession.  Individual prominent oppositionally-positioned 
establishment leaders shifted stances in line with the ebb and flow of volatile socio-
political realities. 
                     Both those sections of the New Order elites holding power and those 
outside the power frame shared the fear that political interests outside of the 
mainstream political establishment might appropriate support from the disadvantaged 
masses.  The Indonesian establishment has always regarded politically mobilised 
mass unrest as the only likely serious threat to the political status quo, and the student-
led riots and unrest that began to intensify from mid-1996 justified these fears.367  
Although focussed on ending Suharto’s rule and his regime’s political repression, the 
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likelihood that the activist student agenda might find appeal as a political focus for 
grass-roots anger about broader issues and arouse people power, as had occurred in 
the neighbouring Philippines during 1985, added to establishment concerns.  The 
student-initiated public mobilisation of socio-political dissatisfaction did not 
necessarily involve rioting and often included relatively peaceful party activity, but 
the combination of organised and non-organised unrest climaxed in massive popular 
mobilisation during the May 1997 general election.  The election also highlighted two 
serious issues of concern for the ruling elites: the demonstrators were growing 
increasingly belligerent and, as the protest and unrest escalated, the security forces 
appeared correspondingly unable to control the large-scale public venting of 
emotions.   
      The endemic prevalence of corruption, nepotism, and cronyism prevented 
the New Order from responding credibly to the regional economic crisis of mid-1997.  
Wealthy, generally well-connected, individuals and companies moved their capital 
off-shore, the rupiah crumbled exacerbating widespread poverty and dissatisfaction 
and the President himself seemed to be the main impediment to economic recovery.  
Attempts by elements of the military and radical Islamic groups to scapegoat the 
Sino-Indonesian population and deflect attention away from the growing crises 
heightened ethnic tensions and intra-elite concerns.368  The New Order was clearly 
becoming less able to guarantee order and stability with opposition to Suharto’s 
continued hold on power even coming from establishment groups previously loyal to 
him.     
        By the beginning of 1998 influential, highly critical, social leaders of the 
unofficial establishment opposition, such as Wahid of traditionalist NU, Megawati of 
the PDI, and Rais of modernist Muhammadiyah, were calling for partisan national 
dialogue on the growing economic, political, and social crises.  Even though their 
criticism of the Suharto regime gained support from press calls for reform and 
aroused “excitement among Jakarta’s elite” they offered little concrete political 
direction.369  Intra-elite criticism remained purely rhetorical as social leaders backed 
away from directly influencing, or being involved in, the protests.  After decades of 
institutionalised prohibition of political dissent and organisation such ambivalence 
towards the New Order implied innate political desensitisation that was hardly 
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surprising.  Despite the regime’s repeated warnings about the consequences of street 
protest, and the general belief that Special Forces officers were actually kidnapping 
student activists, campus-initiated protests grew.  Panic spread among an increasingly 
divided establishment when on the 20th February 1998 ABRI spokesmen added 
confusion to the volatile situation by officially denying that demonstrations were 
banned totally and pointed out that protest was acceptable so long as it was non-
violent and restricted to campuses.370  During the last weeks of Suharto’s hold over 
power, elements of his regime, together with a grouping of senior military officers 
that included the commander of the Special Forces, Suharto’s son-in-law General 
Prabowo, tried to actively incite ethnic and religious differences to achieve 
destabilising “political and possibly economic objectives”.371   
 
2.3.2  The student movement and reformasi dan demokrasi 
                       Attempts to form a coherent opposition alliance to Suharto that 
combined the populist Islamic leaders Amien Rais, Wahid and Megawati stalled 
through irrevocable distrust between the three.  In early 1998 the momentum of 
opposition was forced to turn to the student movement and the students moved to 
centre-stage and become the catalyst for action.  Once Suharto resigned their power 
waned highlighting the enigma that is Indonesian student activism notwithstanding its 
special place in Indonesian history and political culture.372  In 1966 student protest 
had made a dynamic and visible contribution to Sukarno’s overthrow and Suharto and 
his generals professed their indebtedness to what became known as the Generation of 
1966 (the Angkatan 66) for the support and vital legitimacy the students had given the 
military’s grab for power.  The ‘new order’ advocated by the students at the time, and 
promised by the generals, was intended to be in complete contrast to that of the 
Sukarno era but eventually came to disappoint many within the student activist 
movement.  With official praise heaped upon them for their efforts, many of the 
Angkatan generation went on to enter the bureaucracy, politics, and business and as 
members of the establishment became the core of a new middle-class.  During the 
1970s, when all other socio-political forces were seriously feeling the effects of the 
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New Order’s depoliticisation, the students (albeit from the moral position of loyal 
opposition to the New Order) were actually permitted official space to protest. But an 
escalation in the level of their protest from 1973 to 1977 exhausted the regime’s 
patience and in 1978 the New Order extended its depoliticisation program to 
campuses where its Normalisation of Campus Life policy (NKK or Normalisasi 
Kehidupan Kampus) gave university assistant-rectors responsibility for maintaining a 
tight rein on student political activity.  A new wave of student activism broke out in 
1988-9 but protest generally centred about populist issues and only indirectly 
questioned the New Order.  The student’s attitude hardened from the early 1990s and 
with it a general hostility towards ABRI and in particular their use of dwi fungsi to 
legitimise their pervasive hold over all aspects of Indonesian life.    
                      The student movement of 1998, comprised now of a wide range of 
differing political views and personal backgrounds, was not the homogenous 
organisation it had been back in 1966.  At that time they had carried the support of 
rural Muslims prepared to back the military against the hated communists.  During the 
1990s, however, Islam was not prepared to unanimously support ABRI so long as the 
generals supported Suharto’s hold onto power.  Expressing themselves through the 
extremes of radical activism, general passivity, and even caution, the student senates 
reflected the broad diversity that had become student Islam.  Nevertheless, by early 
May 1998 the student movement was at least united behind the over-riding goal of 
removing Suharto totally from power.  Drawn as they were by their historical moral 
obligation to defend the interests of the common people, belief in the purity 
(kermurnian) of their movement required that the students generally reject 
collaboration with other political forces, and in particular, with the now highly 
politicised military elite.  However, while ABRI commander Wiranto appeared to 
sympathise with their demands there was little collaboration between the students, the 
military, the government, or even with those elements of the establishment that were 
now coalescing into an uncoordinated broad socio-political opposition.  Well aware of 
the historical role that Angkatan 66 had played at another time of national crisis, the 
contemporary generation of students realised the responsibility they carried through 
the popular legitimacy their cause attracted but the political agenda of their 1960s 
predecessors, and in particular that generation’s willingness to co-operate with the 
military, had become anathema to the generation of 1998.   
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                    Without doubt the student movement played the decisive role in the 
political transition of 1998 providing a catalyst for direct action while the broader 
establishment opposition limited itself to uncoordinated and at times contradictory, 
rhetoric.  The vigour of the broadly dispersed social revolution and mass response 
they stimulated first disconcerted, then further fractured, the ruling alliance elites and 
were primarily responsible for key sections deserting their patron, President Suharto.  
Student movements, by their very nature, represent a small, albeit at times vocal, 
section of the population, and are generally unable to achieve specific political goals 
unless they can successfully mobilise mass support behind their movement and aims.  
This proved to be the case when anger and violence erupted out of the campuses onto 
the streets in May 1998 visibly linking the highly organised student reform agenda 
with the demands of the economically-marginalised predominantly Muslim urban 
poor whose situation had now become untenable due to the economic crisis.  But the 
linkage of student activism to the disadvantaged masses hinted at primordialism in its 
purest sense, recalled the mass brutality that had accompanied Sukarno’s overthrow in 
1966, and stunned the establishment elites into desperate self-preservation.  Their 
response was to desert their patron.   
   
3.  Summary   
                      Javanese-specific political culture defined by traditional conservatism, 
centrally-controlled social conformity, a traditional suspicion of Islamic politics and 
an inherent tendency towards authoritarianism underpinned the agendas of the 
secular-nationalist Javanese dominated Suharto New Order once they were certain 
they held total power.  A top-down proclivity for formalised corruption, nepotism and 
violence has long had a strong influence on regional politics and been enhanced by 
the processes of modernisation since the end of the colonial era.373  These tendencies 
also highlight the Javanese context and exist alongside traditional power techniques of 
coercion and persuasion commonly employed as political resources with material 
exchange providing an enabling linkage between the two.374  The relationship 
between Javanese notions of the morality and legitimacy of power has historically 
been tenuous so political legitimacy has generally been achieved by unifying 
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subordinate groups through strong centralised control.375  Traditional Indonesian 
political life would therefore suggest little room existed for democratic, popular-
participatory, processes to function so the powerful conservative socio-political and 
bureaucratic administration structures of the Suharto New Order that evolved out of 
traditional deference to aristocratic and bureaucratic authority attained through 
discipline and education hardly appear surprising.376  The most pressing need facing 
the New Order regime when it took power was to construct national unity and pursue 
modernisation through economic development.  Creating unity and stability out of the 
diverse array of conflicting and contradictory social interests left the Suharto regime 
little option but to employ traditional power strategies in striving for socio-political 
legitimacy.  By employing power acquisition techniques that combined elements of 
coercion, persuasion and material exchange the New Order generals were conforming 
to traditional cultural expectations.377  To summarise, there were three cultural 
traditions assisting the New Order elites in managing socio-political life: traditional 
acknowledgement of Javanese influence and power, the need for strong patron/client 
links to enable political and economic advantage and material acquisition, and a 
culture of deference towards bureaucratic authority.   
                    Centuries of Dutch administration had left indigenous politicians 
unsophisticated and inexperienced in the arts of political influence and the techniques 
of participatory political processes.  Moreover, the Dutch system had effectively 
racially defined Indonesia by placing Sino-Indonesian commercial interests above the 
indigenous Muslim majority.  Indigenous Indonesians replaced the departing Dutch 
administrators to provide an influential layer both above and alongside the Sino-
Indonesians, formalising a class arrangement that the Suharto New Order would 
firmly institutionalise to the advantage of their developmental and ideological 
agendas.378  Above the arrangement, unquestioned in authority stood the Indonesian 
army.   
                    The key to the Suharto New Order’s three-decade arrangement of 
Indonesian development lies in its redefinition of nationalism through a balancing of 
techniques of coercion with those of consensus and co-option to restructure the 
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Indonesian state around its own world-view.  The New Order built its legitimacy upon 
national strength and unity through national development upon a solid foundation of 
its own re-defined traditional Javanese virtues expressed through the regime’s 
exclusive representation of Pancasila as the official state ideology.  Javanese political 
philosophy, traditionally informed by an underlying pessimism, was highly 
susceptible to the culture of messianic appeal (or the search for the leadership of a 
‘man of prowess’) within an uncompromising hierarchical society.379  General 
Suharto’s new ostensibly nationalist regime had reinvented these notions and by 
successfully pursuing modernisation legitimised popular consent to his rule.380  
Achieving its socio-political agenda required that the predominantly Javanese New 
Order elites adapt selected aspects of Western government and until some undefined 
level of economic development had been reached temporarily suspended others.  
Successful development in the region could ill afford to leave any aspect of social, 
economic, and political life to chance and required patience through a process that 
Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew described as cautious “one step at a time” for its 
success.381  To maintain adequate socio-political stability, a techno-bureaucratic elite, 
charged with development policy, selectively, albeit loosely, reinvented a pragmatic 
socio-political culture based upon so-called Asian traditions of “deference, 
bureaucracy, and consensus”.382  Allied with selected Sino-Indonesian businessmen, 
financed initially by massive oil revenues and later foreign capital, the politico-
bureaucratic-military leadership grouping came to dominate the state-run economy 
through a complex arrangement of state, capital, and patronage.383   
                    In the final analysis, General Suharto’s New Order was an authoritarian 
regime that pursued its agenda ruthlessly “unconstrained by any system of laws” and 
based primarily upon the President’s personal and arbitrary control.384  The New 
Order’s key economic player, the primarily non-indigenous Sino-Indonesian business 
class, remained vulnerable to indigenous resentment and periodic reactive state-driven 
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economic-nationalism, and avoided traditional political activity preferring a more 
“covert form of political representation – clientilism”.385  International development 
capital supported economic development and provided wealth from multinationals 
and banks for distribution through self-interested economic and political processes.386  
Achieving socio-political agendas required the New Order to stimulate a highly 
prioritised manufacturing sector and managing and controlling its constituent 
elements through market-oriented economic policies.  While not neglecting the 
enormous and socio-politically critical agricultural sector, policy agendas maintained 
inflation at an acceptable level to encourage both domestic and foreign investment.387   
                    To enable it to govern, manage the bureaucracy and neutralise any 
organised opposition to its agendas, the New Order re-invented a pragmatic version of 
the state ideology Pancasila.  Essentially the New Order’s representation of Pancasila 
underwrote a form of democracy built upon traditional cultural understandings of 
guidance, co-operation, and consultation.388  As a “formulaic representation of the 
idea of the Indonesian state”, the doctrine nonetheless merely modified traditional 
practices for the express purposes of abetting social control and economic 
development.389  Intended to appeal compellingly to all citizens to build a nation 
based upon the human values of ethnicity, religious and regional tolerance and social 
justice, a self-interested interpretation of Pancasila was appropriated by the New 
Order to legitimize, morally and intellectually, its total domination of the Indonesian 
people.  For thirty years, underwritten by both the coercive and co-optive potential of 
the state, Pancasila provided the ruling order with an extraordinarily powerful tool to 
manipulate mass consciousness and socio-political behaviour.  The doctrine provided 
an effective and accessible indicator to define the boundaries of allowable political 
participation and debate and, by limiting the possibility of potentially negative 
communicatory politics, satisfied the elites’ need for ideological conformity.390  To 
ensure the strict ideological conformity deemed necessary to deliver successful 
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economic development across a broad range of ethnic, cultural, and religious 
demands, strategies were employed that systematically depoliticised Indonesian 
society and compelled the people to totally accept Pancasila demokrasi as the only 
acceptable ideological basis for socio-political activity.  To further strengthen 
necessary stability, the techno-bureaucratic elites increasingly entrusted with 
development policy, reinvented and exploited traditional understandings of 
“deference, bureaucracy, and consensus.”391   
                      Appalled by the bloody post-coup events of 1965-6, that starkly evinced 
the causal relationship within grass-roots Indonesian society between ideology and 
violent political behaviour, the New Order generals de-ideologised society to ensure 
that errant politicians not promote alternative ideological orientations that might 
influence mass socio-political behaviour.392  To protect simple villagers from being 
confused or mislead, political parties were prevented from operating below the district 
level while the regime’s political organ, GOLKAR, received government support to 
campaign directly to every level of Indonesian society.  The further circumscription 
that all civil servants, including district and village officials and functionaries, be 
members of GOLKAR, guaranteed direct regime access to every level of Indonesian 
society and virtually ensured GOLKAR’s success at every election.  With all socio-
political expression, and both the legislative and judicial branches of government, 
firmly under Jakarta’s authority, social control was in theory complete.  All social, 
political, and economic, organisations required official sanction before they could 
function and most became mere extensions of executive authority.  It thus remained 
for successful economic development to legitimise and justify the regime’s 
hegemonic policies of socio-political and commercial coercion, compromise, and co-
optation.  It is telling that, with the exception of a small, albeit steadily growing, 
educated middle-class, until Indonesia’s economy collapsed in 1997 the majority of 
the population appeared willing to comply with the regime’s demands, seemingly 
“relatively content to trade political liberties for economic growth.”393              
       
 
                                                           
391 Jones, (1997), p. 147. 
392 Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance, 
(Routledge, London, 1998), p. 501. 
393 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, (1998), p. 501. 
 134
Chapter 4 
 
The Suharto New Order as a Gramscian ‘historic bloc’: its 
economic form, the New Order economic bloc 
 
Gramsci and the economy 
                      Gramsci began from the Marxist proposition that in modern societies 
various social classes emerge as a result of the level of development of the forces of 
production, but went beyond merely upholding this traditional materialistic-economist 
explanation for the emergence of class.394  His key departure from classical Marxist 
tradition is his allocation of additional weight to such non-economic factors as politics 
and culture/ideology in production and social relations.395  As outlined in Chapter 2, 
Gramsci’s hegemony is primarily an ideological and political affair but his Marxism 
demands that hegemony’s binding glue, its ideological superiority, nevertheless 
maintains firm roots in the terrain of economic activity.   Thus, while his approach 
goes beyond the materialist-economic proposition, his analysis still centres on the 
complexity of relationships arising within society as a dominant class emerges 
economically from amongst contradictory socio-political forces.396   
                  Gramsci’s focus on issues of mass consciousness and socialising processes 
can result in what some commentators acknowledge as a weakness in his ideas.  
Immersed as he was in Crocean397 liberal philosophy and Machiavellian political 
thought Gramsci has been accused of neglecting a deeper economic analysis in 
linking the issues of popular consciousness and socialisation to the inherent dynamics 
of the modern state’s over-riding economic basis.398  He stands accused of lacking an 
understanding of not only the adaptability and creativity of modern capitalism but also 
modern capitalism’s dynamism and volatility yet his thoughts reflect a deep 
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understanding of the moral and psychological factors that link plural interests in 
modern societies where economic factors dominate.  In fact capitalism itself 
ultimately proved capable of ‘purchasing’ through consumerism the essence of 
Gramscian hegemony - the consent of the masses.  Appreciating the dynamism of the 
relationship between state and economy in a modern industrializing state, Gramsci 
insisted that hegemony needed to be understood equally on ideological and political 
as well as economic levels.399  As outlined in Chapter 2, Gramsci offers the ‘historic 
bloc’ as an analytic device to explain the re-shaping and re-aligning of state-class 
economic interests with, more specifically, the economic form of the bloc, his 
‘economic bloc’ with its focus on the importance of political, cultural, and ideological 
influences upon economics.400  Gramscian hegemony requires that his historic bloc be 
viewed as constituent forms in an historic process influenced by an over-riding, 
consensually imposed, ideological hegemony.  This chapter considers the extent to 
which the Suharto New Order matched the Gramscian model by employing an 
exclusive interpretation of the state ideology Pancasila as the ‘economic’ constituent 
in performing this essential legitimising function and the way the regime organised 
economic matters and processes.   
                    It is first necessary to reiterate those aspects of the Gramscian hegemonic 
model employed in this chapter to contrast the New Order economic process with the 
Gramscian economic bloc.  Gramsci’s hegemonic socio-political processes are based 
on the dominant group exercising ongoing authority over economic processes so the 
essence of the Gramscian project’s economic model is its focus on the behaviour of 
organic intellectuals401 closely involved in the broader activities of economic 
production (economists, techno-bureaucrats and agenda-setting soldiers) and the 
processes they institute to legitimise their sponsoring class’s hegemony.  Although 
closely bound by functional association to the ruling order (the military leadership in 
the case of Indonesia) the organic intellectuals are also required to perform the vital 
role of resolving the cultural conflict and contestation that inevitably occurs between 
the ruling groups and the subordinate masses.  While the role of the organic 
intellectuals charged with articulating and disseminating ideology into the mass 
                                                           
399 Anne Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci’s Politics, (St, Matins Press, New York, 1980), p. 114 and p. 
118. 
400 John Hilley, Malaysia: Mahatharism, Hegemony and the New Opposition, (Zed Books, London, 
2001), pp. 31-33. 
401 Chapter 1, section 1.9, pp. 40-46. 
 136
consciousness on behalf of their sponsoring class is the key to the model, it is 
specifically their representation of the relevant aspects of ‘ideology’ that, by 
underwriting regime economic agendas and policies so as to be accepted as 
universally valid, legitimise the model.402  The leadership must be prepared to update 
its economic arrangements as necessary in line with new and changing economic 
realities.  A stable hegemony lasts only so long as the cohesion of the economic 
alliances upon which the economic bloc is built can be sustained.  The legitimacy of 
the economic bloc’s leadership can only be substantiated by their maintaining an 
ongoing hegemonic “position and function in [and over] the world of production”.403   
                      The Gramscian model also has much to say on the circumstances of 
hegemonic decay and obsolescence as well as the likelihood of an emergent counter-
hegemony.  The dynamic plurality of interests that influence modern industrializing 
societies require constantly adjusting and re-negotiating hegemony to disseminate 
changing subordinate interests.  Failure to do so can lay the basis upon which a 
coherent counter-hegemony may be constructed.404  Counter-hegemony can evolve 
out of any significant questioning of the prime issues that underpin the economic bloc, 
the allocation and distribution of economic benefits and advantage, the ongoing 
legitimacy of economic arrangements and priorities, and the effectiveness of the 
institutions that formalise those arrangements.405  Most important to hegemonic 
legitimacy, and particularly relevant to this chapter, is the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of hegemonic response to profound economic threat.  According to 
Gramsci, economic crisis places a heavy burden on hegemonic legitimacy and thus 
the state that arises out of a specific hegemonic economic era – its economic bloc – 
must assuage the contradictions and antagonisms that inevitably evolve between the 
classes that possess and benefit from the means of production and those that do not.406                  
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1.  The New Order economic system   
1.1  Origins 
                The Dutch colonial authorities allocated Chinese merchants an important, 
advantaged ‘middle-man’ position in their colonial economic system and, playing a 
similar role under Suharto, Sino-Indonesian businessmen became an essential element 
of New Order economic success.407  While they remained an integral component of 
the regime’s relationship with domestic capital, Sino-Indonesian business success 
always far exceeded its level of political influence and, as a minority group, the Sino-
Indonesians remained vulnerable to the economic agendas of the prevailing power-
holders.408  Notwithstanding their vulnerability, the arrangement was one of mutual 
advantage and the elaborate network of state-business relations that came to centre 
about the role of the cukong (Sino-Indonesian businessmen protected by powerful 
officials in return for a share of profit) suggests that cukongism may remain an 
indispensable component of any viable system of rule in Indonesia.409  It is hardly 
surprising therefore that indigenous businessmen blamed the unequal development 
that favoured the politically and economically predominant Sino-Indonesian business 
class on an economic structure inherited from colonial times.410   
                   Indonesian independence in 1949 ended the dominant socio-political and 
economic power of Dutch colonial rule but General Sukarno’s revolutionary 
economic stabilisation programme led to economic and socio-political bankruptcy 
within sixteen years.  Lacking any form of strong indigenous capitalist (or 
bourgeoisie) class, excluding the socio-politically unacceptable Sino-Indonesian 
traders, the newly independent Indonesian state had no choice but to take 
responsibility for economic ‘ownership’ and planning from the outset.  As an early 
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indication of the economic structure that would evolve (and ultimately underpin the 
military bureaucratic state that defined the future New Order) during the early years 
of independence, a totally state-owned central banking system was established 
alongside state trading and manufacturing corporations that controlled all major 
strategic sectors.411  An ill-fated state-initiated scheme called the Benteng program 
was established in the early 1950s for preferential allocation of import licences and, 
while the program was a failure, the institutionalised political allocation of bank 
credit, government contracts and concessions the program offered to favour the 
interests of politico-bureaucratic power-holders represented a form that would come 
to define New Order economic development.412    
                  In 1957 the state deepened its penetration of the economy by nationalising 
the major Dutch commercial enterprises.  Converted into state-owned enterprises 
many of the former Dutch companies became ABRI’s personal fiefdoms and the 
military’s primary source of extra-budgetary funding for some decades.  While a 
predominantly Sino-business class emerged out of President Sukarno’s Guided 
Economy the military-bureaucratic consolidation established a ruling elite free of 
control by the political process and non-bureaucratic forces.413  To ensure total regime 
control over the economy Sukarno’s economic administration built an industrial 
economy around state capitalism, centralised planning, and extensive state ownership, 
with the regime maintaining sole authority over the allocation of licences, credit, 
contracts, quotas, monopolies and concessions.414  By the mid-1960s gross economic 
mismanagement had resulted in Indonesia’s foreign borrowings reaching a staggering 
$US2 billion and with debt repayments exceeding export earnings the state was 
technically insolvent.415   
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1.2  New Order economic policy frameworks 
                       Following the failed 1966 coup General Suharto and the surviving 
senior generals took power.  Their regime, to be known as the New Order, embarked 
upon, and oversaw, a program of economic and industrial development that nurtured 
an emergent capital-owning elite and protected them from both reformist and 
revolutionary tendencies and forces in return for socio-political support.416  In return 
for corporate support, the New Order elite favoured their capitalist backers with some 
three decades of spectacular state-promoted economic development through an 
agenda described by the World Bank as the three-functioned development approach to 
East Asian miracle status.417  Employing what the World Bank calls the functional 
approach to growth the state prioritised market fundamentals, intervened 
pragmatically in the economy, and embedded and empowered a strong politico-
bureaucracy of high quality officials to manage and drive developmental policies.418   
                    A fear of socio-political instability pressed economic development to the 
top of New Order priorities and towards a version of the developmental-state model 
managed by the increasingly influential politico-bureaucratic elite.  To restore 
Indonesia’s economic health from the crisis of the late-Sukarno era the team of 
predominantly Western-trained economists were insulated from socio-political 
pressures and given a high degree of autonomy to devise and implement economic 
policies that tied the state and private sectors into a network of mutual co-operation.419  
The scope of techno-bureaucratic activity and involvement was limited to the 
aggregates (national income, consumption, and investments) of the macro-economy 
rather than the particulars (business, individuals, and their relationships) of the micro-
economy.   
                        With the line between pre- and post-coup politics blurred, questions 
remained as to the likely vulnerability of the technocrats should they attempt to 
contest military demands.  Of particular concern was whether the technocrats would 
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be able to curtail market manipulation and restrict vested military interests’ influence 
over economic and business affairs.  Because of their diverse backgrounds and skills 
those charged with steering economic development were able to show considerable 
resourcefulness in navigating the political and cultural conflicts and antagonisms their 
policies created among conflicting interests, while at the same time still managing to 
maintain the confidence of the Western nations supporting Indonesia’s economic 
recovery.420  Economic development policy often aroused antagonism but the top 
levels of the regime were determined to rehabilitate the shattered economy and it 
recovered rapidly.  As it contributed some 70% to Indonesia’s export earnings, 
sustaining high levels of oil revenue was vital to economic development and 
economic growth of at least 5% was maintained until 1982 until what was referred to 
as the post-oil era, a downturn in the international oil market forced a period of 
economic reform.  Thanks to investments coming on stream from more than a decade 
of windfall oil profits, a modicum of prudent regulatory reform was able to maintain 
economic growth of 7% annually thereafter into the 1990s.421 
                   Suharto and his generals considered three contending options before they 
chose economic and industrial policies, and economic nationalists, interventionists, as 
well as free marketers, shared in the debates.  The regime settled upon an amalgam of 
the four general economic frameworks of economic nationalism, economic populism, 
predatory bureaucratism, and liberalism, with each policy approach coming to the fore 
at different times, in varying degrees, to achieve specific socio-political outcomes.422   
                     Economic nationalism settled comfortably with the requirements of the 
regime’s Pancasila-ist economy and sought a technologically advanced industrial 
economy capable of producing capital and intermediate goods through policies that 
promoted state-led strategic-industry, trade protection, and extensive state investment 
in the economy.  The Pancasila-ist imperatives of ideologically driven nationalist 
policies carried utility in that they strengthened regime legitimacy and thereby the 
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legitimacy and authority of the officials carrying responsibility for accessing and 
allocating state capital.423   
                        Economic populist initiatives, also strongly Pancasila-ist, while 
somewhat influenced by anti-Sino-Indonesian xenophobia, were primarily designed to 
uphold the regime’s prime objective of popular legitimacy.  Their achievement 
required subsidising basic domestic commodities and selectively funding regional and 
local development projects and programmes.424  Government policies during the New 
Order also eased the effects of rising commodity prices and were useful in generating 
considerable popular legitimacy for the regime.425   
                     The predatory bureaucratism, that generally underpinned New Order 
economic and industrial development, resulted from political and techno-bureaucratic 
interests appropriating public authority and accessing political power to influence 
licensing, monopolies, bank credit, capital allocation, and state contracts.  Hilley 
views such state-class arrangements as essential if concessionary advantage is to be 
linked to party-politics and corporate networks.426  Predatory bureaucratism was 
necessary to foster the appropriate state culture of patronage required to maintain the 
personal interests of the military-bureaucratic elites.  The politico-bureaucratic strata 
that managed the day-to-day running of the state were therefore able to ‘constrain’ 
New Order development through their on-going empowerment to confer business 
advantage, patronage, and favour.427   
                      Liberalism, never a strong suit in the regime’s hand of economic choice 
was, nonetheless, forced upon policy by the disastrous drop in oil revenues during 
1982 and 1985.  The vast networks of patronage that sustained the New Order 
economic system depended upon the massive contribution petro-chemical returns 
made to the state and their reduction required finding an alternative source of 
disposable income.  To restore state revenue streams, liberal agendas challenged the 
ruling economic order by demanding improved regulatory procedures and a scaling 
down, through privatisation and deregulation, of the enormous investment by the state 
in the public sector.  As well as economic challenges to the state’s economic 
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arrangement, demands for trade and industrial liberalization and in particular any 
dismantling of the network of protectionism and monopoly, posed serious socio-
political challenge.428  Nevertheless, the laissez-faire ideals of privatisation proved 
timely, and were gratefully embraced by the regime as they offered hegemonic 
opportunity to reactively strengthen intra-elite alliances in the face of changing 
economic fortune.429  The privatisation programmes of the late-1980s and 1990s were 
thus effectively used to empower the New Order with the legitimacy to transfer 
wealth and commercial advantage and realign the reward structure to the benefit of 
strategically placed politico-corporate elites.   
 
1.3  The beneficiaries of the Pancasila-ist New Order economy 
                        The New Order’s representation of Pancasila’s Fifth Principle 
proclaimed an economic system built on social justice, economic and social 
egalitarianism and prosperity.  Emphasising that the state existed for the well-being of 
the collective rather than the individual not only provided ideological justification for 
the New Order’s direct role in the national economy, but also implied that the state 
would place a high priority upon collective indigenous enterprise.  To some extent the 
New Order supported and financed numerous, predominantly rural, indigenous co-
operatives and collective ventures but the majority of the benefits of economic 
development went to the major corporations, including the massive Sino-Indonesian 
conglomerates, and individuals close to centres of power and patronage.  Economic 
development was anything but equitable and just.  While some aspects of New Order 
economic policy agendas actually contributed to ethnic unrest, overall, the regime’s 
economic and developmental performance generated sufficient revenue surplus to 
spend significant amounts on mosque building programs and Muslim education 
programs and facilities thereby to some extent placating ethnic demands.  Under the 
New Order surpluses enabled heavy subsidisation of regional government, and 
regionally targeted distribution programmes were largely responsible for reducing 
poverty from some 60% of the population in 1966 to less than 12% in 1996.430  
                                                           
428 Asian Wall Street Journal, ‘Suharto-linked Monopolies Hobble Economy,’ Vol. XI, No. 61, 
November 24, 1986. 
429 Hilley, (2001), p. 58. 
430 Chapter 6, section 7, p. 281. 
 143
Broader social interests were subordinated to those of excessively privileged large 
domestic and foreign investors.431   
                    Five key economic players, Presidential authority, the powerful military, 
the intrusive and pervasive bureaucracy, the predominantly Sino-Indonesian business 
interests and capital, coalesced into the New Order’s economic alliance arrangement.  
President Suharto charged his techno-bureaucrats with establishing economic and 
industrial policies that would attract much-needed foreign investment and mend the 
bankrupt economy he had inherited from the Sukarno administration.432  To facilitate 
the former, and move the economy towards industrialisation based on import-
substitution protected behind tariff barriers, new investment laws provided taxation 
relief and other incentives to foreign capital.   To reverse the latter a regime of 
controls, described as the “most swift and effective instances of inflation control 
[seen] in the twentieth century” were put in place.433  The strategies employed to 
revitalise the economy prioritised external resources of foreign investment and aid 
assistance.434  Built as it was upon sustained low levels of inflation, manageable 
external borrowings, and significantly increasing investment, the New Order approach 
to economic and development policy was substantially and qualitatively different (and 
more acceptable internationally) than that of the Sukarno regime.435   
                    Domestic investment opportunities were not totally lost to foreign 
interests and grew substantially from 1965 to 1975.  The luxury of huge petro-
chemical receipts during the 1970s enabled massive state investment in the economy 
and significant input also came from those large private corporations and 
conglomerates enjoying political patronage and advantageous access to credit through 
the state banks.  Most of the conglomerates close to political patronage and state 
protection were Sino-Indonesian owned and owed their access to business opportunity 
to mutually advantageous and lucrative associations negotiated with the military 
during the years of anti-colonial struggle.  Suharto himself had gained some notoriety, 
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and was even disciplined by his superiors for overly close working relationships with 
civilian contractors during his days as a regional military commander.  His business 
relationship with close friend Liem Sioe Liong, an old associate from his military 
days, endured until the end of the Suharto Presidency.  On the other hand, and 
contradicting the regime’s implicit Pancasila-ist underpinnings, from the outset of the 
New Order, pribumi, or indigenous, business interests, were economically weak and 
remained so unless able to access political and economic patronage.436  Economic 
development primarily benefited non-indigenous business interests and during the 
1970s, conscious of the inequity development programmes promoted, the regime 
attempted a series of schemes and incentives to prioritise indigenous business.  
However, numerous attempts by the government to ‘pribumitise’ the economy (and 
by their very nature prejudicial to Sino-Indonesian interests) were consistently 
unsuccessful.437      
                 Early New Order capital therefore gained political strength by combining 
with nationalist ideologies and alliances between individual favoured capitalists and 
centres of strategic politico-bureaucratic influence.438  Involvement with increasingly 
profitable ‘client’ corporations helped politico-bureaucratic power groupings to gain 
lucrative access to revenues that satisfied political and personal needs enabling 
individuals at the centre of politico-bureaucratic power to enter the world of corporate 
capitalism as wealthy shareholders and investors.439  The New Order economic 
system sustained itself variously through the devices of protection, monopoly, credit, 
enjoying preferential access to business opportunity and advantage, and benefiting 
from a highly disciplined, low-wage, workforce founded on state-funded education.  
Moreover, the principle beneficiaries of the arrangement, an emergent, strong, private, 
domestic, capital-owning class, owed its dominant economic role to institutionalised 
access to the banking, investment and economic infrastructure.440   
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 1.4 The relationship between state and domestic capital 
                  Sino-Indonesian dominance of the early New Order economy consolidated 
itself progressively and pragmatically through commercial alliances with both the 
political elite and the proportionately smaller pribumi business elite that in turn relied 
for commercial access to links with the Suharto family and associates. Alliances with 
Sino-Indonesian interests were further augmented and strengthened by offshore 
commercial links the Sino-Indonesian conglomerates maintained with the region’s 
guanxi (overseas Chinese) commercial network.  State policies of economic de-
regulation, forced upon the economy by the dramatic drop in oil revenues during the 
early-1980s, proved to be an economic bonanza for domestic capital but advantaged 
the well-connected Sino-Indonesian conglomerates over their proportionately fewer 
associates among the pribumi elite.       
                      While Indonesia successfully industrialised under the New Order, and 
growth in overall terms was economically positive enabling most Indonesians to 
achieve a generally higher standard of living, the President proved inconsistent in his 
guidance of the economy.441  While he listened to advice from his top, foreign-trained 
economists and gave them a relatively free hand to express generally prudent fiscal 
policies, he also permitted his ‘palace’ associates (and later his family) to amass huge 
profits.  To finance their business ventures, wealth accumulation, and patronage, 
Suharto and the military also drew upon funds from an array of ubiquitous ‘charitable 
foundations’ or yayasans.  Exempt taxation and auditing, yayasans provided their 
patrons with a lawful method of accumulating capital and wealth while at the same 
time appearing to ‘do good works’ by funding charitable activities among the lowest 
levels of Indonesian society.  Intended to provide social benefits to their members, 
yayasans had been run by the military for years and were a profitable, unaccountable, 
source of capital to fund business ventures.  From one of his charities, a yayasan 
intended to raise money for mosque construction, Suharto collected compulsory 
contributions of up to Rp500 un-audited per month from every one of the state’s 5 
million civil servants and military personal.442  Three of the President’s yayasans 
exclusively funded the New Order’s political organ GOLKAR and their exploitation 
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defined the culture of business activity that tied the economy to a vast array of 
patronage links between the bureaucracy, party politics, and the executive office.443   
                   To persuade and co-opt those whose support was deemed vital to the 
national development essential to regime legitimacy the New Order required 
uninterrupted access to surplus state revenue that could be converted into political 
support.444  While most state income and revenue was used legitimately to administer 
state affairs, sufficient surplus was needed to provide for illegitimate disbursement to 
sectors within state and society whose support was deemed essential to the stability 
upon which the regime legitimacy and continuity depended.445  As well as privileging 
domestic and foreign investors, successful economic development also generated 
sufficient disposable revenue to finance the costly management of ethnic relations, 
heavily fund regional subsidisation, and greatly expand the education system.  
Investment in global markets not only boosted national income but also provided the 
regime’s official supporters a further means of accessing wealth.  When commercial 
relationships were put under scrutiny, and describing the close political links capital 
established with senior politicians and bureaucrats to maximise business advantage, 
the terms “crony capitalism and money politics become interchangeable”.446  
Describing commercial relationships, particularly the link between state and domestic 
capital, inevitably focuses attention on the close, mutually beneficial, links between 
the proportionately small group of wealthy Sino-Indonesian conglomerate heads and 
their patrons in the military, the bureaucracy, and the government.          
                    Strengthening the state economic sector might have been justified by 
Pancasila-ist economic imperatives that the Sino-Indonesian dominated private sector 
be balanced more in favour of pribumi commercial interests and those of the majority 
of the nation, but political and economic realities saw only a small minority of 
primarily well-connected, and predominantly Javanese, elites led by the President and 
his associates gaining an inordinate share of the resources and economic opportunity 
channelled towards indigenous interests.  While it is not within the scope of this 
research to carry out an in-depth analysis across the three decades of the New Order 
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in terms of the ratio of state to private enterprise, a snapshot comparison accurately 
reflects ownership realities.  Key indicators contradict the tenets of a true Pancasila-
ist economy by showing that the private capital of predominantly Sino-Indonesian 
conglomerates aligned with elite interests dominated the New Order economic bloc:  
           Table 1 GDP 1993 
% of GDP 1993  447 
Private Conglomerates             55.8% 
Small private sector               5.55 
Co-operatives               2.7% 
State sector             35.9 % 
 
            Table 2 Capital formulation 1990 
Capital formulation 1990 448 
Private Sector             62% 
Private enterprise (co-operatives)             16% 
State sector             22% 
 
Table 3 Ownership shares in New Order manufacturing 1988 
Ownership shares in New Order manufacturing 1988 449 
                                                      Private sector          State sector               Foreign 
Excluding petro-chemicals        59.1%                 24.2%                 16.7%          
Including petro-chemicals         43.8%         43.8%         12.4% 
 
 
                                                           
447 Didik J. Rachbini, ‘Growth in Private Enterprises’ in R. W. Baker, M. H. Soesastro, J. Kristiadi and 
D. E. Ramage, (Eds.), Indonesia:The Challenge of Change, (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Singapore, 1999), p. 32. 
448 I. Kefut Mardjana, ‘Public Enterprise Under the New Order’ in Baker (1999), p. 48. 
449 Hal Hill, The Indonesian Economy since 1996, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), p. 
5. 
 148
                     Notwithstanding Article 33 of the Indonesian Constitution calling for 
state economic activity to be organised around a joint endeavour with the people and 
key sectors of the economy controlled for the benefit of the people, under the New 
Order the benefits of economic development were patently inequitable.450  Article 33 
also authorises over-riding adat (customary law and individual rights over land and 
natural resources) for the benefit of the Indonesian state and a Pancacila-ist economy 
demands no less yet when valuable resources are found beneath the ground or under 
water adat is over-ridden and the land becomes tanah negara, or state-owned.  
Paragraph 1 of Article 33 of the Constitution also prioritised economic activity for the 
benefit of society in general rather than for the individual so with both Pancasila and 
the 1945 Constitution favouring gotong rojong or ‘co-operative capitalism’ there has 
been little enthusiasm for individualistic ‘free-fight’ economic liberalism thereby 
delivering even more into the hands of the New Order elites.451     
                     Pancasila’s fifth principle, Kesejahteraan Sosial (social justice) implies 
prosperity through social egalitarianism and obliges the New Order state to advance 
the collective social and economic welfare over that of the individual.  Invoking 
Pancasila as a form of social contract sustaining New Order legitimacy insists upon 
no less, but the contradictory nature of the contractual arrangements that sustained the 
New Order elite ‘pact of domination’, and the clear iniquity resulting from the 
regime’s direct role over the national economy, economic development and the 
dispersal of capital put to question the ideological legitimacy that underpinned the 
New Order economic system.   
                   Traditional indigenous distrust and resentment of the Sino-Indonesian 
business community’s control of the economy was vindicated under the New Order 
and virtually compelled the state to intervene extensively in the economy to ensure 
that development and growth to some extent benefited the indigenous majority.  
However, indigenous resentment of Sino-Indonesian economic power persisted and 
shaped the relationship between the New Order state and domestic capital until 
resentment exploded into violent civil disturbances during the closing months of 
President Suharto’s rule.452  Notwithstanding Article 33, an inequitable dispersal of 
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wealth underpinned and defined the New Order’s thirty years of domination.  
Effectively all key economic decisions were made by the bureaucratic or military 
arms of the regime rather than by the private sector and as such policy tended to 
reflect a compromise among these two competing elements of the ruling elite.453  In 
the absence of adequate legal and institutional safeguards to protect economic 
freedoms and property rights successful economic activity depended upon collusive 
arrangements based around informal and informal association among the elites and 
the favoured access they enjoyed to the state.   
 
1.5  State capitalism 
                  State capitalism had been the main focus of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy 
but from 1965 New Order economic strategy prioritised private enterprise and foreign 
capital investment, with the result that the state corporations of the Sukarno era 
remained in place and grew into massive conglomerates during the New Order.  There 
were two main reasons for this.  First, planners targeted state sectors considered vital 
to the national interest and second, in terms of the bureaucratic-military nature of the 
regime, many of the state corporations became the exclusive economic fiefdoms of 
increasingly powerful military-bureaucratic groups.  Funds from these veritable cash 
cows sustained the important politico-bureaucratic power structures of New Order 
power and not surprisingly in view of the amount of extra-budgetary funding they 
provided the generals were reluctant to relinquish control over their business 
groups.454  Two important examples of key strategic (and significant revenue 
generating) corporations dominated by the military were the state oil company 
Pertamina and Bulog, the institution responsible for allocating food resources.   
                 The configuration of power that sustained the New Order economic system 
also closely paralleled the type of capitalism that was developing: New Order 
bureaucratic capitalism required that centralised officials exercise total control over 
the domestic economy, allocate monopolies over important and valuable sections of 
the import sector, and influence domestic concessions such as the Indonesian 
contribution to minority shareholding in joint ventures with foreign capital.  
Partnerships with key Sino-Indonesians typified bureaucratic capitalism through the 
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form of client capitalism whereby individuals and groups (generally Sino-Indonesian 
business interests) compensated for their lack of political power by attaching 
themselves to powerful bureaucratic patrons.  Robison describes this specific 
arrangement as bureaucratic patrimonialism.455  Bureaucratic capitalism, by which 
funds were committed directly to political purpose, became the principal instrument 
of patrimonial authority through processes that at best blurred the “demarcation 
between public service and private interest”.456 
                 The New Order had begun major enterprise reform in 1967 and further 
reorganisation in 1969 brought state enterprises in line with the limited liability 
requirements of private companies.  The massive oil revenues of the early 1970s 
enabled strong industrial development and the state invested heavily in up-stream 
steel, petro-chemicals and cement sectors with a ten-fold increase in equity 
investment during the period 1972–76.  Government investment in the state sector 
paused in 1976 when the Pertamina scandal revealed that through inefficient and 
profligate management, the state petro-chemical company had accumulated debts 
exceeding $US10 billion.  The debt represented some 30% of Indonesia’s GDP but 
the scandal had little effect on the way the state-owned enterprise sector operated and 
in the aftermath of the scandal the State Enterprise administration faced little scrutiny 
nor was there any meaningful re-evaluation of the sector’s generally acknowledged 
inefficiency.457  There was also little consideration of the core problems facing the 
economy, namely the weakness of an inherent and widespread rentier culture.458  SOE 
growth slowed as a result of the Pertamina scandal but it was not until 1986, and 
faced with irresistible pressure for structural reforms, that the President ordered a 
complete review of the sector.  Although described as the New Order’s Achilles heel, 
and despite their poor commercial performance, large-scale, state-sector, capital 
investment tied to the economic nationalist imperatives of a Pancasila-ist economy 
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remained central to New Order policy during the late 1970s and 1980s and the sector 
responded by contributing a significant 30% of GDP into the 1990s.459   
                   
1.6  Corruption, the New Order economic bloc and the New Order ‘pact 
of dominance’ 
                     The New Order economic arrangement was a ‘pact of dominance’ built 
upon a “complex conjuncture of interests” that linked the politico-bureaucrats charged 
with driving the state apparatuses to the capital-owning classes prepared to support 
the regime’s economic development agendas.460  The politico-bureaucratic element of 
the partnership positioned and maintained itself through virtually endemic corruption 
that while generally regarded in the West as immoral tended to be viewed as less so in 
Asian countries and merely a practical means of attaining just reward for status 
achievement.  The New Order’s early inability to pay its employees a living wage 
meant that financially exploiting office was often necessary and therefore not 
regarded as corruption.  Traditional customs and attitudes also placed pressure on 
officials to exploit their positions for personal gain and to repay those that had 
supported them in their rise to positions of influence and power within the system in 
the first place.  Status demanded that one protected the interests of one’s family and 
associates so the national interest was often relegated in importance and corruption 
became intimately entwined with the sources of social, economic and political 
power.461   
                      Playing a key role in the relationship between the state and domestic 
capital corruption was the defining characteristic of the New Order economy.462  
Official corruption enabled private domestic capital to blossom, but its negative 
aspects in terms of business inefficiency, low productivity, and an inequitable 
domestic business environment that disadvantaged those lacking access to influence, 
frustrated Indonesian manufacturers’ efforts to enter export markets on competitive 
terms.  During the 1980s down-stream manufacturers became a more influential 
socio-political force and, growing increasingly frustrated with the monopolies 
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generated by systemic corruption, the sector began increasingly and publicly to 
criticise New Order economic and industrial policy direction.  The New Order 
alliance with capital required industrial strategic cohesion and minimal tension 
between state and capital so criticism struck at the very heart of regime unity and 
cohesion.      
              Sustaining the dominant role of the class of state officials driving the 
politico-bureaucracy was critical to preserving the economy’s moral and intellectual 
legitimacy.  Carrying as they did responsibility for co-ordinating the politico-
economic interests of both the powerful senior state managers and the major domestic 
corporations (both state and private) at the very heart of the politico-economic 
alliance sustaining the regime, maintaining the authority of the politico-bureaucratic 
elite was integral to New Order legitimacy.463  The politico-bureaucrats’ general 
interests lay in maintaining an economic and political status quo but they also had a 
professional function that charged them with providing the New Order sufficient 
revenue and growth to sustain its legitimacy.  Although preoccupied with maintaining 
elite economic and political privilege, senior officials were also required to satisfy 
their own ‘extra-budgetary’ needs by either appropriating surpluses from the state or 
entering into partnerships with their domestic-capital clients.  With their best interests 
clearly lying in continuing existing processes of capital accumulation, state officials 
were necessarily concerned with preserving a status quo that institutionalised their 
position within the system and their status and privilege.464   
                    The politico-bureaucrats alignment with capital was formalised by their 
privileged ‘administration’ of revenue exchange, their control of concessions, 
licensing, and monopoly allocation, and their authority to dispense credit through the 
state-owned banks.  The personalised and dyadic relationships implied by these 
arrangements stretched from the bottom to the very top of the politico-economic 
hierarchies.465  Arrangements entangling client corporations and business groups into 
bloc development agendas not only committed the politico-bureaucrats ideologically 
to the regime’s nationalist economic development priorities, reinforcing the elite ‘pact 
of dominance’ built around patronage and monopoly, but also provided the regime 
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with a powerful instrument of alliance modification should it be required.466  Resting, 
as economic cohesion did on officialdom’s positioning and exclusive right to allocate 
economic opportunity, the dramatic drop in oil revenues during the 1970s and early 
1980s offered the first opportunity to respond to threats to elite economic alliance 
cohesion.   
                       The politico-bureaucratic institutions running the state and regulating 
the economy faced a dilemma.  Their integrated-nationalist-industrialisation strategies 
had become highly exposed to both external and domestic pressures for change and 
the over-regulated and protected economy found itself increasingly inappropriate to a 
laissez-faire economic environment that demanded a free hand for market forces and 
capital.467  Not surprisingly, there was little enthusiasm for state-sector reform from 
within the politico-bureaucratic elites themselves, nor was there a willingness to 
disadvantage the non-indigenous business community.  Although representing less 
than 4% of the population the Sino-Indonesians were widely believed to control the 
economy and it was generally felt that their hold over the economy needed to be 
reduced in favour of indigenous interests.  The response from the ruling elite was that 
the Suharto family’s business empires, the inefficient state-supported and over-funded 
co-operatives sector, and the state’s tendency towards subsidised credit programmes,  
needed to be understood in terms of actually assisting indigenous commercial power 
to compete with Sino-Indonesian commercial pre-eminence.  This self-interested view 
of a Pancasila-ist economy, together with the deeply embedded culture that tied 
business to politics and allowed powerful politico-business interests to remain the 
prime beneficiaries of development and opportunity, generated growing cynicism.468  
Whenever indigenous capital emerged to match the Sino-Indonesian conglomerates, 
the successful enterprises tended to be from the strongly secular civil and military-
bureaucratic class and the Suharto family and their associates rather than the 
traditional Muslim petty bourgeoisie class.469  The inefficient state funded enterprises, 
and the powerful politico-business family empires, advantaged, protected and 
subsidised by state credit, in theory offered an indigenous counterweight to non-
indigenous (Sino-Indonesian) commercial power.  It was argued that as the 
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problematic state sector tended to balance the Sino-Indonesian conglomerates, why 
reform it?  There was, therefore, little meaningful reconsideration of the role the 
inefficient SOEs role in the economy until late 1986 (by which time state enterprises 
were contributing almost 40% of non-agriculture GDP) when, facing a declining 
economic situation that demanded urgent attention, the President finally called for 
review of the sector.470   
 
2.  The military and the New Order economic system   
2.1  The origins of ABRI’s involvement in economic and business 
affairs        
             When Sukarno and Hatta declared Indonesia’s independence on August 17, 
1945, the civilian-based authority had been reluctant to form a national army so its 
eventual establishment on October 5, 1945 was largely in response to considerable 
pressure from nationalists and freedom fighters that wanted their units legitimised by 
the new state.  Military suspicion of civilian authority was mutual and the unique 
character of civil-military relations in Indonesia that highlighted future decades was 
forged on November 11, 1945 when the government was forced to accept the popular, 
and charismatic, former commander of the Japanese established, indigenous militia, 
PETA, General Sudirman as Commander-in Chief and “father of the Indonesian 
military”.471  Rather than a creation of civilian government, ABRI was effectively a 
‘self-creation’ and, in an arrangement that would directly influence the future balance 
of power between civilian and military institutions, the fledgling Territorial Army was 
also forced to be self-funding.  During the nationalist independence struggle 
individual units were expected to raise their own operational funds and did so through 
various, often informal, methods that commonly included the indulgences of 
smuggling, drug trafficking, and social intimidation.  After independence the 
archipelago was divided into military territories and each command was expected to 
continue to fund itself.  With minimal funding from Java central command, regional 
commanders became adept within the latitude of their commands at satisfying both 
their units’ operational needs and their personal remuneration.  As command was 
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subject to infrequent rotation, regional commanders (which at that time included a 
relatively obscure General Suharto) were able to develop strong local socio-politico 
and economic relationships that they nurtured into the future.         
                   The military’s deep involvement in business activities began early, 
initially to raise extra-budgetary operational revenue but increasingly to satisfy 
individual official and political factions’ personal and political needs.472  It was the 
dual-function involvement in socio-political and economic life implied in ABRI’s 
Pancasila-derived doctrine dwi fungsi that legitimised direct military involvement in 
business and economic activity.473  The spirit of the doctrinal concept implied that the 
military take all steps to serve the Indonesian state and ABRI’s expansion into a 
variety of areas although traditionally closed to conventional military forces carried 
strong ideological logic in terms of promoting Pancasila-ist egalitarian economic 
development.  The Sukarno government’s ordering of the military to take over Dutch 
business interests fell in line with the spirit, if not the intent, of the doctrine.474  
ABRI’s proclivity for intense involvement in the generally non-military roles of 
business and commercial activity had origins in the demands of early independence 
when, minimally funded by the civilian power, the institution was forced to tend to its 
own needs.  Continuing budgetary shortfalls and restraints during the early years of 
Indonesian independence demanded financial austerity, forced economic adventurism 
upon the government, and hardened military resolve for financial independence.  The 
institutionalised benefits that accrued from economic independence from the civil 
authority, not to mention the opportunities for personal enrichment, highlighted the 
success of the arrangements.  While the military leadership took advantage of the 
opportunities offered by financial independence to invest surplus profits and take a 
prominent lead in national development, the institutionalisation of the military’s 
economic arrangements also offered opportunities to exert dominance in areas that 
could readily translate into powerful socio-political influence. 
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2.2  Deepening ABRI business activity under the New Order    
                  Suharto’s New Order was essentially a military-dominated military-
bureaucratic regime.  Rather than committing themselves to the narrow sectional 
interests that had led to the failure of civilian government during the guided 
Democracy and Parliamentary Democracy periods of the ‘Old Order’, the New Order 
generals totally dominated political and economic life from the outset and defended 
their stance by promoting themselves as ideologically legitimate guardians of the 
broader national interest.  As the New Order coalesced the business activities of the 
Armed Forces in general, and individual influential officers in particular, popular 
opinion came to question the regime’s genuine commitment to its egalitarian claims 
as well as the legitimacy of its Pancacila-ist position.  The entire New Order system 
of government tended to prioritise the interests of the predominantly Javanese secular-
nationalist military elite and those bureaucratic and Sino-Indonesian business groups 
fortunate to align themselves closely to it.475  The social and economic chaos of the 
last years of Sukarno’s rule had imbued the military leadership with the belief that 
they were the only institution capable of providing socio-political stability, and that 
their stabilising dominance was vital in attracting sufficient investment to kick-start 
economic development.  Rather than its entrepreneurial skill, the economic strength of 
the military-dominated New Order came from politico-bureaucratic influence and an 
ability to provide enough political and economic stability to successfully attract 
foreign investment.   
                    The specifics of development had initially been formulated by a group of 
highly empowered, Western-trained, technocrats and tended to favour elite interests, 
but policies came to be “distorted at the point of implementation”.476  Although 
devised to conform to international liberal norms the New Order economic system the 
techno-bureaucrats constructed, and adjusted to limits set by the generals, permitted 
exploitation of the rapidly expanding business opportunities primarily by those 
enjoying political influence.  Investment poured in after General Suharto took power 
and the ‘joint venture’ as a project became the typical conduit of capital dispersal.  
The Indonesian side of the venture generally consisted of army officers partnering 
Sino-Indonesian businessmen in arrangements similar to those that had worked 
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successfully during the independence struggle against the Dutch and many army 
officers became more adept at negotiating business deals than commanding troops in 
the field.   
                    The generals also appreciated the importance of maintaining loyalty 
among the junior and middle ranks, so a high priority was placed on ABRI’s financial 
well being in general and the officer corps in particular.  Trusted officers were 
positioned to control all key aspects of the economy including senior management of 
the vital state oil corporation Pertamina, important strategic national food supply and 
distribution agencies such as Bulog, and the major state-sector trading and financial 
organisations.  Public sector placements of this type ensured regime control over key 
strategic sections of the economy and ensured funds flowed smoothly for the 
leadership’s dispersal while the nationalist economic aspirations demanded by a 
Pancasila economy were also to some extent placated.  Not only required to flow in 
sufficient quantities to service the military’s substantial extra-budgetary requirements, 
surplus cash flow also needed to remain outside of day-to-day bureaucratic control.  
An additional ‘informal’ level of military business activity also grew about various 
forms of ‘protection’ ranging from private domestic and international company 
operational security to the individual and collective security of the Sino-Indonesian 
community.477  ABRI were also believed to be illegally and systematically extracting 
timber, oil and mineral resources for their own benefit.  More difficult to validate has 
been ongoing accusation of semi-institutionalised military involvement in drug 
trafficking, smuggling, piracy, gambling and prostitution.478     
 
2.3  The extent of ABRI’s business activity   
                     ABRI’s position of privilege within the New Order and the deep 
institutionalisation of political patronage made a blossoming in military business 
activity possible.479  Core military business interests were diverse but focused on 
banking and finance, real estate, construction, manufacturing, shipping, air services, 
forestry, mining, fisheries, and transportation.  As well as being undertaken 
informally through illegal financial and economic activities, business was also done 
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formally through limited liability companies, co-operatives, or involvement in state-
owned corporations and the yayasan foundations previously discussed.480  The non-
taxed or audited yayasans were intended to be charitable organisations and 
streamlined by Suharto through the understanding of their workings that he acquired 
during his active duty came to represent the most overt form of business activity 
ABRI operated.  Individual military personal conducted their own smaller-scale fund-
raising activities through their own personal yayasans to source venture capital and 
supplement their income.  Many enterprises of this sort were fronted and run by Sino-
Indonesian businessmen with the military partners to the arrangement remaining in 
the background with responsibilities for arranging necessary licences and protection.  
Created initially to benefit the families of servicemen and their pension funds through 
economic, social and educational activities, the yayasans grew into veritable business 
empires often associated with influential, Sino-Indonesian, businessmen.  
Nevertheless, their implied altruism complied with the co-operative welfare economic 
aspects of the 1945 Constitution and further ideologically legitimised the yayasan’s 
contribution to Pancasila-ist socio-economics.   
                  To summarise, one of the most notable characteristics of the New Order 
economic bloc was ABRI’s commercial orientation.  Spread through all of the 
institutions of the military and the officer corps and constantly adjusted to new 
economic circumstances their commercial activities not only honed new and 
necessary skills but also tightened the generally successful business alignments 
between the upper echelons of the military command and their associates in the 
techno-bureaucracy.  While the massive influx of oil revenue during the 1970s 
enabled the military, unchallenged at this time by any political groups outside the 
bureaucracy, to depend less on their traditional informal sources of funding, army 
officers continued to use their positions to further their personal enrichment.   
                                                
3.  The New Order economic system’s response to changing 
economic realities 
                   Combining functional with interventionist economic policies, coupled 
with actively promoting the manufacturing sector, resulted in a rapid growth in 
productivity, and while export markets were encouraged and promoted the regime 
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took care to protect the domestic market.481  Important to development policy was that 
state officials remain pragmatic and flexible, prepared to try out different policy 
instruments to maintain economic coherence, and focus single-mindedly on economic 
and developmental objectives.482  The authoritarian nature of the regime was such that 
the President was able to sustain economic focus by putting his personal authority 
behind economic reforms when necessary to ensure they were carried through.  Also 
critical to systemic cohesion was that Presidential power remained strong enough to 
support the techno-bureaucrats whenever the inevitable economic crises occurred.   
                       New Order economics evolved over four separate and distinct phases 
and stimulating and maintaining growth required shifting from earlier policies of 
import-substitution to export-orientated manufacturing.  During the early years from 
the New Order’s assumption of power in 1967 until 1970, policy primarily concerned 
itself with rehabilitating the moribund economy and used recovery processes 
concentrating on macroeconomic stabilisation and kick-starting economic growth.  
The second stage, from 1971 to 1981, was a period of rapid growth on the back of 
massive windfall gains in oil revenue, with policy frameworks of economic 
nationalism re-emerging as the influential socio-political force during the period.483  
During the third period, from 1982 to 1986, economic policy generally lacked 
cohesion and the economy required re-adjustment to greatly diminished revenue from 
lower oil prices.  Macroeconomic and exchange rate management was carried out 
effectively but the state tended to intervene more in its regulation of the economy.  A 
series of bold reforms, against a background of contending interests calling for de-
regulation and transparency, heralded the fourth stage from 1986.  Policy 
subsequently shifted towards liberalisation as the invigorated private sector was called 
upon to drive industry and trade by emphasising non-oil exports.484 
   
3.1  1967-1970: economic rehabilitation   
                   Committed to building a successful industrial economy as a precondition 
for some future form of sustainable political participation, and in order to 
institutionalise their authority and command, President Suharto and his generals chose 
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corporatist economic policies and ideologies in their drive for economic 
development.485  An elite group of techno-bureaucrats were charged with control of 
the state apparatus and by restoring macroeconomic stability through a pragmatic 
stance towards domestic and foreign capital Indonesia rejoined the international 
economic community.486  Within a decade President Suharto was able to lead 
Indonesia into the exclusive ranks of the oil-producing states with sufficient revenue 
from oil and hydrocarbons to embark on an extraordinary program of development 
(pembangunan nasional).487  A combination of bureaucratic-paternalism and orthodox 
economic policies drove the economic recovery.  Controlling inflation, attracting 
foreign investment, and stimulating domestic industry, were prioritised and advanced 
through orthodox monetary and fiscal policies within a developmental regime of 
state-protected, import-substitution, industrialisation.  The need for stability and the 
rebuilding of basic infrastructure demanded that pressing social and equity needs be 
subordinated to the imperatives of economic recovery.488  Policies chosen to 
encourage and protect foreign investment were not so much the sell-out to Western 
economic and investment norms they appeared to be to the economic nationalists, as a 
hope that capital from the international investment community might assist domestic 
interests to establish themselves and ultimately take over ownership of the SOEs.  The 
state met most of the needs of domestic capital and pressing infrastructure 
development through oil revenues with the availability of guarantees and state credits 
generally dependent upon patronage.  Private corporations blossomed in an 
environment of political patronage and favour and plentiful soft capital from the state 
enabled domestic interests to assemble business empires that within a decade were 
dominating trade and manufacturing.      
 
3.2  1971-1981: the stimulus of oil revenue   
                   From 1968 the new foreign investment regime was attracting hitherto 
unprecedented investment interest and capital inflow.  During 1967 Japanese 
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investment in Indonesia joint ventures had been less than $US7 million but within two 
years rose to more than $US132 million.489  By 1973 economic-nationalist interests 
were more aggressively influencing economic policy and the brakes were being 
applied to capital inflow.  Following violent demonstrations in 1973 during the first 
state visit by a Japanese Prime Minister economic-nationalist interests were assuaged 
by a further series of restrictions on foreign, particularly Japanese, investment.490   
                   Economic rehabilitation during the early New Order remained within a 
relatively liberal framework but by 1975 resurgent economic nationalism and 
interventionary thinking was in the ascendance among the regime’s economic 
planners and import bans and regulations that protected key strategic industrial sectors 
proliferated: moreover, the ideological imperatives of a Pancasila-ist economy 
required no less.491  Massive petro-chemical revenues enabled the state to invest 
heavily on industrial development and an era of economic nationalism was producing 
an average annual GDP growth rate of 7.7%.492  The dramatic improvement in terms 
of the trade brought about by the huge oil receipts enabled vast sums to be poured into 
strategic state sectors. Industrial strategy shifted towards capital- and intermediate-
goods manufacture, state investment poured into infrastructure development and the 
major state corporations Pertamina (the national petro-chemical company) and 
Krakatau Steel led heavy investment into the key up-stream strategic sectors of petro-
chemicals, fertilisers, and metal engineering.493  Domestic capital also benefited from 
heavy state investment in communications and transport infrastructure and generous 
funding of imported technology enabling the new conglomerates to flourish in an 
economic environment stimulated by massive state expenditure made possible by 
huge windfall oil profits.  Notwithstanding a time of rapid growth, a doubling of rice 
prices, quadrupling of international petro-chemical prices, the embarrassing Pertamina 
scandal, and resurgent economic nationalism, brought a degree of uncertainty to 
policy-making.494   
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                    The revenue generated by rising oil prices drove high rates of economic 
growth and strengthened regime cohesion so from the 1970s the revenue bounty 
encouraged interventionist thinking and enabled the New Order to place economic 
nationalism firmly back on the policy agenda.495  A proliferation of protective import 
restrictions, tariff, and non-tariff barriers strengthened import-substitution 
industrialisation strategy.496  Although by 1980 the balance of payments current 
account was in surplus and debt servicing payments were less than 13% of export 
receipts, Indonesia’s trade and investment regime had begun to attract criticism from 
the World Bank as overly “state dominated and inward orientated.”497  Having 
committed itself to an emphasis on industrialization and blossoming with revenue 
from the oil bonanza, the growth-steering bureaucracy had strongly enhanced their 
influence and had become a burgeoning new middle-class.  With the bureaucracy 
mushrooming from 1.67 million to 2.63 million civil servants between 1974 and 1983 
(paralleling a similar growth in the state enterprises) the state had also become the 
nation’s biggest single employer.   
                    Firmly in control of the heavily regulated, state controlled, economic 
environment of mutually beneficial financial arrangements, where the boundary 
between political power and bureaucratic authority was becoming increasingly 
blurred, the powerful new middle-class was positioning itself well to share in the 
growing profits.  But a series of financial scandals in the mid-1970s exposed the 
regime’s increasingly corrupt image, none more so than between the bureaucracy and 
capital, and between 1974 and 1978 student demonstrations attacked the growing 
culture of corruption even targeting Suharto’s family and associates.  Business culture 
during this oil-boom period was effectively one of unabashed pursuit of personal 
wealth and the driving force behind the growth of private capital had become the 
political strength business leaders were able to wield.   
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3.3  1982-1986: reducing oil revenues and necessary adjustment   
               The huge petro-chemical returns that had enabled economic development 
through the 1970s ended in 1982 when the oil price per barrel fell from $US38 to 
$US28 and collapsed further in 1986 to $US18, slashing export revenues from 
$US14.7 billion to under $US7 billion.498  A serious reassessment of industrial 
strategy was clearly needed as foreign earnings and state revenue went into deficit.  
With the government unable to continue underwriting heavy investment on 
industrialisation, an alternative revenue base needed to be found.499  As oil receipts 
represented some 75% of the country’s total export earnings, and 66% of government 
revenue, the situation had become intolerable.500  The rising external debt 
accompanying the economic slowdown signalled an end to the New Order’s ability to 
continue financing growth out of oil so revenue-generation needed to be broadened.  
Notwithstanding an initial period of economic trauma, by adopting austere fiscal 
policies and dramatically cutting back on development projects, the New Order 
response earned praise from the World Bank for what was described as a “remarkably 
comprehensive and successful” adjustment programme.501  By deferring a number of 
major development projects government expenditure was cut drastically and the 
rupiah was devalued in 1983 and again in 1986.  Growth slowed and, by 1985, the 
economy was in recession but, refusing to be deterred, the government carried 
through with the adjustment process and by the end of the decade export growth had 
returned to a healthy 7% per annum.502  Fortunately the economy was cushioned from 
forced fiscal austerity by a huge level of foreign aid exceeding $US4 billion annually 
by 1989.503  As well as maintaining overall macro-economic stability, adjustment 
priorities had reduced the economy’s overall dependence on petro-chemical revenue.    
                  The effects of the slowdown in economic growth and the drop in investor 
interest during the early 1980s led to demands for economic liberalisation to enable 
the private sector to compete more effectively domestically and internationally.  The 
proliferation of non-tariff barriers advantaging well-connected interests and a business 
environment in which the regime protected favoured business groups were becoming 
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increasingly politicised issues.  Powerful, well-connected, corporations continued to 
be the main beneficiaries of state regulation and control but by 1985 the effects of the 
downturn had led to demands for more general trade-regime reforms that might turn 
the protected, inward-looking, industrial sector into a more outward-looking and 
internationally-competitive one. 
 
3.4  1986-1997: deregulation, invigoration, and outward orientation   
                    The final development phase was one of deregulation aimed specifically 
at reducing the impediments to expanding the labour-intensive, export-manufacturing 
sector.  Aware that the economy needed a more autonomous private sector if export 
growth was to be boosted, the state technocrats were coming to accept that the export-
substitution monopolies underpinning regime patronage needed to be reduced.504  The 
market difficulties of the 1980s had led to growing calls for a more liberalised and 
equitable market environment, less vulnerable to state intervention, so dropping oil 
revenues gave the technocrats leverage over the vested interests that they felt were 
stifling micro-economic efficiency.  Realising that the 1986 slowdown and the 
ensuing balance of payments crisis demanded policy changes if the country was to 
become internationally competitive, the technocrats responded with wide-ranging 
deregulation to encourage domestic capital into export manufacturing.505  Export 
incentives, a rupiah devaluation in 1986, further deregulation of domestic and foreign 
private investment, and permitting private sector investment access into the state-
owned strategic assets of power, telecommunications, ports and roads, highlighted the 
strategic shift.506  Trade barriers limiting manufactured exports were greatly reduced, 
foreign investment was again actively encouraged, and the subsequent surge in 
manufactured exports dramatically turned the economy around and returned it to rapid 
growth.507  Increasing domestic demand for consumer goods fuelled by rising 
standards of living also accelerated a move into non-oil exportables from 1988.508  
The results were spectacular and between 1986 and 1996 manufacturing’s share of 
exports increased from less than 20% to about 50% (from $US2.7 billion to $US24.5 
                                                           
504 MacIntyre, (1990), p. 58. 
505 MacIntyre, (1994) p. 255. 
506 World Bank, (1993), p. 138. 
507 MacIntyre (1994), p. 259. 
508 World Bank, (1993), p. 159. 
 165
billion).  Compared with less than $US16 billion in 1989, during 1995 the 
government approved some $US70 billion worth of investment proposals.509   
                    The real cost of the export drive was high and international 
competitiveness was difficult as long as the preferential trading arrangements for vital 
intermediate inputs (trading monopolies) held by well-connected individuals, 
including Suharto family members, continued to force the true cost of exports up by 
some 10% of the value of actual export sales.510  To re-vitalise the stalled economy, 
some 185 trade monopolies were abolished during early November 1986 but the 
bureaucrats running the process left intact the “most important and controversial” 
monopolies and protectionist regulations operated by the President’s family and 
associates.511  Effectively the import monopolies eliminated affected a mere $US300-
400 million of annual imports, while those left in place accounted for some $US1.5 
billion annually.512  The monopoly culture, in many cases linked to the exorbitant 
rent-seeking activities of influential political figures, was seriously undermining 
international competitiveness and had become a very controversial and sensitive 
domestic political issue. 
                     Deregulation successfully opened capital markets to foreign investment.  
To attract foreign investors away from better investment conditions elsewhere in Asia 
the President approved two bold initiatives in the early 1990s; in March 1992 foreign 
investors were permitted to set up enterprises under their own full control, and in June 
1994 the requirement that foreign investors divest shareholding after a specified set-
up time was virtually removed.  The impediment to opening the capital-market to 
foreign investment remained that without a well-connected domestic partner 
navigating the as yet unreformed bureaucracy was problematic.  Shifting policy away 
from protecting and regulating domestic capital in favour of freeing up international 
capital movement (and favouring international interests) also invited political risk by 
infuriating economic nationalists.513   
                     De-regulatory reforms only minimally inconvenienced the major 
conglomerates and the politico-bureaucratic families.  Privileged access to lucrative 
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monopolies and profit opportunities (such as providing the required ‘local’ content for 
foreign investment projects), state contracts, and preferential access to state bank 
credit, remained readily available for those with good political connections.514  The 
conglomerates and politico-business families focused their commercial attention upon 
domestic trade, property development, non-export manufacturing, and the potentially 
lucrative automotive manufacturing sector, areas of the economy not under pressure 
to restructure and become internationally competitive.  Some US$31 billion of the 
US$80 billion invested in lucrative ‘mega-projects’ developing power generation, 
public infrastructure, petrochemicals, fertiliser plants, industrial and residential 
estates, transport, and construction, during the early 1990s came from private 
investment either as direct investment, local partnerships with foreign investors, or in 
cooperative arrangements with state corporations.  Powerful interests dominated the 
foreign investment arrangements providing local partners responsible for the 
influential contacts needed to acquire necessary licences, state contracts, and state 
bank credit.  As Figure 1 below shows, political access to the new deregulated 
markets and capital ensured that elite interests continued to retain their advantages 
and their corporate power was enhanced rather than limited by the reforms. 
                      Figure 1  The Indonesian economy’s resistance to reform.515 
 
Nothing to fear 
Much of Indonesia’s economy remains impervious to 
reform 
Type of 
restriction 
 
Sectors in which prevalent 
Cartels Cement, plywood, paper, fertiliser. 
Price controls Cement, sugar, rice. 
Entry and exit 
controls 
Plywood, retail trade. 
Exclusive 
licensing 
Clove marketing, soymeal, wheat-flour milling. 
Public-sector 
dominance 
Steel. Fertilisers, refined oil products. 
                                                           
514 Robison (1997), pp. 36-41. 
515 FEER, October 16, 1997, p.58. 
 167
                To facilitate foreign investment and accelerate industrial growth it was 
necessary to improve essential infrastructure so major upgrading projects were opened 
to private investors.  Well-connected conglomerates and their politico-business family 
patrons, operating as minimal equity ‘gatekeepers’ partnering domestic and foreign 
interests, steered foreign capital into lucrative port, road, and airport construction 
opportunities previously held as state monopolies.516  Whereas the licensing and 
concession benefits handed out by the state during the early days of the New Order 
strongly favoured Sino-Indonesian commercial interests (and their military and other 
elite patrons), by the early-1990s most opportunities were going to the Suharto family 
and associates whose growing wealth had come to rely totally upon continued state 
largesse.517  When the Suharto family or an associate took part in any business 
venture their involvement virtually guaranteed a quick resolution to any legal and 
contractual problems.518  Thus the spectacular expansion of the de-regulation period 
was dominated by the conglomerates, the politico-business families, and by Suharto 
family-related interests.  Their hold over state power guaranteed ready access to state 
bank credit so their privileged position led the way in the industrial deepening.  
                Reform did little to create free and open competition for the new business 
opportunities the 1990s development boost and industrial deepening offered.  The 
concentration of economic and political power accentuated increasingly apparent 
contradictions between highly advantaged Sino-Indonesian conglomerates and 
indigenous business interests on the periphery of access and privilege, between 
economic nationalists and the demands of the global economy, and between a limited 
number of reformist-minded state managers and predatory capitalists seeking state 
protection and credit.519  The World Bank was also questioning inadequate levels of 
governance, regulatory weaknesses, the ongoing lack of transparency in tendering and 
contracts, and continued state support for cartels, exclusive licensing and domestic 
trading monopolies.520   
                Both domestic and foreign liberal reformists were targeting Indonesia’s 
massive public sector for privatisation but, on its own, the private sector was 
incapable of financing the infrastructure needs of the 1990s development boom so the 
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process of privatisation took place slowly.  Privatisation was intended to move assets 
out of state control so nationalistic public support was not ideologically strong and 
pribumi businessmen in particular were suspicious of the process.  There was also a 
general cynicism that privatisation would simply place state assets in the hands of the 
President, his family, and their Sino-Indonesian cronies.  Because of the unpopularity 
of the process, when technocrats did manage to sell off state assets they did so with 
reluctance and caution.  When state enterprises were sold to influential domestic 
interests rather than to unconnected indigenous interests, there was generally little 
transparency or regulatory control over the deal and with lucrative assets went to 
well-connected conglomerates and politico-business families further narrowed the 
concentration of economic power, monopoly, and wealth.521  Those state managers 
who were committed to monetary discipline clashed with powerful politico-business 
interests that relied upon patronage and tame state banks to satisfy their capital 
requirements.  Bureaucrats remained reluctant to discontinue traditional patterns of 
fund-provision to elite borrowers even though many clearly had little intention of 
repaying them.  During December 1994 the World Bank claimed that the level of 
doubtful state bank loans stood at a staggering 18.6%.522  Because they had ready 
access to capital, economic and corporate power remained with the President’s family 
and associates, the conglomerates, and the politico-bureaucratic elites of the state 
apparatus through the 1990s.  Shadowy coalitions and alliances, rather than 
transparent and equitable regulatory procedures, continued to determine market and 
capital access and accentuated an increasingly obvious inequitable accumulation of 
wealth.   
                The reform packages of the late 1980s had included a sweeping 
liberalisation of the banking system that gave private national and foreign banks more 
opportunity and space to operate locally.  The Sino-Indonesian conglomerates in 
particular relished the opening and within two years more than forty new private 
banks were granted licenses to operate.523  By 1996 private domestic banks, closely 
linked to the conglomerates, politico-bureaucratic families, and the first family had 
made major incursions into the previously state-dominated banking sector.  The 
reforms might have been expected to open the markets to more liberal and transparent 
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processes but the conglomerates and politico-bureaucratic family business interests 
clearly benefited the most.  Generally best placed to benefit, the well-connected 
within the private sector gradually became skilled at exploiting the economic reform 
processes and the limited number of state companies actually privatised generally 
went at bargain-basement prices to those with good connections, the state having 
written off most of the debts.  The well connected now included Suharto’s children, 
old enough to enter the wealth accumulation business and become part of the new 
ownership class.  In general the state maintained key monopolies in strategic areas 
and the reforms merely opened up new opportunities of “patronage in another guise” 
that allowed big business groups to expand into areas previously closed to them.524  
Unrestricted access to political power enabled the state brokers of economic privilege 
to circumvent the real intent of the reforms - more open and equitable market 
competition - to the commercial advantage of the politico-economic elites.  Clearly 
the economy’s rehabilitation, the freeing up of trade and investment and private sector 
investment in infrastructure, had fallen far short of a true commitment to laissez-faire 
capitalism.525  The reform process had re-aligned key players without fundamentally 
altering the alliance of economic interests that underpinned the New Order economy 
and merely broadened the gap between the wealthy few and disadvantaged majority.     
 
4.  New Order economic cohesion and legitimacy     
                       MacIntyre identifies two basic dimensions to an authoritarian 
developmental state’s relationship with its economy: the nature of the state’s 
involvement in markets and the nature of business’s involvement in political life.526  
He further qualifies the former in highlighting the effectiveness of state strength to the 
nature of the state’s strategic intervention in both the domestic and global dimensions 
of its economy.527  State intervention in the economy requires a willingness to use a 
level of both coercion and co-optation if the bureaucracy is to possess the means to 
effectively, and pragmatically, implement state policy without unnecessary 
distractions.  Strategic intervention, implying high levels of direct state investment in 
industry and an active state-owned enterprise sector, also requires a bureaucratic elite 
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remaining willing to provide energetic entrepreneurial domestic capital with such 
“assistance and inducements” as are necessary to promote consensual “agenda-
prioritised” economic performance.528  Thus MacIntyre’s two dimensions merge when 
a strong, centrally co-ordinated, leadership introduces counter-balancing techniques of 
coercion with consensus/cooptation/cooperation (patronage/corruption/nepotism) to 
dominate the relationship between state and capital.529   
                       The nature of state/business relationships and how they are constructed 
is clearly a critical variable in the realisation of state economic performance in 
Southeast Asia.530  The over-riding concern of state development in the region, 
including Indonesia’s Suharto New Order agenda, was to prioritise economic 
development in the interest of national self-realisation.  Evoking the powerful 
symbolism of modernity economic development became the mainstay around which 
most of the region’s governments based their legitimacy and, in turn, promoted the 
longevity of their leaderships.531  Heading a regime that used hegemonic methods of 
socio-political control through the unifying tenets of the state ideology to drive 
economic development, Indonesia’s President Suharto legitimised his regime’s 
economic agendas by depicting himself as the Father of Development.532  Supporters 
of the New Order further proclaimed their legitimacy on the grounds that after some 
two decades of Sukarno’s socio-political chaos, Suharto and his generals were able to 
negotiate socio-political stability and launch a process of controlled and essentially 
successful economic development that dramatically improved the economic position 
of the majority of Indonesia’s citizens.  Pragmatic industrial and economic strategies, 
that also included periods of economic liberalisation, held the New Order economic 
alliance structure together, but when economic legitimacy came under threat the state 
unabashedly renegotiated elite interests and as necessary promoted economic 
nationalism.533  Nation-building was nevertheless organised through economic 
development and socio-political stability underpinning an elite economic alliance 
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structure that, while satisfying the prime interests of each participant, also enabled 
broader mass interests to be placated with offerings of legitimising economic-
nationalism and economic populism.   
                     The economic woes of the mid- to late-1980s called for structural policy 
adjustments that required renegotiating the means by which privileged capital 
interests (the regime’s clients) were favoured.  New coalitions, relevant to a new array 
of growth-promoting policies and strategies, emerged to ensure that influential 
business elites maintained access to commercial power and advantage.534  As 
commercial interests were realigned in response to changing structural arrangements, 
the rearranged hierarchy of economic privilege posed what Haggard and Kaufman 
called the “central political dilemma” for any state attempting to carry out substantive 
economic policy adjustment.535  Re-arranging new patronage arrangements not only 
involved significant start-up costs as new clients are set in place but former, now 
dissatisfied, clients moved to the economic peripheries where rentier access was more 
restricted.   
                       When the serious economic crisis hit Indonesia in 1997 the reformist 
faction within the bureaucracy, emboldened by encouragement from international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank, were to some degree able to prevail in 
policy debates.536  “[E]xternal shocks at timely intervals” had traditionally reinforced 
a necessary culture of discipline among the state’s techno-bureaucracy and prepared 
them to manage policy change and balance it with the politically sensitive issues 
change inevitably created in the relationship between state and capital.537  From the 
mid-1990s the powerful techno-bureaucrats were almost exclusively prioritising the 
business interests of the ruling elites without allowance for the necessary 
compromises with subordinate interests essential to a Pancasila-ist economy.  The 
President, his family and associated business interests, together with the techno-
bureaucratic elites themselves exclusively dominated the New Order economic 
system.538  But the alliance of economic dominance they had created was not 
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sustained through any deepening in the systems of rules, or procedures surrounding 
property-rights and contracts, nor was the economic system subject to stronger 
institutional structures.  It was rather that the New Order was coping with the new, 
problematic, realities of market adjustment by merely re-aligning elite power 
locations, coalitions, and alliances to the detriment of the subordinated, predominantly 
pribumi, majority.  Contradictions drove economic priorities and the balancing of elite 
economic interests vital to the system became socio-politically and ideologically 
problematic.  Issues of equity and social justice, the iniquitous concentration of 
economic and political power among an elite minority, contradictions between 
economic nationalism and the need to integrate with the global economy, and, as 
Robison puts it, tensions between a bureaucracy committed to “fiscal discipline and 
predatory capitalists seeking state protection or credit” were causing unacceptable 
levels of socio-political tension.539  By 1997 the New Order economic arrangement 
was ill prepared to cope with the contagious effects of the Asian economic and the 
impact of financial crisis on the Indonesian economy.   
 
5.  Summary   
                    This section summarises the chapter’s explanation of the Suharto New Order 
in terms of the Gramscian model as an economic bloc and the utility of the 
comparison.  The New Order complied to a large extent with the legitimising 
nationalist and populist ideological demands of a Pancasila-ist economy and 
responded when necessary to changing economic circumstances and demands with a 
variety of economic frameworks and sustained hegemonic alliance arrangements that 
provided key interests with ongoing preferential advantage and access to business 
opportunity.  Prime characteristics of the Gramscian hegemonic order were therefore 
exhibited.  Yet the New Order failed the model to the extent that in contradiction to a 
Pancasila-ist economy’s ideals, the leadership did not live by the values of 
ideological legitimacy: consensual participation in the bloc’s economic arrangement 
had more to do with co-optation through corruption and preferential socio-political 
advantage than an egalitarian and equitable sharing of socio-economic benefits.  The 
analytical value of the model and in particular the ideologically-based nature of the 
approach is compelling as are Gramsci’s insights in explaining the ultimate failure of 
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the New Order economic bloc in 1997/8.  An appropriate model should identify 
factors of ideological legitimacy and potential counter-hegemony as the underlying 
causes for bloc failure and Gramsci’s insights are not disappointing: the Gramscian 
imperatives of sustaining organic intellectual legitimacy provide explanations in terms 
of coherence within the New Order’s two key organic constituencies, the Armed 
Forces and the techno-bureaucracy, and the contradictory demands on New Order 
ideological legitimacy of both necessary systemic corruption and calls for economic 
and financial reform.      
                    Economic nationalism, state ownership of key sectors, state investment in 
the economy and economic populism, coupled with Pancasila’s requirements that an 
egalitarian society equitably share economic benefits, elements of economic 
liberalism echoing the demands of foreign pressures, and predatory bureaucratism 
provided a useful means of co-opting influential business interests into the regime’s 
alliance structures and agendas as well as satisfying corporate acquisitive instincts.  
Ideologically driven nationalist policies strengthened the bloc’s ideological legitimacy 
and economic-populist initiatives increased the regime’s popular legitimacy by 
seemingly countering perceived Sino-Indonesian economic power more in favour of 
the pribumi majority.  Heavy state investment in the economy strengthened the 
nationalism implicit in a Pancasila-ist economy and persuasively legitimised the New 
Order’s ideologically motivated economic policy agendas.  Yet while the regime 
argued that the state economic sector balanced the Sino-Indonesian dominated private 
sector more in favour of pribumi commercial interests, in reality only a small minority 
of primarily well-connected Javanese indigenous interests - led by the President and 
his associates - shared in the spoils of development.  Both Pancasila and Article 33 of 
the Constitution carried implicit legitimising economic logic in calling for state 
economic activity organised around a joint endeavour with the people for the “benefit 
of the people” but under the New Order, most of the benefits of economic 
development were unequally shared.540  Predominantly Sino-Indonesian 
conglomerates (notwithstanding heavy elite share-holding) contributed some 60% of 
GDP during the early 1990s compared with 25% from the state sector and co-
operative ventures, the private sector controlled 62% of capital investment compared 
with 38% from the state and co-operative sectors, while during the late-1980s the 
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private sector coupled with foreign interests owned 76% of manufacturing excluding 
the state-owned petro-chemical industry.541  Notwithstanding a Pancasila-ist 
economy’s egalitarian tenets, a clear state/private balance favouring the latter and 
profound socio-economic inequity implied that rent flows considerably influenced the 
sharing of the fruits of economic and industrial development and put to question the 
New Order economic bloc’s popular legitimacy.  Such matters had profound socio-
political consequences during the last few months of the New Order following the 
1997 economic crisis and seriously questioned President Suharto’s right to office in 
terms of ideological legitimacy.   
                     Representing, in Gramscian terms, the most powerful organic 
constituency ABRI’s officer corps forged an influential socio-economic and political 
position for their institution in mutual accord with other elite commercial classes as 
senior participants in the alliance arrangements privileged with ready access to 
investment capital.  ABRI’s direct involvement in business activities, ideologically 
legitimised by its self-proclaimed Pancasila derivative dwi fungsi, provided the 
rationale for military expansion into a number of areas traditionally closed to 
conventional military forces.  As doctrine, dwi fungsi legitimised the military taking 
all steps to serve the Indonesian state, including egalitarian and economic-nationalist 
development, so from Sukarno’s instruction during the early 1950s that the military 
take over Dutch business interests, ABRI set a course that fell in line with the spirit, if 
not the original intent, of the doctrine.  The opportunity their business activities 
offered to cover budget shortfalls, as well as access to personal and institutional 
enrichment, highlighted the self-interested success of the arrangements.  ABRI’s 
business activities also offered a useful position from which to watch over and 
influence socio-political affairs.  While deploying trusted officers into key strategic 
industries and the major state-sector trading and financial organisations to a great 
extent placated the Pancasila-ist economy’s nationalist orientations and legitimised 
ABRI’s behaviour in organic terms of Gramscian legitimacy, the arrangements also 
ensured funds flowed smoothly for both the regime’s dispersal and individual 
officer’s material gratification.    
                     Faced from the outset with a plethora of potentially problematic ethnic 
differences, in broad terms of race, culture, and religion, Pancasila also provided the 
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New Order economic bloc a base from which to unify the nation ideologically and 
intellectually behind economic and political development.  By constantly balancing 
the interests of the bloc’s key players with the needs of economic development (not 
least the inherent contradictions between institutionalised corruption and both 
domestic and international demands for equitable, market-friendly economic policies) 
until the mid-1990s the New Order paralleled the Gramscian model in its re-
adjustment and re-negotiation of complex relationships when necessary to subordinate 
alliance partners to hegemonic agendas.   
                    At the heart of New Order ideological legitimacy, a Pancasila-ist 
economy called for an economic system built on social justice, economic and social 
egalitarianism and prosperity.  But by the mid-1990s it was apparent to most 
Indonesians that the system was built on endemic corruption, nepotism and an 
inequitable, unjust, sharing of the fruits of development.  The system was therefore ill 
equipped to cope with the externally generated economic crisis of 1997.  The bloc’s 
second most powerful organic constituency, the economic techno-bureaucracy, had 
remained throughout the course of the New Order prepared to make dramatic 
economic policy shifts as and when necessary but, although aware of the progressive 
deterioration in the economic situation, remained reluctant to prejudice the interests of 
business elements close to the power structure and in particular the President, his 
family, associates and cronies.  The privatisation processes forced upon the bloc by 
the demands of a more internationally competitive economic environment were 
merely employed to further benefit the interests of the ruling elites and their business 
associates.  While techno-bureaucratic organic influences conformed to the practices 
implicit in the Gramscian model by showing a preparedness to re-arrange economic 
alliance patterns in response to changing economic conditions, the results, although 
arguably ideologically legitimate in terms of a Pancasila-ist economy’s 
nationalist/populist imperatives, merely perpetuated an increasingly corrupt business 
culture.  As well as severely undermining international competitiveness, organically 
generated economic reform processes merely raised controversial and sensitive socio-
political issues.  The networks of advantageous business links around the President’s 
family and associates, and his offspring’s corrupt business activities, aggravated 
deepening socio-political problems and increasingly contradicted and questioned the 
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economic bloc’s ideological legitimacy and thus the moral and intellectual leadership 
of the New Order itself.542   
                    The New Order economic bloc had been originally constructed on global 
investment and participation in global markets to create sufficient revenue to 
underwrite national development, but elite interests disproportionately benefited from 
the spoils of development.  A Gramscian-style balancing of coercion with ideological 
persuasion subordinated the nation to the needs of economic development but sealing 
the arrangement required a continuous stream of surplus income to construct and 
sustain appropriate alliances with key socio-political and corporate interests.  While 
most of the revenue was used legitimately to administer the affairs of state and thus 
maintain the societal stability necessary to sustain the New Order bloc, additional 
surpluses were required for “illegitimate distribution” among those upon whose 
continuing support bloc cohesion depended.543   
                     The New Order economic bloc had been constructed primarily to 
creatively and pragmatically balance growth conditions and provide business 
opportunity for the regime’s corporate clients but a predominance of patronage and 
corruption eventually called to question the ideological legitimacy of the New Order’s 
representation of a Pancasila-ist economic system.  Favoured domestic capital 
interests became the principle beneficiaries of an exceptional rentier culture and never 
more so than during the periods when economic interventionists were driving 
economic policy.  Protected by tariff walls the New Order state used the enormous oil 
revenues at its disposal from the 1970s to strengthen the bloc’s alliance of economic 
domination and underwrite an exclusive dispersal of favour and economic 
opportunity.  Patrimonial ties between the state and domestic capital were deemed 
necessary for corporate success and ideological cohesion but despite official rhetoric 
to the contrary, and with the exception of the President’s family and associate’s 
business interests, the indigenous majority were increasingly marginalised by 
favoured, predominantly Sino-Indonesian, corporate interests.  The New Order 
economic bloc became a mere “infusion of patrimonial distributional networks” 
linking powerful strata of officialdom with capital elites in a culture of patronage 
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where business success was premised upon privileged access to hegemonic power.544  
By the mid-1990s, the New Order developmental state’s economic bloc was 
neglecting the economic egalitarianism implicit in the Pancasila-ist ideological 
pretensions that in Gramscian terms underpinned hegemonic legitimacy.   
                   Throughout the New Order the powerful institutionalised organic 
influence of an increasingly predatory techno-bureaucracy, empowered to allocate 
licensing, monopolies, bank credit, and access to capital and state contracts, linked 
economic and political power.  The New Order economic bloc also met the 
imperatives of the Gramscian model by demonstrating an ongoing preparedness to 
renegotiate alliance arrangements as necessary.  In the face of changing economic 
realities and in response to international and domestic demands for more liberal 
economic policies, the bloc’s ideological underpinnings were modified from the late 
1980s by instituting minimal levels of regulatory reform that included a program of 
privatisation.  Given the serious economic and socio-political opposition from 
economic nationalists to reform processes and the alliance refurbishment privatisation 
came to represent, only a minimal number of lucrative state assets were sold outside 
elite corporate interests.  The processes were merely manipulated by the regime as 
opportunities for hegemonic re-arrangement to integrate influential favoured interests 
into the hegemonic order.  The privatisation programme ran from the late-1980s into 
the 1990s but did no more than re-arrange the reward system and tighten regime 
cohesion by transferring wealth and commercial advantage to strategically placed 
politico-corporate elites.   
                     Gramsci’s hegemonic bloc is defined by an ideologically legitimate 
relationship between state and capital arranged and sustained by organic intellectuals 
tasked with legitimising the dominant class’s economic developmental agendas 
through top down relationships bound by ideological consensus (and thus legitimacy), 
uniting all classes behind the regime’s economic world-view.  The typical 
characteristic of these relationships is ongoing socio-political and ideological struggle 
that require certain conditions being met and sustained.  This is the real value of 
Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony in that it emphasises an ongoing need for re-
negotiating hegemonic legitimacy in response to changing conditions between peer 
and subordinate groups by altering patterns of alliances rather than simply dominating 
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by force.  Meeting the Gramscian hegemonic model’s requirements therefore required 
the New Order economic bloc constantly co-opting and renegotiating subordinate and 
alliance consent to its economic agendas and consent needed to be gained through 
practices compatible with legitimate state institutions and processes and by using 
legitimising ideological discourse.  But the reality of the New Order economic bloc as 
a genuine Pancasila-ist economy fell short of the ideal model.  While elite alliance 
consent was effectively co-opted and renegotiated as necessary in the face of 
changing economic conditions and circumstances through the hegemonic 
refurbishment opportunities provided by privatisation and regulatory reform, mass 
subordinate interests were neglected.  Because of the bloc’s inherent corruption and 
unambiguous socio-economic inequity the vital element of mass consensus was 
missing and the leadership became increasingly estranged from the non-
compromisable values and interests of the masses. 
                   In the sphere of economics the New Order arrangement - its economic 
bloc - is well explained by the Gramscian hegemonic model.  The very essence of 
Gramscian hegemonic order, the balanced duality of coercion with consensual 
support, is clearly evident in the New Order’s emphasis on the persuasive techniques 
of co-optation and compromise to gain support from key economic sectors for their 
imposed (coerced) economic policy agendas.  The nature of a developmental state’s 
strategic intervention in its economy has important implications and none more so 
than the state’s willingness to provide its techno-bureaucracy with the coercive means 
to effectively and pragmatically implement state policy agendas.  The New Order’s 
organic techno-bureaucrats served this function but also effectively co-ordinated the 
consensual aspects of Gramscian hegemony by both providing necessary domestic 
capital and empowering its use with assistance and inducements.  Although defined 
by techniques of consensus, cooptation and co-operation counter-balancing coercion, 
the relationship that resulted between the New Order state and capital effectively 
evolved as a culture of patronage, corruption and nepotism balancing forced 
compliance.   
                    In terms of the Gramscian model, the New Order economic bloc under-
performed in its organic intellectual functions.  The inequitable dispersal of benefit 
clearly contradicted the bloc’s ideological legitimacy in terms of the Pancasila-ist 
economy’s imperatives of an egalitarian society and an equitable sharing of benefits.  
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Advantaged and indulged, charged with the essential Gramscian hegemonic function 
of disseminating the state ideology’s economic imperatives on behalf of their 
sponsoring class, the organic intellectuals of the New Order techno-bureaucracy, 
while becoming the self-satisfied bedrock of a burgeoning middle-class, in turn 
perpetuated the corrupt and inequitable arrangement that defined the New Order 
economic bloc.  There was little alternative to their prioritising the ruling order’s elite 
interests; recalcitrant techno-bureaucrats would simply be replaced by those that 
would.  Moreover, by complying with the demands of their superior class, the techno-
bureaucracy was meeting cultural expectations of their class.545  This issue of 
subordinate compliance based on cultural grounds of traditional obsequiousness546 
tends to contradict the function of the Gramscian organic intellectual charged with 
disseminating the ideologically based values of its sponsoring class.  Hilley also 
identifies this culture of deference and reluctance to oppose guidance from above in 
the behaviour of the Malaysian bureaucracy and civil service under Mahathir but sees 
no need to compare their traditional behaviour with the function of the Gramscian 
organic intellectual.547  But the inconsistency can be reconciled somewhat by 
Gramsci’s insights into the close relationship between ideology and culture and his 
view that the organic intellectuals’ prime hegemonic function is to craft society’s 
acknowledgement of their sponsoring classes’ ideological superiority over the cultural 
order including resolving the inevitable conflicts that arise between alta cultura and 
cultura populare.548   
                   The Gramscian model also has much to say about counter-hegemony.  
Gramsci’s insights prove highly useful in providing an explanation as to why an 
effective counter-hegemony failed to arise and coalesce around an alternative 
rendering of ideology to that of the New Order economic bloc.  First and foremost the 
Gramscian hegemonic model is more concerned with the hegemony of the higher and 
middle classes (the bourgeoisie) controlling production than that of the masses (the 
proletariat).549  To achieve ideological superiority an emergent counter-hegemony 
must develop firm roots in the world of economic production and exert its authority 
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over the state’s economic processes.550  Therefore, in the New Order context, an 
alternative hegemony would need to have risen from either of two sources: from a 
split within the organic constituency dominating economics and production (and 
underpinned by an alternative, not necessarily completely new, rendering of 
ideology), or from the masses underpinned by traditional ideological renderings based 
on the masses acquiring control of the means of production.   
                   In the former scenario, it is difficult to reconcile the New Order situation 
with the Gramscian model in trying to explain the growing divergence between 
reformists committed to monetary discipline and those committed to the status quo in 
terms of the Gramscian traditional/organic intellectual dichotomy and emergent 
counter-hegemony.551  Notwithstanding that the President was the final arbiter of 
policy direction, the Gramscian model provides little utility in identifying a clear-cut 
traditional/organic power distinction among the New Order bureau-technocrats 
charged with the bloc’s economic and financial policy implementation.  By drawing 
on egalitarian ideals of an equitable sharing of resources Pancasila-ist values steering 
New Order economic agendas already incorporated values generally expected of 
Indonesian traditional interests so, at least as represented by Pancasila, both 
traditional and organic influences had been assimilated into hegemonic arrangements.  
To encourage international investment the organic economic constituency had been 
constructed in the first place in response to the demands of global agendas but 
disagreement within the techno-bureaucracy from the late-1980s about the need for 
reform and an end to corruption were also responses to global agendas, certainly not 
culturally-based, and represented organic inconsistency and contradiction.  In terms of 
the economic bloc’s organic constituency, there was insufficient emergent traditional 
constituency cohesive enough and imbued with alternative values upon which an 
alternative counter-hegemony could coalesce: there was merely a minority view 
emergent within the New Order organic constituency that was responsive to global 
influences calling for financial transparency and economic de-regulation and able to 
call upon Pancasila to justify its stance.552  Moreover, in Gramscian terms, the only 
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potential emergent counter-hegemony built on alternative traditional values came 
from muted calls for a more Islamicised economy and which carried little cultural 
basis anyway.553                
                    In the latter scenario, Gramsci’s Marxist orientation is telling: a mass 
based counter-hegemony could seemingly only occur through a successful revolution 
such as that of the Bolsheviks in 1917 and paralleled in the New Order context as a 
mass-based popular uprising taking total control of the Indonesian state and thus the 
means of production and the economy.554  From the mid-1990s the legitimacy of the 
New Order’s bureaucratic and corporate hegemonic arrangements with Indonesian 
society, that had for some three decades underpinned the New Order economic 
system, came under threat from an emergent popular opposition outside the techno-
bureaucracy.  Led by a loose and diverse assemblage of traditional intellectuals, 
popular, mass-based opposition focused on economic inequity, social injustice, and 
the continuing denial of democratic processes.  Traditional intellectual reformists 
turned to an alternative rendering of a legitimate Pancasila-ist economy calling for 
more open and effective market reforms, questioned the lack of governance and weak 
regulatory legal and administrative frameworks, and voiced a growing distaste for a 
business culture that, through its virtual institutionalisation of political manipulation, 
monopolies, cartels, banking collusion and corruption, lacked the moral and 
intellectual legitimacy implicit in Pancasila.555  With the deteriorating economic 
situation, any remaining illusions as to the legitimacy of the New Order’s 
representation of a Pancasila-ist economy had been well, as Gramsci put it, 
demystified.556  Demands for demokrasi dan reformasi compounded the questioning 
of the socio-political and economic status quo and an emergent, potentially powerful 
range of traditional intellectual constituencies displayed all of the characteristics of a 
nascent Gramscian counter-hegemony.  In terms of the Gramscian model, the New 
Order economic arrangement neglected mass interests and failed to sustain critical 
socio-economic alliances of popular interest yet, notwithstanding the dramatic 
overthrow of the regime in 1998, a coherent economic counter-hegemony failed to 
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555 World Bank, 1995, xv.    
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emerge around transformed or rearticulated ideological arrangements either from 
within the masses nor from contradictions among the bloc’s organic alliance 
structures.557  Notwithstanding leadership change and a degree of fiscal reform and 
adjustment sufficient to secure assistance from international financial institutions to 
ease the effects of the economic crisis, the location and concentration of Indonesia’s 
economic power and wealth remained relatively unchanged.  Comparison with 
Hilley’s Mahathirist hegemonic project, hegemonic obsolescence, decay and response 
to emergent counter-hegemony is appropriate.  Faced with demands similar to those 
confronting the Suharto regime with the onset of the regional financial crisis and 
similar calls for more liberal processes in the context of more heightened Islamic 
values, Mahathirism sustained support for its hegemonic agendas through processes 
of hegemonic refurbishment based on more consensual and thus more legitimate 
societal consent than formerly and promised a more equitable distribution of wealth 
and the fruits of economic progress.558           
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Chapter 5 
 
The Suharto New Order as a Gramscian historic bloc: its 
political form, the ‘political bloc’ 
     
 Before discussing the political form of the New Order historic bloc it is 
necessary to outline relevant elements of the Gramscian model.  As detailed in chapter 
1, Gramscian hegemony closely ties ideology into socio-political systems in such a 
way as to be accepted by the general population as a “universally valid” expression of 
the national interest.559  It is also the nature of Gramscian hegemony that the cohesive 
qualities of ideology essentially overlay (and thus bind) the arrangement of the bloc 
formed.  Linked to the dominant social order, organic intellectual influences give 
substance to the bloc’s hegemonic structures by disseminating a discourse that secures 
mass acceptance of the regime’s interpretation of ideology.  Acceptance of the 
arrangement is organised through direct political leadership with citizens drawn to 
conforming to political processes through genuine democratic institutions.560  The 
essence of Gramscian hegemony therefore is that socio-political decision-making 
based upon ideological leadership functions as legitimate state activity.  But because 
hegemony can only last as long as the cohesion of the alliances upon which the bloc is 
built is sustained, hegemonic consistency requires organic influences maintaining on-
going process and conquering alternative ideological inputs by winning them over 
through various strategies that include the assimilation of subordinate groups’ non-
negotiable values.561   
      At the heart of hegemony and hegemonic order a duality of coercion and 
consensus balances subordinating opposition through force when necessary and the 
consensual support of subordinate groups through techniques of co-operation, co-
optation, and compromise.  The hegemonic legitimising combination of coercion and 
consent are arrived at through the normal outlets and institutions of public expression 
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exercised in a parliamentary environment.562  It is also essential that the balancing 
processes respond to conditions existing at any particular time and that corresponding 
arrangements of socio-political control be constantly adjusted and reaffirmed.  As a 
consensually based socio-political system that consciously acknowledges moral and 
intellectual legitimacy, hegemonic political order is therefore sustained by ongoing 
refurbishment and renegotiation of top-down socio-political alliances in the face of 
socio-political contestation.  Only as long as a ruling order is able to co-opt and 
sustain subordinate consent to its agendas does a class remain hegemonic and prevent 
the emergence of cohesive counter-hegemonic socio-political forces based on an 
alternative representation of ideology.  For an alternative rendering of ideology to 
emerge and legitimise counter-hegemony it must effectively challenge the organic 
cohesion of the hegemonic alliances upon which the political bloc has been built.  The 
alternative must also in itself be cohesive and more than merely question the 
legitimacy of hegemonic ideological discourse.  Hence Gramsci’s argument that an 
emergent cohesive counter-hegemony must be structured in such a way as to 
demystify society’s ideological subordination comprehensively across mutually 
inclusive political and economic, as well as ideological, affairs.563   
  Focusing on the socialisation of power, Gramsci’s concept of social 
politics steps beyond what he regarded as the problem of “who gets what, when, and 
how” and addresses the more significant socio-political question of “who holds power 
over whom and how?”564  The relations entailed depend on the authority of elite 
interests, strategic alliances, and “moral and intellectual leadership at the national-
popular level” occurring over an extended period of hegemonic order thus their 
analysis utilises the form of an historic bloc.565  Representing the Suharto New Order 
as such a temporal construct details the historic processes by which these relationships 
were managed to realise and sustain the regime’s dominant position over society, how 
an appropriate level of social consent and moral-cultural leadership balanced a 
sufficiency of coercion and force, and how these relationships were sustained across 
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each of the bloc’s three overlapping economic, political, and ideological forms.566  
The process required rule through a pact of domination: the Indonesian ruling class’s 
alliances of elite567 interests established and sustained its socio-political domination 
by drawing legitimacy from ideological (moral and intellectual) leadership balanced 
with a sufficiency of coercion to subordinate the majority popular masses to its 
agendas.  But the extent to which a society is consciously persuaded to the legitimacy 
of moral and intellectual leadership always requires that the dominant order’s 
“particular view of reality” be firmly institutionalised alongside processes that are 
able to be modified to reassert legitimacy as necessary in the face of challenge.568  
While the institutional means of portraying the New Order’s view of socio-political 
reality was ideological persuasion, its institutional form was the state ideology 
Pancasila’s political derivative, Pancasila demokrasi.  This chapter will outline how 
the Suharto New Order legitimised their view of socio-political reality through 
constitutional processes based on ideology, imposed and sustained them upon 
Indonesian life, and assess the extent to which alternative renderings were resisted.  In 
so doing the chapter will explain how the somewhat ‘feudalistic’ socialising 
tendencies of elements of an Indonesian elite class at the “decisive nucleus of 
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economic activity”569 established and maintained political domination over 
Indonesian society from 1966 until the mid-1990s and an explanation for their failure 
to sustain socio-political consensus and cohesion into 1997/8.570   
 
1.  The politics of the New Order bloc  
1.1  Origins   
                 The relatively open and participatory nature of the 1955 elections 
heightened military antagonism towards the political party system and ABRI’s anti-
party bias from the beginning of the decade was largely responsible for President 
Sukarno’s declaration of martial law in 1957.  During the early years of 
independence, and in particular the electioneering leading up to the 1955 election, 
rather than functioning as a representative process aggregating and articulating 
diverse competing political interests, the Indonesian parliamentary system had been 
little more than an “arena for intra-elite competition.”571  The 1955 election showed 
that political parties had little empathy with the broader interests of Indonesian 
society, particularly outside central Java, and rather served those of a loose grouping 
of central national elites.  The system did entertain a certain amount of success in 
promoting elite solidarity except that party interests differentiated by party affiliation 
were largely linked through “exclusive membership of the relatively small, Jakarta-
based, national elite.”572  The 1955 election did however succeed in introducing 
strong divisive forces into the formerly insulated world of elite Jakarta politics.573   
                   The political stalemate that resulted from the 1955 elections and 
parliament’s subsequent ineffectiveness forced changes upon elitist Jakarta politics.  
To the concern of the predominantly Javanese, secular-nationalist, military elite, to 
broaden their support base the political parties were forced to turn to the peripheries 
of central power and the mass religio-cultural communities with their propensity for 
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“primordial loyalty”.574  In competing with each other and for the support of the two 
principal sources of power, the military and the President, party leaders were obliged 
to develop, and depend upon, provincial and communal mass followings.  Un-willing 
to compromise with each other, party leaders saw themselves as the representatives of 
mass communities rather than, as formerly, members of an elite separate from the 
masses.575  Lacking effective internal party mechanisms to legitimise leadership party 
competition became little more than mass mobilisation around personal agendas.  To 
integrate themselves into the traditional world of rural Indonesia the political parties 
of the modernising national elites were forced to link communal concerns to their own 
agendas but, in doing so, deepened cultural and religious divisions among the masses.  
This situation seriously concerned the military elite.  Mass mobilisation by Masyumi, 
the PKI and the PNI toward the end of Guided Democracy justified military concerns 
by inflaming sectarian tensions and ultimately led to the cataclysmic events and 
blood-letting that followed the October 1965 coup attempt.  Having grown 
increasingly hostile to the very existence of political parties the military’s rise to 
power during the period of Guided Democracy came largely at the expense of 
participatory politics.  Following the abortive coup the two previously strongest 
political parties of the Guided Democracy period, the communist PKI and the 
nationalist PNI, were closed down by the military leadership.  Proclaimed illegal, 
most of the PKI leadership and much of its membership and support base were 
slaughtered, and the independent leadership of the PNI imprisoned or removed from 
political influence.   
 
1.2  New Order political arrangement and processes  
                     To maintain the political stability deemed a necessary prerequisite for 
modernisation and development the new regime’s first priority was to institutionalise 
its socio-political authority.576  Development through modernisation, Suharto pointed 
out, required “balancing the ideals of democracy and socio-political stability.”577  The 
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corporatist/patrimonial modernisation strategy he chose severely restricted political 
expression and by channelling political participation through a controlled network of 
state-sponsored organisations, political parties were effectively sidelined.578  The 
resulting regime is well described as a military-bureaucracy but Liddle also uses the 
term “bureaucratic-populist” to explain the “pyramid of power” that evolved as the 
New Order.579  Comprising the institutions of Presidential domination, politically-
active military, and a decision-making process centred about the bureaucracy 
dominating state/society and economic relations to achieve its socio-political agendas 
the New Order pyramid of power combined varying and balanced degrees of co-
optation, responsiveness, co-operation and corruption with repression.580  Karl 
Jackson prefers the term “bureaucratic polity” to describe the New Order’s 
domination that permeated all state institutions from the President’s palace down to 
village administrations through an array of bureaucratic “cliques, circles, and patron-
client ties.”581   
                    Four key players dominated the political arrangement of the Suharto New 
Order.  At the top, and within a decade of the New Order’s creation unchallenged in 
authority, a strong President dispensed authority through a compliant political system 
while his loyal and highly organised power base, ABRI, extended executive authority 
from the top of the New Order ‘pyramid’ down to the village level.  A robust, highly 
empowered, civil bureaucracy committed itself to policy implementation while a 
wealthy, privileged and substantially Sino-Indonesian business class remained 
prepared to allot part of its wealth to sustaining the political process in return for 
political protection and economic privilege, opportunity, and advantage.  From its 
very inception, the New Order institutionalised and empowered the bureaucracy to 
control and direct the regime’s developmental agendas.582  Aware that the 
bureaucracy’s effectiveness as an engine of economic and socio-political growth 
demanded a single, highly centralised, hierarchical structure of command the regime 
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staffed it heavily with loyal military personnel.  The bureaucracy effectively 
functioned as ABRI’s additional arm and enabled regime power and influence to be 
extended deep into every facet of Indonesian society.583   
                       Given the omnipresence of corruption in the Indonesia bureaucracy, the 
wealth of many senior military officers suggests that while the main purpose of 
placing military officers in non-military positions (kekaryaan) was strategic to impose 
discipline over decision-making processes the practice also enabled an extra-
budgetary means of rewarding and ensuring personal loyalty.584  Although paid 
regularly, salaries in the civil service were abysmally low but subsidised through 
additional benefits of a free rice allowance, free housing, transport to and from work, 
and medical care.  Rigid conformity and total commitment to government policies 
was demanded in return.  All civil servants were also required to be members of 
Korpri, the regime-controlled civil servant’s organisation, and expected to vote for the 
official regime political party GOLKAR.  In rigidly ordering the lives and 
performance of the bureaucracy the New Order was effectively exploiting the 
traditional “natural hierarchical tendencies” of its people as an extraordinarily 
convenient method of middle-class control and regimentation.585    
              Considering the enmity with which the mostly disadvantaged indigenous 
Indonesians viewed their Sino-Indonesian fellow citizens, the important contribution 
of the minority grouping to economic development ensured their careful political 
treatment by the New Order regime.  Watched closely by military intelligence they 
dared not mobilise politically so business success and political protection demanded 
Sino-Indonesians find reliable business partners among indigenous army officers, 
state officials, influential members of the ruling elite, and in particular, the ‘First 
Family’ and their associates.  Although alienated from formal politics, the Sino-
Indonesian commercial class were able to develop impeccable links to the political 
elite through patronage networks.  As they were expected to play a vital part in the 
New Order’s development goals, long-term regime policy also favoured assimilating 
Sino-Indonesians into the national culture.  The approach assumed that the indigenous 
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business class would progressively expand alongside Sino-Indonesians with the 
indigenous business community growing much larger in absolute terms within a few 
decades, but a progressively widening socio-economic gap between the Sino-
Indonesian minority and the indigenous majority was never adequately addressed 
resulting in the perceived rapacity of the Sino-Indonesian business community 
becoming an increasingly politicised issue.586  When economic reforms did occur 
during the mid-1980s they clearly advantaged the Sino-Indonesian dominated private 
sector over the predominantly Muslim indigenous majority and equity and race 
entangled to dominate political debate.  State sector privatisation was the key issue of 
economic reforms in the 1980s but generally advantaged the Sino-Indonesian 
conglomerates closely linked to regime cronies and Suharto family members.  With 
the term ‘privatisation’ becoming political anathema during the late-1980s, the 
President visibly distanced himself from the Sino-Indonesian business community.587  
In so doing he not only reaffirmed the state’s commitment to the Pancasila-ist socio-
economic development underpinned by the socio-political approach implicit in Article 
33 of the 1945 Constitution but also strengthened his regime’s ideological legitimacy 
and in so doing gained valuable political support from the leaders of the majority 
Muslim pribumi community.   
                   No parliament elected under the New Order ever proposed a draft law or 
amended national budget allocations but merely rubber-stamped the President’s 
instructions.  Ordinary citizens abided not by laws regulated by parliamentary 
legislation but edicts issued by the President, Directors General of Departments, 
Provincial Governors and District Heads.  In practise, the executive branch and the 
bureaucracies exercised real legislative power and the executive itself regarded 
parliament and the bureaucracy as symbolic institutions duty bound to follow top 
down initiatives.  Considering development (pembangunan) to be a technical rather 
than a political matter, the New Order based its rationale for legislative domination on 
the belief that processes required oversight by experts of the executive branch and 
bureaucracy rather than the unsophisticated politicians of the parliamentary system.  
Given the importance of development to regime legitimacy, bringing politicians into 
the decision-making process was considered inefficient and wasteful of the state’s 
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time and energy.588  In a scenario that obliged all political parties to avoid 
antagonising the regime the DPR (Dewan Perakilan Rakyat: Peoples Representative 
Council or Indonesian parliament) was totally funded by the executive and political 
parties were financially incapable of even holding their own national congresses 
without regime financial and logistic support.   
                   Throughout the New Order the President appointed all Supreme Court 
Judges including the Chief Justice and his deputies.  Considering the significant 
number of appeal cases heard by the Supreme Court concerning conflicts over land 
appropriated for development purposes, the situation tended to encourage venality and 
corruption.  As the Supreme Court lacked the constitutional power of judicial revue 
(the authority to decide whether government policies and actions conformed to the 
Constitution) a growing culture of corruption fed the rapid economic growth.589  All 
Indonesian judges were members of the civil service and being under Supreme Court 
jurisdiction, appointed, promoted, paid, and supervised by the Department of Justice, 
their role challenged their impartiality in matters of law and professionalism.590  
Having little enthusiasm for an independent judicial system, most of the New Order 
ruling elite treated the law as merely another instrument of development. 
                  The military preferred the New Order model of political representation 
because it functioned primarily to facilitate state management and simplified socio-
political control.  When societal demands grew louder during the 1970s the strategic 
political model of Pancasila demokrasi was extended, and a number of new 
organisations and functional groups incorporated into it.591  By reforming and 
improving bureaucratic recruitment to create a disciplined and hierarchical civil 
service management with trusted military officers in key positions (kekaryaan), 
executive policy was able to be enforced with minimum public debate to the contrary.  
With the New Order the “bedrock of their existence” conservative elites remained 
prepared to commit themselves to regime renewal and continuity.592   
                                                           
588 Ramlam Surbact, ‘Formal political institutions,’ in R. W. Baker, M. H. Soestrato, J. Kristiadi, and 
D. E. Ramage, (Eds.), Indonesia: The Challenge of Change, (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Singapore, 1999), pp. 63-5. 
589 Surbact, (1999), p. 72. 
590 Surbact, (1999), p. 72. 
591 MacIntyre, (1994), p. 252 
592 Vatikiotis, (1998), p. 142. 
 192
                      President Suharto and his fellow New Order generals had initially 
shared two major concerns about their political future.  They were convinced that a 
formal linkage between state and Islam would put national unity at risk, and that a 
competitive political-party system (certainly the form represented by Western-style 
parliamentary democracy) was inappropriate to Indonesia’s societal diversity.  By 
rejecting participatory politics in favour of total state political-control the New Order 
regime was able to achieve what they regarded as the inextricably linked objectives of 
political stability and economic growth.593  With economic and socio-political 
development taking precedence over political freedom elections under the New Order 
became little more than symbolic affairs.  Although claiming democratic legitimacy 
through Pancasila demokrasi, elections were justified more in terms of an elite 
rendering of traditional values than the participatory politics of the ballot box.  In 
defending their position the regime insisted that its formulation of Pancasila 
demokrasi, as a uniquely appropriate form of political participation that blended 
modern reality with traditional culture, was the only way Indonesia could successfully 
develop.   
 
2.  New Order political arrangement 
2.1  Establishing and sustaining New Order political domination       
                  From its formation in 1948, ethnic-related tensions and conflict plagued 
governance of the Indonesian Republic.  Taking power in 1967 amidst socio-political 
chaos, Suharto and his generals were aware that social conflict and disharmony 
represented the most likely source of challenge to the developmental agenda they had 
chosen to legitimise their authority.  In pre-empting conflict, their method of choice 
was to employ social and political strategies that combined and balanced elements of 
coercion, persuasion, and co-optation.  To manage the archipelago’s potentially 
destabilizing social diversity the state was also obliged to preoccupy itself with 
establishing appropriate processes of social-political governance.  Indonesia’s 
demographic diversity (some 120 million people, comprising thirteen major, and 
hundreds of minor, ethnic groups) was also difficult to control from the centre.  Elite 
fear that mass politics might encourage political affiliation around ethnic, regional or, 
                                                           
593 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘Indonesia: Domestic Priorities Define National Security, Muthia Alagappa, 
(Ed.), Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, (Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, 1998) pp. 478-83. 
 193
in particular, religious affinities, conceived a ‘floating mass’594 approach whereby 
grass-roots interests could be disconnected from political parties and processes to 
ensure that nothing distracted the nation from the prime goal of ordered development 
(pembangunan).  While prepared to use a high degree of coercion to legitimise 
Pancasila demokrasi and counter, subvert, and dissipate social protest, the regime 
also placed considerable balancing emphasis on techniques of persuasion - both 
coercion and persuasion being traditional and valid instruments of state power in 
democratic systems.   
 
2.2  The instruments of socio-political arrangement; coercion 
balancing persuasion, co-optation, and consensus 
                     The New Order was little averse to using force against its people when 
deemed necessary to achieve goals and press agendas.  ABRI were a highly capable, 
well-disciplined, loyal organisation, tightly arranged in a hierarchy of authority 
closely monitored and ordered by the President himself.  While generally poorly 
prepared in terms of equipment and training to defend the nation from any form of 
external enemy, the military was nevertheless organised as an effective instrument of 
social arrangement.  Following the abortive 1966 coup, in what has been described as 
“one of the bloodiest massacres in modern history”, ABRI was prepared to use 
considerable force and brutality against the Indonesian people.595  Having liquidated 
the PKI, perceived by the New Order generals to be the threat from the extreme left, 
force was turned against militant Islam during the 1970s and 1980s, considered the 
threat of the extreme right and thereafter regarded as the only remaining potential 
challenge to the regime.     
                  As well as using coercion when necessary, the New Order devised an 
arrangement of persuasive symbols and institutions to regulate societal behaviour and 
neutralise societal demands.  The most prominent and intrusive example was ABRI’s 
self-justifying, Pancasila-derived, ‘dual-function’ doctrine dwi fungsi596 that 
legitimised ABRI’s involvement in both civilian socio-political life and state security.  
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Ill-disposed from the outset to leaving the business of politics to politicians, but not 
prepared to take the Latin American path of military dictatorship, the New Order 
generals chose a middle way (jalen tengah) between leaving the politicians to their 
own devices and taking direct control of the political system.  As well as justifying the 
Armed Force’s deep intrusion into Indonesian life, legitimising and institutionalising 
the military’s dwi fungsi also enabled New Order influence to be spread through the 
kekaryaan policy that placed military personal in senior positions in non-military and 
private enterprise.  Dwi fungsi also further facilitated regime influence and projection 
into all levels of Indonesian life by legitimising the allocation of 20% of parliament’s 
seats to ABRI, granting retired officers leadership positions in Goliard and in the 
outlying and peripheral provinces, and giving some 40% of all senior government and 
administrative postings to retired and active military personal.  Two further symbols 
of persuasion tightened the socio-political arrangement; the acronym SARA597 
(representing the Indonesian words for ethnicity, religion, race and other conflictual 
groups) identified the extremely sensitive issues that were under no circumstances to 
be publicly discussed or politicised, and the executive dictated 1978 program of 
Pancasila refresher courses (termed P4598) reaffirmed the importance of ideological 
unity and socio-political responsibility within the civil service.     
                 To further ensure political stability and ethnic harmony the regime 
employed various techniques of “organisational co-optation.”599  The military-
bureaucratic political party, GOLKAR, that General Ali Murtopo had established in 
1964 to promote the Armed Forces’ parliamentary interests in response to Sukarno’s 
pronounced lean to the left, grew powerful under the New Order and extended the 
military and bureaucracy into the parliamentary process ideologically defined as 
Pancasila demokrasi.600  The military-dominated New Order that took power 
following Sukarno’s effective removal was not simply the product of a military coup 
but carried significant social support.  By the mid-1960s the small Indonesian middle 
class were wary of social and political disorder and their willingness to support any 
authority capable of providing order offered the new regime a solid basis from which 
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to co-opt key organisations to their agendas.601  The Armed Forces offered the middle 
class the only alternative to Sukarno’s former left-leaning, egalitarian, tendencies.  
The events bloody of 1965/6 that drew together the coalition of forces that would 
form the New Order received strong support from both the Islamic community and 
the student movement, as well as what Aspinall describes as a growing “secular-
orientated, urban, middle class”.602   
                  From the very beginning of the New Order the strong civilian coalition of 
forces that supported the military perceived Suharto’s military-dominated regime as 
legitimate.  But within a decade disillusion around the issues of democracy, socio-
economic justice and wealth distribution had weakened the civilian-military coalition 
and civilian opposition to the regime grew thereafter.  The regime had intended to 
limit political participation by organising the majority of society into a floating mass 
with the political aspirations of all legitimate interest groups channelled through 
corporatist functional groups.  Coalescing society into an integrated organic whole, 
underpinned by Pancasila and bound by consensus rather than the divisional conflicts 
of the political past, could made no allowance whatsoever for any form of potentially 
oppositional political participation.   
                Opposition from politicised Islam, defined by the New Order as threat from 
the extreme right, was deemed intolerable and although Islamic organisations had 
supported the military in removing the PKI extreme left, Islam’s disintegrative 
potential dispelled any likelihood of an easing in the tensions between those aspiring 
to a politika-Islam and the New Order generals.  Potentially troublesome Muslim 
activists were removed, mainstream Muslim leaders generally agreed to disavow 
Islamic politics, and through state support and funding the regime generally co-opted 
the mass-based cultural and social organisations Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul 
Ulama that represented the modernist and traditional streams of orthodox Islam 
respectively.603  Many oppositional elements within the predominantly Islamic middle 
class shared the New Order’s commitment to economic development and socio-
political stability, and their fear of mass politics together with their revulsion towards 
the corruption that had underpinned their opposition to the old order remained.  
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Although not actually participating in the mechanisms of state power, and without 
challenging the nature of the regime itself, there was a general tendency among 
oppositional elements of the urban middle class and conservative Islam to gain access 
to its benefits.  The behaviour of the former modernising intellectuals of the late 
Sukarno era exemplified this tendency.  They had given their support and advice on 
political and economic reforms to Suharto and his generals immediately after the coup 
and were rewarded with co-optation and integration into the regime as technocrats, 
bureaucrats, and into the GOLKAR machine itself.604  As the New Order established 
and consolidated itself with independent political expression increasingly repressed, 
little space remained for anyone to challenge the regime.  Although the urban middle 
class grew rapidly during the first decade of the New Order they still represented a 
relatively small minority within a society largely comprised of impoverished urban 
and rural masses.  Comfortably ensconced in state employment (and enjoying the 
growing culture of patronage) the middle class retained their conservatism, fearful 
that any loosening of socio-political control might release frustrations among the 
Muslim majority and jeopardise growing middle-class prosperity and the increasing 
opportunities for upward mobility.     
                     In 1974 the New Order evoked an exclusive ideological vision of 
political order by extending Pancasila into the self-justifying political derivative 
Pancasila demokrasi that persuaded society to accept a completely restructured 
political and social arrangement that tightening the regime’s hold over the political 
system. The systematic de-politicising (and re-ideologising) that re-aligned all 
political parties into distinct, controllable, groupings was the first significant New 
Order political initiative.  Structurally formalising Pancasila demokrasi as the basis of 
the regime’s political form required an electoral arrangement that would place 
GOLKAR, the regime’s official political organ that included all civil servants, 
government employees, and the powerful parliamentary military faction, apart from 
the ‘official’ politically neutralised parliamentary opposition.605  To ensure GOLKAR 
retained its commanding political position, and to further limit any possibility for 
mass-based political mobilisation, the 1974 electoral re-construction effectively co-
opted the nine potentially confrontational political parties into the non-confrontational 
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New Order political system that was Pancasila demokrasi.  Formalised into a three-
party system comprising GOLKAR, the non-governmental PDI (Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia – Indonesian Democracy Party) and the PPP (Partai Persatuan 
Pembanguan – Development Unity Party),606 secular-nationalist and Islamic interests 
were respectively coalesced and peripheralized.  The move proved highly successful 
in ensuring that political opposition operated according to Pancasila’s tenets and 
GOLKAR won no less than 60% of the national vote in every election during the next 
three decades.607  The party system was further streamlined in 1984 with the 
implementation of azas tunggal608 that demanded all organisations acknowledge 
Pancasila as their sole ideological basis and PPP (the Muslim party) was further 
weakened when Wahid withdrew his traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 
organisation from the party.  All other significant socio-political organisations 
including the modernist Muhammadiyah complied with azas tunggal.     
                 As well as balancing coercion with persuasion and co-optation to maintain 
socio-political order, New Order management was also characterised by a tendency to 
take specific concessionary approaches to ameliorate particular ethnic issues.  Regime 
legitimacy benefited substantially from subsidising and supporting politically non-
threatening cultural/regional programmes such as Islamic cultural and religious events 
and a substantial mosque construction programme.  The extensive lengths government 
rice policy took to maintain pricing levels and supply also appeased three important 
mass constituencies.  Government officials received rice to subsidise their salary 
packages, and considerable care was taken to maintain realistic pricing levels for 
urban consumers.  Government policy also targeted predominantly indigenous rural 
rice producers to ensure their profits remained above international levels and that 
price increases in fertilisers and insecticides were eased by subsidies.609   
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3.  New Order socio-political resources  
                   As discussed above, the New Order’s socio-political arrangement is well 
described as a pyramid of power arranged from the top-most institution of the 
Presidency, down through a politically active military, a decision-making 
bureaucracy, and a controlling pattern of state/society and economic relations.  Two 
powerful socio-political resources impacted upon the structures of the New Order’s 
socio-political arrangement of Indonesian life; the unified ABRI and divided 
Indonesian Islam.  On the one hand, ABRI represented the single most powerful 
instrument of socio-political control while, on the other, Islam represented both an 
enabling instrument of regime legitimacy as well as the most powerful source of 
potential challenge to New Order socio-political legitimacy.  Reconciling these two 
powerful organic intellectual initiatives at the very heart of New Order power was 
primarily the function of ABRI doctrine as ideological discourse and its commitment 
to the imperatives of a Pancasila-ist state.   
                  
3.1  The Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) and New Order politics   
                   Underwriting the coercive aspects of some three decades of New Order 
domination required that ABRI not only remain the largest and most powerful socio-
political organisation in the country but also that it remained united.  Deeply 
embedded in the New Order political system and committed to prioritising political 
stability as a pre-requisite to national development and economic growth, ABRI’s role 
“inextricably entwined” the institution in the nation’s fate.610  This section explains 
how ABRI sustained their organic influence over the New Order socio-political 
arrangement.  ABRI’s role as the regime’s principle instrument of socio-political 
persuasion and control will be discussed and an explanation of ABRI’s propensity to 
pervade Indonesian socio-political affairs through the post-independence years until 
the Suharto New Order’s collapse in 1997 follows.  Finally the relationship between 
ABRI and the bloc’s organ of political process and expression, GOLKAR is 
discussed.      
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3.1.1 ABRI as the regime’s principal coercive instrument of socio-political control  
                   Suharto’s earliest expression of authority was his purging of the Armed 
Forces’ officer corps of ‘leftists’ and ‘Sukarnoists’ and devolving authority from field 
command to military headquarters in Java.  Placing ABRI under his direct control as 
Commander-in-Chief effectively unified the institution into his personal instrument of 
power and control.611  By removing native sons from command roles outside of Java 
he also minimised the likelihood of ‘warlordism’ and the possibility that independent 
pockets of authority might grow outside of the New Order power structure to 
challenge his new regime.612  ABRI were consequently structured to exemplify the 
ethnic bias of Indonesian patrimonialism.613  Ethnic Javanese constituted 66% of the 
military elite at the beginning of the New Order but by 1978 the figure had risen to 
80% with 14 of the 15 Regional and Territorial Command positions held by 
abangan/priyayi Javanese.614  Institutionally, Javanese values deeply influenced 
ABRI with recruitment and promotion into the military elite came to be dominated by 
officers hostile to orthodox and modernist Islam.615  In terms of military factionalism, 
the most important were divisional identifications and ethnic background.  In matters 
of factional rivalry Javanese officers generally prevailed over non-Javanese and if not 
diverted into powerless positions non-Javanese were simply passed over for 
promotion.616    
                   Institutionalised as the power base of New Order socio-political control, 
ABRI’s organic intellectuals claimed legitimacy through both dwi fungsi617 
doctrinally and the institution’s sworn ideological dedication to protecting the state 
ideology Pancasila.618  More than a political compromise between nationalist and 
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religious groups, without which they believed Indonesia would disintegrate, 
Pancasila defined for ABRI the very essence of national unity as a total way of life 
through which unity and stability could be forged.619  Essentially a mechanism of 
socio-political control and order the doctrine of dwi fungsi was enshrined in the sacred 
soldier’s oath Sapta Marga and reinforced by the military’s high degree of internal 
solidarity and loyalty.620  Significantly, the doctrine enabled ABRI to intrude with 
impunity into socio-political matters far beyond a military’s traditional role of 
ensuring national security and defence against external threat.621  Dwi fungsi’s 
justification for intensive intervention into all socio-political life took two specific 
forms.  While the doctrine legitimised military domination of the governmental 
structure through state assemblies and government ministries down to governing and 
district levels, it also enabled extensive military influence over the rural development 
projects upon which regime legitimacy among the general population came 
increasingly to rely.622   
                  As employed by Suharto’s New Order, dwi fungsi’s amended 1966 form 
comprised four elements.  It defined and institutionalised ABRI as both a defence and 
a social force.  In ratifying its legitimacy and committing ABRI to the goal of socio-
political and economic development, the doctrine became long-term rather than a 
temporary expedient for the duration of what was at the time a major crisis.  By 
stressing that the doctrine had been forced upon them, the Armed Forces were able to 
insist that civilians acknowledged their inability to manage national development 
(pembangunan) without military help.623  To counter inevitable social criticism, dwi 
fungsi was thus legalised and institutionalised in a form that emphasised its civil 
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responsibilities.  To further embed its doctrinal implications throughout the 
developmental state, within a decade some 20,000 military officers were diverted to 
influential civilian positions.624  To oversee Pancasila and national development, dwi 
fungsi therefore provided ABRI with a supervisory role over all fields of social 
activity as well as the means to resist any social pressure for political change.  In the 
view of the New Order generals, dwi fungsi totally justified the subordination of 
civilians to the military.625   
                  Having confirmed ABRI’s socio-political status, the government’s Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies officially defined dwi fungsi’s dual-function in 
a 1973 text The Acceleration and Modernization of 25 Years Development.626  “Born 
from the people” and in “shoulder to shoulder struggle with the people” for the 
purpose of national defence and security, ABRI would not only be a professional 
army, but also society’s most powerful “social force” and the New Order’s most 
potent socio-political resource.627  To clarify the doctrine’s boundaries, and ensure 
they were fully understood, a 1982 ‘guide book’ incorporated all military doctrinal 
papers from the beginning of the New Order and the doctrine’s legal status became 
secure under Presidential decree No. 20/1982.628  As Pancasila’s guardian and 
defender from all kinds of deviation, dwi fungsi’s dual functions carried not only 
historical considerations but firm constitutional and legal grounds.629  Socio-political 
legitimisation came from Article 30, paragraph 1, of the 1945 Constitution that 
insisted on all citizens having the “right and the duty” to participate in the defence of 
the state.  Moral justification for economic and socio-political responsibility came 
from the active role the military had played during liberation and independence.630  
Thus, from the outset of the New Order, the generals not only dominated the upper 
levels of the regime, Cabinet, and senior civil service, but morally and intellectually 
legitimised their control of decision-making.   
                    ABRI’s ideological integrity is thus underpinned by a unique culture that 
is well described in terms of a dual-levelled ideological structure that views military 
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doctrine as an ‘ideology’ within Pancasila.  On the one hand, doctrinal legitimacy 
derives from adherence to the sacred soldiers’ oath Sapta Marga, with operational 
doctrine, as an essential and necessary indicant of strategic direction, defined by dwi 
fungsi’s broad enabling parameters.  On the other hand, ABRI’s constitutional 
responsibilities tied the institution to protecting the state ideology Pancasila on behalf 
of the people.  As a Pancasila derivative, dwi fungsi linked doctrine directly to the 
state ideology and in effect doctrine and ideology became a mutually inclusive 
duality.  Dwi fungsi offered the doctrinal means to sustain ideological cohesion, while 
Pancasila provided the ideological substance that underwrote the institution’s 
legitimacy as the regime’s prime asset in sustaining primarily the coercive and, to a 
lesser degree, the consensual aspects of legitimate moral and intellectual leadership.  
Sustaining ABRI’s internal cohesion at both ideological levels was vital to both the 
institution’s ongoing role as the coercive arm of regime hegemony and its consensual 
role in terms of Pancasila’s national-popular imperatives.  During the early decades 
of the New Order, officer corps and thus doctrinal/ideological homogeneity was 
tightened by Suharto’s purges of the institution and, to a large extent, by the shared 
experiences of a generation of soldier that had fought together against the Dutch, 
Islamic and regional separatists during the 1950s and 1960s and, following the failed 
1966 coup, the leftist forces supporting the PKI.  But doctrine and ideology were to 
come under increasing scrutiny during the 1980s and 1990s from both within ABRI as 
a result of officer corps generational change as well as a desire for more 
professionalism, together with a broadening socio-political questioning that also 
divided the military as to Pancasila’s true role within what had become a dynamic 
and changing Indonesia society.631          
                    The higher echelon civilian or military office-holder in the civil service is 
referred to as kekaryaan.632  Although initially disparaged by other military officers, 
by the early 1980s some half of the positions at this highly influential level of power 
were held by service personal and as the importance of political influence became 
more apparent, kekaryaan assignments came to carry great prestige.  Together with 
their civilian kekaryaan counterparts senior level military kekaryaan also carried 
                                                           
631 The evolving doctrinal/ideological dichotomy is traced further below in Chapter 6, section 2, pp. 
256-258 and section 2.1, pp. 258-262 and Chapter 7, section 2.1, pp. 295-298.  
632 The term kekaryaan,  while generally describing either civilian or military high level government 
officials, to the military means a ‘worker’ of ‘functionary’ appointed to a senior civilian position.  Mac 
Dougall, (1982), pp. 89-92. 
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considerable decision-making authority in key socio-political and economic roles.  As 
they generally owed their positions to palace patronage, civilians at this level of the 
bureaucracy and civil service were no less active supporters of New Order agendas 
than their military counterparts.  By the 1980s the military karyawan at the upper 
political levels of the regime were remnants of the 1945 generation of officers that 
had not seen combat since the revolutionary era and although still immensely loyal to 
Suharto most were off the active duty list and held their appointments in retirement.  
Significantly, this older generation was coming under pressure from younger officers 
growing increasingly envious of the high level of prestige and opportunity offered by 
the choice karyawan assignments and looking forward to succeeding their elders.  By 
the 1980s the situation had highlighted a growing organic intellectual cleavage within 
the extremely hierarchical structure extending below the President where senior 
military karyawan occupied half of the top 141 positions of New Order power.  Seven 
of the President’s eight senior aides, two of his three Co-ordinating Ministers, eight of 
seventeen Cabinet Ministers, two of six Junior Ministers, sixteen of eighteen 
Secretary-Generals, eleven of seventeen Inspector-Generals, and twenty-five of 
seventy-one Director-Generals were military officers.633   
 
3.1.2  ABRI as political actors 
                    Crouch insists that ABRI were politically oriented from the outset 
because their leaders had identified early in the independence struggle that the socio-
political nature of their cause required a permanent willingness to lead all necessary 
socio-political initiatives.634  The early involvement of senior (and medium level) 
military commanders in national politics stemmed from the revolutionary roots of 
their struggle and units having to operate independently unwilling to subordinate 
themselves to civilian controls.  Officers that rose to prominence during the 
revolutionary struggle regarded their units as personal instruments of power and came 
to favour the idea of a politicised military under their direct control.635  The perceived 
failings of civilian government during the post-independence Sukarno era 
strengthened the belief that the officer corps needed to sustain their political 
orientation and convinced many that they commanded the only political force capable 
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of ensuring the social order and unity necessary for economic and socio-political 
development.636  Assured that their intervention into politics and economic 
development was legitimate the military therefore felt justified in acquiring corporate 
interests to strengthen their position.637  As well as enjoying the status their dual-
function role offered, junior officers came to rely on the economic opportunities dwi 
fungsi offered to subsidise generally poor salaries.   
                    Three particular events of the Sukarno era strengthened the military’s 
ability to make their long-term total commitment to socio-political control.  
Nationalising Dutch companies in 1957 gave the military access to substantial extra-
budgetary funding and, as well as placing lucrative assets under their control, the 
secondment of senior officers into influential economic and business positions 
enabled them to acquire new and valuable skills.  As well as strengthening executive 
power, President Sukarno’s 1959 reinstatement of the 1945 Constitution also enabled 
him to place senior military officers into key political ministries in his 1959 
cabinet.638  Thus, by 1960, ABRI had successfully embedded themselves into all of 
the state’s most influential economic and political positions.  With all senior 
promotions dependant upon the President, together with the commensurate 
requirement that military candidates for high office maintain associations with 
influential individuals and groups outside ABRI, the military had effectively 
entrenched itself in politics.639 
                   In his enquiry into Indonesian civil-military relations Sandhaussen 
observes that as well as opportunity an army generally requires the inclination to enter 
politics but before a military makes a move into politics it is necessary that 
opportunity and inclination be “in confluence”.640  ABRI actively involved itself in 
post-independence politics because they were inclined to protect their corporate 
interests but there were also occasions when they believed that civil-government 
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weaknesses permitted the opportunity to do so.641  Initially their involvement in 
politics was to protect vital domestic and corporate interests but as their interests 
broadened to include areas of revenue allocation and personal remuneration they also 
felt that, as an institution, the military needed to be able to execute its functions 
without “interference from other forces and institutions, and, in particular, 
civilians.”642  Although they had always been poorly paid and supplied, the 
Indonesian army did not intervene in politics simply to rectify these interests alone.  
They made moves when inclination and opportunity converged during the 1945-8 
struggle for independence, when martial law was declared following democratic and 
civil breakdown in the late 1950s and in defensive response to what they portrayed as 
a coup attempt by leftist forces in 1965/6.643  Each incursion into politics was not 
simply to protect general interests but largely a response to ABRI command 
perceptions that civil and political institutions were breaking down.    
                   ABRI’s self-justifying rationale, reflected in their dwi fungsi doctrine that 
they were the only force capable of holding the Indonesian republic together, 
conceived an integrated state in which prime interests would be defined by social 
obligations rather than liberal-democratic ideals.  Military doctrine thus saw 
individual rights as inimical to Pancasila and as such inappropriate to the New 
Order’s hegemonic agendas.644  As a strategic doctrine, dwi fungsi enabled the New 
Order regime to appropriate the strategic political resources of both a highly pervasive 
territorial military command system and the power to appoint military officers to all 
levels of the civilian bureaucracy (karyawan).  It also permitted the appointment of 
military officers to the political institutions of the DPR, MPR, and provincial and 
district parliaments, as well as leadership positions in the official state political party 
GOLKAR.645  To fight the first New Order elections in 1971 ABRI treated GOLKAR 
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as their own civilian political federation and by mobilising the party against potential 
organised civilian opposition the regime effectively undermined the election.  The 
opposition’s subsequent crushing electoral defeat effectively represented the demise 
of the last “remnants of civilian [political] strength.”646  Having effectively removed 
independent political parties from electoral politics the last rallying point for civilian 
opposition to the regime was neutralised and the banning of political activities at the 
village level effectively reduced the civilian population to the status of a floating 
mass.  With the party system emasculated and those on the peripheries of power 
deprived of any institutionalised means of political expression to advance their 
aspirations, the military was freed to underwrite regime interests untroubled by their 
effect on the general citizenry.     
 
3.1.3  ABRI and the bloc’s instrument of political expression: GOLKAR 
                    The official regime political party GOLKAR provided the Armed Forces 
with its “concrete grass-roots stake” in the New Order political arrangement.647  
Formed in October 1964 as a civilian counter-force to Sukarno’s swing to the left, 
GOLKAR placed the military at the heart of institutionalised politics.648  GOLKAR 
consisted of 61 organisations - or functional groups - and expanded during the New 
Order to include 201 representative organisations.  Originally intended to mobilise all 
non-communist organisations permitted representation by President Sukarno in the 
national and regional assemblies, upon taking power in 1966 Suharto and the military 
refocused GOLKAR as an efficient political machine that totally dominated the New 
Order political process.649  Deciding, on the advice of his chief political aide Ali 
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Murtapo, to hold parliamentary elections during the late-1960s, Suharto formally 
converted GOLKAR into his New Order’s official political party.650   
                   Sceptical about political parties from the outset the military determined 
that the political system not be permitted to challenge their domination and this was 
obvious from their mobilisation of GOLKAR for the 1971 elections.  The mass socio-
political movements of the last years of the Sukarno era had convinced Suharto and 
his generals that sectoral interests needed to be controlled so GOLKAR’s corporatist 
style provided an ideal method to successfully channel political participation away 
from less controllable political parties towards state-controlled, functionally-
differentiated, representative bodies.651  By unfastening the link between political 
parties and sectoral interests the strategy created a network that steered all socio-
political aspirations upward to the leadership elites.652  The result countered the 
divisiveness associated with the liberal-democratic competitive pluralist party system 
favoured in the West regarded by the regime as incompatible with Indonesian socio-
political culture.   
While socio-political priority was directed at strategic sectors the regime’s 
corporatist strategy was not limited to mass social organisations but extended to cover 
all societal groupings.  In terms of hegemonic rearrangement the most profound 
corporatist adjustment was the 1973 rationalisation of the political-party system by 
which the nine political parties competing with GOLKAR were separated from 
society and fused into two new composite parties: the PPP that amalgamated the 
former Muslim parties, and the PDI that combined the former nationalist and 
Christian parties.  Carefully vetted and compliant, and subject to ABRI’s 
manipulation and co-optation, the leaderships of the two composite parties simmered 
with internal tensions.  The rationalisation of the political party system, coupled with 
society’s depoliticisation through the floating mass approach to political expression, 
effectively denied the general population all but state-approved political involvement.  
Only GOLKAR was permitted to operate at the village level and the only direct 
influence the people had upon the political process was through GOLKAR, its array 
of functional representative organisations, and the two narrowly defined and 
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compliant alternative parties.  Direct political control was extended into the state 
apparatus itself with all government employees (including the military) required to 
become members of the Civil Service Corps (KORPRI) the functional organisation 
responsible for representing their interests.  Expected to support GOLKAR at 
elections, all civil servants became members of the so-called ‘GOLKAR family’ 
trilogy (Keluarga Besar GOLKAR) alongside the ABRI and KORPRI.653  
                  Effectively dominated by the military and the bureaucracy, GOLKAR was 
imbued with the ideological rationale of Pancasila demokrasi and by de-emphasising 
the class aspect of Indonesian society intended to represent the interests of the entire 
Indonesian population.654  But rather than promote its members’ interests, 
GOLKAR’s corporatist network served largely to restrict and control societal 
demands and the leaderships of its component organisations were given little leeway 
other than to promote their own narrow personal interests.  Nevertheless, the New 
Order corporatist strategy achieved its prime purpose of minimising the capacity for 
mass groups to make demands upon the state and influence politics and, pushed to the 
peripheries of power, corporatist representative organisations were unable to threaten 
stability and conformity.  In a process repeated at all subsequent elections, highly 
organised mass social mobilisation enabled GOLKAR to gain 62% of the national 
vote in the first New Order election in 1971.  Having performed their intended 
function, active-duty military personnel were subsequently moved to the background 
and replaced at the forefront by reliable retired military personal.  It was not until 
1993 when, in reaction to a perceived cooling of his relationship with elements of 
ABRI senior leadership and his realisation that it would be to his political advantage 
to re-arrange the bloc’s hegemonic alliance structure to include Islam, President 
Suharto broke the tradition of active or retired military officers at the head of 
GOLKAR and appointed a loyal Muslim civilian associate to lead the party.   
 
3.2 Politika-Islam and New Order politics  
                  During the closing decade of the twentieth century democratic ideas spreading 
among disparate peoples and cultures had a powerful impact upon geo-politics but the 
accompanying global upsurge of ethnic and religious identity looked unlikely to prove 
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compatible with democracy.655  Democratic principles are often incompatible with 
culture and belief so it is mistaken to simply assume that all societies will embrace 
democratic institutions hence the complex, and highly debated, relationship that has 
been witnessed globally between Islam and democracy during the last two decades.656  
Islam is not ideologically monolithic and arguments vary between dismissing any 
familiarity between the two and the idea that Islam requires a democratic system if it 
is to be relevant to the contemporary world.  A middle road argues that Islam can 
actually enhance democracy even when the incumbent political system is not 
specifically Islamic, but there is also the possibility that Islamic political parties might 
be tempted to embrace democracy temporarily simply to gain sufficient political 
power to impose an Islamic theocracy.   
                     Many Islamists believe democracy to be a foreign concept that 
Westerners and secular reformers push upon Muslim societies, but there are Islamic 
intellectuals who believe that Islam and democracy are compatible and can make a 
necessary pairing in the modern world. This latter view is propounded by 
Abdurrahman Wahid as leader of Indonesia’s traditionalist Muslim Nahdhatul Ulama 
in arguing that Islam is the necessary base upon which a more democratic and liberal 
Indonesian society must be built.  Wahid, like many Muslims, sees little difficulty 
with a political system that allows people to freely choose their representatives and 
leaders, in which power can be alternated peacefully, and one in which freedom and 
human rights are legally assured.657  Moreover, the principle of shura itself implies 
that an Islamic community has an obligation to engage in mutual consultation in the 
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management of worldly affairs.  While devout Muslims regard Islam as a total social, 
political, legal, and cultural system able to embrace democracy, unlike Christianity, 
Islam does not encourage separating religion from politics.658  Secularists, on the 
other hand, stand accused of wishing religion to be invisible and not interfere in life 
but the idea that religion belongs only to the private sphere makes little sense to the 
vast bulk of believers of most world religions.  Generally, the notion that religions, or 
beliefs, should remain separate from political interference comes from democracy’s 
respect for human rights with one of those rights being that each citizen count equally 
with all other citizens.659          
                      From Indonesian independence these matters frustrated the advocates of 
an Islamic state.  Sukarno’s appeals that Muslims and secular nationalists devise a 
formula to balance their interests resulted in the compromise of the Jakarta Charter 
which, while guaranteeing religious freedom, insisted that the state remain non-
confessional.  Secular-nationalists balked at the condition that the Charter obliges the 
state to work towards implementing Islamic law, albeit only “within the Muslim 
community” and in the interest of harmony the Charter was quietly dropped from the 
declaration of independence and the preamble to the Indonesian Constitution.660  
Controversy continued for a decade and, believing they deserved a more formalised 
political role, Muslim leaders hoped that the 1955 election would give their cause 
clear societal support.  This did not happen and, unable to gain a decisive majority in 
the elections, the two Muslim parties representing modernist and traditionalist Islam 
respectively shared the vote with the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) and the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).  As neither combinations of Muslim or secular-
nationalist interests were strong enough to impose their view on the future political 
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relationship between religion and the state, President Sukarno closed the debate in 
1959 by dissolving the popular assembly, returned the country to the original 1945 
Constitution, and assumed virtually dictatorial power through his imposition of 
Guided Democracy.661 
                  From the outset of independence those demanding an Islamic Indonesian 
state were effectively marginalized by Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution that while 
insisting on a secular state, thereby legitimising religions other than Islam, by way of 
a concession to Islam called for one based foremost on “belief in One, Supreme 
God.”662  There is no Qur’an-ic injunction for an Islamic state (and those Muslim 
leaders who suggest there is confuse a man-made imperative with a divine one) so 
Article 29 does not contradict Islamic doctrine.  Nevertheless, Muslim clerics and 
intellectuals found a basis in the vague wording of the Article leaving open the 
possibility of some future Islamic state, for future divisions in Muslim social and 
political development.  As the New Order’s representation of the 1945 Constitution 
effectively de-politicised Islam, the success of Islamic parties in the 1955 election 
(when they gained some 40% of the vote in what was considered to have been the 
fairest and most democratic election ever held in Indonesia) was never fully restored.  
Consequently, at no stage since independence has Muslim political influence been 
able to match the high proportion of Muslims in the Indonesian population.663  The 
relationship between politika-Islam and the Indonesian state therefore continued to be 
as persistent a point of debate among Muslims during the New Order as it was under 
the earlier Sukarno regime.664   
                     Alongside earlier demands for separatism and later for liberal-
democratic reforms, politika-Islam offered the most potent potential challenge to the 
Suharto New Order.  This section will examine Islam in terms of its non-monolithic 
nature and the implicit difficulties Islam faced in forming a coherent socio-political 
opposition to the New Order.  Riven by profound cleavages, Indonesian Islam 
strongly precludes the likelihood of a unified socio-political entity emerging based on 
either sectarian or secular-nationalist principles.  This section first describes the 
                                                           
661 Hefner, (1999), p. 222. 
662 Vatikiotis, (1998), p. 120. 
663 Hefner, (1999), p.221.  Allan A. Samson ‘Religious Belief and Political Action in Indonesian 
Islamic Modernism,’ pp. 116-142, in R. William Liddle, (Ed.), Political Participation in Modern 
Indonesia, (Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, New Haven, 1973). 
664 Kenneth M. George, ‘Designs on Indonesia’s Muslim Communities,’ in The Journal of Asian 
Studies, Vol.57, No.3, August 1998, p. 697. 
 212
historic failure of formulating a coherent, unified politika-Islam opposition prior to 
Suharto and its continued peripheralization thereafter.  Islam’s changing role in terms 
of Presidential reassessment that an accommodative Islam should be given more 
socio-political influence in line with Islam’s cultural and socio-political resurgence 
from the late 1980 will then be discussed.  Suharto’s most controversial Islamic 
initiative ICMI formed in 1991 is then discussed, as is the debate surrounding the 
politika-Islam/secular-nationalist dilemma in the context of intra-regime rivalry and 
mass demands for reformasi dan demokrasi.       
 
3.2.1  The cleavages within Indonesian Islam   
                   Wide-ranging intellectual chasms have divided and challenged Indonesian 
Islam since independence.  As well as the abangan/santri split separating the less 
devout animist-Hindu-Buddhist-Muslim (predominantly Javanese) syncretists from 
the pious (mostly non-Javanese) Muslim community, the majority santri community 
has also been divided since the early 20th Century between Islamic modernism and 
traditionalism.  Islamic ‘modernism’ is generally associated with the late 19th Century 
academics of the University of Al-Azhar in Cairo.665  The most influential mass 
grouping of Indonesian modernism, the Muhammadiyah (Followers of Muhammad), 
focuses on an organisational Islamic approach to education, health, and care, rather 
than formal politics and, by the 1990s, the organisation numbered some thirty million 
followers.  Unlike Islamic traditionalists Muhammadiyah scorned charismatic 
religious leadership and favoured modern, rule-based, organisational structures.666   
                        Representing the interests of traditionalist Islam is Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU, The Awakening of Traditional Religious Leaders and Scholars), an association 
of traditional Muslim scholars formed in 1926 and by the last decade of the 20th 
century claiming some 40 million supporters.  NU is less ideological than its 
modernist rival Muhammadiyah, and its guidance and direction centres on the 
activities of rural-based religious scholars (ulama) and their individual support bases 
and followings.  Disavowing their modernist rival’s more abstract principles, the 
ulama’s job is to protect his community and way of life by accommodation through 
processes that place ideological purity second to the need to balance multiple societal 
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interests.  Significantly, while defending that ‘traditionalism’ has never meant 
incompatibility with - or a negation of - modernity and development, NU’s leaders 
generally accept that independent Indonesia should not be an Islamic state.667  To the 
kiai (leaders) and the ulama, Islam is a private matter intended to be no more than a 
guide to an individual’s social interaction and behaviour.668  On the other hand, 
although in general terms, modernism stressed the core beliefs of Islam.  While the 
modernists viewed scripture as complete and self-sufficient, requiring that the 
individual assume responsibility for his or her own moral conduct by purging all 
improper innovations from Islam’s traditions, modernists also wanted to be both 
religious as well as modern in the Western sense of the term.669  As Samson put it, 
modernists wanted to maintain “a foot in both the mosque and the Faculty of 
Engineering.”670  Traditionalists, on the other hand, work from the principle that as 
the meanings of God’s scriptures are at times immensely complex, special training 
was needed to understand them and the ulama, as Muslim scholars, were the only 
ones qualified to carry the responsibility of their interpretation.671  As long as NU’s 
leaders remained comfortable with the New Order’s representation of Pancasila, and 
prepared to work within it, conflict between traditional Islam and the regime could 
seemingly be avoided.  Overlapping and dominating the above cleavages since the 
late-1970s and highly relevant to the surge in Islamic awareness, has been the 
intellectual split, between Islamic ‘spiritualists’ and ‘accommodationists’.  Both 
variants have an impact on New Order politics by offering profound alternative 
stances to Islam’s appropriate place in contemporary Indonesian socio-political life.  
While accommodationists believe the Qur’an should be understood in the context of 
existing socio-political conditions and that a secular-nationalist Pancasila state is 
appropriate to Indonesia, scripturalists disavow any tendency towards accommodation 
and adhere to a conscientious and uncompromising implementation of Islam’s 
requirements.      
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3.2.2  Institutionalising Islamic politics 
                    Acknowledging the strong ties between Muslim leaders and the 
Indonesian populace, and intent on unifying political Islam into a controllable entity, 
the Japanese occupation authorities organised Muslim interests into the Masyumi 
federation in 1942.672   During the early years of independence, modernist Islamic 
aspirations found political expression initially through Masyumi until the organisation 
was banned by the Sukarno regime and during the early years of the Suharto New 
Order through the political party Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia).  Largely 
representing modernist interests and the largest Muslim political party, Masyumi 
polled 21% of the vote in the 1955 election but their vocal opposition to Sukarno and 
Guided Democracy’s secular-nationalist perception of the Indonesian state (as well as 
the involvement of key Masyumi leaders in the anti-government regional revolts of 
1958-9) saw the party dissolved by Presidential decree in 1960 and most of its 
leadership imprisoned.  The largest and most influential of Masyuni’s political 
factions, notwithstanding significant elements of fundamentalists and 
accommodationists, were reformists who viewed Islam as a relevant religion for the 
modern age that Indonesia was entering.673  The reformists were also willing to co-
operate with secular groups and even with the secular-nationalist Javanese political 
elite if, in so doing, they could advance their own social and political ends.  With 
regard to their non-negotiable Islamic goals, the reformists were adamant to the point 
of militant fundamentalism, a stance that led to their proscription and relegation to a 
clandestine periphery under both Sukarno and later the Suharto New Order.  But the 
difference between the Masyumi schools of thought, the trio of ‘fundamentalism’, 
‘reformism’, and ‘accommodationism’, was not a simple clear-cut rivalry between 
those promoting political Islam and individual spirituality; it was more about 
differences of opinion as to the direction Muslim politics should take.674   
                  In terms of different perceptions of a religious political party’s role, the 
appropriate interaction between the Islamic community and non-Islamic groups, and 
the meaning of Islamic struggle, Masyumi, and later Parmusi, represented, through 
fundamentalist, reformist, and accommodationist strains, three distinct visions.675  The 
reformists, the largest and most influential grouping, viewed Islam as not only 
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relevant but essential to modern times and attempted to use politics to instil Islamic 
values broadly across Indonesian society.  Occupying a middle ground between 
fundamentalists and accommodationists, the reformists remained willing to co-operate 
with secular groups if only to achieve desirable social, economic, and political ends, 
but generally refused to budge on basic Islamic goals.  On the other hand, opposed to 
any form of religious laxity, fundamentalists (that later in the New Order assumed a 
more scripturalist position) applied a narrow, uncompromising approach to politics.  
While valuing the inclusive framework offered by Islamic solidarity, 
accommodationists assumed a pragmatic stance towards Muslim social and economic 
interests, prepared to separate politics from strict religious supervision.  Politically 
flexible, accommodationists have generally been prepared to align themselves with 
secular political forces when necessary and willingly acknowledge the legitimate 
authority of the secular-nationalist Indonesian state as defined within the New Order’s 
Pancasila-ist frameworks.676  On the other hand, to both the fundamentalists and the 
reformists, politics has been all about unceasing struggle against forces hostile to 
Islam.  While accommodationists value Islamic solidarity they have tended to be more 
concerned with social and economic progress and thus remain flexible, viewing 
politics as more “the art of the possible” than an unflinching defence of Islamic 
faith.677  With Masyumi thinkers removed from the political frame through 
banishment and imprisonment during Sukarno’s last years in power, with the PKI 
Communists expanding their socio-political influence, with NU’s ‘soft’ traditionalism 
the only Islamic influence in a parliament bereft of reformers, and reflecting the 
military’s deep loathing of politika-Islam, Muslim influence over national politics 
steadily declined.678              
 
3.2.3  Political Islam under the New Order 
                   Throughout the New Order the military and Islam remained Indonesia’s most 
influential socio-political forces with ABRI dominating the political arena.  Politika-
Islam remained on the political peripheries until the early 1990s when in a major shift 
the regime re-aligned its alliance-structure and assimilated an accommodative and 
compliant section of Islam into the socio-political framework.  Vocalised by a diverse 
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range of intellectual strains, the voice of Islam was initially unable to offer a coherent 
ideological challenge.  This section will address these issues.   
                      Two key ideological strands within the ABRI leadership had always 
opposed any form of compromise with political Islam: soldiers of a Javanese cultural 
tradition saw Islam as a “rival culture” and those of a secular-modern persuasion saw 
Islam as ideologically incompatible with modernisation.679  The New Order generals 
could not forget modernist Masyumi’s political activism in the regional rebellions of 
the first decade of independence so politika-Islam faired badly from the outset.  The 
NU traditionalists on the other hand, having co-operated with the military during the 
1965-6 anti-PKI purge, expected the newly empowered military to look more 
favourably upon them and their interests.680  To their disappointment, the New 
Order’s attitude hardened towards its post-coup partners and towards Islam in general.  
Suharto was determined to nullify any potential centres of civil autonomy and non-
state authority and any form of political Islam threatened the likelihood of both.  
Masyumi leaders had hoped that the New Order generals might restore their party to 
political life and enable them to continue their campaign for a greater state 
commitment to Islam.  In the aftermath of the blood-spilling of 1965-66 they were 
refused even the ineffectual status given to Muhammadiyah and NU.681   
                     Although Suharto refused a Masyumi appeal for the rehabilitation of the 
party in early 1968, he acknowledged that modernist Islam needed some form of 
vehicle to express itself so he approved the formation of a new Islamic political party 
in February 1968.682  Named Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia) the new party was 
authorised on the condition that remnants of the former Masyumi leadership are 
excluded and ABRI’s manipulation of the new party’s structure ensured that 
accommodationist leaders close to ABRI held key positions, rendering the party 
politically ineffectual from the outset.  The political aspirations of Islamic modernism 
carried over into the New Order were further split by an ongoing dilemma in that the 
three dominating factions of fundamentalists, reformists, and accommodationists 
permitted to join the new Islamic party to varying degrees exhibited a constant and 
profound inability to coexist.  While some factions showed an occasional pragmatic 
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and rational approach to politics others remained theologically rigid and unwilling to 
move on key ideological issues exhibiting divisions the ruling secular-nationalist 
Javanese political elite eagerly exploited to their advantage.      
                    Disappointed former senior Masyumi leaders were left with no option but 
to pursue their struggle for political power outside the party system which they did by 
emphasising dakwah (religious predication - preaching an appeal for a deeper 
profession of faith among the Muslim community) and adopting the relatively 
inoffensive strategy of principled non-cooperation towards the regime.  Although 
employing and promoting a cultural version of Islam former Masyumi leaders seemed 
to be merely suspending, rather than relinquishing, their goal of an Islamic state.683  A 
younger generation of Masyumist intellectuals, frustrated with the earlier failure of the 
political approach, associated themselves with this Islamic revitalisation of faith under 
the rubric of renewal (pembarua) and gained considerable legitimacy by publicly 
rejecting Masyumi’s long-time struggle for state power.684  Their belief that the earlier 
subordination of Islamic ideals to the needs of party politics had merely distorted 
religious teachings and debased the idea of politika-Islam enabled them to separate 
religion intellectually from politics.  Offering an alternative strategy of societal reform 
through constructive engagement, learning, and education, the young Masyumist 
intellectuals argued for a Muslim politics that did not necessarily require the goal of 
an Islamic state.685  The young modernists claimed that the early Muslim leaders had 
fallen to wasting their efforts on unprofitable ideological bickering and “frivolous 
political adventures” rather than concentrating on intellectual and economic reform.686  
They concluded that the over-riding dilemma for Indonesian Islam was that while the 
appeal to Muslim solidarity required Islam remaining at the heart of social life, Islam 
offered little idea as to how the state itself should be organised politically.  This 
growing stream of modernist intellectual debate persisted for some decades outside 
the realm of elite New Order party politics but strengthened irresistibly with the 
Islamic resurgence through the 1980s into the 1990s and gained socio-political 
legitimacy through the formation of ICMI in 1991.        
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                         Suharto’s New Order followed a two-pronged Islamic policy that on 
the one hand promoted individual piety but firmly depoliticised religion on the 
other.687  By merging Muslim political interests after the 1971 election into the PPP 
(United Development Party) and enforcing azas tunggal in 1984 that demanded PPP 
(the officially approved Islamic party) and all social organisations and political parties 
accept Pancasila as their sole ideology, Suharto virtually guaranteed that Islam 
remained politically ineffectual.688  As Islam had seemingly acquiesced to the New 
Order’s organic prerogatives ideological conformity had been preserved.  While the 
peculiar New Order tactic of suppressing Muslim parties and, at the same time, 
encouraging Muslim piety offered Muslims access to no more political space than 
other society-based organisations, during the late-1980s the Islamic community 
experienced a remarkable social renaissance unprecedented in modern Indonesian 
history.689  The era’s surge in religious awareness indirectly heightened political 
consciousness.  While it had been considered unfashionable before the mid-1980s for 
middle-class Muslims to openly display piety, this reluctance changed during the late 
1980s and it not only became acceptable but also desirable for urban professionals to 
be seen as living a virtuous Muslim life-style.690  An accelerated conversion of 
nominal Muslims to the faith, and a growing religious awareness and piety, sent a 
message to the regime that Islam’s position on the political landscape needed to be re-
considered.  The unexpected and unintended consequence of azas tunggal was that 
while the intention of the state directive had been to re-enforce acknowledgement of 
Pancasila’s implicit secularism, Muslim political influence actually strengthened.  
After years of political isolation, and now no longer identified with an independent 
political party, Islam had become less confining and thus more accessible to every 
political party.  Islam’s resurgence was also complicated during the 1990s by the large 
number of re-politicised Muslims coming to represent the largest constituency within 
the pro-democracy movement that was by implication hostile to the New Order.   
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                   Azas tunggal had been intended to tighten ideological conformity but 
effectively became a turning point in Islam’s repoliticisation when Abdurrahman 
Wahid reacted by withdrawing his some forty million traditionalist NU followers 
representing the nation’s largest Islamic social and educational organisation, from the 
regime’s official political process.  By so doing, his organisation abandoned formal 
politics as part of the New Order’s forced amalgam of Islamic parties, the PPP, and 
outwardly rededicated itself to its original social and educational purposes.  
Ostensibly a social pressure group dedicated to a socially oriented approach to Islamic 
life, NU had in theory become more acceptable and less threatening to the regime.  As 
such, Wahid claimed the organisation was better able to respond to the societal trauma 
of economic development that he saw as having become the major problem 
confronting grass-roots Islamic society.  Releasing his organisation’s secular-
nationalist, non-exclusionary and accommodative vision of Islam and the state from 
what he regarded as ersatz domestic politics as part of PPP, the charismatic Wahid 
was better placed to play politics Suharto’s way and did so by somewhat ironically 
adhering firmly to his understanding of the principles of Pancasila.  To strengthen its 
hand in his new political position outside formal politics, NU accepted the regime’s 
insistence that Pancasila be the basic foundation of the New Order state.  By doing 
so, Wahid not only formally rejected the proposition that Indonesia ever become an 
Islamic state but also subtly questioned the regime’s organic legitimacy by applying 
his own interpretation to Pancasila.  As a result of the loss of traditional Islam’s 
political support the PPP’s electoral popularity dropped dramatically from a high of 
27% in the 1982 election to 16% in 1987.691  Although Islam had declined as a direct 
political force, its social significance, and hence its indirect political influence, 
strengthened.692   
 
3.2.4  Political Islam, Presidential initiative and ideological refurbishment 
                     The late 1980s represented a water-shed for politika-Islam and, defined by a 
growing debate between those who wanted Indonesia to become more Islamic and 
those who wanted Islam to become more ‘Indonesion-ised’, discussion shifted to 
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centre on the twin poles of Islam and secular-nationalism.693  Indonesian nationalism 
had been the most influential factor driving politika-Islam during the first half of the 
20th Century, but from the early days of the New Order the majority of Muslims had 
resigned themselves to the idea of a secular state.  Accommodating Muslim politics to 
the regime’s idea of nationhood became increasingly problematic.  Initially influenced 
by Middle East reformist ideas, Muslim nationalists became convinced that Islam, 
rather than secular-nationalism and socialism, was the correct basis for future 
Indonesian nationhood, but the idea central to modernist politics that religion and the 
state could not be separated continued to divide Indonesian Muslims.694  
                      By the end of the 1980s, having decided that the relationship between 
Islam and the state needed to be re-addressed, Suharto initiated a dramatic attitudinal 
shift towards Islam’s place in the New Order.  In contrast to the 1970’s and 1980’s 
view that given more political influence Islam would pose a potential threat to a 
harmonious, pluralist, unitary state, from the late 1980s Suharto softened his 
previously uncompromising attitude and actively, albeit cautiously, began to court 
Muslim support.695  His tilt towards Islam should not have been overly surprising.  
Azas tunggal’s acceptance by all organisations, specifically Islamic social 
organisations and political parties, permitted the New Order to relax its concerns that 
organised Islam threatened the state’s secular-nationalist ideological basis.696  The 
Muslim middle class of the 1980s and 1990s had become more confident culturally 
and moved beyond the belief of the 1950s and 1960s that Islam was simply a religion 
of traditionality belonging to uneducated and backward villagers.  Although as good 
Muslims they believed that there could be no separation between religion and society, 
most generally did not support the idea of an Islamic state.697  The dramatic expansion 
of the state education system over two decades had been the principal reason for the 
change in outlook.  By providing Western-style education from primary to tertiary 
level the state had offered millions of children and young adults the chance to gain 
urban white-collar employment and access to a modern life style.  Paralleling 
economic development, religious instruction had produced a more uniform Islamic 
population, modern yet more openly pious in their daily lives and the workplace.   
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                     Although Islam’s independent political influence had been minimal 
throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s the compensating surge in Islamic social and 
intellectual vitality represented a decisive turning point for cultural and civil Islam, 
appearing to vindicate the accommodation Muslim leaders had shown towards the 
regime since Suharto’s grabbing of power in 1966 had neutralised their political 
visions.  Importantly, cultural Islam’s most visible advance was the economic growth 
among the middle class that were coming to dominate the metropolitan regions.  With 
azas tunggal re-affirming ideological conformity, reassuring the political system that 
Islam was no longer associated with any single political party, and recognising the 
value in supporting Islam’s cultural resurgence, all political parties began to promote 
some level of commitment to its tenets.  The form of Islam presented also remained 
more attuned to the regime’s politically neutral ‘neo-Santri’ stance than the 
troublesome, highly politicised, Islam of the 1950s and 1960s.698  Moreover, 
Suharto’s change in attitude towards Islam had much to do with the credible view that 
as the Muslim middle class (representing the majority of state officials and 
bureaucrats) had much to contribute to, and gain from, development, they would no 
longer threaten New Order values and goals.  Nevertheless, compared to its 
persecution of Islamic modernists during the early decades of the New Order the 
regime’s turnaround during the late 1980s represented a dramatic turning-point in the 
relationship between Islam and the New Order state.699   
 
3.2.5  ICMI and the New Order 
                     The most controversial formalisation of the New Order’s reassessment of 
Islam, and a move that institutionalised the changed relationship, was Suharto’s 
sponsorship and support for the modernist Muslim Intellectual Association, ICMI, in 
December 1990.  By placing his powerful support behind the organisation (it would 
never have been born without it) Suharto appeared not only to be offering the Muslim 
community the benefits of his considerable powers of patronage but also to be 
rekindling hopes of a more political role for Islam.700  As ICMI drew much of its 
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initial membership from the ranks of the bureaucracy, independent ICMI members 
complained that the immediate flow of new recruits from government departments 
was an intentional regime strategy designed to dilute any free expression the new 
association may have hoped for.701  Indeed, ICMI’s formation and management 
appeared to represent no more than a further example of the New Order technique of 
bureaucratic control through corporatist inclusion.  Notwithstanding the reasons 
behind its formation and its strong Presidential backing, ICMI provided a number of 
Muslim activists, previously excluded from the debate over Islam’s place in 
Indonesian society, a voice in socio-political affairs and, importantly, unprecedented 
freedom of movement and access to the press.  ICMI may have simply been formed as 
a vehicle to assist the President’s re-election in the 1993 elections but even so it 
offered Muslims an historic opportunity and, by encouraging a deepening Islamic 
devotion within the middle class and government officials, represented an 
achievement in itself.702   
                   Suharto’s shift towards Islam could have been interpreted in a number of 
ways.  Having sensed a drop in ABRI support the President may have felt the need to 
balance the setback with a new support base.  From the mid-1980s Suharto’s power 
had become such that if it was to his benefit to do so, he could bypass the military.  
The appointment of the highly unpopular GOLKAR Chairman Lt. General (Ret.) 
Sudharmono as his vice-President in March 1988, together with the fact that only 
three of the nine hand-picked advisers chosen to assist him in formulating his 1988-93 
Cabinet came from ABRI, had incensed the generals.  Unhappy with a series of ABRI 
initiated senior command appointments, Suharto had also taken to intervening in the 
appointment process by appointing former Presidential adjutants to key commands.  
The powerful intelligence guru, the Catholic General Moerdani, had led the 
opposition to Sudharmono’s appointment so Suharto removed him from power but 
Moerdani’s influential networks remained in place and military opposition to the 
President continued to focus around him.  Suharto’s breach with ABRI and in 
particular those allied to Moerdani intensified during 1989 and 1990.703  Numerous 
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high ranking military officers advised the government against ICMI on the grounds 
that the association could only but encourage emotional and primordial issues.704  The 
President’s support for a modernist Islamic intellectual stream might have had 
something to do with an old man’s growing piety but Mackie offers the generally 
accepted, more cynical, view that notwithstanding its balancing of lost ABRI support, 
Suharto viewed ICMI more as a mechanism for elevating chosen Muslim 
intellectuals, previously excluded from influence, thereby gaining their support before 
the 1993 elections.705  Supporters might have hoped for some form of reward in return 
for loyalty and in due course access to previously denied perquisites of power and 
influence.  ICMI is thus best viewed as another example of New Order-style 
bureaucratic/corporatist politics linking patrons to clients as much as an attempt at 
ideological refurbishment by realigning social forces through assimilation.  The 
steady stream of officials joining the organisation during its first few years 
strengthened both views and Suharto gained much politically by promoting compliant 
ICMI personnel into GOLKAR leadership positions.  It was after all a prime function 
of the two state political organisations GOLKAR and ABRI to compliment each other 
to ensure Suharto’s parliamentary majority.  As GOLKAR’s two major institutional 
elements were ABRI and the civilian state bureaucracy, by providing the President 
with GOLKAR cadres “from outside of the Armed Forces command structure” ICMI 
reduced the President’s reliance on ABRI support in parliament.706   
                     It is difficult to go beyond the view that ICMI enabled Suharto to merely 
“play the Muslim card” against those in the military and the pro-democracy reformist 
movement he suspected of opposing him and his desire for a further Presidential 
term.707  This view had ICMI as little more than a centrally controlled umbrella of 
Islamic political support created to bolster the President’s political agenda that would, 
after the 1993 election, simply be allowed to fade away.  But this was not to be the 
case and clearly as part of Suharto’s long-term political strategies ICMI survived with 
its accommodatory-stanced members continuing to play an important role in future 
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cabinets well-placed to influence the growing mid-1990s debate over Islam and its 
role in Indonesian life.708   
                    An instrument of the President’s creation, ICMI thus appeared to be just 
one more corporatist organisation created by the New Order for the express purpose 
of controlling a potentially problematic social group.709  The potential for nuisance 
was a nascent Islam bent on modernity, reform, and more influence over political life 
but Suharto was always the final arbiter when the political system needed re-shaping 
and any change tended to be to his ultimate advantage.  His stance towards Islam 
should therefore be seen realistically in terms of the two-pronged approach the New 
Order had always employed; encouragement of personal piety balanced by ruthless 
suppression of unacceptable Islamic political activity.  Therefore, as a top-down 
initiative, and whether or not intended to offer modernist Islamic intellectuals a 
stronger voice in Indonesian life, ICMI was primarily intended to foster Suharto’s 
political advantage rather than the broader needs of the Islamic community.710 
                    On a personal level, ICMI aroused considerable animosity within the 
military towards the organisation’s chairman, Suharto protégé B. J. Habibie.  Habibie 
harboured higher political ambitions and ICMI offered him the mass political base he 
lacked.  A strong economic nationalist, in return for their political support Habibie 
was able to offer ICMI’s accommodative Islamic intellectuals and activists an 
opportunity for both economic advancement and access to political advantage.711  As 
well as suspicion that the organisation might add some legitimacy to Muslim activists 
calling for the de-militarisation of Indonesian politics, ABRI maintained its traditional 
concerns that should ICMI enable Habibie to develop his own mass political base, 
Indonesia might return to the disastrous primordial politics of the early 1960s.  
Notwithstanding Suharto’s rapprochement with Islam being driven to some extent by 
concerns over diminishing ABRI support, ICMI clearly reflected the President’s 
awareness of the extent of Islam’s resurgence, and the necessity of accommodating 
and harnessing it to his political advantage.   
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3.2.6  Megawati, the PDI, and a secular-nationalist parliamentary alternative to 
GOLKAR 
                     The PDI (Indonesian Democracy Party) had been formed during the 
1974 electoral reconstruction712 to coalesce the secular-nationalist aspirations of the 
people into a non-governmental political party but its leadership were carefully vetted 
and monitored by the top level of the regime.  The PDI, like the Muslim PPP, was not 
supposed to be an opposition party but intended to be a corporatist arrangement 
replacing Sukarno’s old nationalist party and provide broader secular-nationalist 
support for the regime than the official New Order party GOLKAR.713  By early 1996 
PDI was showing signs of defying its intended role within the New Order political 
arrangement so a party conference was organised to oust its leader Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, Sukarno’s highly popular daughter, and replace her with the more 
regime-compliant Drs Soerjadi as Chairman to debar Megawati and her supporters 
from taking part in the May 1997 elections.714  Megawati and her supporters reacted 
with a systematic populist attack on the regime demanding reform, an end to 
corruption, an overhaul of the political system and the reinstatement of political and 
civil freedoms.  The regime responded by demonstrating that their coercive instincts 
remained intact and on July 27 1996 a mob of thugs and soldiers attacked the PDI 
party headquarters, killed several PDI supporters and a number disappeared 
presumably into security service detention.715  Megawati’s growing popularity was 
apparent when tens of thousands of urban poor rioted following the attack and 
although the demonstrations lacked political direction they indicated the depth of 
socio-economic grievance facing the regime.  Significantly, the demonstrations 
showed that dissatisfaction had found an establishment outlet through Megawati.   
                      The violent rioting spread throughout Java and various places in 
Indonesia and most had ethnic, religious and economic undertones: in West 
Kalimantan some 500 people died in violence between Christians and Muslims, and 
Sino-Indonesian resentment fuelled widespread anger towards the government’s 
economic policies that greatly favoured Sino-Indonesian corporate interests close to 
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the executive office.  Elements within the military and modernist Muslim ICMI were 
believed to have instigated the riots in East and West Java to discredit Wahid and his 
traditionalist NU organisation that had been demonstrating support for Megawati’s 
PDI.  While it is difficult to substantiate the various conspiracy theories they did 
indicate the depth of distrust and mutual suspicion within the New Order political 
establishment.716        
 
4.  The New Order political imbroglio of the mid-1990s: 
Islam’s ‘scripturalist/accommodationist/reformist’ dilemma                        
                    Increasingly dominating the debate around politika-Islam during the mid-
1990s was a growing distinction between the accommodationist ICMI Islamic 
grouping and a loosely arranged, predominantly Islamic, rival assemblage of secular-
nationalist-inclined reformists that opposed the New Order’s socio-political 
arrangements and demanded change.  At the forefront of the debate, and sensitised by 
ICMI’s formation, was a concern among secular-leaning nationalists that the 
deepening Islamisation of Indonesian political life tended to contradict Pancasila’s 
basic tenets as the organic intellectual basis of the New Order state.  Loosely defined 
and often overlapping distinctions between accommodationist and reformist Islamic 
groupings further complicated the debate.  Notwithstanding that secular-nationalists 
included many non-Muslims, millions of traditionalist Muslims from Wahid’s NU 
openly sympathised with the secular-nationalist view and shared their fear of any 
deepening Islamisation of Indonesian political life.717  Their concern was to some 
extent understandable as some ICMI modernists were suspected of having assumed 
the mantle of the 1950s Masyumi party and thus retained the old commitment to an 
explicitly Islamic state.  Some forty years later Masyumi’s forbearers seemed to have 
resurfaced and firmly ensconced themselves within the political establishment 
through the ICMI/GOLKAR linkage and, significantly, did so with clear support from 
the top level of the New Order regime.718   
                       On the face of it the contemporary modernist Islamic agenda appeared 
pragmatically accommodative towards the New Order, indicating a readiness to work 
towards an Islamic society within the Pancasila framework, and thus appeared more 
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moderate and less fixated with the old Masyumi views.  Their vision for Indonesia 
appeared to now imply more a “modernity within Islamic guidance” than the 
problematic juridical Islamic prohibitions and requirements that had driven the 
modernist agenda in the early days.719  While most modernists shared a more 
accommodating modern-day view than that of the old Masyumists and accepted that 
an Islamic society and a more moral Islamic way of life was possible within the New 
Order Pancasila state, their view had somewhat hardened through frustration at 
having been excluded from economic and socio-political opportunity for some three 
decades.  Contemporary modernists were now motivated more by the promise of 
access to previously denied political influence and opportunity.   
                   The shifting ground between Islamic modernist-accommodationists and 
secular-nationalists was nowhere more apparent than within the military/GOLKAR 
political establishment.  Prior to the 1990s GOLKAR had remained firmly hostile to 
political Islam but with Suharto moving to accommodate Islam, and ICMI growing in 
influence, a similar shift had occurred within GOLKAR.  Parallel shifts occurred 
within the ABRI leadership and, in contrast to the 1970s and 1980s when then Armed 
Forces chief Moerdani had advanced a general policy of actively excluding Muslim 
officers from influential positions and postings, during the early 1990s Suharto was 
appointing loyal Muslim officers to key posts.  It would be an overstatement to 
suggest that all Muslim officers supported Islam’s growing political influence.  
Loyalty to military doctrine, Pancasila, and the Constitution, deeply permeated the 
officer corps and when there was sympathy with Muslim activists it generally arose 
out of individual officer’s frustration at perceived promotion discrimination because 
of their Muslim faith.  The nationalists included military officers as well as civilians, 
but nationalist-leaning officers were primarily driven by concerns that an overly 
Islamic agenda might prejudice national unity because the multiplicity of Muslim 
stances made Islam intrinsically untrustworthy.  Regardless of whether they were 
Muslim or not most officers remained concerned that the religiously-inclusivist 
Indonesian state implied in Pancasila and the officer’s oath be sustained.  The most 
prominent civilian advocating the secular-nationalist position was Wahid and he 
earned grudging support from a significant portion of the professional officer corps 
through his persistent political vision that condemned exclusionary religious-based 
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political parties.  His formation of the Democracy Forum (Forum Demokrasi720) in 
1991 (clearly a response to ICMI) had attracted a wide cross-section of support that 
included, as well as his NU traditionalist Muslims, key Christian democrats and 
secular-nationalist intellectuals as well as military reformists.  In the lead up to the 
1997 elections, alongside nationalist officers that feared the resurgence of politika-
Islam and resented the military’s loss of control over GOLKAR, Wahid put his solid 
support behind Megawati and her PDI’s historically strong ‘secular-nationalist’ 
credentials.  
                    The closing years of the New Order saw the nationalists loose ground to 
the various modernist/accommodationist and scripturalist/fundamentalist Islamic 
groupings.721  By 1997 the modernist ICMI faction was at the forefront of GOLKAR 
and the organisation’s director, B. J. Habibie, had solidified a support-base among the 
modernist elites for any future political aspirations his President might have held for 
him.  With Wahid proclaiming a closer relationship with the secular-nationalists and 
reformists among the ABRI leadership, having implicitly demonstrated that he shared 
their broad goal of ensuring that politics remained de-confessionalised and that Islam 
never again be the basis of political allegiance, the undisputed leader of traditionalist 
Islam seemed to be steering a careful political course between the ideas of a military-
dominated state and an Islamic dominated one.  The modernist/traditionalist Islamic 
cleavage had deepened and now assumed clear political distinctions emphasised by 
Wahid’s insinuations that ABRI’s doctrinal interpretations had simply reduced 
Pancasila and dwi fungsi to political tools to perpetuate their domination of 
Indonesia’s political system on behalf of the Suharto regime.  While he agreed with 
the military that Pancasila was “necessary for Indonesian unity”, and that the only 
serious threats to Pancasila could come from challenges to the religious and ethnic 
tolerance implicit in the doctrine, Wahid and the military were still clearly in 
disagreement over ABRI’s exclusive, self-perpetuating, assumption of New Order 
Indonesia’s ideological foundations.722   
                       Notwithstanding more than two decades of economic development the 
better educated and more socio-politically conscious 1990’s generation of military 
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officers remained troubled that the widening gap between rich and poor clearly 
contravened Pancasila’s implicit humanitarianism.  Given the increasing 
politicisation of Islam by contradictory intellectual forces their concern remained that 
income inequality in different parts of the country would be exploited by mass 
political appeals to religion, race, ethnicity, and class.  Thus the considerable political 
credibility Wahid drew from his populist message of secular-nationalist democracy 
that tended to turn the language of Pancasila against the New Order itself, could only 
but antagonise instinctively doctrinaire army officers.   
                   By 1997 the emergent force of politika-Islam had polarised around the 
two powerful political constituencies of Islamic modernism and secular-nationalism 
but was beset with inherent contradictions.  Further complicating issues was that the 
modernists were by no means the sole representatives of politika-Islam as millions of 
NU traditionalists remained well outside the modernist orbit, and the broad 
‘accommodationist/scripturalist’ dichotomy further deepened the confusion as to 
Islam’s place in a future Indonesian state.723  Fundamentalist elements of the 
scripturalist position also maintained their own agendas and some had found support 
among shadowy elements of the Armed Forces that in turn possessed their own 
agendas, prepared to incite communal disharmony in order that the military be called 
upon to restore order thereby confirming their power.  Also, and significantly, while 
back in 1955 some 85% of Indonesians were to some degree Muslim, in what were 
regarded as the only free elections in post-independence history Islamic parties had 
managed a mere combined 40% of the vote.  Clearly Indonesian Muslims did not 
have a history of identifying politically with Islam but the question remained whether 
they were inclined towards more democratic political processes.  
 
5.  Summary   
                    This section summarises the chapter’s examination of the Suharto New 
Order’s political arrangement of Indonesian life in terms of a Gramscian political 
bloc.  Because it draws on mass perceptions of ideology and culture to order socio-
political life, the Gramscian model shows how the New Order political leadership 
exclusively represented ideology to underpin their hegemonic legitimacy.  The 
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Gramscian schema reinforces an understanding of the processes through which the 
ideologically defined political arrangement Pancasila demokrasi and its derivatives 
formalised and tied the New Order political system to legitimate democratic 
institutions that guaranteed firm control over all levels of social politics.  Gramsci’s 
insights and his warnings also explain how the New Order failed the model by not 
ideologically assimilating in the process of its ongoing hegemonic refurbishment both 
the broader non-negotiable interests and values of the predominantly Islamic masses, 
as well as a wide range of increasingly non-negotiable socio-political interests and 
demands that found accommodation and counter-hegemonic potential in demands for 
reformasi dan demokrasi and Suharto’s resignation. 
                     Legitimised by the 1945 Indonesian Constitution, Pancasila and its 
derivatives pervaded all levels of state activity: through its self-proclaimed 
doctrinal/ideological derivative dwi fungsi, ABRI provided the bloc’s coercive 
functions while potentially divisive socio-political forces found amelioration in 
compliance with the compromises implicit in commitment to a Pancasila-ist, secular-
nationalist state.  Gramsci’s perceptions of hegemonic obsolescence and decay also 
provide needed clarity to an understanding as to how and why Suharto’s New Order 
failed.   
                  Gramscian consensus is distinctive in that it implies a conscious 
attachment to a ruling order firmly rooted in the idea of the moral and intellectual 
legitimacy of its leadership, yet in Gramscian terms, the degree of voluntary and 
consensual support the Suharto New Order political system received from the 
subordinated masses is questionable.  Notwithstanding the plethora of democratic 
institutions and practices underpinning Gramscian hegemonic order and evident in the 
New Order socio-political arrangement, mass conformity may merely have derived 
from society’s general fear of the consequences of non-conformity.  Deprived of 
political expression outside of the prescribed political system and denied the 
alternative of a politika-Islam, to the subordinated, predominantly Muslim, rural and 
urban masses conformity and consensual support for the political system might 
merely have been through habit, pragmatism, or the belief that it was simply 
inconvenient not to comply.  For the growing urban Indonesian middle-class hoping 
for a more influential socio-political role in the future there was no realistic or 
sensible alternative political means of pursuing important individual goals of material 
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acquisition and prestige.  This is an aspect of the consensus implicit in the Gramscian 
hegemonic model that is found inadequate when tested in the New Order context.  
Gramsci’s insights on coercive means balancing (but not dominating) consensual 
techniques are also useful yet somewhat difficult to quantify in terms of the clearly 
despotic, authoritarian, military state that was the New Order where the most common 
techniques of consensus depended on varying degrees of co-optation, compromise 
and corruption.   
                    In terms of coercive techniques, Gramsci places a moral limit upon the 
legitimacy of excessive socio-political authority and the New Order did provide 
significant socio-political and economic benefits.  Before the Suharto New Order took 
power, Indonesia’s cultural and religious diversity threatened catastrophic instability 
if not somehow unified and ordered.  The experiment with liberal democracy during 
the 1950s had proved a failure and mass mobilisation during the 1960s around 
sectarian and ideological issues led to a veritable blood-bath yet the New Order’s 
rendering of Pancasila provided a unifying formula that prevented mass mobilisation 
around alternative ideological and cultural renderings enabling all religions to practice 
reasonable levels of observance. The societal stability the New Order’s Pancasila-ist 
arrangement of Indonesian life provided resulted in a high level of socio-political and 
economic development from which few Indonesians failed to benefit to some extent.  
It was the largely externally generated regional financial crisis of 1997 that brought 
some twenty-five years of solid economic growth to an end.      
                       The Gramscian model of hegemonic order requires ongoing hegemonic 
refurbishment that responds to the needs of changing conditions and the Suharto New 
Order complied by adeptly re-negotiating and adjusting socio-political alliance 
arrangements with subordinate groups when necessary.  Having at the outset crushed 
the potentially counter-hegemonic challenge from communism on the left, and 
politika-Islam on the right, the President’s preparedness to refurbish hegemonic 
arrangements when required maintained an effective level of socio-political cohesion 
until the early 1990s.  A forced amalgamation of all political parties into manageable 
groupings during the New Order’s first decade reconstructed the parliamentary 
environment around Pancasila demokrasi and the political elements of ABRI’s dual-
function role were formalised through both the ideologically-derived military doctrine 
dwi fungsi and their dominance of the official state political party GOLKAR that 
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enabled the military to oversee the parliamentary process and social politics down to 
the village level.  Attempts at hegemonic refurbishment during the early 1990s, 
however, were problematic.  Reconstructing and Islamising ABRI leadership to 
counter-balance Suharto’s perception that he was loosing ABRI support accentuated 
internal cleavages in the institution that had previously been his unquestioned and 
most powerful socio-political support base.  Offering an accommodative section of 
Islam a more pro-active socio-political role in turn both emphasised irreconcilable 
theological differences within Indonesian Islam and heightened ABRI fears of 
possible sectarianism that would contradict the state’s Pancasila-ist secular-
nationalist basis.  The President’s attempts at hegemonic refurbishment during the 
early 1990s also presaged potential counter-hegemonic consequences among the 
diverse range of interests increasingly vocalising demands for reformasi dan 
demokrasi and an end to Suharto’s Presidency.      
                      Gramsci’s insights would indicate that to sustain hegemonic legitimacy 
the New Order would need to establish and maintain socio-political domination by 
first aligning its interests through a balance of coercive/consensual processes of mass 
socio-political arrangement and second, reconciling the ideological frameworks of its 
two most powerful socio-political constituencies, ABRI and Indonesian Islam.  ABRI 
proved an effective instrument in carrying out the coercive aspects of hegemonic 
socio-political arrangement while an array of persuasive symbols and institutions 
attended to hegemony’s consensual demands and regulated socio-political behaviour 
by alternatively neutralising or assimilating societal interests including those of the 
majority Muslim urban and rural masses.   
                    Mass socio-political arrangement was subject to ongoing refurbishment 
and re-negotiation with elite and popular political interests rationalised by such 
arrangements as the restructuring of the political system in 1974, and the imposition 
of azas tunggal in 1984 that compelled all mass social organisations to acknowledge 
the bloc’s socio-political legitimacy and accept Pancasila as their sole foundation.  
Hegemonic refurbishment utilised such instruments of hegemonic 
coercion/persuasion as SARA that defined the boundaries of socio-political discourse, 
and the somewhat sinister executive-initiated P4 program that reaffirmed the civil 
services’ socio-political and ideological responsibilities in supporting the regime’s 
hegemonic agendas.  An ongoing process of organisational co-optation drew all 
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significant functional groupings into the military-dominated GOLKAR political 
framework that institutionalised the national-popular participatory voice of Pancasila 
demokrasi.         
                    While, in Gramscian terms, the evolving doctrinal/ideological dichotomy 
of Pancasila demokrasi and dwi fungsi enabled ABRI to legitimise hegemony’s 
coercive imperatives, the institution’s former cohesion loosened from the late-1980s.  
Under Moerdani’s command doctrine firmly adhered to Pancasila’s secular-
nationalist tenets but his fall from favour, concurrent with Islam’s socio-political 
resurgence and coinciding with growing demands for more military professionalism 
from a new generation of officer, stimulated a questioning, both within and outside 
the military, as to Pancasila’s legitimacy and in particular the role of its doctrinal 
derivative dwi fungsi in Indonesian life.  Contradictions between doctrine and 
ideology, complicated by perceptions of their mutual validity, weakened ABRI 
solidarity and in turn questioned the very substance of New Order political 
legitimacy.  With Suharto offering Islam more space for socio-political influence 
during the early 1990s and ABRI influence over GOLKAR weakening, ABRI 
solidarity and cohesion faltered.  The military’s previously unqualified support for 
Suharto came under question as elements both within and outside ABRI came to 
reassess and question the resurgent politika-Islam in Pancasila-ist terms.  Given the 
increasing politicisation of Islam by contradictory intellectual forces (both organic 
and traditional in Gramscian terms) the military’s concern was that income inequality 
in different parts of the country could be exploited by mass political appeals to 
religion, race, ethnicity, and class.  Although viewed as necessary hegemonic 
refurbishment, Suharto’s opening to Islam represented a decisive turning point in the 
previously carefully crafted and balanced relationship between Indonesia’s two most 
powerful socio-political forces.      
                     In Gramscian terms, while Indonesian Islam’s potentially divisive 
political forces were initially subject to the regime’s coercive instincts they were 
ultimately ameliorated and assimilated into the bloc through the moral and intellectual 
political leadership represented by Pancasila demokrasi.  As with ABRI, the regime’s 
relationship with the socio-political forces of politika-Islam required periodic 
refurbishment and re-negotiation in the face of the changing socio-political realities 
brought about by the Islamic resurgence from the late-1980s.  The non-monolithic 
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nature of Indonesian Islam, split by irreconcilable intellectual schisms across the 
theological spectrum traversing accommodation and dogma, proved problematic.  By 
choosing to assimilate an accommodative modernist Islam into the socio-political 
order Suharto’s attempt at hegemonic refurbishment merely invited opposition from 
within both ABRI and elements of contemporary Islam, questioned Pancasila’s true 
meaning as opposed to that of the New Order and, as the 1990s progressed, roused a 
wide range of social forces behind calls for reformasi dan demokrasi and offered the 
potential for an emergent counter-hegemony.     
                      Riven by profound cleavages, Indonesian Islam strongly precludes the 
likelihood of unified counter-hegemony emerging based on either sectarian or secular-
nationalist principles.  Historically endeavours to formulate a coherent unified 
politika-Islam opposition prior to Suharto failed and politika-Islam was more firmly 
curtailed and peripheralised by the New Order bloc.  Islam’s changing role in terms of 
Presidential reassessment and the need for hegemonic re-arrangement and 
realignment following Islam’s cultural and socio-political resurgence from the mid-
1980s led to Suharto’s most controversial Islamic initiative, his support for the 
Islamic modernist organisation ICMI in 1991.  While in Gramscian terms ICMI can 
be seen as an attempt at ideological refurbishment through assimilating an 
accommodative segment of Islam into the bloc, it can also be viewed as another 
example of New Order-style bureaucratic/corporatist politics linking patrons to 
clients.  Notwithstanding his apparent realisation, having re-assessed changing socio-
political realities, of the need for hegemonic refurbishment the subsequent debate 
surrounding the politika-Islam/secular-nationalist dilemma in the context of intra-
regime rivalry and growing mass demands for reformasi dan demokrasi, provided 
fertile ground for the formation of a nascent counter-hegemony founded upon an 
alternative socio-political reading of ideology.  
                    For most of the period from its creation in 1967 until its demise in 1997/8 
the New Order political arrangement exemplified the principle characteristics of a 
Gramscian hegemonic model political bloc but notwithstanding a period of Suharto-
initiated and carefully crafted hegemonic refurbishment from the late 1980s, in 
Gramscian terms, the bloc exhibited significant shortcomings during the 1990s.  
Gramscian hegemony required an ongoing balancing of coercion and persuasion with 
domination not coming about through a predominance of the former.  The New Order 
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political bloc sustained the Gramscian requirements of socio-political order by, on the 
one hand, and certainly during its first decade, deploying its coercive socio-political 
resources to create stability and order and it also, on the other, mitigated and 
assimilated from below into its alliance structures, through a persuasive rendering of 
the state ideology Pancasila, elements of all potentially divisive socio-political forces.  
The New Order political bloc also met the Gramscian imperative of diffusing a 
‘common sense’ concept of socio-political reality throughout all of society’s 
institutional manifestations and did so by generally convincing society to accept a 
regime rendering of a binding ideology that unified all classes behind the regime’s 
world-view.  Where the New Order political bloc did exhibit shortcomings in 
Gramscian terms was in failing to comprehensively assimilate subordinate values and 
ideals across the total socio-political spectrum.  Gramsci’s insights suggest that by 
neglecting prime subordinate non-negotiable values in its dissemination of the state 
ideology Pancasila, New Order moral and intellectual legitimacy declined and the 
bloc suffered hegemonic obsolescence and decay opening the way a for potential 
counter-hegemony to evolve.   
                     As discussed in Chapter 1, a stable, ongoing hegemony requires that a 
cultural and ideological belief system be proliferated through society to the extent that 
it is accepted as universally valid and that its norms and values legitimately express 
all including subordinate interests.724  As the Gramscian model shows, only so long as 
the alliances upon which the bloc has been built can be sustained will a stable 
hegemony last.725  Hegemony must not only influence the plethora of interests that 
inform the mass consciousness, but must also constantly respond to them.726  
Hegemony must respond to changing circumstances through ongoing hegemonic 
refurbishment to reaffirm the arrangements but the broader, increasingly non-
negotiable, interests from within both of the bloc’s key socio-political constituencies, 
Islam and the military, were not appropriately accommodated in Gramscian terms.727  
While significant elements of an accommodative Islam were co-opted and assimilated 
into the New Order’s hegemonic arrangements, with the bloc’s rendering of Pancasila 
providing the appropriate enabling discourse, the majority of the masses were not.  
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Their traditional leaderships drew upon various alternative renderings of Pancasila to 
challenge bloc moral and intellectual legitimacy that the hegemonic arrangement was 
unable to assimilate and conquer ideologically.728  Similarly, disagreement and debate 
developed within the military around contradictory interpretations of Pancasila and 
its derivatives’ true meaning and intent as military doctrine as well as its socio-
political relevance.  The bloc’s inability to assimilate and conquer the alternative 
ideological/doctrinal values and interests that came to undermine ABRI’s former 
cohesion and loyalty resulted in the military refusing to prolong Suharto’s Presidency 
and his New Order regime in the face of hegemonic decay and obsolescence. 
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Chapter 6 
 
The Suharto New Order as a Gramscian historic bloc: 
its ideological form, the ideological bloc 
 
                    Having rejected Marx’s emphasis on materialist determinism’s economic 
imperatives Gramsci sought an explanation for the control the capitalist state held 
over its people from within the nature of ideology when firmly institutionalised into 
society through a state’s legitimate socio-political apparatus.729  By tying social 
control to the hegemonic dissemination of ideology into mass consciousness across all 
spheres of social existence Gramsci acknowledged Marx’s assertion that “it is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that 
determines their consciousness”.730  This chapter discusses the Suharto New Order 
historic bloc’s ideological form that depicts the means by which the state ideology 
Pancasila and its derivatives were disseminated into Indonesian society, but it is first 
necessary to reiterate the relevant elements of the Gramscian ideological model being 
tested in the thesis.  In essence a Gramscian ideological bloc represents the 
ideological form of the historic processes by which the dominating class’s moral and 
intellectual hegemonic legitimacy is maintained through the predominantly 
consensual dissemination of ideology into the mass consciousness.  The evolving 
hegemonic order is framed and sustained through the endeavours of hegemony’s 
organic intellectuals convincing subordinate groups to actively support their own 
domination.  Gramsci’s organic intellectuals (professional soldiers, economists and 
religious teachers and such like) perform this role by actively taking part in all socio-
political affairs hence ideology overlaps all three economic, political, and ideological 
blocs.731   
                        What is specific about Gramsci’s model of hegemonic order is the way 
it incorporates ideology.  A ruling social class is seen to have assumed a hegemonic 
role only when its organic intellectuals have articulated and proliferated, on the 
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regime’s behalf, ideological belief systems that are accepted as universally valid by 
the general population.732  Gramsci viewed ideology as “an expression of culture” 
specifically designed to promote the interests of a particular class in attaining their 
collective moral and intellectual acceptance within mass society.733  By disseminating 
its dominant ideology throughout mass-based society through effective leadership the 
dominant class is deemed to have achieved the ideological legitimacy of its rule.734  
Having transformed itself into a “political force of national standing” through national 
acceptance of its ideological legitimacy a ruling class has achieved true hegemony.735  
In employing ideological systems to maintain its leadership, it is also necessary that 
the ruling order lead its allies and dominate its opponents through processes that 
reflect the Gramscian imperative of balanced coercion and consensus without the 
former dominating.736  A class remains hegemonic only so long as the ruling order is 
able to sustain subordinate consent to these processes.        
                    In Gramscian terms, the Suharto New Order bloc’s ideological form was 
defined by the powerful symbolism the state was able to evoke over some three 
decades to portray the state ideology Pancasila in such a manner as to craft mass 
consciousness to the legitimacy of the regime’s hegemony.  Before explaining the 
relevant processes of ideological assimilation used, this chapter will examine the 
nature of Indonesian political ideology.  The roles of the organic instigators and 
sustainers (including the ideological basis of the collective organic intellectual mass 
GOLKAR represented as the regime’s instrument of political expression) of New 
Order intellectual and moral legitimacy will be outlined.  How the Suharto New Order 
employed ideology as hegemonic discourse to underpin their legitimacy over three 
decades will then be explained by describing the three essential elements of the New 
Order ideological legitimacy: its moral and intellectual origins, the use of Pancasila 
as an enabling discourse of unity and cohesion and the regulatory measures 
Pancasila-based derivatives provided to sustain consensus to regime moral and 
intellectual legitimacy.  Section 1 examines the origins and consolidation of the 
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ideological basis of New Order society, the ABRI’s doctrinal and ideological attitude 
towards Islam, and the use of Pancasila and its derivatives as the discourse of 
national unity and consensus.  Section 2 discusses the methodology of ideological 
reaffirmation during the 1980s and 1990s in the face of contradictory ideological 
representation and challenge from a resurgent Islam.  Sections 3, 4 and 5 examine 
three competing interpretations of Pancasila during the 1990s; from those responding 
to the President’s invitation for socio-political debate, from a range of social 
constituencies and from the regime’s organic constituencies that necessitated bloc 
ideological realignment and assimilation.  Section 6 discusses the consequences of 
organic ideological reaffirmation in response to diverse and contradictory ideological 
renderings and section 7 summarises the extent to which the Suharto New Order 
Order’s ideological arrangement of Indonesian life matches the Gramscian model of 
ideological hegemony and hegemonic order.         
                     
1.  The New Order ideological control  
1.1  Origins 
                   Working through the Japanese sponsored committee investigating Indonesian 
independence during the closing stages of World War II the early independence 
leaders, the soldier Sukarno and the civilian Hatta, faced determined resistance to 
their inclusive vision of a secular-nationalist independent Indonesia from those 
promoting an Islamic state.  Debate split the committee but power tipped towards the 
secular-nationalists when Pancasila was accepted as the operating concept for future 
Indonesian independence and that the new state be based on ‘belief in God’ but not 
‘exclusionary’ Islamic became fundamental to Sukarno’s agenda.  The Republic’s 
founding fathers envisaged a fully integrated state, what they called an ‘integralist’ 
state and rather than the primary emphasis resting on an individual’s rights (thereby 
critically limiting the government’s powers of intervention) the state would emphasise 
social obligations and the greater societal good over individual rights thereby enabling 
the state and society to co-exist as an organic singularity.  Some fifteen years later, 
offering the potential of an all-embracing national ideology upon which a national 
will could be constructed that would support, albeit remain subordinate to their 
developmental vision, Suharto and his generals saw in Pancasila an ideal opportunity.  
Pancasila provided the New Order generals with a set of unifying principles (binding 
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glue) that could underpin the ideological authority central to their integrated state 
concept.  Diffused rigidly throughout New Order society as the state’s official 
ideology, Pancasila would enable the construction of societal consensus around the 
ideological conformity that the regime believed to be a vital pre-requisite to their 
vision of Indonesian society.737  Sukarno had regarded Pancasila as little more than a 
set of vague beliefs, but differing interpretations of the concept evolved to underpin 
first his, and then later his successor Suharto’s, vision of a prosperous and stable 
society.738  In the New Order’s view, the most significant of the concept’s tenets was 
Pancasila’s fourth principle that defined a quest for a form of politico-economic 
democracy that would bring socio-political development and economic prosperity to 
all Indonesians.  Under the New Order and notwithstanding Pancasila’s promise, the 
egalitarianism implicit in the doctrine gave way to the regime’s profound 
disinclination towards becoming a mere neutral servant of the state.   
                   ABRI’s culture of command over civilians that came to permeate New 
Order life had evolved largely out of the military training the early nationalists 
received under the Japanese, no great supporters of civilian government themselves, 
and later the high degree of autonomy from civilian authority field-commanders 
experienced during the independence struggle against the Dutch.  The timidity of the 
interim civilian government towards the Dutch also hardened military doubt about 
civilian government and the paltry returns from liberal democracy during the late-
1950s before President Sukarno established his Guided Democracy confirmed the 
military belief that civilian governance was inherently weak.  It was hardly surprising 
that ABRI came to involve itself heavily in politics.  As Crouch put it, having proved 
their indispensability during the independence struggle and in the national crises of 
widespread rebellion and opposition to centralised Javanese control during the early 
years, the army leadership felt it had “underpinned its claim” to a permanent role in 
government.739  Pancasila’s original 1945 interpretation provided an appropriate set 
                                                           
737 Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order, 
(Routledge, London, 1998), p. 105.  
738 J. W. Rich, Asia’s Modern Century, (Longman, Croydon, 1969) p. 79. 
739 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1978). 
 241
of national ideals that embodied in a state ideology evolved to represent an 
intellectual and moral basis for ABRI’s socio-political authority.740   
                   The New Order socio-political arrangement intended Indonesia to be a 
religious state and, notwithstanding Islam’s preponderance, one in which adherents of 
all religions, including Islam, could fulfil their respective religious obligations.  By 
interpreting and representing the state doctrine to depict political Islam as an enemy 
of Pancasila (and by implication an enemy of the state), the New Order ideologically 
marginalized the majority of its citizens.  The New Order’s appropriation of 
Pancasila may have deviated from its original intent and meaning but as unifying 
discourse it successfully created sufficient political stability to enable spectacular 
economic growth, relative societal stability and, in general, materially benefited a 
large proportion of the Indonesian people.  Pervading virtually every aspect of 
Indonesian socio-political and ideological discourse and transcending all faiths, 
Pancasila’s social value came from its emphasis on tolerance, particularly on matters 
of religion.  The doctrine’s effectiveness as moral/intellectual (ideological) discourse 
derived from its ability to co-opt those Islamists who wanted an Islamic state into 
consenting to a secular-nationalist state and, as such, the necessary ideological pillar 
around which the New Order regime could construct its vision of a unitary Indonesian 
state.  As well as favouring the bias upon which the regime built its relationship with 
Indonesian society to legitimise its moral/intellectual leadership, the New Order’s 
exclusive representation of the doctrine also rejected Western-liberal forms of 
democracy as deviating from Pancasila’s true intent.741   
                   In a state address on August 16, 1967, General Suharto detailed the key 
role that his New Order would attribute to Pancasila in negotiating Indonesian 
society’s ideological conformity.742  At the time Sukarno was under house arrest and 
Suharto, as acting-President, was still tentatively establishing a somewhat fragile 
authority over his fellow generals while trying to ensure the constitutional legitimacy 
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of his challenge for the Presidency.  As he outlined it, Pancasila would play the key 
role of underpinning the legitimacy of his and his fellow generals’ new socio-political 
order.  The form of democracy that Indonesians were going to live by would be a 
Pancasila derivative Pancasila demokrasi based on the 1945 Constitution’s basic 
laws and norms.  Suharto’s new socio-political arrangement would require “nothing 
less than the ordering of the entire life of the people, nation and state … returned to 
the pure implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.”743  Essentially, the 
oppositional form of politics that typified liberal democracies would be “unknown in 
the life of Pancasila demokrasi.”744  Suharto thus clearly ordained the authoritarian 
nature of the regime that would dominate Indonesian life for some three decades.  As 
he pointed out, firmly established in the nation’s “philosophy of life [and] collective 
ideology” as the ideological raison d’etre of every political party and organisation, 
Pancasila would provide the New Order’s moral and intellectual legitimacy.745   
                      Suharto left no doubts as to the role Pancasila would play in ensuring 
societal stability:  having sharpened ideological differences and caused “conflict and 
suspicion” the “Sukarno-era physical compartmentalisation of party groupings” would 
be discarded.746  In his regime’s construction of socio-political life around the 
principles of Pancasila demokrasi, ABRI would be the functional group that would 
play the “active role in protecting and upholding Pancasila and the 1945 
Constitution”.747  Suharto pointed out that ABRI would not impose a military 
dictatorship against the people’s will because the sacred soldiers’ oath swore 
allegiance to ABRI functioning primarily as the paramount defender of Pancasila and 
the 1945 Constitution on behalf of the people.  In conclusion, Suharto pointed out that 
a just and prosperous society could only be achieved if Pancasila underwrote 
society’s material and spiritual basis through voluntary and unselfish sacrifice by 
“relevant individual or group interest[s] for that of society and the nation”.748   
                    In a keynote speech to the Indonesian General Assembly in mid-1977 the 
New Order’s representation of Pancasila demokrasi was reiterated by Minister of 
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Information Mashuri.749  An early Suharto confidante and New Order Director of 
Higher Education, Mashuri explained the New Order’s official approach to the 
doctrine and how it would be deployed socio-politically.  The regime’s development 
efforts at the time, he argued, faced three problems: maintaining national growth, 
coping with societal stability, and guaranteeing national survival.750  Only Pancasila 
demokrasi built totally upon the “pure precepts of the 1945 Constitution and 
Pancasila, rooted in Indonesia’s value system” had the capability of mobilising 
society behind resolving Indonesia’s problems.751  The characteristics of liberal 
democracy as understood in some countries, he claimed, had evolved out of different 
cultural values to those existing in Indonesia and were thus inappropriate to the 
problems facing Indonesia’s modernisation.  Because the principle of consensus was 
more appropriate to Indonesian culture than the idea of absolute majority vote, the 
political paralysis that had been experienced under the earlier Sukarno regime (first by 
parliamentary democracy and then by Guided Democracy) could only be prevented 
from recurring through the type of political participation defined within Pancasila 
demokrasi.  Clearly Indonesian political and cultural realities required a different 
process of public decision-making, Mashuri explained, and traditional Indonesian 
conventions about the incompatibility of “institutions of opposition” with a culture of 
consensus-building justified his government’s interpretation and representation of the 
doctrine.752  In a reference to the socio-political situation in South Vietnam and the 
situation of emergency that still existed in Indonesia, Mashuri suggested that an 
opposition culture was clearly not rooted in Indonesian tradition and therefore too 
risky.753   
                     While the New Order employed Pancasila demokrasi’s unique 
Indonesian characteristics to corroborate its ideological and moral authority, the 
doctrine nonetheless carried some genuinely democratic logic.  The New Order 
generals believed that their revolutionary exploits during the early years of 
independence had earned them the right to take action on behalf of the people as they 
saw fit and be the final arbiters in protecting Pancasila from any individual or group 
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whose actions were contrary to their singular yet egalitarian perception of the 
doctrine’s true meaning and intent.754  Ironically, the ideological legitimacy the New 
Order drew from Pancasila came under challenge during the early 1980s and 
increasingly debated during the 1990s as various groups took advantage of a more 
open socio-political environment to use the language of Pancasila itself to question 
the regime’s hold over the doctrine’s meaning and articulation.  While Islam’s 
resurgence and the growth of Islamic cultural identity during the 1980s found it 
difficult to coalesce into a cohesive opposition, growing calls from Islam and other 
reformist elements for a more realistic participatory role in political life presaged a 
real and serious challenge to the New Order’s ideological coherence.  With the New 
Order position resting upon Indonesian society totally accepting Pancasila as 
intellectually and morally legitimising their authority, any questioning of the 
doctrine’s meaning represented a challenge to the regime’s organic ideological basis. 
 
1.2  Organic and traditional intellectual consolidation 
1.2.1  Organic secular modernisation 755 
                       Following Sukarno’s ousting and the political and ideological 
annihilation of the PKI, the most coherent political voices remaining to influence the 
still insecure, predominantly Javanese, secular-nationalist New Order leadership, were 
those of a loose grouping of intellectuals that Liddle describes as the “secular-
modernisers”.756  Evolving out of the conservative remnants of the PNI, surviving 
socialists and an increasingly confident amalgam of secular student-based groups, the 
secular-modernists came to be known as the ‘1966 generation’ intellectuals.  In the 
aftermath of the 1965 coup they propounded a post-Sukarno socio-political ideology 
built upon a Western-assisted industrial economy, an egalitarian society, and a 
pluralist model of activist state founded on democratic principles.757  Arguing the 
need for modernisation, their views dominated public discussion for several years 
after the coup in a generally free intellectual environment of a media relatively 
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unencumbered by government control.  The concept of modernisation they offered the 
new national planners suggested co-operation with the industrialised West in an 
atmosphere of socio-political order and rational economic planning.  The 
predominantly urban grouping lacked any great understanding of rural Indonesia but 
did attract influential support from among the senior officer corps preoccupied with 
fears of the potentially destructive power of Indonesia’s uneducated and 
unsophisticated masses.758  Taking early comfort from the new regime’s seemingly 
strong commitment to the idea that economic development would be impossible 
without modernisation, during the first few years following the coup the secular-
modernisers launched a spirited public attack on any impediments to modernisation 
and development.   
                  The main target for their intellectual criticism was the political system 
itself claiming that in the past political parties had failed to promote modernisation 
because strategies had been ideological rather than programmed, the implication 
being that Islam’s divisive influence had retarded progress.  The secular-modernisers 
argued that political parties had exacerbated ideological tensions between santri and 
abangan at both the elite and mass levels and, by searching for organisational loyalty 
out of grass roots society, the parties themselves had compounded sectarian tensions 
with disastrous results.  In particular they attacked the self-seeking opportunism of 
political party leaders that isolated themselves from the broader interests of their 
assumed constituencies.  They claimed that, as well as the detrimental influence of the 
intrusive bureaucracy, the sheer multiplicity of political parties had been the principle 
reason for parliament’s general instability and inability to reach agreement on 
important issues.  But while opposed to the form of control the Sukarno regime had 
exercised over every aspect of socio-cultural life the secular-modernizers could not 
envisage successful economic development without firm policy guidance, planning, 
and implementation.  They were hinting strongly at the need for authoritarian controls 
and initially they even welcomed a close working relationship with ABRI conceding 
that as the military was vital to stability there was little alternative to co-operation 
with them in the short term.759   
                   The secular-modernizers’ most urgent priority was to reform the political 
system and they argued for a two-party system.  A one-party system, they felt, would 
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be undemocratic and lead to a society dominated by politics while the multi-party 
system they blamed for the problems of the past, was even less acceptable.  A two-
party system, they argued, would eventually encourage programmatic rather than 
ideological politics and thus lead to more stable governance.  Given the extent to 
which the old parties remained ideologically entrenched in the villages, they 
acknowledged that transforming mass political culture would be an enormous 
problem requiring a mammoth education program of some kind to overcome.  
President Suharto agreed to an election in 1971 but the secular-modernisers saw major 
problems in the inevitability of a two-party system emerging around coalitions of 
secular-nationalism and politika-Islam.  They could not see the habit of supporting 
political parties on traditional grounds being broken in a single election campaign and 
the likely parliamentary dominance by two such coalitions could set the stage for 
potentially disastrous Muslim versus anti-Muslim conflict.760   
              It was therefore clear to the secular-modernisers, and a growing number of 
their military associates, that some new form of political arrangement strongly 
committed to modernisation needed to be created before the 1971 elections.  Grave 
concerns were being voiced within the military over deteriorating domestic stability 
leading them to support the moderniser’s view that political stability and economic 
progress could only be achieved by some form of alternation in power between two 
non-ideological political parties committed to programmed industrialisation and 
economic development.761  The two-party system promoted by the secular-
modernisers was poorly co-ordinated and in late 1969 the Ministry of Home Affairs 
silenced debate by firmly pointing out that the issue would be settled in the nation’s 
interest by the Executive office.  As a lobby-group the secular-modernisers slipped 
outside the power elite, the substance of their ideas were taken from them, and much 
of their influence lost.  Many found new, albeit subordinate, organic roles as 
organisers and spokesmen for GOLKAR, the new political party bolstered by the 
regime to contest the first New Order elections in 1971.  Although the secular-
modernisers lost most of their political influence the regime assigned many of them 
new roles as technocrats and advisers, firmly subordinated to, and charged with, 
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facilitating the new politico-economic alliance being built between the military and 
foreign and selected indigenous (predominantly Sino-Indonesian) capital interests.762  
 
 
 
1.2.2  The military and traditional intellectual challenge from Islam763  
                     The New Order generals remembered the ongoing Islamic-supported armed 
struggle during the Guided Democracy period between 1955 and 1966 and they were 
convinced that allowing any ideological disagreement with the state’s secular-
nationalist philosophical basis (its dasa negara) promised dire consequences.  Until 
ended brutally by the military in 1962 the Darul Islam revolts convinced the officer 
corps that the extreme right offered the only likely serious challenge to the regime and 
reinforced Pancasila in the minds of many providing ABRI and others among the 
ruling elites with the justification for some forty years of anti-Islamic politics, 
thinking, and behaviour.   
              The ABRI leadership was aware that the most likely ideological challenges 
to their agenda would come from two sources; from communism on the extreme left 
(ekstrem kiri) or from political Islam on the extreme right (ekstrem kanan).  The threat 
from the left was to all intents and purposes removed by the time General Suharto 
took power.  Javanese Muslims played a major, and unabashedly enthusiastic, role in 
the slaughter of over half a million suspected communists and their supporters but the 
carnage served to remind the new leadership of the destabilising potential inherent in 
mobilising sectarian interests.  Having removed the threat from the left it remained for 
Suharto and his generals to concentrate their attentions on neutralising any potential 
threat from Islam.  Adamant from the outset that an Islamic state would be a disaster, 
the regime effectively depoliticised Islam and through doctrine encouraged the 
creation of a predominantly Javanese/abangan officer corps that included Christians, 
Hindu Balinese, and other non-Muslims.764  Greatly disappointing Islamic political 
pretentions, considering how rural Javanese Muslims had assisted in the anti-
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communist pogroms of 1966/7, Suharto and his generals peripheralised politika-Islam 
until the mid-1980s and adhered to a strict policy that on the one hand encouraged 
Islamic piety while on the other oppressed all forms of direct Islamic political activity.     
                     As discussed above, Indonesian Islam was split by both an 
abangan/santri dichotomy reflecting degrees of religious piety and rivalry between 
Islamic modernist and traditionalist intellectual strains.  Less rigid ideologically and 
more accommodating than its modernist rivals, the traditionalist Nahdlatal Ulama 
(NU) centres upon the activities and guidance of its religious scholars and throughout 
the New Order NU leaders remained adamant that Indonesia need not necessarily be 
an Islamic state.  When, from the early 1980s, NU leader Wahid openly challenged 
the regime’s interpretation of Pancasila his concern had more to do with Pancasila’s 
unilateral interpretation than the doctrine’s actual content.  In terms of NU’s 
‘accommodation’ towards Pancasila in its purest meaning it is therefore unsurprising 
that the rival modernist Islam of Muhammadiyah offered more potential for 
ideological challenge to the doctrine’s deterministic implications.  Whereas the 
traditional Islam offered by NU regarded faith as a private matter subject to the norms 
of social interaction and behaviour and compatible with the tenets and requirements of 
New Order Pancasila-ist society, modernist Muhammadiyah’s firmer adherence to 
scripture inevitably placed modernist Islam on a collision course with the regime’s 
idea of a secular-nationalist state.  The regime’s subsequent contradictory support for 
the modernist intellectual association ICMI during the early 1990s, and the 
opportunity for patronage to manipulate and influence modernist Islamic thought the 
linkage offered the regime, while representing a significant turning point in the 
regime’s relationship with Islam, needs to be viewed primarily in terms of the New 
Order refurbishing their ideological legitimacy.     
 
1.2.3  ABRI and dwi fungsi’s organic implications     
                     Determined from the early independence years that the Indonesian state not 
be an Islamic theocracy, the military leadership wanted a state that would evolve into 
a stable society based on belief in God, but one in which all religious adherents, 
including Muslims, would be able to fulfil their respective religious obligations.  
Pursuing the societal stability so seriously lacking during the problematic post-
independence years preoccupied the regime with re-inventing the state ideology 
Pancasila to provide, particularly in religious matters, social and ideological value 
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through the doctrine’s emphasis on tolerance.  The almost constant Islamic-supported 
armed struggles and insurrections of the early period clearly demonstrated the dire 
consequences of any mass-based ideological disagreement with Pancasila’s implicit 
endorsement of the state’s secular-nationalist philosophical basis and convinced 
Sukarno and his generals of the need to exploit the doctrine’s potential ideological 
value as a counter to a politicised Islam.     
                      Refusing to be anything but political the generals staked their early 
claim to a permanent role in Indonesia’s governance by institutionalizing General 
Nasution’s ‘middle way’ concept into the ideologically-based military doctrine of dwi 
fungsi.765  Derived from Pancasila demokrasi’s unique system of “governance 
through ideological conformity” the doctrine’s ‘twin-functioned’ characteristics 
effectively institutionalized ABRI’s pre-eminent role over Indonesian life.766  
Furthermore, enshrined in the sacred soldier’s oath (Sapta Marga) as the very essence 
of national unity (a ‘total way of life’), Pancasila and dwi fungsi legitimised ABRI’s 
moral authority as self-proclaimed defenders of the nation’s values.767  Ideologically 
and doctrinally central to dwi fungsi was the idea of an integrated society defined by 
the primacy of social obligations implicit in Pancasila that carried clear socio-
political implications in legitimising top-down approval of ABRI’s self-appointed role 
as defenders of a non-communist, non-Islamic, unitary state through an enforced 
framework of ideological conformity.   
                     Dwi fungsi enabled military intervention into all aspects of Indonesian 
socio-political life and in the name of national security the doctrine empowered 
officials of the Department of Defence and Security to monitor the activities and 
inclinations of all social organisations at every level of society.  A parallel territorial 
command structure separated the archipelago into ten regional commands that 
facilitated further penetration into society by enabling local military personal to 
oversee all regional affairs and intervene when necessary to ensure ideological 
conformity and adherence to central policy.  Dwi fungsi’s tenets extended direct 
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control by enabling the routine placement of active duty army officers in key state 
bureaucratic positions and departments that often had little to do with military affairs.  
For most of the New Order, active duty and retired military officers occupied up to 
half of the regional governorships and vice-governorships as well as a similar 
proportion of district heads at the next level of authority.768     
 
1.3  Pancasila as ideological discourse and the balancing of coercion 
and consensus to reaffirm ideological conformity   
                     The legitimacy of New Order moral and intellectual leadership depended on 
society’s general acceptance of the regime’s representation of the official state 
ideology Pancasila.  An array of coercive and consensual devices provided the means 
to sustain this situation and the ‘enabling’ mechanisms doctrinal and ideological 
interpretations provided are the subject of this section.  Specific to the nature of New 
Order ideological legitimacy was Pancasila and its derivatives’ exclusive use and 
regular reinforcement through ideological discourse.  While primarily devised to 
create societal unity the processes also provided the means to effectively neutralise 
potential ideological challenge and particularly that of Islam.  While the purity of 
Pancasila’s Five Principles and their appeal to the common will, coupled with virtual 
systemic corruption and unabashed nepotism, provided the consensual aspects of New 
Order domination, counter-balancing coercive imperatives found legitimacy through 
ABRI’s direct doctrinal linkage to the Constitution, Pancasila and dwi fungsi.  In its 
search for social conformity and stability the New Order employed the range of 
policies detailed in Chapter 4 to balance coercion and a sufficiency of “persuasion, 
exchange, and co-optation” yet the regime also required a continuous source of 
income surplus for redistribution among those within state and society to co-opt those 
whose support was deemed vital to fulfilling regime developmental goals and 
agendas.769   
                     While organically hardening the moral and intellectual legitimacy of the 
power structure, the resources of ideological persuasion ultimately roused opposition 
from, initially, the ideologically traditional intellectuals of Islam and later, a mix of 
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formerly organic and traditional intellectuals from both inside and outside Islam that 
were promoting various conflicting visions of reform and change.  ABRI and intra-
Islamic dynamics thus respectively imposed upon the processes of ideological 
conformity influences that both reaffirmed and contradicted the regime’s use of 
Pancasila and its derivatives.  The most effective institutionalised symbol in 
regulating and reinforcing socio-political control and ideological conformity within 
Pancasila demokrasi’s all-embracing system of governance was ABRI’s dwi fungsi 
doctrine but other instruments were also employed.  
 
1.3.1  Sara 
                    Popularised by the highly-censored Jakarta press during the early 1970s 
was the ideological reaffirmation represented by the acronym SARA.  As discussed in 
Chapter 2, section 3.2.2, p. 79, the term described a range of sensitive socio-political 
issues (ethnicity, religion, race, and the curious term ‘among groups’ that referred to 
‘class conflict’) considered  by the regime to be too sensitive for public discussion or 
employed under any circumstances to mobilise social action.770  SARA referred to 
those groupings within society considered potential sources of ideological conflict and 
if mobilised likely to represent a threat to regime authority.771  The fourth letter’s 
reference to antar golongon (conflict ‘among groups’), while somewhat ambiguous, 
referred to the particularly troublesome and sensitive divisions that had carried over 
from the early days of independence between soldiers, civilians, and social classes 
and might find an outlet in opposition to dwi fungsi.772  The issues represented by the 
acronym were particularly off limits during New Order election campaigning because 
of a fear they might arouse communal violence.  Loosely grouped within the taboo 
areas covered by SARA were such tendencies as questioning the state ideology 
Pancasila or the 1945 Constitution, promoting socialist or Marxist thought, calling for 
an Islamic state, and anything else that could be considered socio-politically offensive 
around the sensitive subject of religion.773            
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1.3.2  The 1973 realignment of the political party system 
                     Completing the New Order’s socio-political arrangement of society 
channelling religious political expression was the 1973 redesigning of the electoral 
laws, essentially a strategy of “organisational co-optation”, that gave the government 
political party GOLKAR a commanding electoral position as the official state 
party.774  Concerned that an upsurge in Islamic political discourse was taking 
advantage of the new regime’s preoccupation with establishing its socio-political 
agendas and fearing Islamic political challenge, the New Order dismantled the old 
political party system.  The forced amalgamation of the remaining parties into 
politically manageable groupings, to restrict religious and nationalist inclinations 
within a controlled electoral environment, severely proscribed independent political 
activity. The process left GOLKAR dominant and unchallenged and by combining the 
remaining political parties into two groups that adjusted and limited the political 
system in line with its vision of a de-politicised and de-ideologised mass politics, the 
regime effectively institutionalised Pancasila demokrasi.  GOLKAR compulsorily 
included all civil servants and government employees including the military, and the 
PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or Development Unity Party) fused the Islamic 
parties into one entity.  The PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia) incorporated the old 
PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia or Indonesian National Party that had been identified 
primarily with upper-class syncretic Javanese) together with the two small nationalist 
parties and the two Christian parties into a grouping that shared a general opposition 
to militant Islam.  Liddle suggests that the regime’s reconstructed party system was 
designed to offer the PPP as the “spiritual aspiration” of the people, the PDI as 
reflecting the people’s “material aspirations”, with the state party GOLKAR a 
“harmonious joining” of the two.775  The forced infusions of the nine pre-New Order 
parties into the PDI and PPP gave the regime complete control over the entire party 
system.  In terms of tightening organic ideological cohesion, the 1973 rationalisation 
of the political-party system uncompromisingly institutionalised Pancasila demokrasi, 
emasculated Islam as a parliamentary force and guaranteed that the parliamentary 
process remained controlled by the heavily ABRI-infiltrated, strongly secular-
nationalist, GOLKAR party.   
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1.3.3  Pancasila refresher courses: P4  
                    Ideological conformity tightened further in 1978 when, in an 
extraordinary move, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) agreed to force all 
civil servants below the rank of Cabinet Minister to attend a series of Pancasila 
refresher workshops, or upgrading courses, called P4 administered by specially-
trained civil servants.776  As discussed in Chapter 2, section 3.2.4, p. 81, attendance 
was not only compulsory, but proved immensely disruptive and costly due to the 
absence of civil servants attending the courses from work and missing one day of the 
two-week courses required employees repeating the course from the beginning.  The 
initiative came from the highest levels of the executive and suggested the regime 
believed that a general reaffirmation of the state ideology was necessary.  The P4 
program was taken extremely seriously and neither illness nor family bereavement 
was sufficient excuse to merit non-attendance.  The compulsory nature of the courses 
and their obvious costs indicated the seriousness the regime attached to reaffirming 
ideological unity and, thus, its own moral and intellectual legitimacy.  The 
programme’s overall purpose appeared to be to remind those charged with overseeing 
New Order agendas that the regime’s interpretation of Pancasila was a sensible and 
rational formulation based upon traditional Indonesian (or certainly Javanese) 
philosophies of life.  It is difficult to disagree with Morfit’s observation that, in terms 
of hegemonic rejuvenation, P4 represented the “clearest and most self-conscious 
articulation” of the New Order’s ideological vision for Indonesian society to date.777   
                     While the MPR stressed P4’s purpose as enhancing civil service 
understanding and enthusiasm for their employer’s development programs, P4 also 
reminded the civil servant and bureaucrat classes in general of the importance the 
New Order attached to Pancasila as the ideological basis of its policies and agendas.  
Moreover, while the program further re-affirmed ABRI’s role as the driver of 
ideological security (and thus social harmony) to sustain development, P4’s overt 
conservatism also suggested that the regime was little inclined to changing the social 
order in the near future.  As such, P4 offered Pancasila as an ideology of containment 
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Foundation in Jakarta during the running of the state P4 program.   
 254
and socio-political unity rather than one of mobilisation.778  The President himself 
was believed to be the driving force behind the indoctrinisation program and although 
making little public comment beyond conventional explanations, during an address to 
Army commanders at Palanbaru in early 1980 he took the opportunity to remind his 
audience that Pancasila demanded a close relationship between ABRI and the 
regime’s political vehicle GOLKAR.  Obviously referring to approaching general 
elections he reminded ABRI that strongly supporting GOLKAR maintained and 
strengthened the supremacy of ‘their’ state ideology.779  The President was reminding 
the military elite that Pancasila’s implicit ‘popular-participatory’ social 
responsibilities gave ideological substance to ABRI’s mobilisation behind GOLKAR.   
 
1.3.4  Azas tunggal 
                          The final act in institutionalising ideological conformity, and discussed 
earlier in Chapter 2,section 3.2.5, p. 82, came during the early 1980s with the 
controversial azas tunggal initiative whereby socio-political ideological control was 
further tightened by demanding the two non-government political parties and all 
social organisations, including the two massive Islamic organisations, traditionalist 
NU and modernist Muhammdiyah, acknowledge Pancasila in their organisational 
charters as their principle reason d’etre.  Appropriate legislation, proposed in 1982 
and formally adopted in 1985, stipulated that all political parties and socio-political 
organisations accept Pancasila as the sole philosophical basis of the state.  In 
response to azas tunggal’s forced acceptance debate during the late 1980s and into the 
1990s was dominated by differing perceptions of the relationship between the state 
and Islam that challenged the basic tenets by which the New Order governed the 
nation.  A dramatic attitudinal shift subsequently took place towards Islam at the 
highest levels of the regime.  Given that one of the few remaining potential threats to 
the regime’s hold over the political system during the early 1980s was the decision to 
continue holding parliamentary elections, azas tunggal had apparently been 
considered necessary to tighten control and limit even further the potential for partisan 
mobilisation.  There nevertheless remained many alternative interpretations of 
Pancasila to confuse the issue and although the real meaning of the doctrine 
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continued to be contested, the regime held firm to its line as to what it intended the 
doctrine to represent.      
                    NU’s acquiescence to azas tunggal coupled with Wahid’s 1984 decision 
to withdraw the organisation from active politics were both dramatic and momentous 
affairs but effectively moved traditionalist Islam to a new “political space” from 
which NU reformists were able to circumvent government control and manipulation 
“outside of elite politics”. 780  Having relentlessly excluded Islamic politics for some 
two decades, azas tunggal enabled the regime to effectively tighten control over 
Pancasila to legitimise party political behaviour: Wahid’s removal of NU and his 
massive personal following out of official politics was an act of frustration.  
Determined to offer an alternative vision as to how Pancasila might work for 
Indonesia, Wahid and other reformists were forced to challenge the New Order’s 
hegemonic use of the state ideology from outside official politics where more freedom 
of movement and opportunity existed to participate effectively and compete 
intellectually.  Ironically, NU’s appropriation of Pancasila that challenged the 
regime’s representation of the doctrine also ‘inoculated’ its leaders against 
accusations by the regime of being anti-Pancasila.781  Believing democracy could 
only fail in an environment of intolerance and religious strife, Wahid and NU’s 
Pancasila line that disavowed Islam as the basis of the state was a necessary socio-
political compromise if a legitimate challenge to New Order hegemony was to be 
tolerated.  While azas tunggal succeeded in gaining Pancasila’s formal acceptance by 
all political parties and social organisations, and as such effectively strengthening 
New Order ideological/intellectual control, there nevertheless remained a number of 
alternative interpretations of the state ideology to legitimise a questioning of its 
exclusive regime interpretation and use.   
                    While azas tunggal gave the New Order tighter control over all state 
organisation and reinforced uniform acceptance of what the regime intended 
Pancasila to represent, the post-azas tunggal era nevertheless impacted upon the 
regime’s use of the doctrine in contradictory ways that both reinforced and questioned 
the regime’s grip on power.  During the early 1990s New Order legitimacy was being 
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buoyed by successful economic development and with all politics drawn about 
Pancasila ideological conformity had tightened.  Under Wahid’s direction 
traditionalist Islam was the most dynamic Muslim organisation in Indonesian society 
and, together with the accommodationist ICMI carrying Presidential support, earlier 
general discomfort with Pancasila among Muslims appeared to be easing.  But 
ABRI’s prominent and privileged position in Indonesian society was under question 
and doubts were increasingly being raised about the nature of the nation's governance 
and its leadership and both issues had Pancasila at their core.  A new generation of 
Islamic intellectuals from NU, Muhammadiyah, and ICMI were trying to depict Islam 
as inclusive and democratic while not necessarily demanding its own state but the 
very nature of what was clearly a sectarian debate hinted at a return to mass-based 
Islamic politics.  Such considerations suggested that a potential challenge to the 
regime was emerging and that it would be one based upon an alternative 
intellectual/ideological format to that underpinning the New Order.      
 
2.  The 1980s and 1990s: organic reassertion, re-arrangement, 
inclusion, and traditional challenge 
                 While Pancasila’s organic function was to legitimise regime leadership its 
worth as a morally and intellectually legitimate ideology of unity is directly related to 
its level of acceptance by the popular masses as generally reflecting consensus to the 
doctrine’s regimist representation of society’s best interests.  As the ruling order’s 
reinvention, Pancasila was fulfilling its organic imperative by justifying ABRI’s self-
professed socio-political role as protector of the New Order unitary state.  But the 
doctrine also possessed a traditional intellectual logic that offered a unifying 
framework for Islamic social life, and consequently politika-Islamic regeneration that 
had the potential to question regime legitimacy.  Pancasila’s role as legitimising 
discourse was crucial to the Suharto New Order because consensus is the only moral 
and intellectual basis around which leadership can be legitimate.  New Order 
authority needed to be based on the presumption that society generally believed that 
the regime occupied its dominant position over society legitimately but only through 
popular consensus can moral legitimacy be placed on the “extent and nature” of that 
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authority.782  When Suharto and his generals took power and captured Pancasila to 
legitimise their socio-political agendas, the doctrine offered a logical approach to 
legitimising their new socio-political arrangement of Indonesian life.  By offering the 
New Order leadership a schema that could underwrite ideological unity through 
intellectual and cultural control over what was clearly a potentially destabilising, 
complex and divisive society, Pancasila provided a very powerful instrument of 
legitimacy.  Possession of a potentially unifying ideology, able to embrace the 
multiplicity of Indonesia’s societal interests, provided the New Order with the means 
to actualise the stability essential for economic and social development.   
                   ABRI doctrine, as it evolved under the secular-nationalist guidance of the 
military’s Catholic military intelligence guru and Suharto confidant General Benny 
Moerdini, drove a remorseless Pancasila-ist line in meeting first the ideological 
challenges of the left (Communism) and the right (politika-Islam) and later in 
renewing the institution’s doctrinal logic of self-justification.  Moerdini’s formulation 
of Kewaspadaan (socio-political vigilance) as doctrinal re-invigoration during the 
early 1980s reinvented the nature of threat to justify reasserting Pancasila through 
dwi fungsi to legitimise ABRI’s ongoing socio-political and ideological oversight.  As 
a counter to Islam’s perceived socio-political resurgence during the early 1980s, azas 
tunggal had forced all societal groupings to acknowledge Pancasila’s primacy and 
Kewaspadaan effectively complimented azas tunggal’s ideological reaffirmation by 
tying responsibility for socio-political vigilance to the ideological status quo.  By the 
end of the decade, acknowledging that liberal-democracy’s global resurgence 
demanded broader political expression and debate, the President complicated the issue 
by initiating a Keterbukaan (‘political openness’) approach (an Indonesian version of 
the Soviet Union’s glasnost) that appeared to contradict military Kewaspadaan. 
                         As a doctrine of ideological tightening, Kewaspadaan clearly 
conflicted with Keterbukaan’s invitation for more ideological and socio-political 
opinion and debate.  The implications of, on the one hand, ideologically-tightening 
military doctrine and, on the other, more open moral and intellectual debate and 
expression, demonstrated a profound ideological divergence between the President 
and ABRI.  As the brainchild of the, by this time, discredited General Moerdani, 
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Kewaspadaan came to provide a rallying point for intra-military opposition to the 
President, but also roused considerable debate among civilians as to the New Order’s 
representation of Pancasila.  The doctrinal hardening Kewaspadaan represented also 
polarised elements within the officer corps as well as civilians around such issues as 
military professionalism and promotion, the relevance of dwi fungsi and, by 
implication Pancasila, to Indonesia of the 1990s.   
                       The Islamic cultural resurgence of the mid-1980s also threatened likely 
political consequences that the President duly noted and quickly converted into 
political opportunity.  His 1990 ICMI initiative, that provided modernist Islamic 
intellectuals a more prominent voice in socio-political affairs, placed further pressure 
on organic solidarity by seemingly questioning Pancasila’s secular-nationalist 
credentials.  As the 1990s evolved, the contradictory socio-political pressures 
emanating from within both ABRI and Islam polarised the debate around Pancasila’s 
true meaning further and challenged the very basis upon which New Order legitimacy 
had been constructed for some quarter of a century.     
                   The section below will first address the issues of Kewaspadaan and 
Keterbukaan in terms of ABRI’s organic doctrinal reinforcement through the 1980s 
and 1990s to tie the institution firmly to Pancasila and dwi fungsi and their 
implications for subsequent intra-military cleavages and regime disunity.  The section 
will also explain the co-optation of potential opposition from both the military and 
Islam through processes of ‘divide and rule’ together with the ideological implications 
of President Suharto’s calls for socio-political ‘openness’ in an environment of 
contradictory demands for socio-political reform and the military’s doctrinal 
tightening.   
        
2.1  ABRI and organic reinforcement   
                       Providing the coercion implicit in New Order domination, any disunity 
within ABRI threatened regime cohesion and legitimacy.  When differing perceptions 
as to how the New Order should evolve became apparent during the late 1980s among 
the middle and senior levels of the officer corps, regime legitimacy could not but 
come under scrutiny and the ideological contradictions roused by the military-initiated 
Kewaspadaan (vigilance) on the one hand and Presidential-initiated keterbukaan 
(openness) on the other polarised the debate that followed.   
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                        Changing perceptions of national life during the 1980s placed growing 
pressure upon the ABRI leadership to adapt their ideological approach to cope with 
new demands and mainstream calls for less exclusionary political processes.  Human 
rights accountability and, in particular, an end to the military’s intensive socio-
political intrusion, threatened the military’s pre-eminent position within the New 
Order.  ABRI response was to reassert its position by reformulating 
doctrinal/ideological frameworks through internal refurbishment that interpreted any 
form of socio-political and ideological dissent as national threat thereby redefining 
any opposition as a legitimate target of their coercive defensive instincts.783  Sustained 
by doctrine that demanded on-going national stability as a pre-requisite for economic 
and socio-political development, the military’s self-defined dwi fungsi ideological 
mission required both permanent defence and socio-political roles.  Throughout the 
New Order, at the head of ABRI and committed to upholding the institution’s 
doctrinal legitimacy, President Suharto constantly reaffirmed these perceptions and 
that the potential for national instability remained ever-present.  During the early 
1980s, confirming that under his leadership the military continued to be concerned 
about the potential for national instability, ABRI Commander Moerdani updated 
officer corps doctrinal training through his Kewaspadaan approach that formalised the 
belief that Pancasila society was coming under potentially destructive threat from a 
new array of subversive groups and ideologies.784  The existence of a “credible 
persistent threat” required a degree of imagination on ABRI’s part so to justify the 
need for renewed and ongoing socio-political vigilance in early 1988 military doctrine 
reformalized itself around Kewaspadaan.785   
                        Kewaspadaan provided the military high command doctrinal value in 
that it tightened organic legitimacy by reasserting the Armed Forces’ role as the 
guardians of the national interest but to defend the military’s sacred role against 
growing calls for an end to dwi fungsi and that the military ‘return to their barracks’, 
the doctrine needed to justify that renewed vigilance was required at every level of the 
state if it were to be plausible.  Real threats to national stability had to be identified if 
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the approach was to make sense.  In insisting that foreign values such as democratic 
political participation and humanitarian rights were destructive and threatened 
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, the doctrine struggled with credibility and 
regime critics viewed Kewaspadaan as little more than another of the regime’s self-
justifying tools of repression.786  Notwithstanding the Kewaspadaan mindset among 
ABRI’s leadership satisfied their self-belief that a re-affirmation of ABRI’s 
commitment to Pancasila was overdue.  Military hard-liners grasped the doctrine as 
sensible ideological fortification for the challenging times and a useful means of 
controlling the pace and degree of what they saw to be inevitable demands for socio-
political reform.   
                      Kewaspadaan’s architect, General Moerdani, fell from Presidential 
favour in 1988 following his outspoken opposition to the President’s choice of Lt. 
General (ret.) Sudharmono’s appointment to the Chairmanship of GOLKAR and thus 
preferred choice as the next Vice-President.787  Not regarded as the ‘military’s man’, 
Sudharmono had done little to endear himself to the ABRI elite by his tendency to cut 
budget allocations to military business activities.  As GOLKAR Chairman, 
Sudharmono’s preference for recruiting GOLKAR functionaries from the ranks of 
business rather than ABRI reduced the party’s dependence on military influence or, 
put another way, reduced ABRI’s influence over GOLKAR.  Until 1988 Moerdani 
had been at the fulcrum of military power and influence with an extensive support 
base among the officer corps so when his intelligence empire and its network of 
patronage was disbanded, there was considerable anger towards Suharto from 
Moerdani supporters.  In sidelining his one-time trusted aide, Suharto not only seemed 
to neutralise a focal-point for opposition within the military but also served notice to 
the non-Muslim dominated military command that Moerdani’s influential Christian 
influence had come to an end.   
                         Moerdani had dominated military intelligence for some fifteen years 
before his appointment as ABRI Commander and many senior officers owed their 
careers to him but his Roman Catholic background and connections troubled Muslim 
officers as well as civilian leaders who distrusted the independent power base he had 
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built within the officer corps and the intelligence apparatus.  Moerdani had preferred 
to work with officers from abangan (less pious Muslim), Christian, and minority, 
backgrounds and under his leadership more pious (santri) officers were unlikely to 
reach senior rank.  But Moerdani’s fall from grace was viewed among sections of the 
officer corps as an example of inappropriate Presidential interference in military 
affairs and implying, as one influential Moerdani supporter put it, that the military’s 
socio-political role of ensuring the “purity and consistency of Pancasila and the 
Constitution” was going to be all the more difficult in the future.788  In a dramatic 
response to the President’s challenge of their authority, the high command turned to 
pure Kewaspadaan doctrine and launched a provocative series of investigations in an 
effort to show that neo-Communists had actually penetrated the Sudharmono-led 
GOLKAR.  The military were effectively using Moerdani’s doctrine, originally 
designed by the theoretician to tighten Pancasila conformity, as a platform from 
which to challenge Suharto.  Although devised to re-vitalise intra-military ideological 
standardisation, the Moerdani initiative thus became a doctrinal means by which 
disaffected senior officers could, from both an organic and traditional intellectual 
basis, oppose Suharto’s political plans and effectively threatened to undermine intra-
elite and regime cohesion.789  Moerdani was reduced to the somewhat junior position 
of Defence Minister in 1988, and remained out of the official power frame, but his 
influence remained through the broad network of patronage he had built during his 
long powerful military and intelligence career.  With their self-justifying doctrines 
revitalised by Kewaspadaan and emboldened by newfound ideological legitimacy, 
ABRI were able to turn their attention against the growing calls for democracy, 
reform, and greater political participation.  Originally born out of a perceived need for 
ideological standardisation and revitalisation, and later modified to legitimise even 
greater intrusive surveillance over society, Moerdani’s Kewaspadaan project had 
evolved into an instrument by which dissident elements of the military could both 
reaffirm their socio-political roles and justify challenging the President.   
                   Permitting the influential General (ret.) Soesatro to address the DPR on 
June 21 1989 and confirm the President’s call for Keterbukaan, suggested that the 
boundary of permissible political discourse had truly expanded and implied that 
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latitude was now going to be permitted to publicly criticize the regime.790  The speech 
could never have been made without Presidential support, and was backed by a 
number of influential retired generals, but Keterbukaan’s openness clearly challenged 
and complicated the military’s Kewaspadaan calls for vigilance.  Keterbukaan drew a 
not unexpected defensive reaction from the military leadership that responded by 
resurrecting the ideological warnings implicit in Kewaspadaan to remind that the 
tenets of Pancasila and dwi fungsi were non-negotiable.  In turn, the relevance of 
Kewaspadaan itself in the new environment of Keterbukaan’s implicit promise of 
reform came under challenge from within the regime.  Cracks were appearing in the 
regime’s aura of organic solidarity as a new generation of military officers, often 
overlooked for promotion and missing out on the spoils of development or simply 
concerned at the loss of professionalism apparent within their institution, grew 
increasingly resentful and dubious as to the continued legitimacy of their institution’s 
role in national life.  ABRI declined to enter the debate until December that year when 
Chief-of-Staff, Sudrajat, addressing the military academy and called on officers to 
begin a rational debate on socio-political matters.  The invitation for political 
openness gained further legitimacy when Exterior Minister Rudini even called for 
discussion as to whether ABRI’s dwi fungsi role was still justified.791   
                     When ABRI Commander (and Moerdani protégé) General Try Sutrisno 
firmly contradicted the reformist atmosphere by declaring that the matter should not 
be one of public debate among serving personnel, the depth of antagonism the subject 
provoked among some elements of the military was apparent.792  The swing between 
discussion and contradiction highlighted the growing differences between the 
President and elements of the military leadership as to the legitimacy of debating dwi 
fungsi (and thus Pancasila itself) in the changing socio-political environment but the 
implication remained that, at the highest levels, Pancasila remained sacrosanct.  But 
Suharto could hardly remain impervious to calls for at least debating change and 
reform, nor could he continue to ignore the growing criticism from within the Muslim 
community of the institution that had been his most potent socio-political resource for 
some three decades.  The President’s subsequent response leaned more towards 
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maintaining popular support for himself than shielding the military from criticism and 
suggested rather an opening for Islam than generally favouring Keterbukaan.   
                                              
2.1.1  The military generation gap: divergent ideological perceptions   
                      At the heart of the now discernable cleavage, debated publicly and privately 
within both the active and retired officer corps, was in its simplest terms a generation 
gap between the military karyawan running the New Order and the new young 
generation officers that “controlled the guns”.793  The gap had been widening since 
the early 1980s but by the 1990s was concentrated around two alternative potential 
power centres; the retired military karyawan representing the remnants of the 1945 
Generation clinging onto power, and a new generation on active duty at the middle 
levels of the staff and command structure.  Compounding the problem was an officer 
corps that had greatly increased since 1966 through an unprecedented progressive rate 
of officer graduations.  To satisfy career aspirations large numbers of active duty 
officers required regular and frequent re-assignment but by the early 1990s the 
average length of medium rank command had reduced by up to 50% causing a 
veritable “promotional log-jam”.794  Military logic demands that satisfactory and 
meaningful regional command assignment lengths are essential if officers are to have 
sufficient time to familiarise themselves with the specific demands of a region.  
Moreover, regular personal rotation is also necessary to ensure the maximum number 
of officers benefited from command responsibility.   
                           The large pool of officers waiting for promotion were growing 
disenchanted with their vocation as it was also clear to most of them that the selection 
process was being abused in professional terms; when rotation did occur it was most 
likely to be from political preference than talent and merit.  The issue of merit over 
personal selection through political interference actually prompted the Minister of 
Security to comment publicly that it was the job of the military, not the executive 
office, to decide important command assignments.795  Many middle-ranking officers 
also felt that appointments were too frequently being made contrary to the will of their 
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immediate superiors and more to serve the interests of the executive office, 
Presidential aides, and the staff of the Ministry of Defence.796  The officer corps of the 
1990s turning into a promotional log jam had two particularly disturbing 
consequences for officer corps’ morale.  With little hope of promotion some middle-
ranking officers were forced to remain in the regions of their active service for too 
long and on becoming familiarised with local socio-political realities felt reluctant to 
use heavy-handed methods against civilian protest and unrest.  Facing mandatory 
retirement at age fifty-five, and hoping for the traditional financial security of civilian 
postings, many were also concerned by the increasing pressure on the state and 
bureaucracy to accommodate their generation’s retirement needs.797   
                    The new generation had limited means available to actively oppose 
regime policies and the only effective tactic was to weaken the President’s position by 
encouraging ABRI’s political-neutrality.  Generational discourse thus centred about 
older officers’ concerns that their interests would be prejudiced if the military 
retreated from political influence, and the younger, better educated, and often 
overseas trained, generation’s growing frustration that their legally-determined (yet 
irrational by conventional military standards) dual socio-political role retarded 
military professionalism.  Antagonisms had the effect of broadening dangerous 
fissures within the formerly highly cohesive institution that had effectively for some 
twenty-five years underpinned important coercive and consensual elements of regime 
authority.798   
                       Reduced ABRI support for GOLKAR saw the vote for the regime party 
slip from its 73% in 1987 to 68% in 1992 but parliamentary opposition was limited to 
official opposition politicians and remained relatively muted with disquiet generally 
centring round the military’s guaranteed representation in the DPR and MPR.  While 
the President had the power to keep criticism under control, there was the problem 
that his endorsement of Keterbukaan encouraged discussion therefore debate came 
under the rubric of Presidential approved political openness.  The Vice-Presidential 
election at the March 1993 MPR session increased the antagonism between the 
President and ABRI.  Traditionally ABRI waited for the President to nominate his 
choice of Vice-Presidential candidates but the practice broke down in this instance 
                                                           
796 The editors, Indonesia, (1996), p. 103. 
797 The editors, Indonesia, (1996), p. 104. 
798 Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto, (Routledge, London, 1998), p. 61. 
 265
when the military pre-empted Suharto and announced their nomination before the 
session started.  The President had the last word, re-arranged his cabinet and, in a 
massive military reshuffle tightened organic ideological cohesion by elevating a new 
generation of loyal, predominantly Muslim, officers and former adjutants into senior 
military positions.799   
 
 
2.2  Resurgent Islam and traditional intellectual inclusion  
                     Through the 1980s and into the 1990s the New Order’s approach 
towards Islam changed.  Suharto’s change of direction has been discussed and further 
debate follows below but had much to do with his perception that he had lost the 
support of key elements within the military and the need to counter an impatient 
ABRI leadership looking towards a future without him at the helm.  The most 
significant of Suharto’s moves towards Islam, providing accommodatory elements of 
modernist Islam a public voice in socio-political affairs through the Intellectuals 
Association ICMI in late 1990, suggested that the President was balancing declining 
support among sections of ABRI with electoral support from the increasingly pious 
middle-class, santri intellectuals and social activists in the lead-up to the crucial 1991 
general elections and the Presidential election that would follow.  Suharto’s support 
for modernist ICMI was clearly a calculated move.  Largely rural traditionalist Islam 
under Wahid’s leadership already offered an accommodatory stance that vocally 
supported the New Order’s Pancasila-ist position on the place of Islam.  Modernist 
Islam, on the other hand, embraced by many among the increasingly pious and 
growing urban middle-class, offered a potentially powerful electoral constituency if it 
able to be successfully brought in line with the President’s agendas.  While the 
modernist stance also included reformists and scripturalists committed to a deeper 
Islamisation of Indonesian society and even an Islamic state, modernist Islam’s 
preparedness to link “modernity with Islamic social consciousness” made the gamble 
worth while.800  The highest levels of the regime realised that giving modernist Islam 
a more influential role in the New Order might also encourage a more accommodating 
position from this important broad electoral constituency.   
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                       Suharto’s support for ICMI rekindled hopes among Islamic intellectuals 
in general that there might be a more influential role for politika-Islam but the 
association troubled those concerned with maintaining the Pancasila state’s secular-
nationalist orientation.  Notwithstanding its stated intentions, to the regime’s critics, 
which included elements within the military, ICMI was merely another example of 
New Order corporatist inclusion.  Its ranks swelled by influential members of the 
increasingly pious bureaucracy and civil service, ICMI seemed to offer no more than 
a controlled environment whereby modernist Islam could be included in organic 
ideological discourse as a counter to Wahid and traditionalist Islam’s attempt to 
capture Pancasila to legitimise regime challenge.  Officially ICMI was intended to 
provide Suharto a “formal sphere of Islamic scholars” under his watchful eye, and 
another view suggested the organisation merely opened an arena for fostering moral 
and intellectual ideological discipline within government circles.801  Christians and 
abangan intellectuals could not help but see the organisation as a first official step 
towards turning Indonesia into an Islamic state, while some academics from the santri 
community and Wahid was the most vocal, feared that ICMI’s sectarian and 
exclusivist inferences hinted at a return to the dangerous sectarian politics of the 
1950s and 1960s.  Critics such as Wahid argued that implementing Islamic precepts 
more deeply into the state were contrary to Pancasila’s intent and would inevitably 
see Islam being treated as a “special case”.802  The spirit of the 1945 Constitution and 
Pancasila guaranteed equal treatment to every individual and group so the 
particularistic line ICMI seemed to offer Islam threatened to jeopardise the idea of the 
state’s secular orientation and thus national unity.803  There was also a degree of 
apprehension and ambiguity within ICMI itself between those prepared to work for 
the regime and those wanting to push for more democratisation from within the 
organisation’s ranks.  With some ICMI members declaring their involvement in the 
organisation as being to promote a deeper Islamisation of state and society, and others 
talking of more democratisation, ICMI was clearly a dangerous departure from the 
New Order’s previously unabashed non-sectarian tenets.   
                  Notwithstanding the apparent pragmatism behind its formation, as ICMI 
was the most significant new Muslim organisation created under the New Order it 
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heightened concerns among elements of the ABRI leadership, as well as a broadening 
range of secular-nationalist interests, that Islam was on a path that could tip 
Pancasila’s ideological balancing of New Order society.  Most military officers 
remained hostile to the organisation believing that ICMI surreptitiously supported an 
Islamic state, that even the more prominent voice the organisation offered the 
significant sprinkling of democratists within ICMI’s ranks contravened Pancasila; 
Suharto, they felt, was playing a dangerous game.804  Many prominent Muslims 
associated with the organisation nevertheless publicly acknowledged that prosperity, 
equality, and democracy did embody core Islamic values and, as such, they were 
prepared to set aside the idea of an Islamic state in favour of working towards a more 
pious society within Pancasila’s frameworks.805  Most military leaders refused to be 
convinced and remained suspicious that Suharto was not only supporting a potentially 
exclusionary organisation and the influential umat to increase his legitimacy but was 
doing so to punish and marginalise ABRI.       
 
2.3  Islamic scriptualists and accommodationists 
                  Given Indonesian Islam’s traditional split between the majority abangan 
(nominally pious syncretist Muslims) and the more pious minority santri, and 
elements of both strains spread among the social organisations of traditionalist NU 
and modernist Muhammadiyah, a further intellectual separation, paralleling the 
general increase in middle-class Muslim piety from the mid-1980s into the 1990s, 
became apparent between what Liddle calls Islamic “scriptualists” and 
“substantialists.”806  In the context of contemporary Islamic observance, 
substantialists are more usefully described as ‘accommodationists’ and both 
intellectual streams of scripturalism and accommodationism cutting across abangan, 
santri traditionalist and modernist strains.  By entering the debate on Islam’s 
appropriate place in contemporary Indonesian society each of the intellectual variants 
invoked the spectre of sectoral exploitation around ideological interpretations and 
caused mounting concern among the secular-nationalist ruling elites.   
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                      The accommodationists generally shared four ideas: that believing is 
more important than performing the required Qur’anic fundamentals; the modernist 
imperative that the Qur’an should be interpreted in the context of existing societal 
conditions; that Muslims must be tolerant towards non-Muslims; and the traditionalist 
imperative that the status quo (i.e. a secular-nationalist state with moral and 
intellectual legitimacy underpinned by Pancasila) remained the most appropriate final 
form of the Indonesian state.  The accommodationists saw no need for an Islamic state 
and, significantly, shared the New Order common commitment to an inclusive 
nationalism that recognised the equal rights of Muslims, Christians, and others as 
Indonesian citizens.807  The scripturalists on the other hand disavowed modernist 
tendencies of accommodation believing that the message and meaning of Islam did 
not need to be adapted to the social conditions of any century let alone the late 20th 
Century.  On the contrary, they believed that a good Muslim implemented Islam’s 
true requirements conscientiously and without compromise.  The scripturalists 
acknowledged a diverse and threatening range of interests lined in opposition: 
Christians, the general anti-Islamic nature of New Order policies, the variety of 
influences and pressures the West and its international institutions were imposing 
upon the Indonesian state, and accommodationists from within the modernist and 
traditional camps of Muhammadiyah, ICMI and NU.  Considering the diversity and 
authority of the opposition, the scripturalists were primarily defensive while the 
accommodationists were appropriately reflective and more intellectually 
compromising.  The New Order firmly opposed any political expression of 
scriptualism but tacitly supported the compatibility of the accommodationist’s 
nationalism with the social politics and economy of Suharto’s vision of a unitary, pan-
religious, state based upon a mixed private-state economy.   
                     The New Order’s economic and social development policies had an 
impact on both scripturalist and accommodationist positions but the larger, better 
educated and more prosperous, santri community, plus many other upwardly mobile 
urban Indonesians, were gradually becoming more sympathetic to the 
accommodationist positions.  Liddle points to three factors that were pushing large 
numbers of Indonesian Muslims in the other direction towards the scriptualists.808  
First, the scripturalist stance is not difficult for pious Muslims to accept as most of the 
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accommodationalist positions on Islam were generally at odds with the contemporary 
Islamic world and in particular the Qur’anic injunction that Islam encompasses all 
aspects of human life including governance.  There is also the likelihood that a more 
participative political environment might enable scripturalists to form advantageous 
political alliances with other rising social groups.  Also, mass rural Muslim lower-
class groups, particularly on the highly populated island of Java, have long distrusted 
the higher-class bureaucrats, military, Sino-Indonesians, and Western interests 
regarded as favoured by the New Order that tended towards the accommodationist 
position.  Finally, and confirming elite fears of mass political mobilisation, there was 
the likelihood that broader political representation might enable more, rather than less, 
ambitious politicians to use Islamic piety to mobilise mass political support.   
                 Tacit New Order support for such prominent accommodationists as 
Abdurrahman Wahid did not necessarily signify regime comfort with their social or 
political conservatism as many accommodationists remained critical of many aspects 
of the New Order, particularly its authoritarian, and self-serving, exclusive, 
interpretation of Pancasila.  Support for the accommodationist position, and 
repression of their intense scripturalist opponents, gave the accommodationists a 
strong advantage in being able to air their views and ideas publicly.  As the 1990s 
progressed, many within the growing, better educated and more prosperous, santri 
community continued to turn towards the accommodationist position and as thoughts 
of an Indonesia without Suharto in charge came to dominate political speculation, 
uncertainty grew as to how the two strains of scripturalism and accommodationism 
might mutually fair in a post-Suharto era when in all likelihood there might be 
opportunities for both to rouse potentially problematic, mass-based, political 
expression.   
                     
3.  Keterbukaan’s openness and the realignment of New Order 
ideological interests   
                       Suharto’s call for more open debate, and the rapprochement with Islam 
confirmed by his patronage of ICMI, was a clear response to the cooling in his 
relationship with ABRI’s senior officers.  Muslim schoolgirls were given permission 
to wear the jilbab (religious veils), an Islamic bank (Bank Muamalat) was established 
and, along with members of his family and close associates, the President made the 
haj (pilgrimage to Mecca).  ICMI’s overtly accommodationist position rewarded a 
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significant segment of Islam with the prospect of greater ideological and political 
leverage over New Order affairs notwithstanding their organisation probably being 
part of a socio-political strategy by the President to balance personal challenge from 
within the military.809  Suharto also dismayed his generals when he implied in an 
address to the ABRI leadership in November 1990 that a shift was overdue with 
regard to ABRI’s role in Indonesia’s socio-political life.810  ‘Democratists’ were 
encouraged by the speech’s implication that dwi fungsi’s socio-political intrusion 
might be limited in the future.  With animosity between Suharto and ABRI growing 
the most conclusive evidence of their rift surfaced following an incident in Dili, East 
Timor November 12, 1991 when troops fired on thousands of demonstrators killing 
several hundred within view of foreign journalists   For the first time New Order 
officers of general rank were held responsible and while many serving officers 
considered the shootings to be a correct doctrinal response to the incident two 
generals were cashiered.  The earlier sideling of the influential Moerdani, ICMI’s 
provocative sectarian implications, the cashiering of two generals and sundry court-
martials in the aftermath of the Dili shootings, and the setting up of a National 
Commission for Human Rights in 1993 were clear indications that ABRI’s influence 
over the President was being undermined.   
                    Suharto’s Keterbukaan had been intended to stimulate more critical 
debate on the political situation in anticipation of Islam being more supportive but the 
initiative merely deepened antagonisms between the President and elements of the 
ABRI leadership and represented the most significant weakening of ideological 
coherence since the beginning of the New Order.811  The rift between the President 
and the military coupled with Keterbukaan encouraged those attacking ABRI’s 
intrusive socio-political activities and interests.  ABRI’s ideological response to 
Suharto’s Keterbukaan was doctrinal but Kewaspadaan’s calls for heightened 
vigilance was increasingly at odds with the President’s attempts to manage the 
pressures the early 1990s were imposing on the New Order.   
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                       Antagonism between the President and ABRI continued through the 
1992 elections and ABRI took a more neutral position towards GOLKAR than in 
previous New Order elections tolerating a number of high profile retired officers to 
publicly support Sukarno’s old political party, Megawati’s Indonesian Nationalist 
Party PDI.  The 1997-8 elections were still some time away but it was obvious that 
the subject of executive transition would have to be addressed at that time so the 
President began to comprehensively restructure the senior officer corps with officers 
more amenable to him.  Having shut down Moerdani’s highly organised personal 
network Suharto had effectively removed any likelihood of an organised, 
autonomous, military power base evolving outside of his control.  With few serving 
officers remained from his revolutionary 1945 Generation, the President was 
increasingly forced to turn to cronies, associates, former aides, and family members, 
to sustain loyalty among the upper echelons of ABRI command.   
 
4.  Competing interpretations of Pancasila and ideological 
confrontation    
                     Four competing intellectual voices variously employed Pancasila 
discourse during the post-azas tunggal era of the 1980s into the 1990s to question the 
use of the state ideology; (1) Abdurrahman Wahid (as chairman of both NU and 
Forum Democracy) representing the traditionalist Islamic view of secular-
nationalism, (2) the influential Islamic modernist view associated with ICMI closely 
aligned with GOLKAR, (3) the ABRI leadership and, with growing enthusiasm (and 
also linked closely to Forum Democracy) and (4) a broad range of democratically-
inclined secular-nationalists assuming a diverse range of stances opposing the New 
Order.812  Discourse occurred across an increasingly complex political terrain 
overlapped by Islamic revival and the scripturalist/accommodationist dichotomy, 
cleavages within both the serving and retired military, calls for democratic reform, 
and successful, albeit inequitable, economic development.  Encouraged by 
Keterbukaan’s more open environment Pancasila was hungrily appropriated by a 
vocal and diverse range of interests.  The state ideology provided an ideal vehicle for 
legitimising NU’s political activities as Pancasila fortified both Wahid’s commitment 
to secular democracy and his nationalist credentials.  Under various guises Wahid was 
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calling for an Indonesian Islam firmly committed to the Pancasila-ist, politically 
secular, nationalist state in much the same vein as the earlier New Order vision.  
Along with intellectuals from modernist ICMI, Wahid’s use of Pancasila as 
ideological legitimacy was complicated by resurgent mass Islam’s potentially 
problematic polarisation around accommodationist and scripturalist visions of Islam’s 
socio-political place in the Indonesian state.   
                      In attempting to appropriate Pancasila’s intellectual and moral high 
ground Wahid offered socio-political compromise that expressed the 
accommodationary values and ideals of a “rational, unitary, non-Islamic state” but 
contradicted those of the New Order regime as well as his (and the regime’s) 
scripturalist opponents.813  He was also sharing secular-nationalist and democratist 
concerns that elements within ABRI were aligning with fundamentalist elements of 
the modernist Islamic community and ideologically associated radical scripturalists to 
threaten Pancasila’s implicit tolerance.  Wahid's Islamic interpretation regarded 
Pancasila as a necessary precondition if Islam was to be rational in the Indonesian 
context, but he argued that activist Islamic elements wanted to go further and 
‘Islamise’ Indonesia as a precondition for democratisation.  In terms of there being no 
contradiction between Islam and nationalism (and that Islam could thrive spiritually in 
a nationalist state not formally based on Islam) Wahid’s approach was therefore as 
much nationalist as Islamic.814   
                        Wahid’s NU was not the only non-state actor appropriating Pancasila 
to legitimise its debate on Islam’s place in the New Order.  Commentators were 
divided over Suharto’s dramatic about-turn in attitude and approach towards Islam, 
represented by his support for ICMI’s accommodationist position.  Notwithstanding 
the possibility he was loosing ABRI support for his continuing Presidency, or whether 
he simply felt political Islam no longer threatened him, ICMI offered the President an 
opportunity for considerable socio-political advantage.  Asaz tunggal had theoretically 
brought all organisations and political groups behind the Pancasila line so with 
Habibie’s staff running ICMI’s administrative functions ICMI appeared to provide an 
easily controlled, more acceptable, Islamic voice than Wahid’s rhetoric of covert 
challenge.  Establishment-sponsored and legitimate, ICMI was officially intended to 
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represent, focus, and manage, the aspirations of the new urban, increasingly middle-
class, educated Muslims that had benefited from pembangunan (economic 
development).  But it was also asserted that ICMI, and the Muslim intellectuals 
involved in it, were politically naïve and being manipulated cynically to strengthen 
the President’s socio-political legitimacy in the face of an increasing divergence of 
interests between himself, senior influential ABRI officers and other elements within 
the ruling elite.  Notwithstanding accusations of their co-optation, ICMI intellectuals 
found themselves with an unprecedented opportunity to enter, and possibly influence, 
socio-political debate.   
                      The ICMI membership represented several streams of socio-political 
thought, Muslim theologians and scholars, Islamic activists (both scriptualists and 
accommodationists), and government bureaucrats.  As the organisation was largely 
staffed and administered by government bureaucrats and Habibie staffers and 
associates, the regime was in a position to closely monitor and direct its influence.  
NU was no longer Indonesian Islam’s only strong voice and the alternative official 
Islamic contribution ICMI offered to ideological discourse was more attuned, and 
accessible, to the regime.  As the only significant Islamic organisation ever created 
under the New Order, ICMI clearly reflected a turning point in the regime’s 
ideological approach to social politics.  As much as the significance of Presidential 
support for ICMI needs to be understood in terms of the asset the organisation 
provided him in balancing ABRI influence, the importance of the organisation to the 
regime in other respects cannot be overstated.  Islam was clearly undergoing a cultural 
resurgence and many of the intellectuals associated with ICMI (as well as those 
associated with NU) appeared to accommodate Pancasila as an ideologically 
legitimate mainstay for Indonesian life and were thus able to accept the strict 
proscription of explicit Islamic political activity the New Order demanded.815  Indeed, 
as Pancasila comfortably satisfied their religious interests within the context of the 
Islamic society they lived in, few Muslims saw society’s problems being the fault of 
Pancasila and its dwi fungsi derivative but more to do with specific New Order 
policies and doctrinal interpretations.  The regime in turn regarded post-azas tunggal 
Islam with much less suspicion.  Empowered to represent an accommodative stream 
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of Islam ICMI members found themselves with access to the very heart of New Order 
power.   
                      As it appeared to legitimise appeals to the old primordial loyalties of the 
early 1960s ICMI troubled ABRI and some senior officers within the military elite 
viewed with alarm the organisation’s potential to resurrect the old ideological 
problems that had plagued the Republic before they and Suharto had been forced to 
take control.  Of particular concern was military elite distrust of the liberal-democratic 
inclinations of some of ICMI’s more influential members that the military considered 
incompatible with Pancasila demokrasi.  Some ICMI activists were vocally opposed 
to the military’s continuing socio-political influence and on a personal basis, sections 
of ABRI viewed ICMI’s chairman Habibie with suspicion.  Although the military 
realised that negative reference to Pancasila was strictly avoided within ICMI, they 
knew that considerable Muslim apprehension remained towards the New Order’s 
exclusionary representation of the state ideology.  Many Muslims, they suspected, had 
not let go of the belief that only Islam could ever really be Indonesia’s unifying 
ideology and that ICMI, NU, and other accommodationists’ acceptance of the 
regime’s version of Pancasila was little more than a convenient way for the Islamic 
movement to participate and operate within the New Order’s highly circumscribed 
socio-political culture.             
                   Adding to the debate over Pancasila’s appropriateness to the changing 
socio-political and cultural environment of the 1990s was the voice of Forum 
Democracy.  A grouping of forty-five prominent intellectuals, formed in March 1991 
and led by Wahid, Forum Democracy was, its leaders claimed, prompted by, rather 
than a counter to, ICMI’s establishment.  Representing the public face of secularism 
the Forum called for a return to a more explicit inclusive interpretation of Pancasila 
that would commit the nation to the unity felt under threat from increasing religious 
and ethnic division and hostility.  By calling for the disestablishment of such 
sectarian-orientated groups as ICMI, Wahid (wearing his Forum hat) was proclaiming 
a genuine Pancasila-ist secular-nationalist logic.816  The Forum’s greatest concern 
was that by sponsoring ICMI the regime was not only attempting to manipulate 
religious and ethnic issues for political gain but also divide Islamic society.  The 
regime’s tendency to divide and rule was not lost upon the secular-nationalists.  
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Inevitably the regime depicted the Forum’s activities as anti-Pancasila but Wahid 
maintained his line carefully appropriating the doctrine differently as leader of NU to 
the way he used it as the Forum’s leader.  While Wahid’s NU strategy was one of 
“accommodationary de-confessionalism” his Forum Democracy position placed more 
emphasis on promoting democracy and in particular the need for a society tolerant of 
religion as an essential precondition for future democracy. 817  While Wahid saw 
Pancasila’s inherent tolerance as vital to democratic evolution, the secular-
nationalists generally faced a dilemma.  Their ranks included many non-Muslims who 
wanted to keep Islam out of politics and saw in the search for a more democratic 
society vulnerability to a politika-Islam that might force them to rely on ABRI’s rigid 
commitment to Pancasila as the only guarantee of long-term secular rights.  The 
1990s therefore found secular-nationalists confronted by a fine line between demands 
for an Islamic society (or even an Islamic state), on the one hand, and continued 
domination by a military-backed regime on the other.    
 
5.  1993: Organic and traditional ideological realignment, 
assimilation and consolidation  
                     By 1993 Suharto’s purge of Moerdani supporters had reasserted his 
control over ABRI’s leadership and GOLKAR, ABRI, and ICMI appeared to be 
operating in concord as a power axis, the regime having assimilated from below into 
its organic constituency the intellectually significant section of Islam represented by 
the overtly accommodationist ICMI.  As well as having loosened its influence over 
GOLKAR, ABRI itself had also become increasingly Islamized.  ABRI of the early 
1990s had generally been commanded by Moerdani-generation abangan Javanese 
officers, or officers from ethnic and religious minorities, so Suharto’s elevation of two 
devout Muslim generals, R. Hartono and Feisal Tanjung, to senior command between 
1993 and 1995 surprised observers and troubled Moerdani-ists.818  As noted above, 
Islam had effectively split into three loose groupings around the now organic 
intellectualism of ICMI, and the polarised traditional intellectual offerings of both the 
increasingly dissatisfied scriptualists and Wahid’s version of accommodationist Islam 
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opposed to ICMI and aligned with an array of secular-nationalist interests that in 
calling for reformasi dan demokrasi regarded Wahid as their intellectual mentor.   
                        Notwithstanding Moerdani’s fall, the President’s support for the rise of 
Muslim officers, his appointment of the Muslim Generals Hartono and Tanjung to 
ABRI command, and the sustained Kewaspadaan military doctrine now employed by 
the military’s more Islamised leadership, intra-military cohesion remained 
fragmented.  The meteoric rise of the President’s Muslim son-in-law Lt. General 
Prabowo, the GOLKAR/ICMI linkage, the mobilisation of Muslim issues in the 
context of military policies, and Kewaspadaan’s dogmatic approach to popular 
movements that interpreted criticism and demands for reform as a threat to the basis 
of Pancasila, were by no means supported by the majority of the officer corps.819  
Disenchanted officers, notwithstanding their oath of loyalty to Pancasila and the 
Constitution, were not only disillusioned with their leaders’ erosion of ABRI’s 
credibility, but also frustrated by the advantages enjoyed by officers promoted from 
Suharto’s circle of former adjutants and confidantes.  It was difficult to determine 
whether it was the Kewaspadaan approach, or the different perceptions of the 
doctrine, that were driving ideological disagreement among the formerly tightly 
woven institution of the officer corps.  Because of the likely damage to career 
prospects if serving officers expressed alternative policy views it was left largely to 
influential retired officers to voice general dissatisfactions.  With refreshing and 
growing candour from the safety of retirement, no longer silenced by their careers, 
generals not only criticised the ABRI’s ongoing domination of socio-political life but 
argued that Kewaspadaan’s doctrinal tightening was inappropriate to both the 
regime’s ideological legitimacy and the changing socio-political realities.   
                        Former supporters of the regime were now complaining that ABRI 
could only succeed in its dwi fungsi role so long as the doctrine enjoyed legitimate 
public support which could only occur when the military stopped influencing every 
aspect of national life.  Kewaspadaan’s doctrinal reinforcement, although originally 
intended to protect Pancasila, was merely restraining legitimate socio-political 
aspirations and the time had come, critics insisted, to reassess ABRI’s role and its 
institutional framework in the light of new societal conditions.  They also argued that 
ABRI’S credibility was suffering immeasurably from the President’s patrimonial 
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tendency of promoting only loyalist officers to top positions.820  Serving officers 
added to the general criticisms by reminding that Pancasila’s secular-nationalism was 
integral to the nation’s goals and, rather than merely promote group interests, military 
policy needed to express Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution’s true egalitarian and 
unifying ideals.   
                      The most powerful group of dissident retired officers calling publicly 
for reform was the sixty-eight member political association, the Foundation for 
National Brotherhood Harmony (YKPK), formed in late 1995.  Although he shared 
their interests, Moerdani was not a member but officers associated with his former 
commands were among the sixty-eight.  The majority of YKPK’s high profile 
participants were retired officers and included prominent secular-nationalists.  
Although limited in their influence, by voicing widespread concern over national 
unity and calling for a reaffirmation of nationalism unaffiliated to any particular 
religion, the group defined the split within contemporary military thought.  YKPK 
based their reformist stance on the failure of ABRI’s socio-political doctrine to reflect 
its legitimising triple commitment to Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and the 
peoples’ security and prosperity.  They argued that ABRI could only be prevented 
from “siding with any one group” and becoming an instrument of sectional interests, 
if the institution adhered to the true triple commitments of their professional oath.821   
                       YKPK’s opposition to ICMI’s implicit sectarianism, and similar 
tendencies afflicting ABRI, not only aligned the group with Wahid’s secular-
nationalist NU but was also welcomed by secular-nationalist minded serving officers, 
as was YKPK’s criticisms of the military’s overt alliances with one single political 
party GOLKAR.  Claiming that ABRI had become a mere “tool of the rich” the group 
focused on ABRI’s manipulation by the regime.822  Although Harmoko’s appointment 
in 1993 was the first civilian GOLKAR chairman since the party’s creation, he was 
strongly supported by the President, Army Commander-in-Chief Tanjung, and ICMI 
Chairman Habibie, and showed that in terms of self-realisation, and notwithstanding 
GOLKAR’s reduced vote in 1992, the senior levels of ABRI remained close to 
GOLKAR.823  This reality contrasted with the growing concerns the issue of socio-
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political sectarianism was raising amongst elites outside of the ABRI/ICMI/GOLKAR 
power axis.  ABRI’s basic ideological role was meant to be a twin commitment to 
Pancasila and the Indonesian Constitution however, as YKPK spokesmen pointed 
out, by siding with one particular political party linked to an accommodative section 
of Islam, ABRI was theoretically anti-Pancasila-ist as well as anti-Constitution.  The 
cracks in regime unity and cohesion were thus firmly premised on interpretations of 
the very ideological foundations upon which the New Order was constructed.  While 
differences remained among medium-level officers, between those supporting ICMI 
and those of a reformist and more secular-nationalist inclination over the leadership’s 
different partners in GOLKAR, and ABRI’s public image as a mere tool of Suharto’s 
political ambitions, by 1994 the reconstituted military’s senior command itself had 
become decidedly pro-Suharto in full support of his Islamic tilt.  In preparation for the 
general elections in 1997 and the Presidential elections that would follow the situation 
seemed politically ideal for the President as he prepared to counter the strong 
opposition anticipated from Megawati’s Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI).   
                       While the President’s encouragement of Keterbukaan in 1990, and the 
promise the opening offered those supporting the growing calls for reformasi dan 
demokrasi, had given heart to the military’s social critics, socio-political reformists 
continued to be frustrated because ABRI now had its Kewaspadaan doctrine to justify 
the continued use of coercion to sustain their version of social order.  Curiously, 
ABRI concern that Kewaspadaan might turn the people against them paradoxically 
found hope in the possibility that the approach could actually be employed to cultivate 
Islamic sympathy.824  By highlighting and exploiting the social, economic and 
political negativity of a “rich-Christian-minority-Sino-Indonesian” and a “poor-
Muslim-majority-indigenous-Indonesian” dichotomy, the military had the means to 
create a rallying point they could control around Indonesian Islam.825  Calling for 
Islamic solidarity in this manner was little more than a temporary measure to conceal 
the growing conflict between regime preservation and genuine social demands for 
reform.   
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6. 1995: Oppositional traditional intellectual forces 
contrasting the GOLKAR/ABRI/ICMI power axis organic 
deepening   
                        The appointment in February 1995, with ICMI’s full support, of Muslim Lt. 
Gen. Hartono as Army Chief of Staff joining the Commander-in-Chief since 1993 
Muslim Gen. Feisal Tanjung, signalled that the Islamisation of the upper levels of 
ABRI was complete.  The regime may have assimilated a considerable number of 
ICMI’s Muslim accommodationists into its organic constituency but it had alienated a 
substantial and increasingly frustrated accommodationist position outside the ICMI 
that were obliged to turn to the forces for reformasi dan demokrasi to realise their 
alternative vision of socio-political and cultural life.  Scripturalist and fundamentalist 
influences remained fragmented but some found clandestine support from shadowy 
elements among the military that opposed the regime’s secular-orientation, and 
looked towards a dynamic Islamisation of the Indonesian state.  Some found hope that 
ABRI’s increasing Islamisation might influence GOLKAR more towards Islamic 
while others assumed the radical scripturalist stance of fundamentalism and opposed 
both the GOLKAR/ABRI/ICMI power axis dominating the New Order as well as all 
Muslim tendencies towards accommodationism.  At the extreme, and in concert with 
elements of the military, fundamentalists sought an Islamic state that could be attained 
by either manipulating the power axis or through an Islamised military intervening in 
response to serious socio-political breakdown.   
                        In terms of the regime cohesion exemplified by the 
GOLKAR/ABRI/ICMI power axis, ABRI’s move towards GOLKAR had exacerbated 
several issues and tensions.  The split between ICMI and its secular-nationalists 
opponents within ABRI and intra-military cleavages themselves enhanced the 
military’s image as a mere tool of the President’s interests and ABRI’s Kewaspadaan-
induced attacks on Communist ghosts and the shabby military involvement in 
Megawati’s removal from leadership of PDI to make sure her supporters remained 
outside formal politics during the build-up to the 1997 election, showed that the 
regime’s coercive instincts remained intact.826  ABRI’s leadership had become more 
Islamised but was defined by a pragmatic Pancasila-ist view of domestic stability that 
merely re-affirmed the military’s narrow ideological orientation as little more than an 
                                                           
826 Chapter 5, section 3.2.6, pp. 225-226. 
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instrument by which the regime could resist and re-articulate demands for reform.  
The acknowledged widening socio-economic gap, on-going government corruption, 
religious disharmony, and vocal concerns over ABRI’s continuing dwi fungsi role, 
threatened social disorder which in itself justified the military continuing their 
coercive social surveillance approach.  Kewaspadaan’s ideological fortification in 
response to the military’s distrust of Keterbukaan’s openness dialogue and 
participation enabled ABRI to vigorously re-assert Pancasila to mediate the pace and 
degree of what they saw as inevitable demands for socio-political change.  The 
military leadership’s new-found Islamic solidarity around the GOLKAR/ABRI/ICMI 
axis did little more than blur a growing contradiction between preserving status quo 
socio-political arrangements and broadening calls for reformasi dan demokrasi.827  
Nevertheless, with the power axis confirming that the structural nature of the regime’s 
ideological arrangements was firmly in place, re-invigorated dwi fungsi sustaining 
ABRI’s repressive socio-political role over the nation, the conservative military 
leadership openly loyal to the President’s desire to retain political power into the 
foreseeable future, it was also apparent that should Suharto decide to go, ABRI were 
well positioned to influence the choice of his successor.      
 
7.  Summary 
                    Chapters I and 5 explain, and it is reiterated above, how organic intellectuals 
of the dominant class aspiring to hegemonic order play the pivotal role in establishing 
and perpetuating hegemonic order on behalf of their sponsoring class by 
disseminating their sponsor’s ideology into an appropriate form for mass 
consumption.828  As the facilitators of mass societal consent to a ruling class’s 
domination (and thus reinforcing that class’s over-arching moral and intellectual 
legitimacy) the organic intellectual must also assume responsibility for abetting 
processes that ensure the view of society’s subordinate groups are assimilated into 
those of the ruling order.  Only through such assimilation is the leadership able to 
weld ideological moral and intellectual acceptance into practical and all-embracing, 
Gramscian hegemonic order.  The extent to which the intellectual and moral 
legitimacy implicit in Gramscian hegemonic order was attained by the New Order 
                                                           
827 Honna, (1999), p. 118. 
828 Chapter 1, section 1.9, pp. 42-46 and Chapter 5, pp. 183-185. 
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leadership depended upon how effectively and all-embracingly the regime was able to 
disseminate consensually its exclusive interpretation of ideology into the mass 
consciousness.  Only by doing so is a ruling order able to sustain societal consensus to 
the validity of its legitimacy and remain, in Gramscian terms, hegemonic.   
                      Replicating the Gramscian model of hegemonic order required the 
Suharto New Order legitimising its domination by articulating and proliferating an 
ideological belief system, tied closely to culture, in a manner so as to be accepted as 
universally valid by the general population.  In Pancasila the New Order found an 
ideology it could present as a set of unifying principles to underpin its hegemony by, 
on the one hand, stabilising a divided society and, on the other, offering a construct 
about which egalitarian social and economic development could be achieved.  The 
New Order subsequently represented Pancasila over some twenty-five years to limit 
individual rights while emphasising social obligations for the greater societal good, 
encouraging belief in God but not an exclusionary Islamic one thereby denying a 
deeper Islamisation of society, and promoting an egalitarian nationalist economic 
system while effectively institutionalising an economic system that privileged a 
favoured minority.  While egalitarianism was not strong the Pancasila-ist system 
nonetheless resulted in a relatively high level of societal stability and socio-political 
development that improved the overall well being of most Indonesians.829   
                    It is also implicit in the Gramscian hegemonic model that it constructs 
and maintains itself by balancing coercion with compliant consensus without the 
former dominating.  Successfully matching the Gramscian model thus required the 
state ideology Pancasila and various ideological/doctrinal derivatives functioning as 
an appropriate “enabling discourse” by which subordinate groups could be convinced 
                                                           
829 As a series of statistics that represent a general indicant of societal betterment Hill offers the 
following:   
 
      1965                    1992 
GDP per capita 190 rp 610 rp 
Lack of schooling  68.1%  18.9% 
Poverty:   a)    Java:  
- very poor 
- sufficient 
b) outside Java 
- very poor 
- sufficient 
  
 
 61% 
   8% 
  
 52% 
  10% 
 
 10% 
 36% 
     
   7% 
  47% 
                      Hal Hill The Indonesian Economy Since 1996, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,   
                       (1996), p. 5. 
 282
of the legitimacy of their effective domination.830  In such terms, the New Order 
ideological bloc proved a sound match for the Gramscian model in that subordinate 
group interests were consistently assimilated, moderated, or co-opted and only when 
necessary, compelled and coerced to conform.  Pancasila and its derivatives provided 
the Suharto regime with the means of legitimising the processes.              
                     As well as the regime’s organic intellectuals (essentially ABRI’s 
doctrinaires and a loose grouping of regime-sponsored techno-bureaucrats) a range of 
traditional intellectuals (representing the two principle divides of Islamic 
traditionalism and Islamic modernism831 plus their variants) shared and competed 
upon the New Order’s ideological and socio-political terrain thus offering the basis of 
an alternative potential counter-hegemony.  With the resurgence of Muslim awareness 
from the 1980s, the abangan/santri separation, reflecting degrees of piety, together 
with the influence of two further intellectual divides, scriptualism and 
accommodationism (contributing both organic and traditional intellectual input), also 
contributed to the debate on New Order ideological legitimacy to offer additional 
sources for a potential counter-hegemony.    
                   The original organic diffusers and interpreters of moral and intellectual 
direction charged with legitimising the values and politico-economic foundations of 
the early New Order bloc coalesced into two groups.  The first, the ‘1966 generation’, 
grouped secular-modernisers charged with overseeing development and the second 
grouped senior military theoreticians charged with formalising appropriate hegemonic 
military doctrines to ensure ideological cohesion and societal stability based on 
national consensus.  Tasked with legitimising the stability necessary for their 
sponsor’s socio-political developmental agendas the techno-bureaucrat-secular-
modernisers and military planners propagated an exclusive interpretation of Pancasila 
as the official state ideology to translate the interests and values of the ruling order as 
reflecting the “general and common values and interests” of the subordinate 
masses.832  Various means were employed to assimilate the values and beliefs of 
subordinate social groups outside the socio-political elites into the New Order’s 
                                                           
830 David McLellan, Marxism after Marx, (Mc Millan, London, 1998), p. 202. 
831 With the regime initiated establishment of ICMI in 1990 a modernist section of Islam was 
assimilated out of the traditional intellectual constituency into the regime’s organic constituency.  
Chapter 2, section 4, p. 84. 
832 Benedetto Fontana, Hegemony and Power: On the Relationship Between Gramsci and Machiavelli, 
(University of Minnesota Press, London, 1993), p. 141. 
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hegemonic arrangements.  The most potent instrument was Pancasila deployed as 
ideological discourse and, by balancing elements of coercion with consensus, a high 
degree of socio-political control and cohesion was sustained.   
                     From the mid-1980s, revitalised Islam led to a resurgent Islamic socio-
politics and as the 1990s progressed, traditional ideological influences attempted to 
capture Pancasila itself to challenge its exclusive use by the New Order as the moral 
and intellectual basis of regime legitimacy.  To sustain its moral and intellectual 
leadership the bloc was obliged to conform to Gramscian imperatives and re-negotiate 
ideological legitimacy in the face of what were effectively changing socio-political 
and economic circumstances.  The regime’s hegemonic defence of the doctrine came 
under growing contestation and its responses to an emergent, albeit disparate, counter-
hegemony placed bloc cohesion under remorseless pressure.  Moreover, pressure was 
compounded by the reality that while organic New Order influences had performed 
the vital ongoing function of resolving potential economic, political and ideological 
differences as they arose, their processes contradicted the vital element of subordinate 
ideological assimilation in that intellectual Islam had been polarised on the powerless 
peripheries of socio-political influence for the previous twenty-five years.         
                     On the one hand, the New Order regime presented itself for some 
twenty-five years as politically secular while effectively promoting Islamic culture 
and, on the other, strictly proscribing religion as the basis of political mobilisation.  
By the beginning of the 1990s Islamic intellectual and cultural life was thriving with 
Islam’s most vocal representative the highly popular Wahid arguing for a tolerant 
accommodative Islam capable of embracing democracy within a Pancasila 
framework.  Wahid was not the only Muslim voice promoting an accommodative 
approach to Pancasila as many among the nominally-Muslim abangan class, both 
within the military serving and retired, and from within the urban and rural 
population, feared that those calling for a more Islamicised society might manipulate 
the political process and enable a democratically elected Muslim majority government 
to extinguish democracy in favour of an Islamic state.  Therein lies Pancasila’s 
inherent enigma in that while used successfully by the New Order to underpin its 
hegemonic legitimacy thereby limiting the allowable boundaries of political 
behaviour, the doctrine (in its original, albeit simplistic, meaning) also provided the 
unifying power of a national ideology capable of appealing across all religious, ethnic 
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and regional affiliations.833  Wahid’s appropriation of Pancasila, offering the doctrine 
as a religiously neutral ideology essential to national unity, caused complex political 
manoeuvrings that in themselves encouraged a resurgent politika-islam to challenge 
New Order ideological legitimacy and thus bloc hegemony.   
                     Wahid’s proactive traditionalist stance, contrasting that of an officially 
sanctioned accommodationary modernist ICMI, confirmed that politika-Islam was 
resurgent but not necessarily an overt challenge to Pancasila as the ideological 
foundation of the New Order state.  Elements within conservative Islam were looking 
towards a political future without Islamic fundamentalism but with greater 
democratisation and less military influence and appropriated Pancasila itself to 
achieve that goal.  An Islamicised rendering of New Order Pancasila demokrasi 
offered many potential problems.  The new era of Islamic mobilisation also 
accentuated the scripturalist/accommodationist dichotomy but because both variants 
traversed Indonesia’s broad traditionalist/modernist and abangan/santri divides the 
likelihood of Muslim cohesion was complicated.  Too much democratisation might 
provide Indonesians with the option of choosing Islam and, in so doing, play into the 
hands of both those within ABRI that rejected Islamic politics and, in a scenario 
referred to as Wahid’s ‘Algerian analogy’, those Islamic radicals who, while rejecting 
democracy, might be prepared to manipulate it to achieve pragmatic socio-political 
ends.834  The emerging imbroglio implied that many within the Indonesian political 
establishment, and perhaps even Wahid and many millions of other 
accommodationists, preferred a military-dominated, more inclusive, Pancasila state to 
an Islamic state.  In the interest of national unity a truly Pancasila-ist state would at 
least protect minority rights rather than permit a democratic process that might enable 
re-confessionalised Islam to win through the ballot box.  Preventing such a scenario 
required Pancasila’s continued representation as an ideology of de-confessionalism, 
unity, and tolerance, and as ABRI doctrine theoretically accepted Pancasila in its 
totality, the doctrine’s implicit logic of liberalism and compromise already firmly 
existed within the bloc’s most powerful coercive instrument.   
                      Many active duty officers distrusted Wahid’s leadership of Indonesia’s 
democracy movement and to counter their concerns Wahid took care to remind them 
                                                           
833 Ramage (1995) p. 193. 
834 In Algeria democratic means were employed to gain parliamentary power and then the new 
government attempted to install a fundamentalist Islamic state.  Ramage (1995) p. 72. 
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that their professed doctrine and sacred oath, founded on the notion of protecting all 
citizens’ rights to an equal share in the state regardless of religion, ethnicity, or 
regional origin, had, albeit unwittingly, committed them to accepting the basis of 
some future, more liberal and inclusive, democratic environment.  Wahid 
acknowledged military doctrinal concerns that religious affiliation be officially 
separated from political mobilisation and participation, but continued to criticise 
ABRI’s attempts to assume the ideological high ground and appropriate sole 
interpretive rights to Pancasila to sustain their self-defined role as Pancasila’s sole 
defender.  While for Wahid Pancasila remained the “preferred political and 
ideological vehicle” to express the accommodative “values and political messages” 
that bound New Order hegemony as the bedrock of bloc moral and intellectual 
legitimacy, the state’s ideological cohesion was looking increasingly likely to become 
unglued.835   
                    Pancasila, the bedrock of New Order moral and intellectual legitimacy, 
was appropriated during the 1990s for contradictory purposes by an array of 
fragmented socio-political interests that had the potential to coalesce into a coherent 
counter-hegemony and challenge New Order hegemony.  The mainstream Muslim 
activists of ICMI were willing to assume an accommodatory stance prepared to 
temper their earlier opposition to regimist Pancasila in return for a chance to work 
within the bloc and, with Presidential support, for an opportunity to more effectively 
promote their alternative vision of a more Islamicised society in which government 
reflected more closely Islamic values.  While Suharto’s voice on Pancasila had 
changed during the post-azas tunggal and Keterbukaan eras, his overall Pancasila-ist 
position remained firm and his regime refused to compromise its concept of a secular-
nationalist state.  By supporting ICMI to improve his personal socio-political 
legitimacy Suharto co-opted an influential segment of Islam and in return seemed 
prepared to weaken the New Order’s prohibition on religious expression by opening 
the door to politika-Islam.  Mainstream Muslim activists remained under no illusion 
that even though the era permitted more space for political debate, verbal opposition 
to an uncompromising regimist Pancasila would see their newfound access to 
national socio-political discourse quickly removed.  The President and, to a lesser 
degree, ABRI continued to set the limits of permitted debate on the role of Islam and 
                                                           
835 Ramage (1995) p. 76. 
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the state but the parameters of discourse had become blurred.  Establishment concerns 
focussed on a vocal NU and a regime-sanctioned ICMI seemingly appealing to the 
masses and hinting at a revival of the old ideological issues that had so disastrously 
aroused primordial instincts thirty years before.  While both organisations represented 
respectively the intellectual strains of predominantly rural traditionalist and urban 
modernist Islam their cohesion was loosened by the uncompromising stances of the 
Pancasila-averse scripturalists and the Pancasila-tolerant accommodationists.  With 
fundamentalist elements among the scriptualists willing to promote violence and 
societal chaos to achieve their ends, the fear that political and institutional links might 
develop between extremist Islam and elements within the elites suggested that a 
diverse range of secular-nationalist interests might be forced to create balancing 
alliances with the military to protect their interests.   
                     Establishment elites traditionally feared sectarianism returning to 
contemporary politics as much as they generally distrusted party-political processes 
linked to grass-roots mass society.  However much they feared mobilisation around 
religious issues, the ruling elites were also concerned at the likelihood of religious 
mobilisation linking to calls for more democracy and the wider political participation 
such linkages implied.  The major concern shared by most secular-nationalists was 
that emotional ideological issues might inspire and arouse mass behaviour that 
ABRI’s reinvigorated Kewaspadaan doctrine could justify overstating as an excuse to 
directly hinder any efforts towards more democratisation.  New Order economic 
development had been premised on an earlier assurance that at some time in the future 
broader political participation would be permitted, but due to the New Order view of 
the particular nature of Indonesian socio-political society, liberal democracy was 
constantly depicted as contrary to Pancasila.  Leading Indonesian democratisers 
disagreed, maintaining Wahid’s line that the very nature of Indonesian society made 
Pancasila, notwithstanding its less than liberal interpretations by the New Order, an 
essential prerequisite for democratisation.   
                    Maintaining the New Order bloc required moral and intellectual 
leadership sustaining legitimacy through its exclusive interpretation and 
representation of Pancasila.  However, from the late 1980s more open debate, 
although clearly restrained, encouraged a broad range of interests to offer ideological 
alternatives that increasingly and vocally challenged the bloc’s hold on ideological 
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representation and, as such, New Order hegemonic legitimacy.  Having depoliticised 
society for a quarter of a century by exclusively and restrictively representing 
Pancasila, the bloc had denied any alternative form of moderate, secular, socio-
political expression.  Keterbukaan’s new era of openness offered the traditionalist and 
modernist strains of Islam, represented by NU and ICMI respectively, an opportunity 
to demonstrate that considerable socio-political space had opened for so-called non-
political organisations such as theirs to challenge bloc moral and intellectual 
legitimacy.  Kewaspadaan’s demand that the military remain ideologically vigilant 
not only challenged ABRI’s traditional internal cohesion, but also focused opposition 
upon the New Order’s prime instrument of the coercive side of ideological 
conformity.    
                    Gramscian hegemony is an unceasing, remorseless, process of struggle 
and by definition a dynamic affair to control the hearts and minds of subordinate 
classes.  Hegemony’s work, so to speak, “is never done.”836  As the 1990s unfolded 
the New Order bloc’s moral and intellectual right to leadership, underpinned by its 
exclusive representation of the bloc’s binding ideology, faltered through its inability 
to assimilate the key views and values of a prime segment of hegemony’s 
subordinated masses.  Although the bloc had captured intellectually a significant 
accommodationary segment of resurgent Islam, diverse elements remaining outside 
the power frame offered the potential for the formation of an effective counter-
hegemony.  Gramscian hegemony is all about social and political control combining 
coercion (the threat of physical force) with consent (ideological legitimacy through 
intellectual, moral, and cultural persuasion) but as the 1990s evolved the New Order 
faced increasing challenge to its exclusive representation of the latter in attempting to 
legitimise the former.  In terms of Gramsci’s intellectual duality, Islamic scripturalism 
came to assume a traditional intellectual position that starkly contrasted the alternative 
traditional intellectual character of the various accommodationist forces aligning 
themselves with demands for reform, human rights, and socio-political change under 
the banner of reformasi dan demokrasi.  Two potentially counter-hegemonic 
amalgams thus threatened the bloc but also represented two irreconcilably opposed 
moral and intellectual constituencies.         
                                                           
836 Gramsci cited in R. Miliband, Capitalist Democracy in Britain, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1982), p. 76. 
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                   Ultimately, by questioning the legitimacy of the bloc’s exclusive 
representation of the state ideology Pancasila, both traditional and organic intellectual 
sources were offering alternatives to the official ideological discourse that had 
underwritten New Order hegemony for some thirty years.  Alternative ideological 
renderings faced profound difficulties in coalescing into a cohesive counter-hegemony 
but the consequences of their efforts challenged hegemony’s ideological legitimacy.  
In the hands of those who had used it so effectively previously, Pancasila’s utility as 
the ideological pillar of the regime’s socio-political agendas had been undermined and 
the bloc had clearly entered a state of moral and intellectual obsolescence.   
                The important consideration in summarising this chapter has been the extent 
to which the Suharto New Order’s ideological arrangement of Indonesian life - its 
ideological bloc - matched that crucial aspect of Gramscian hegemonic order of 
consensually underpinning the New Order’s ideological legitimacy.  This section 
summarises the Suharto New Order’s effectiveness in legitimising its socio-political 
and economic interests through its exclusive arrangement and representation of 
ideology and argues that Gramsci’s insights are robust in the context.837  Yet the 
behaviour of the New Order ideological bloc in terms of the Gramscian model 
showed distinct shortcomings.  Notwithstanding Islam’s prevalence, Pancasila’s 
hegemonic representation as state ideology and the pillar of a secular-nationalist state 
became increasingly unconvincing to the majority therefore the consensual aspect of 
hegemonic legitimacy was questionable.  While the Gramscian model remained sound 
in the Indonesian context, its imperatives in terms of New Order hegemonic 
observance was progressively more deficient.   
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
837 Dante Germino, Antonio Gramsci: Architect of a New Politics, (Louisiana State University Press, 
London, 1990), p. 177. 
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Chapter 7 
 
New Order collapse 
 
                   The Suharto New Order came to an end in 1998 after a regional economic 
crisis in 1997 had spread financial chaos into Indonesia and catalyzed the socio-
political deterioration that had been gaining momentum during the 1990s into regime 
collapse.  This chapter will explore the ‘twin crises’ approach by way of a narrative 
summary as to how a disparate range of domestic social forces demanding political 
reform, an end to corruption, nepotism, growing economic inequity and poverty, came 
together temporarily under the rubric of reformasi dan demokrasi and placed 
irresistible pressure upon Suharto’s Presidency leaving him no alternative but to 
resign.  The chapter will conclude with first a summary of the events that led to the 
New Order’s demise and follow with an explanation that will highlight the utility of 
the Gramscian approach that explains regime failure in terms of the historic bloc 
model.  Before turning to the specific conclusions of the final chapter, this summary 
highlights the key elements of the thesis’s Gramscian ideological approach by 
discussing the explanatory value of the three economic, political and ideological 
components of the New Order historic bloc as a more useful alternative to the ‘twin-
crises’ approach.     
                 During the late 1980s, believing himself to be increasingly estranged from 
his most potent instrument of socio-political control, the ABRI leadership, Suharto 
attempted to adjust his New Order ‘pyramid of power’838 by re-aligning the alliance 
of elite interests that sustained his authority.  Maintaining cohesion and stability 
during the early 1990s required the President constantly having to balance the two 
powerful socio-political resources of the military and Islam.  His efforts proved 
reasonably successful until the impact of the regional economic crisis compounded 
growing domestic socio-political problems and ultimately led to his resignation and 
the collapse of the New Order.   
                                                           
838 The President, his compliant military, his supportive, predominantly Islamic, techno-bureaucratic 
‘middle class’, and an accommodative, predominantly Sino-Indonesian capital class: refer below, 
chapter 5, section 1.2, pp. 188-189.    
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                    An Islamic cultural resurgence from the mid-1980s, and subsequent 
Islamic socio-political rehabilitation contrasting a process of ideological deepening 
through military doctrinal refurbishment, set the stage for the ideological and socio-
political questioning and scrutiny that came to dominate the 1990s.  To counter his 
perceived loss of support from the military senior leadership, Suharto offered 
accommodatory modernist intellectual Islam a more influential socio-political voice 
but his move, coming with his call for more socio-political openness, while 
perplexing and angering elements within the military, offered encouragement to the 
diverse range of interests calling for reform and change.  Suharto’s move polarized 
positions within both Islam and the military that varied between preservation of the 
socio-political status quo based upon a regimist representation of the Pancasila and 
demands for varying degrees of change.  The progressive Islamisation of the military 
command structure highlighted the disunity within an institution that had for some 
twenty-five years represented Suharto’s loyal, unified, support base.  The invigorated 
Indonesian Islam of the 1990s in turn polarized around leaders and positions 
previously unacceptable to the New Order.  Islamic modernists and traditionalists, 
pious santri and syncretist abangan, all assumed positions that exhibited varying 
degrees of accommodation with the New Order’s version of a Pancasila-ist state in 
return for a deeper Islamisation of Indonesian life and a louder voice in socio-political 
affairs.  Rigid Islamic scripturalists and defiant Islamic fundamentalists called for no 
less than an Islamic state.  ABRI, the regime’s socio-political and economic elites, 
and the burgeoning, upwardly mobile, urban middle-class professionals, civil servants 
and businessmen watched anxiously, entered the debate, and pondered the 
inevitability of a future without Suharto firmly at the helm.     
                    Increasing disunity among the ruling elites, broad intellectual cleavages 
within the religious leaderships and mass demands for reformasi dan demokrasi, all 
had a significant impact on the socio-political resources of both the military and 
Islam.  Finally, with the collapse of the Indonesian economy in 1997, the alliance of 
elite interests based on ideological conformity that had underpinned and legitimized 
the New Order ‘pyramid of power’ for some three decades disintegrated and President 
Suharto resigned.   
                     For some three decades the New Order had systematically depoliticized 
mass society and desensitized socio-political consciousness to the extent that popular 
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interests could only be channelled ‘upwards’ through the constrained Pancasila-ist 
socio-political system.  Although they traditionally assumed oppositional socio-
political stances, the willingness of popular leaders Rais and Wahid (representing 
modernist and traditionalist Islam respectively) and Megawati (representing 
democratic populism) to accommodate the demands of the New Order Pancasila state 
failed the socio-political aspirations of the popular masses when the nation was 
brought to the verge of chaos by the 1997 economic crisis.  It was left to the student 
leadership to co-ordinate popular opposition to Suharto and the demands of the 
masses for reformasi dan demokrasi.  During the early and mid-1990s the ‘upward’ 
aspirations of middle-class Indonesians had found accommodation with the regime 
through the state organs GOLKAR, ICMI, ABRI, the bureaucracy, and their particular 
religious orientation.  Their response to the succession of crises was to withdraw their 
support from Suharto and constrained by their latent conservatism, rather than 
coalesce into a coherent opposition, remained estranged from the student-led popular 
masses that had come together to bring the regime down.       
                   The ‘twin crises’ explanation of the New Order’s collapse is best 
described as concurrent ‘socio-political revolution’ and ‘economic breakdown’ and 
this chapter will detail the progression of events leading to the collapse of the Suharto 
New Order in order that they can be tested against the Gramscian notion of 
hegemonic obsolescence and decay and the possible emergence of a coherent counter-
hegemony.  The mounting socio-political uncertainty of the early 1990s will first be 
described followed by a discussion on ABRI’s deteriorating socio-political position in 
the lead-up to Suharto’s resignation.  Section 3 outlines the consequences of socio-
political Islam’s resurgence during the period and enables discussion as to whether the 
phenomenon represented an emergent counter-hegemony.  Section 4 describes the 
Indonesian economy of the early 1990s and the reasons for its collapse in 1997/8 
following the Asian economic crisis in terms of a collapse of the New Order 
economic bloc.  Section 5 describes the socio-political crisis of the final months of the 
New Order in terms of the regime’s loss of establishment support catalyzed by 
student-led popular revolution in terms of hegemonic obsolescence and decay within 
the New Order political bloc.     
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1.  The 1990s: Mounting socio-political uncertainty and 
challenge   
                   President Suharto’s 1990 keterbukaan initiative inviting socio-
political openness demonstrated his belief in the legitimacy of his regime’s socio-
political position and suggested the New Order was satisfied with the invulnerability 
of their socio-political domination.  Generally successful economic development, azas 
tunggal’s tacit demonstration of ideological cohesion, ABRI’s dogmatic Pancasila-ist 
stance, and a resurgent Islam co-opted into accommodating the socio-political and 
ideological status quo, implied the New Order and Suharto’s position were secure.  
By encouraging socio-political debate keterbukaan opened the way to an intense 
questioning of the logic that underpinned the New Order’s socio-political pretensions 
and in particular the regime’s exclusive representation of Pancasila.   
                      The emergent nationalist-populist moods of the 1990s drew political 
sustenance from the social inequalities that seemed to represent the New Order’s idea 
of successful economic growth.  The moods only legitimate political outlet was 
Megawati’s secular-nationalist orientated, and politically marginalized PDI, but her 
‘echo’ of Sukarnoism troubled ABRI deeply.839  Elements of the PDI leadership had 
received, if not support, certainly encouragement from the military group that had 
been associated with the Christian Moerdani prior to his removal from the power 
frame in 1993.840  While opposition to the regime from PDI’s lower-class, urban 
support base was little more than implied, middle-class critics found encouragement 
from a dramatic growth in the number of non-confrontational NGOs during the 1980s 
to the extent that from the early 1990s an embryonic state-civil society distinction was 
discernable.841  Given their stake in continued economic progress and sustained social 
stability it was hardly surprising that the inherently conservative growing middle class 
that had profited under the New Order hoped for a continuation of the socio-political 
status quo.842  As the major economic and social beneficiaries of a quarter century of 
successful economic development, the new middle classes had become highly 
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dependent on state patronage so political pluralism and any open lobbying from an 
autonomous civil society promised to be problematic.843  A combination of mainly 
material rewards for participation in the system, fear of their removal, sanctions and 
even coercion if the system was challenged, gave form to a largely ambivalent and 
constrained middle-class generally indifferent to change and indisposed to pressuring 
for more constitutional processes.      
                      The distinctions between the regime and its opponents that took form in 
the early 1990s were more about growing tensions between the Executive and 
elements of the senior military contrasting an apparent rapprochement between the 
President and a potential Islamic constituency.844  The extraordinary reconciliation 
between the highest levels of regime power and an accommodative modernist stream 
of Islam would not have occurred had basic ideological differences not been removed 
by azas tunggal back in the early 1980s.  The sizeable educated Islamic middle-class 
emerging during the 1980s made rapprochement a socio-political necessity if the 
regime was to sustain its socio-political legitimacy.845  Secular-nationalist and liberal 
concerns at Islam’s nascent ascendancy, voiced by such powerful populist leaders as 
Wahid and Megawati, were also shared generally by the middle ranks of the military.  
Paradoxically, not only did the secular-liberal dissidents view President Suharto’s 
resignation or retirement as a necessary pre-requisite to any future democratization, 
they also regarded a strong, stabilizing, military as not only essential but inevitable in 
any future post-Suharto socio-political arrangement.   
                  President Suharto’s calls for socio-political openness in his Independence 
Day speech of 16 August 1989 showed the New Order was prepared to ease 
constraints on free speech.846  While reform, he claimed, needed to be balanced with 
continuity and lessons had to be learned from the experiences and mistakes of the 
past, the persisting factor, essential to the nation’s unity and considered “sacred … 
essence unchallenged”, must remain Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.847  While 
national development required constantly balancing Pancasila as a framework for 
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reconciliation, the ideology nevertheless needed to be “opened” to enable “fresh and 
creative” ways of responding to the demands of modernity and change.848  Addressing 
the nation a year later, and again in the context of Keterbukaan, the President 
continued the theme: competing demands and a “diversity of viewpoints and 
opinions” had to be complimentary if progress was to be achieved.849  Democracy, the 
President insisted required consultation and discussion and “to fear diversity of 
opinion” was to doubt Pancasila’s power and hinder its evolution as the national 
ideology.850  A new era of consultation had clearly dawned.   
                     To Indonesia’s “dynamic society and its growing middle-class” 
Keterbukaan’s invitation for broader political debate was seen as not only implying 
more opportunity for expression but also that Suharto was of the belief that successful 
economic growth needed to be accompanied by a higher level of political 
liberalization.851  The top level of the New Order regime clearly felt that their socio-
political domination was total.  Whereas Suharto had previously relied on his generals 
for support, Keterbukaan now offered a rationale for listening more to civilians.  
Suharto’s National Day address on August 16, 1993, actually conceded that 
“differences of opinion are legitimate … socio-political organization … and other 
state institutions are gradually [having to become] more aware of their respective 
missions and functions.”852  Nonetheless, the New Order had little tradition of public 
debate or loyal opposition so openness was regarded with caution and taken by the 
middle-class generally, and the military in particular, to represent a potentially 
dangerous threat to socio-political stability.  Keterbukaan seemed to threaten their 
vested interests in sustaining the socio-political status quo.853   
 
2.  ABRI: status quo versus change  
             Outwardly, ABRI was aware that by calling for more socio-political 
openness and debate the President was widening the gap between them and the people 
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they were ideologically committed to serving.  Inwardly their concern was to preserve 
their future or, more specifically, their privileged position in Indonesia’s socio-
political system following inevitable Presidential succession.  While many officers of 
the new generation doubted the validity of their twin socio-political functions, others 
saw any change to dwi fungsi as likely to undermine their relevance in politics and, by 
implication, their ability to influence a future regime change.  While dwi fungsi had 
been born of necessity out of ABRI’s view that politics was too serious a matter to be 
left to politicians, the doctrine now seemed anachronistic and had evolved to the point 
where many within the military acknowledged it was more protective of corporate 
privilege than national interests.854  Moreover, Suharto’s power had become such that 
if it was to his benefit to do so, he could bypass ABRI.  Keterbukaan enabled the 
President to choose selectively from new civilian political constituencies and thereby 
exploit divisions within Indonesian society.  By sanctioning the Muslim ICMI he not 
only appeared to contradict the traditional regime aversion to sectarian politics but 
also acquired an influential Islamic constituency in the build-up to the 1993 
Presidential elections.  The President had targeted indigenous accommodatory Islam 
as a potentially complimentary support-base to GOLKAR and a “useful barricade” 
against ABRI influence.855   
 
2.1  ABRI doctrinal reaffirmation through ‘Kewaspadaan’   
                     During the 1980s, the previously close, mutually advantageous, ABRI 
cohesion came under serious scrutiny through differing perceptions within the officer 
corps as to how Indonesian society should continue to evolve and the military’s place 
within it.  The 1990s saw the generals under growing pressure to adapt the ideological 
pretensions reflected in military doctrine to include the new range of demands 
emanating from Indonesia’s rapidly changing society.  But mainstream calls for less 
exclusive political participation, human rights accountability and, in particular, an end 
to the military’s intensive socio-political intrusion, were seen by the senior command 
as seriously challenging their pre-eminent role.  ABRI responded by updating its 
ideological foundations through doctrinal refurbishment that interpreted any form of 
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socio-political dissent as national threat and, as such, a legitimate target of their more 
coercive defensive instincts.856  Sustained by a doctrine that was integral to regime 
legitimacy and that insisted on societal stability as a necessary prerequisite to 
sustained economic and socio-political development, ABRI’s ideological mission, 
self-defined through dwi fungsi, claimed permanent defence and socio-political roles.  
As long as the threat persisted, the potential for instability remained, fortifying and 
sustaining their perceptions and heightening the need for constant vigilance.  
Sustaining the notion that national threat persisted required a degree of imagination 
and in February 1988 doctrine was adjusted and formalized into Kewaspadaan to 
broaden the likely source of threat and prioritize on-going socio-political vigilance.857   
                      Effectively Kewaspadaan institutionalized into doctrine the military 
leadership’s belief that Pancasila society had come under threat from a new array of 
subversive groups and ideologies.858  To the military high command Kewaspadaan 
provided essential doctrinal value in that it served as a timely reminder that their 
institution’s legitimacy rested upon its acceptance by society at large as the foremost 
guardians of the national interest.  Defending established self-perceptions of its sacred 
role against growing calls for an end to dwi fungsi (and in particular demands that the 
military return to the barracks) through a doctrine that demanded renewed vigilance at 
every government level, required the military being able to identify threats to national 
stability even though they might not necessarily exist.  The doctrine struggled to insist 
that Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution were being challenged by such destructive 
foreign values as democratic political participation and humanitarian rights and 
regime critics saw Kewaspadaan as little more than another self-justifying “tool of 
popular repression”.859  To ABRI’s leadership, reinforcing doctrinal commitment to 
Pancasila through Kewaspadaan’ was a sensible ideological fortification for 
challenging times and offered a useful tool to control the pace and degree of socio-
political change and, ultimately, Presidential transition.  The President’s keterbukaan 
(openness), initiative by implying that the boundary of permissible political discourse 
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had expanded and that some latitude was now permitted to publicly criticize the 
military, clearly contradicted ABRI doctrine.860  The depth of antagonism the subject 
provoked among some elements of the military was clear when General Try Sutrisno, 
ABRI Commander (and Moerdani protégé), challenged the reformist atmosphere by 
firmly declaring that dwi fungsi was not to be publicly debated.861  The swing of 
discussion and contradiction served to highlight the differences between the President 
and some elements of the military leadership as to dwi fungsi’s place in the modern 
era but after three decades of totally dominating Indonesian life, Suharto’s regime 
could hardly remain impervious to the growing demands for change.   
 
2.2  Keterbukaan and New Order cohesion   
                    ICMI’s signal of Suharto’s apparent rapprochement with Islam seemed to 
be in response to his perception that support from senior elements of the Armed 
Forces leadership was cooling.  An accommodative ICMI appeared to offer Islam the 
prospect of greater political leverage over the affairs of the state and as such a clear 
strategy by the President to counter a challenge to his authority from the military.862  
The most conclusive evidence of a rift between the President and the military came as 
a result of the Dili, East Timor incident in 1991 when, for the first time, New Order 
officers of senior rank were cashiered.  Keterbukaan had been intended to stimulate 
more general critical debate on the political situation but effectively deepened 
antagonisms between the President and key elements of ABRI’s leadership and 
provided encouragement to those determined to undermine ABRI’s political activities 
and interests.863   
                    Kewaspadaan’s reassertion of ABRI’S ideological mission appeared 
increasingly at odds with the President calling for Keterbukaan as a means of coping 
with the pressures on his authority and direction from Indonesia’s changing society of 
the 1990s.  Suharto’s address to the ABRI leadership in November 1990, implying 
that a shift was needed in ABRI’s role in socio-political life and that he intended to 
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limit the political aspect of the military’s dwi fungsi mission further, dismayed his 
generals.864  Moerdani’s sidelining, ICMI’s provocative sectarian implications, the 
Dili cashierings and setting up a National Commission for Human Rights in 1993, 
were all seen as clearly undermining ABRI’s influence.  Antagonism continued 
through the 1992 elections with the military retaliating by adopting a more neutral 
position towards GOLKAR, publicly supporting Megawati’s PDI, and announcing 
their own nominee for vice-President without following tradition and waiting for 
Suharto to announce his preference.865  The President’s response was typically firm, 
Moerdani’s remaining supporters in command positions were removed and the senior 
officer corps was comprehensively restructured with officers more amenable to 
Suharto who turned to cronies, associates, former aides, and family members, to build 
a new loyal military support base.   
 
2.3 1993: Intra-military cohesion and GOLKAR/ABRI/ICMI 
rapproachment 
                  Notwithstanding the removal of Moerdani’s divisive influence, the 
President’s support for the rise of Muslim officers confirmed by Muslim General 
Feisal Tanjung’s appointment in 1993 as ABRI Commander-in-Chief, and the 
sustained Keterbukaan approach now fine-tuned more to supporting Suharto’s new-
found Islamic base, intra-military cohesion remained fragmented.  But the meteoric 
rise of the President’s son-in-law, the Muslim Lt. General Prabowo, as commander of 
the Special Forces, the Golkar/ICMI linkage, the mobilization of Muslim issues in the 
context of military policies, and Kewaspadaan’s dogmatic approach to popular 
movements were by no means supported by the majority of senior and middle-ranking 
officers.866  Their disenchantment was not only with their leadership’s erosion of 
military socio-political credibility, but also with the advantages enjoyed by officers 
promoted from Suharto’s circle, and the likely damage to career prospects if views 
were expressed contradicting policy and doctrine.  It therefore fell to safely retired 
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senior generals, no longer concerned about career prospects, to criticize the regime on 
behalf of reformist-inclined serving officers.  From retirement they criticized 
Kewaspadaan, and what they regarded as the increasing illegitimacy of ABRI’s socio-
political mission insisting that the time had come to reassess the military’s role in the 
face of new socio-political realities.  However, their complaints were being made 
from the peripheries of political power.  
                   Harmoko’s appointment in 1993 as the first civilian GOLKAR chairman 
since the creation of the party, with strong support from the President, Army 
Commander-in-Chief Tanjung, and ICMI Chairman Habibie, showed that ABRI had 
moved even closer to GOLKAR paralleling the concerns the issue of socio-political 
sectarianism was raising amongst elites outside of the ABRI/ICMI/GOLKAR power 
axis.  However, although differences in opinion among medium-level officers were 
apparent, between ICMI supporters and the secular-national camp, over the 
leadership’s different partners in GOLKAR, and over ABRI’s public image as little 
more than a tool of Suharto’s political ambitions, the reconstituted Armed Forces 
senior command itself remained decidedly pro-Suharto from 1994.   
 
2.4  1995:  The reinforced GOLKAR/ABRI/ICMI power axis and 
ABRI’s growing Islamisation   
                  Muslim Lt. Gen. Hartono’s appointment as Army Chief of Staff in 
February 1995 with full ICMI and GOLKAR support joining Muslim Gen. Feisal 
Tanjung, the Commander-in-Chief since 1993, signified that the upper levels of 
ABRI’s leadership was completely Islamised.  The strengthened GOLAR/ABRI/ICMI 
power axis of 1995/6 reflected that elite cohesion was strong but ABRI’s closer 
association with GOLKAR raised important concerns.  The split between ICMI’s 
Islamic accommodationists and its secular-nationalist and reformist inclined 
opponents, vocal intra-military cleavages, and the military’s image as a mere tool of 
the President’s interests, exacerbated tensions.  A shabby attempt by the military to 
remove Megawati from the PDI leadership and Kewaspadaan-induced attacks on 
Communist ‘ghosts’ demonstrated that the military’s repressive instincts remained 
intact and at the President’s disposal.   
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                    ABRI’s ideological orientation, as expressed by the current Islamicised 
leadership, had narrowed and the now fully operational Kewaspadaan doctrinal 
approach not only re-affirmed military self-perceptions of socio-political and 
ideological legitimacy, but had become a powerful instrument with which the ABRI 
leadership could confront and re-articulate reformist demands.  But while the 
widening socio-economic gap, rampant government corruption, religious disharmony, 
and overt societal distrust of the military’s socio-political role presented opportunities 
for social disorder they also served to validate military perceptions that the need for 
heightened social surveillance was justified.  Responding to the threats inherent in 
Keterbukaan’s call for openness, dialogue, and participation, Kewaspadaan’s 
ideological fortification seemed to offer the military leadership the only appropriate 
option if they were to control the pace and degree of inevitable socio-political change 
and ultimately regime transition.  With the GOLKAR/ABRI/ICMIC axis representing 
new-found regime solidarity, officers below the senior command structure were able 
to do little more than ‘blur’ the growing contradiction between preservation of the 
socio-political status quo and the growing calls for reformasi dan demokrasi.867  The 
structural nature of the President/military relationship remained in place, dwi fungsi 
continued to characterize ABRI’s role over the nation, and to ensure they maintained 
some hold on the centre of political power the conservative military senior command 
remained overtly loyal to the President.            
 
3.  Islam: status quo versus change   
                  Despite the New Order having peripheralised politika-Islam for some 
two decades, regime challenge from the late-1980s occurred within the context of 
reformasi socio-politics and Islam’s cultural and political resurgence.  To ameliorate 
Islam’s challenge the New Order employed its hitherto highly successful persuasive 
technique of splitting its opposition and co-opting the politically and socially 
significant modernist intellectual element of Indonesian Islam willing to 
accommodate the regime’s secular-nationalist representation of Pancasila.  
Intellectual Islam represented the second most powerful socio-political intellectual 
resource after ABRI and with reformasi drawing together an array of intellectual 
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forces potentially antagonistic to New Order domination, intellectual Islam became a 
critical arena in any re-arrangement of the ruling alliance structure.  Since Indonesian 
Islam was far from monolithic, the various intellectual strains of Indonesian Islam 
also tended to overlap those of the secular-nationalist and liberal-democratic forces 
staking their future on growing discourse demanding the changes symbolized by 
reformasi dan demokrasi.   
                   The executive office maintained its firm grip on power throughout the 
early 1990s and although the President and ABRI continued to set the limitations of 
political discourse and participation the parameters of authority became increasingly 
blurred.  Elites, both inside and outside of the power framework, were forced to 
confront issues that questioned the New Order socio-political arrangement and its 
exclusive representation of Pancasila to underwrite the legitimacy of its leadership.  
The matter of Presidential succession also preoccupied elite political thought as did a 
fear that close political and institutional links between Islam and the state had the 
potential to revive the old ideological issues and ‘primordial’ politics of the violent 
mid-1960s.  Paralleling Islam’s international revival, Indonesian Islamic intellectual 
and cultural life was thriving but its socio-political potential for activism now hinted 
at sectarian politics mobilizing the masses around religious, democratic and human 
rights issues.  Secular nationalists, although ever conscious of the tenuous causal link 
between emotional ideological issues and mass behaviour remained politically 
impotent and marginalized to the peripheries of political expression by the New 
Order’s restrictive and exclusive interpretation of the Pancasila state.  Yet Indonesian 
Islam, through accommodative traditionalist NU and accommodative modernist 
ICMI, demonstrated that so-called non-political organizations could actively 
participate on what had become a more open socio-political terrain.  Secular-
nationalists saw the organizations’ implied sectarianism as provocative and evoking 
the awful image of political organization reaching out to the unpredictable masses.   
 
3.1  ICMI and Muslim accommodation with the New Order 
                      The Islamic Intellectual Association (ICMI) was generally considered to 
counter-balance Suharto’s perception that he had lost the support of a new generation 
of secular-nationalist military officers looking beyond his leadership.  As well as the 
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Association’s tacit sectarian implications, elements within the military were 
particularly troubled by Habibie’s chairmanship because the role offered the 
President’s favourite an opportunity for a civilian to consolidate an independent 
Islamic constituency outside that of military influence.  Looking towards a time 
without Suharto in charge, the military leadership saw ICMI as a modernist Islamic 
pseudo-political organization and, notwithstanding its accommodationist position, that 
its channelling of formerly depoliticized Muslim aspirations into socio-political policy 
could threaten the secularism underpinning Pancasila.868  Clearly after some twenty-
five years of New Order socio-political engineering the role of Islam needed to be 
reassessed in the context of change and the introduction and dissemination of the 
secularistic ideas and practices that accompanied modernization challenged the social 
roles of the religious elites.869  Modernisation’s proliferation of such professional 
groups as the politically nuanced ICMI not only questioned the religious elites’ 
traditional roles but also the legitimacy of their influence over mass communities.  At 
the same time modern secular knowledge, attuned and adjusted to modern realities, 
was tending to push traditional knowledge and religious teachings to the background.   
                     Prior to ICMI Muslim communities had been permitted little space to 
articulate political aspirations outside Pancasila’s narrow precepts.  The merging in 
1973 of all Islamic political parties into the docile PPP had marginalized Islam out of 
the political arena and discredited it as anti-Pancasilist thus ensuring that Muslim 
political aspirations remained repressed.  The Islamic elites were left with but two 
alternatives; rejection of the New Order Pancasila state, or accommodation within it.  
ICMI’s accommodation took the line that Islam could progress as part of the New 
Order corporatist arrangement outside of the decision-making process but offered 
hope that they could eventually influence reform from above.  Accommodationists 
also believed that Islam could be strengthened from outside the state through such 
socially orientated organizations as NU and Muhammadiyah and ICMI’s sanctioning 
after decades of politika-Islam’s repression, seemed to have vindicated this strategy.  
An alternative accommodationist view saw a more inclusive Islam that could 
empower Indonesian society overall by aligning with the diverse yet compatible 
societal forces of secular-nationalism demanding reformasi dan demokrasi.870  Wahid 
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was the most vocal proponent of this approach but warned against Indonesian Islam’s 
disintegrative potential when used competitively.  He argued that the New Order’s 
secular-nationalist form of the Republic was its final form and, as such, common 
socio-political interests should be found within Pancasila’s confines.871  But his 
inclusivist view of Islam providing a moral and ethical foundation for a more 
egalitarian Indonesian state was incompatible with the state-orientated strategy of 
empowerment proclaimed by his scripturalist opponents who desired no less than the 
total Islamisation of all Indonesian affairs.  While proponents of the former stance 
tended to enjoy some degree of state support and elite patronage, those of the latter 
remained outside the system (with little chance of joining it if ABRI had its way), 
their sectarian goals only achievable through the fundamentalist agenda.  
Nevertheless, during the final months of the New Order some ABRI officers and units 
were suspected of working with fundamentalist and scripturalist elements possibly to 
incite societal chaos and thereby justify a military coup.     
 
4.  Economic failure 
                    The first direct questioning of the New Order’s status quo economic 
arrangement came during the post-oil boom, de-regulatory reform years after 1986 but 
the relatively small number of Indonesian reformist-inclined, ‘de-regulationist’ liberal 
economists opposing the economic status quo (and backed by the World Bank) 
represented a disparate and somewhat ineffectual grouping.  By the beginning of the 
1990s, notwithstanding a few years of minimal reform, economic power remained 
firmly in the hands of the predominantly Sino-Indonesian conglomerates and their 
politico-business family supporters.  De-regulation had generally failed to produce the 
more liberalized market environment demanded so the reformers turned their attention 
to opening market institutions and establishing more enforceable regulatory 
frameworks.  They met strong opposition from powerful vested interests within the 
bureaucracy and from among the conglomerates and politico-business families.872  
From the outset alliance leverage over state and capital had rested upon maintaining a 
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qualitative homogeneity - or alliance of domination - amongst a group of key 
economic players.873  Firmly controlling more than two decades of economic policy 
and strategic direction the strata of politico-bureaucrats charged with managing the 
highly regulated economy had effectively prioritized and institutionalized the 
alliance’s interests over those of the mass majority.874   
                    From the early 1990s market demands forced deregulation and the 
necessary policy adjustments put alliance cohesion under increasing scrutiny.875  If 
they were to continue, deregulation required successfully managing and diffusing 
socio-political resistance to the reform approach but as the new policy directions 
weakened the power and prestige of the bureaucratic elites, strong resistance came 
from within the ruling coalition.  Forced to reduce state investment in the economy, 
state officials stood to loose control of the apportioning and allocation of economic 
and investment opportunity and, unless carefully managed, the deregulation processes 
threatened to literally unravel the economic and policy processes that underpinned the 
New Order economy.  The market reconstruction the reforms represented were 
therefore not so much technical as very much influenced by political constraints and 
pressures.876  If foreign capital was to be attracted improved market institutions and 
regulatory frameworks were required so policy shifts had to be made but sustaining 
the dirigiste state and its complex arrangement of bureaucratic, family, and corporate 
interests and alliances was becoming increasingly problematic politically.   
                    The range and diversity of domestic manufacturing interests posed the 
major difficulty for reform.  Deregulation placed the downstream producers and 
manufacturers that relied on domestic and foreign markets at odds with the interests 
of upstream manufacturers importing capital and intermediate goods, while domestic 
producers and manufacturers found difficulty competing with foreign imports once 
tariffs and quotas were lifted.  The market-reform environment also seriously 
threatened the plethora of import monopolies underpinning the network of alliances 
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between politico-bureaucrats and their corporate clients that often included members 
of the President’s extended family and associates.877  But the pressing need to develop 
non-petro-chemical exports forced the government to soften its demands upon 
downstream manufacturers.  Reversing some of the 1986 reforms, while at the same 
time reducing some import monopolies, offered downstream domestic producers and 
manufacturers an exemption whenever imports critical to export manufacture became 
unavailable locally.878  Domestic interests were dealt a blow when the government 
opened a number of sectors, previously closed to foreign investment, to foreign 
companies and permitted them to borrow from domestic banks to do so.879   
 
4.1  Accommodating power shifts: ‘technocrats’ versus ‘nationalists’ 
                     Given that the relationship between government and business continued 
to be largely one of patron and client, contradictions between the interests of state and 
capital became increasingly problematic and acquired an increasingly political 
dimension.  Powerful influences among the politico-economic elite vehemently 
defended self-gratifying economic-nationalist Pancasila-ist economic policies of 
state-led industrial deepening and opposed any loosening of the state’s control and 
investment in the economy contrasting technocrats wanting the market opened to the 
realities and needs of modern capital movement.880  The ardent economic-nationalist 
ICMI chairman, B. J. Habibie, was able to promote the position of Muslims in 
Indonesian economic life.  His championing of value-added industry appealed to 
many middle-class Indonesians who felt that the export-orientated alternative, while 
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offering low-paying employment for the masses of the poor, was of little benefit to 
pribumi middle-class business interests.881  At the head of ICMI Habibie became the 
most powerful and influential of a number of Muslim economic nationalists 
determined to promote Pancasila-ist state intervention as a means of improving the 
economic position of the indigenous Muslim majority.   
                    Influential elements among the politico-economic elite adopted 
oppositional positions around these issues and two powerful nationalist groups, the 
military and the civil bureaucracy, led the faction supporting continued state 
involvement in the economy.  Any loosening in their ability to appropriate the 
resources and authority of the state, threatened to seriously erode not only their 
position in society but the unity and cohesion of the New Order economic system 
itself.882  Nor could the strata of officials running the state corporations and strategic 
industry management, deeply immersed in the state apparatus and ideologically 
committed to a nationalist integrated industrial base, accept any loosening of their 
control: subsidizing their inadequate official salaries depended upon the indulgences 
their positions offered.883  As few of the private and state-owned enterprises in the 
upstream sector were likely to survive in an open marketplace without subsidies and 
protection they also saw their continued profitability dependant upon the continuation 
of an interventionist economic regime.  Included among those opposed to a less 
protected environment, and enjoying close relationships with centres of power about 
the President and his cronies Liem Sioe Liong and Bob Hasan, were monopoly-
holders with licenses to import key industrial inputs that had previously been able to 
operate with little competition.  Any opening in the market and any tendency towards 
transparency spelt potential financial disaster for such operators.   
                      Both the technocrats and the nationalists competed for Presidential 
support.  The technocrats represented a diverse arrangement of interests that while not 
entirely anti-nationalist were generally reform-minded state officials agreeing among 
themselves that deregulating markets and privatizing state assets was necessary.  The 
nationalists, on the other hand at least outwardly, tended to want the state to continue 
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controlling and directing markets as the only way to advance Pancasila-based 
national goals.884  There was also a significant difference between the two groupings 
in their attitude to the way the New Order regime treated non-pribumi Sino-
Indonesians.885  While the economic nationalists wanted to improve pribumi 
economic prospects through positive discrimination, or affirmative action, the 
technocratic approach preferred advancing the economy through race-blind policies 
that while enabling open competition in international markets also offered a freer 
hand for non-pribumi.  President Suharto was the final arbiter on policy decision-
making so the issue was handled largely with due regard to the political demands 
made upon him by ties to his cronies among the wealthy and economically powerful 
Sino-Indonesians.   
                    While not always in disagreement the two sides did generate an important 
debate as to whether the state should continue to shape the markets primarily to 
Indonesia’s economic advantage and it therefore became a question of whether 
private enterprise was capable of exploiting the nation’s considerable resources to the 
people’s benefit.  Although he tried to distance himself from economic matters during 
the early 1990s, Suharto’s choice of Habibie as vice-President in March 1998 
appeared to suggest that, notwithstanding extreme pressure from the IMF and the 
growing economic crisis, the President was leaning towards the nationalists and the 
popular legitimacy he could accrue.886  A number of influential figures “straddled the 
fence” over the debate and many of the nationalists themselves were not necessarily 
totally opposed to deregulation.887  Their general concern was that deregulation and 
privatization might touch key strategic industries and simply further advantage the 
Sino-Indonesian conglomerates already dominating the private sector.   
                     Economic-nationalists also drew support from the Pancasila-ist 1945 
Constitution that clearly implied social, rather than individual, prosperity, emphasized 
business cooperatives rather than business corporations, and was intended to ensure 
that powerful individuals not exploit key production sectors and natural resources 
intended for the peoples’ benefit.  Nevertheless, while nationalists were using the 
Constitution and Pancasila to attack privilege the technocrat’s pro-market policies 
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seemed to be contradicting Pancasila.  It also appeared that in general the technocrats 
representing the majority of ‘unconnected’ pribumi businessmen, and the growing 
middle-class wanting the consumer benefits of a free market, were the main 
proponents of economic reform.  The nationalist opponents of economic reform 
tended to include a business culture that had succeeded through political and 
economic connections, and officials who had used their authority lucratively to issue 
permits, licenses, and opportunity.  With the economy booming in the mid-1990s and 
foreign investment flowing into the country, reform seemed unnecessary so the 
President listened less to the technocrats.  To the very end of the New Order Suharto, 
always the final arbiter in economic matters remained ambivalent towards free 
markets.   
                   By 1996 the foreign and domestic forces working to free the economy 
lacked political influence but enjoyed some success when it became increasingly 
apparent that the state could not continue to underwrite its nationalist industrial-policy 
agenda indefinitely.888  With pressure mounting from international capital and the 
World Bank for deregulation and a more open market environment, domestic 
reformists, including Indonesian academics and planning bodies, become troubled by 
the mounting foreign debt.  Although politically weaker (and out of self-interest a 
little selective in their commitment to freeing-up markets) domestic downstream 
producers, forced to buy imported inputs from privileged monopoly-holders, became 
to some extent included in the reform group.  As the struggle between powerful 
business monopolies and free market forces over economic policy intensified the 
pressing issue became the conflict of interests between deregulation and privileged 
monopoly.  With the country sinking heavily into foreign debt, and to keep the 
economy afloat, policy acquiesced more to the demands of foreign investors and aid 
providers.889   
                     The deteriorating economic situation during late 1996 clearly justified 
the de-regulationists’ stance.  Backed by powerful international financial institutions 
and a handful of influential Indonesian economists, the reformers demanded that the 
huge protected state-sector dominating the manufacturing sector be dismantled.  
Limited reforms and the shift in policy towards promoting export-orientated 
production based on comparative advantage merely exposed the depth of privilege 
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and monopoly that underpinned the New Order and contradicted the tenets of a 
Pancasila-ist economy.  Clearly concerned at the increasingly vocal criticism these 
issues attracted, the regime angrily responded by closing down the newspaper Sinar 
Haragan that had been focusing attention on the endemic culture of business 
monopoly and financial and economic privilege that editors suggested defined the 
New Order economic system.  The President might not have been aware of the actual 
depth of corruption that pervaded his administration but he nonetheless permitted the 
monopolistic culture to continue.  He also faced the dilemma in that his regime 
needed to sustain a sufficient flow of funds to underwrite the massive budgetary (and 
extra-budgetary) social and development projects vital to his regime’s socio-political 
legitimacy and he was committed to sustaining an economic environment that would 
allow the alliance of elite interests underpinning his regime to amass not only capital 
and wealth but sustained access to new economic opportunities.         
                                         
4.2  The Asian economic crisis and the New Order economy 
                    At the beginning of 1997 Thailand was predicting economic growth 
continuing at 6-8% per annum but by March of that year Thai analysts were 
estimating that non-performing loans, mainly in property and construction, would cost 
banks and finance companies some US$30.82 billion.  On 27 June sixteen major Thai 
finance companies closed down, a financial contagion swept out of Thailand into 
Southeast Asia, and by early September, the region’s major currencies, the Malaysian 
ringgit, the Philippine peso, the Thai baat, and the Indonesian rupiah, had dropped to 
record lows against the US dollar.  Whereas during 1996 some US$93 billion of 
private capital had flowed into the major Southeast Asian economies, during 1997 
US$12 billion departed.  As the wave of capital flight continued into early 1998 the 
major Southeast Asian currencies crumbled, the crisis deepened, and the East Asian 
economic miracle appeared to have come to an end.   
                  The decade from the mid-1980s had featured a succession of deregulation 
packages that somewhat improved Indonesia’s international economic 
competitiveness but little improved the overall quality of domestic financial and 
economic institutions.890  In 1996, responding to the growing crisis, the technocrats 
managed to force two key deregulation packages which, while offering export 
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incentives and markedly reducing the mass of tariffs still in place, did little to correct 
the structural problems endemic to the economy, namely the proliferation of well-
connected cartels and monopolies.891  By mid-1997 it was estimated that the 
Indonesian private sector’s massive US$55 billion in foreign borrowings represented 
some 25% of Indonesia’s GNP.892  By early October of that year Indonesia’s 
corporate debt, now at the very heart of a full-blown financial crisis, had increased to 
US$80 billion.893  Inflaming the growing sense of panic was that some US$30 billion 
of this debt represented short-term loans and the likelihood that they could ever be 
refinanced was diminishing as the economic situation and the rupiah deteriorated.894  
To rescue his economy on earlier occasions the President had turned to his 
technocrats but as the crisis of 1997 deepened it was clear he faced a different, more 
serious problem.  Although the economy continued to stumble during late 1997, those 
understanding the reasons behind the crisis and calling for urgent economic and 
financial reform faced powerful opposition from economic nationalists and well-
connected business interests that now included economically aggressive, ambitious, 
and increasingly panic-stricken, members of the President’s extended family.895   
                    ABRI also grew concerned.  As well as the detrimental effect to their 
own economic interests, coupled with a deepening drought that was seriously 
threatening food crops, the economic downturn guaranteed social unrest.  Although 
the President eased the food situation somewhat by agreeing to remove the National 
Logistic Agency (Bulog) monopoly on the supply of wheat, soya beans, and garlic, he 
balked at altering the rice and sugar monopoly structure.  The regime had long viewed 
state control over the price and distribution of the rice staple as an article of good faith 
essential to their socio-political and economic legitimacy.  Since the 1950s some four 
million civil servants had received twenty kgs of free rice per month and continuing 
the practice was regarded as vital if the stability and loyalty of the massive civil 
service was to be sustained.896  But the political importance of Bulog’s monopoly on 
sugar imports as a prime source of patronage funds for civilians and the military, as 
well as a means of subsidizing rice prices, ensured that the key commodity remained 
immunized to the forces of deregulation.   
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                   To comply with an initial US$33 billion multilateral bail-out package 
(including US$10 billion from the IMF) sixteen commercial banks, some partly 
owned by the President’s family and other prominent business people close to 
Suharto, were closed down on November 1 1997.897  Closing down or merging a few 
dozen of the hundreds of banks that saturated the financial scene had little overall 
effect, nor did the closures restore faith in the banking system overall as seven major 
state and ten private banks controlling some 70% of total bank assets remained 
untouched.898  Finance Minister Mar’ie Muhammad’s reform package accompanying 
the bank closures aimed to dismantle private and state monopolies but one of the most 
blatant monopolies, Suharto associate and friend Liem Sioe Liong’s massive Salim 
Group controlling over 95% of the archipelago’s wheat milling, remained intact.899  
Amid concerns over the President’s health the rupiah deteriorated to 4,000 per US 
dollar on December 5 and further still on December 6 to 4,575 per US dollar.900  
Capital flight accelerated and during the last five weeks of 1997 some US$1 billion 
was thought to have departed for Australia, with Singapore banks reporting a 25% 
growth in non-resident (mainly Sino-Indonesian) US dollar deposits during 
November.901   
                   1998 opened with soaring urban unemployment and food prices and, as 
common during times of economic crisis, weekly riots targeted Sino-Indonesian 
merchants.  With some 80% of corporate Indonesia bankrupt the US dollar passed the 
10,000 rupiah mark and triggered coup rumours as wealthy Indonesians exchanged 
rupiah for dollars while poorer Indonesians dumped the currency to purchase and 
hoard food staples.902  Meanwhile, on January 20, GOLKAR Party Chairman 
Harmoko shocked the international community and the markets in general by 
announcing that Suharto had accepted GOLKAR’s nomination for a seventh five-year 
term as President.  Within days of agreeing to a vital IMF bailout package, and the 
reforms they premised, rumours strengthened that the President’s protégé and long-
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term friend, Research and Technology Minister and ICMI chairman, B. J. Habibie, 
would be Suharto’s next vice-President and, as such, Suharto’s choice of successor.903  
Markets reacted negatively to Habibie’s close association with the Suharto family, his 
committed reputation to economic-nationalist development and extravagance, and the 
likelihood that in the event he succeeded Suharto as President there would be a 
continuation of status quo state economic intervention, corruption and cronyism.  
Habibie’s elevation caused the rupiah to plunge to a new record low of 11,000 to the 
US dollar.904  Amidst unprecedented demands for democratic change – demokrasi dan 
reformasi – and an end to dwi fungsi and military influence over socio-political and 
economic life, a general fear grew that the worsening economic situation might 
unleash Muslim discontent.  The departure of NU Chairman Wahid’s moderating 
influence form political life following a stroke in January removed the voice of 
tolerant accommodative Islam at a time when some Muslim activists were thinking of 
seizing economic power.  With economic and social pressures increasing ethnic 
tensions it was feared that Wahid’s absence from political prominence might expose 
NU’s mass grass-roots support-base to more “radical outside” Islamic forces.905   
                       By the end of February 1998, international portfolio investment 
managers had quit Indonesia, foreign direct investment had ceased, and foreign credit 
was no longer available.  With interest rates continuing to rise and debt seemingly out 
of control, the banking sector lost its ability to function effectively.906  Moreover, and 
a portent of socio-political tragedy, per capita GNP that had been about US$1,200 per 
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annum before the crisis hit, was now believed to have shrunk to US$450 per 
annum.907  Against a backdrop of nation-wide campus protest, and growing doubt as 
to whether the President would implement a crucial IMF salvage program in its 
entirety, the Indonesian People’s Assembly on March 10 elected Suharto President for 
a seventh term.908  Confirming B. J. Habibie as his vice-President on March 14, 
Suharto in desperation formed a new reform cabinet comprised largely of close 
friends and family.  At a time when the international business community had realized 
that the biggest impediment to reform in Indonesia was its endemic corruption, 
cronyism, and nepotism, Suharto was turning to his trusted business cronies for 
help.909  At a massive rally on March 16, to the delight of protesting students, the 
populist modernist Muhammadiyah Chairman, and former student leader, Amien Rais 
offered to lead a “non-violent people power” revolution similar to that responsible for 
overthrowing President Marcos in the Philippines.910   
                          Although the IMF softened some of the conditions attached to its 
harsh US$33 billion rescue package and permitted the Indonesian government to 
continue subsidizing food and energy, social tensions heightened during March and 
April.  The economic reality was now apparent even to Suharto that there were simply 
too many bad foreign-currency loans.  With the rupiah continuing to plummet and 
little hope of recovery in the fore-seeable future the massive loans would clearly be 
un-payable when the majority of corporate debt fell due for payment at the end of 
1998.911  By the beginning of May, with the economic, political, and social elites 
(including ABRI) seemingly unable, or unwilling, to take positive initiatives in the 
face of the deepening social crisis, student protest erupted across the archipelago and 
the New Order entered its final phase.  To co-ordinate activities among themselves 
and the general populace, the student movement developed an effective, 
decentralized, structure, and increasingly bold protest strategies.  The regime’s 
announcement on May 5 of a 70% increase in premium petrol prices, and an 
impending 60% electricity price increase, set off a massive round of student-initiated 
rioting and looting.  The security forces met student protest off campus with tear gas 
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and rubber bullets and while the students had not yet set off the nation-wide uprising 
they were threatening, their effective organizational capabilities were drawing 
activists from all sides of the religious and social spectrum into mass opposition.     
 
5.  The student movement and New Order collapse   
                      Student protest has always carried a special meaning in Indonesian 
political culture.  In 1966 student protest had been the dynamic and visible catalyst to 
the end of Sukarno’s rule and left Suharto and his generals indebted to the revered 
‘Generation of 1966’ (Angkatan 66) that had given much needed legitimacy to the 
military’s grab for power.  The new socio-political arrangements the students hoped 
for and advocated during the mid-1960s were supposed to be in complete contrast to 
those of the Sukarno era and with official praise heaped upon them for their efforts 
many of Angkatan 66 went on to enter the bureaucracy, politics, and business, 
eventually becoming the core of an enlightened New Order middle class.  Even when 
the New Order’s depoliticisation program took its toll during the 1970s the students 
were permitted officially recognized space to protest, albeit from the moral position of 
‘loyal’ opposition to the regime.  The student protests in 1973 and 1977 eventually 
tested New Order patience and in 1978 the New Order’s depoliticisation program was 
extended onto campuses and through the Normalisation of Campus Life policy (NKK 
or Normalisasi Kehhidupan Kampus) university rectors were given responsibility for 
tightly controlling student political activity.   
                    Student activism during the 1960s and 1970s had been centered about the 
Universities of Jakarta and Bandung but the growth in tertiary education in response 
to modernization and development’s demand for professional skills saw an increased 
and more dispersed student activism from the late 1980s.  A resurgence of student 
activism through 1988 and 1989 had generally involved populist moral concerns that 
only indirectly questioned the regime but a less compromising attitude of general 
hostility developed during the 1990s towards the military’s pervasive involvement in 
Indonesian life.  As they had done in 1966, during the mid-1990s the students were 
providing the masses with the leadership that was absent from the oppositional 
establishment leaders by bringing an array of social forces together against a failing 
regime.   
 315
                    In early 1998 the ability of the student leadership to mobilize broader 
popular dissatisfaction into a mass national movement became clear when they 
convinced urban and rural workers to join forces under student direction.  The student 
demands were broad but in general their leadership called on behalf of the masses for 
Suharto’s resignation, his trial for corruption, lower commodity prices, and, as a 
necessary pre-requisite to economic reforms, sweeping political change.912  Reflecting 
the respect the military held towards student protest913 ABRI continued to show a 
reasonable amount of restraint, notwithstanding tear gas, rubber bullets, and beatings.   
                
5.1  1996-1998: Socio-political deterioration, and student-led mass 
mobilization   
                 A fear shared among the establishment elites, both power-holders and those 
outside of the political framework, was that grass-roots based mass mobilization 
might be appropriated by political interests outside of the New Order socio-political 
arrangement for short-term political gain.  The establishment elites have always 
regarded political mass mobilization as the greatest potential threat to the socio-
political status quo they enjoyed and the growing socio-political instability from mid-
1996 fuelled their concerns.914  Mobilized political anger and frustration did not 
always necessarily involve rioting, but the growing proclivity for mass activity against 
the back drop of a shadowy mix of organized and non-organized unrest, continued 
and climaxed with the May 1997 general election.  The election mobilization served 
to highlight two particular concerns for the establishment elites; the demonstrations 
were growing increasingly destructive, and the security forces correspondingly less 
able to control the angry mobs.  Considering the key role the students had played in 
Sukarno’s overthrow thirty years before, it was also particularly concerning to the 
establishment elites that the student agenda, now focusing primarily on ending 
Suharto’s rule, might again become the socio-political focal-point of mass carnage.  
Most Indonesians shared the two particular sources of discontent that drove the 
                                                           
912 Editorial, Far Eastern Economic Review, May 14, 1998, p. 22. 
913 Godement, (1999), p. 162.  Editorial, Far Eastern Economic Review, May 14, 1998, pp. 22-4.  
Following the attempted coup in 1966, student leaders had been co-opted by the military leadership to 
help in bringing Suharto and the New Order to power.    
914 Max Lane, ‘Mass politics and political change in Indonesia’, Ariel Budiman, Barbara Hatley and 
Damien Kingsbury, (Eds.), Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia, (Monash Asia Institute, 
Clayton, 1999). 
 316
student-led mass mobilization.  While the issues of nepotism, corruption, and 
collusion had troubled most levels of Indonesian society for decades, the economic 
and socio-political inequities highlighted by the country’s deteriorating economic 
situation were now directly responsible for intolerable hardship and suffering among 
the majority rural and urban masses of poor and disadvantaged.  The 1997 economic 
crisis was drawing the consequences of societal inequity and endemic corruption to an 
inevitable conclusion.     
                  During the last months of the New Order a growing mutual distrust and 
interplay between military and Islamic factions fuelled establishment fears of social 
breakdown, religious extremism, and possibly a military coup.  Shaped by thirty years 
of New Order hegemony, political culture had fed factional mutual distrust that settled 
around four distinct socio-political tensions.915  As a result of personal re-organisation 
during the early 1990s loyal ex-Presidential adjutants, generally non-committal about 
the deteriorating socio-political situation and concerns over who should lead after 
Suharto, were now in command of ABRI and left civilian political elites the groupings 
most preoccupied with who should lead post-Suharto Indonesia.  Islamic clergy 
engaged themselves primarily in ‘turf fighting’ between their respective urban and 
rural power bases leaving the student leadership, themselves worried about becoming 
tools of the socio-political elites, to drive the growing calls for revolutionary change.  
Although ABRI remained the most powerful socio-political force, during the later 
months of the New Order their capacity for independent action was severely limited.  
Although Article 8 of the Constitution provided clear formal rules of succession from 
vice-President to President, observers generally feared that in the event of a crisis the 
military would not take lightly a civilian vice-President succeeding Suharto and most 
likely create the circumstances for a ‘state of emergency’ that could justify their 
ruling through committee.     
                       Communal violence, often sparked by relatively minor incidents, had 
erupted across Java in the early months of 1997 prior to the national elections and 
while most of the violence carried sectarian overtones it was generally aimed at 
specific government policies.  Churches, police stations, banks, and department stores 
(many owned by Sino-Indonesians) were attacked and military spokesmen blamed the 
urban unrest on un-named individuals and groups trying to disrupt the coming 
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elections by discrediting faction leaders and their followers.  In early February 1998 
the annual meeting of senior military officers (Moko dongam) found it necessary to 
officially deny rumours that dissident military officers were planning and instigating 
food riots and demonstrations either for political gain or to divert attention away from 
the seriously declining economic situation.916  An ICMI spokesman suggested that the 
unrest represented a “politico-economic rebellion” by members of a “domestic 
minority” (by implication, rich Sino-Indonesian businessmen backed by some 
politicians and military officers) with support from Western anti-Islamic states, 
Western capitalists, and overseas Chinese.917  Rumours abounded that some 
politicians were scurrilously exploiting the plummeting Rupiah and President Suharto 
spoke of conspiracies intent on bringing down the currency to destroy the Indonesian 
economy and thus national unity.  The implication was that unknown groups actually 
wanted increased unemployment and general social misery that would provide certain 
groups with a “tractable social force” that could be manipulated to political 
advantage.918  Refusing to name names (a frequent tactic with the socio-political and 
economic chaos increasing) the Minister of Religion borrowed a New Order cliché 
and somewhat unrealistically identified the instigators of the violence as “the children 
of former Communists” suggesting their agenda to be revenge on the Muslim 
community for their part in supporting ABRI during the Communist coup attempt 
back in the mid-1960s.919  The influential Chairman of MUI (Indonesian Council of 
Ulama) lamented the infiltration of Islamic institutions by socialists and democrats 
intent on creating discord between the Islamic community and the Armed Forces.920   
                    Because they were a visibly wealthy segment of society (and incorrectly 
believed to control the economy) the blame for the economic crisis was being laid on 
the perennial source of disaffection, the Sino-Indonesian community.921  Enmity 
towards the Sino-Indonesian elite took a broader, more sinister, form in late 1997 
when an explosion on premises being used to make bombs was linked to prominent 
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Sino-Indonesians associated with the political think-tank CSIS.922  In a 
Marchiavellian twist, CSIS opponents reasoned that the bombs were intended for a 
wider anti-Islamic plot intended to discredit devout Muslims by giving the impression 
that they were responsible for the chaos and that political Islam was synonymous with 
violence.  The Islamic resurgence of the 1990s had been complicated somewhat by 
the large number of re-politicized Muslims coming to represent the largest 
constituency within the pro-democracy movement that was by implication hostile to 
the New Order.  By early 1998 this Muslim influence had joined with the broader 
secular-nationalist opposition demanding reformasi dan demokrasi.923  Suharto’s 
opening to Islam in the early 1990s had not so much wanted a freer-thinking civil 
Islam as a regimist Islam prepared to live within his authoritarian agendas.  But the 
significant numbers of Muslims turning to the social democracy implicit in reformasi 
dan demokrasi during early 1998 threatened the possibility of a monolithic opposition 
coalescing against the regime.  The response was to turn to what had always been a 
standard political tactic of the New Order: it attempted to divide the growing 
opposition along ethnic and religious lines by turning the Muslim pro-democracy 
movement against the Christians and Sino-Indonesian communities.924     
                  A major security mobilization restricted the massive student protests to 
their campuses during the run-up to the 1998 Peoples Congress but most people 
feared that frustration at the lack of political or economic reforms would expand the 
large-scale demonstrations onto the streets as the elections neared.925  Ever-increasing 
numbers of labourers forced out of work by the deteriorating economic situation 
swelled the demonstrations and military spokesmen warned against unscrupulous and, 
as usual, unspecified individuals and groups inciting destruction and violence.926  
From the beginning of March 1998 the mass demonstrations gradually built up and 
some 50,000 students at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta trying to take their 
protest off campus fought with security forces.  On the campus of the University of 
Indonesia, some 20,000 students massed to listen to the modernist Islamic 
Muhammadiyah leader Amien Rais, demand reformasi dan demokrasi.  The cabinet 
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reshuffle on March 14 merely promoted familiar corrupt personalities of the by now 
thoroughly discredited New Order regime and set off a new wave of campus 
demonstrations.  Demonstrators were now demanding the sacking and replacement of 
unacceptable cabinet ministers and a serious approach by the regime to political 
reform and lower consumer prices, but drew little support from the representatives of 
the ‘mainstream’ political organizations.  Key military figures tried to balance calls 
for caution with encouragement for dialogue while constantly demanding the 
protesters remain on the campuses.  The military claimed that the large security 
presence was to protect the students and prevent outsiders from “exploiting them and 
the situation”.927  The Army, military spokesmen claimed, were not in disagreement 
with the need for urgent reform, but insisted on gradual and constitutional processes 
rather than radical change.928   
                 A few months earlier, such official comments from the Armed Forces 
would have been unthinkable, but with the moderating General Wiranto now in 
charge the military seemed prepared to discuss solutions to the crisis with even such 
noted critics of the New Order as Rais, Wahid, and Megawati.  The students at the 
forefront of the massive protests regarded these so-called ‘oppositional’ establishment 
leaders as inept and any dialogue with the military as little more than a symbolic 
attempt by the military to continue the socio-political status quo.929  To the students, 
ABRI were simply the most powerful element within the regime and therefore, 
notwithstanding the current more conciliatory leadership, shared the New Order’s 
responsibility for the crises.  In their view ABRI had done little to curb New Order 
excesses in the past and had been the principle perpetrators.  Although military 
spokesmen continued to call for discussion, the students were little inclined and 
viewed any discussion of economic affairs as irrelevant and inappropriate to a 
military’s correct role in society.  The students were primarily interested in the 
security measures the military were prepared to take to restrain protest activities and 
ABRI Commander Wiranto’s apparent fixation with protecting them from 
“contamination” by mysterious third parties.930   
                   Clashes with the security forces continued on the major campuses through 
April with mounting injuries among students, the police, and the security forces.  
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Pleading for moderation, the ailing Wahid called on students to be on the alert for 
agitators, but as had become his way he was unable to be more specific as to the 
agitators’ identities.  To the concern of human rights groups, increasing numbers of 
people were going missing with reports of activists abducted by unidentified, 
strongly-built, individuals with ‘close-cropped’ hair, implying that these ‘shadowy’ 
figures possessed some kind of military background.  Observers suggested that 
elements of the security forces were acting independently and that the so-called 
‘shadowy forces’ involved some form of internal power struggle bent on creating 
chaos and instability to discredit elements among the elite and justify a military 
coup.931  By mid-April, with the violence mounting, both NU and Muhammadiyah 
urged ABRI to actively support reformasi dan demokrasi but both groups 
disappointed the students with their insistence that while political, economic and legal 
reforms were necessary pre-requisites to clean, legitimate government change would 
have to be gradual, constrained, and peaceful.932   
                  Student-led protest continued to escalate in early May and as the situation 
deteriorated President Suharto consulted with establishment political leaders but his 
attempt at dialogue disappointed the student activists.  Discussions were little more 
than polite, uninterrupted, monologues from the President and while Suharto 
conceded his willingness to consider reforms he insisted that stability was the first 
priority and that impatience would only lead to a strong reaction from his security 
forces.  By suggesting a five-year timetable for reform he further frustrated the 
student leaders and riots and widespread property damage continued in Jakarta and 
Medan with the security forces enthusiastically responding causing growing casualties 
on both sides. Three days of rioting and looting in Medan spread to neighbouring 
cities with Sino-Indonesian property continuing to be a target of the mobs.  Although 
vigorously opposed by parliament, the substantial fuel and electricity price rises 
demanded by the IMF as a condition of financial assistance were imposed on May 14 
causing widespread anger and increasing the tempo of violence and kidnappings.   
                    Violence erupted across the archipelago and 500 people, mainly looters, 
were killed in Jakarta.  During a peaceful demonstration on the campus of Jakarta’s 
Trisakti University on May 12, and presumably at the hands of a ‘shadowy’ elite 
military unit, six students were shot dead.  The killing of the students set off an 
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outpouring of nation-wide grief and anger.  Mass demonstrations overwhelmed the 
security forces and huge crowds went on the rampage with the Sino-Indonesian 
community continuing to bear the brunt of the looting, violence, rape, and murder, 
while the indigenous business community frantically tried to protect their properties 
from the mobs.  Blame for the some 1,000 deaths and about US$1 billion of property 
damage in Jakarta was directed at the security forces’ inability, or even lack of will, to 
curb the riots.933  Regime response was disunited and ineffectual and ABRI chief 
Wiranto responded cautiously and while acknowledging the students’ positive 
contribution to the situation continued to warn against their manipulation by 
‘shadowy’ forces.  Between May 13 and 15, within days of the Trisakti campus 
killings, massive riots broke out and against a backdrop of widespread civil unrest, 
intra-elite divisions were escalating into outright power struggles between the two 
elite groupings with access to the parliamentary system: the dominant conservative 
status quo factions on one side, and the broad range of groups demanding reform on 
the other.934  The killings on the Trisakti campus had signalled the turning point of the 
crisis and the political situation was dramatically changing as the regime showed itself 
incapable of controlling the chaos.935   
                    When some 30,000 students, with mass popular support, occupied 
parliament buildings on May 19 in a standoff with marines and security forces, the 
popularist ‘modernist’ Islamic leader Amien Rais re-affirmed his willingness to lead 
an Indonesian “people’s power” so long as the movement overturned the New Order 
leadership without bloodshed.936  President Suharto returned to Jakarta from a state 
visit to Egypt and faced with the likelihood that an extraordinary session of the 
Peoples Congress would be unable to agree on a successor and the distinct possibility 
of a military coup, President Suharto resigned on May 21, 1998, enabling his 
                                                           
933 van Dijk, (2001), p. 192. 
934 J. Kristiadi, ‘The Future Role of ABRI in Politics’, in Geoff Forrester, (Ed.), Post-Soeharto 
Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos? (Crawford House Politics, Bathurst, 1999), pp.55-56.  Kristiadi further 
suggests that the killings on the Trisakti campus were initiated by elements of the Armed Forces and 
indicated fragmentation and panic among the military elite.  Five months after Suharto’s resignation a 
government-appointed joint fact-finding investigation, investigating the previous May’s riots suggested 
they were linked to an intra-elite power struggle directly related to the Trisakti shootings.  While the 
investigating team identified anti-Sino-Indonesian sentiments as being the catalyst for the events the 
report called for more information on the role General Prabowo, Suharto’s son-in-law, played in the 
violent affairs.  The report also suggested that elements within the political elite had in fact caused the 
turmoil for their own interests and as a consequence, in some situations, the Armed Forces had become 
powerless to protect the people.  Manuel Tegoio, ‘Assessing the May riots’ Asiaweek, November 13, 
1998.  
935 Vatikiotis, (1998), p. 226. 
936 van Dijk, (2001), p. 205. 
 322
constitutional successor, vice-President Habibie, to be sworn in as Indonesia’s third 
President.       
 
6.  Summary 
                   The key challenge for the New Order facing the growing crises of the 
mid-1990s was balancing the demands of the secular-nationalists and both the 
accommodatory and non-accommodatory Muslims with the status quo and reformist 
interests within ABRI.  Secular-nationalists and reformists called for greater 
democratization and captured the New Order’s ideological high-ground by stressing 
the importance of a religiously tolerant Pancasila as a continuing basis for the 
Indonesian state.  Pancasila, it was argued, could guarantee religious tolerance and 
the equality of all citizens in Indonesian society because religion and other primordial 
affiliations were dangerous ways to channel political aspirations.  As Wahid put it, the 
essence of secularism was the “impartiality of the state vis-à-vis its citizens’ religious 
inclinations”.937  Not only did secular-nationalism reject religious politics, but also 
opposed what was regarded as the military’s undemocratic involvement in political 
and social processes, refusing to accept the military’s ‘integralist’ interpretation of 
Pancasila that ABRI claimed legitimized their deep socio-political penetration into 
Indonesian life.  But secularism also provided a voice of pragmatism that regarded 
ABRI as the only effective protection of religious and ethnic rights and national unity 
from what were regarded as the easily manipulated primordial masses.     
                  The crisis that led to President Suharto’s resignation began in mid-August 
1997 with the dramatic devaluation of the Rupiah coinciding with growing doubts 
among the socio-political elites as to whether Suharto should be nominated for a 
further term in office.  There were four phases to the crisis.  The first was the Rupiah 
devaluation and the second came in early December 1997 when rumours spread about 
Suharto’s supposed ill health.  The third phase began in late February 1998 when 
student protest erupted on major campuses across the country and the fourth and final 
that led to Suharto’s resignation began in the first week of May 1998 when the IMF-
directed abolition of fuel subsidies triggered popular riots in Medan.938  During this 
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critical final period interaction between ABRI, social and political Islam, and the 
President, changed as the attitude of the major Muslim organizations towards the 
regime moved away from its traditional socio-religious orientation into political 
affairs.  As the crisis moved towards its climax politika-Islam became increasingly 
pragmatic but although key Muslim leaders realized that Suharto was losing ABRI’s 
support, because of the conflictory intellectual stances being taken by the leaderships 
of the major Muslim groups and factions, a united Islamic position was unable to 
coalesce into a strong, definitive, united opposition able to offer leadership and give 
coherence to the growing mass calls for reformasi dan demokrasi.939   
                     Suharto’s removal effectively came about because in the face of a 
potential mass uprising a temporary and extraordinary alliance was forged among 
different elite groupings able to unite briefly and withdraw their support from 
Suharto.  The arrangement proved to be a limited affair that was hard to sustain after 
he had gone.  Boudreau notes the low level of “concrete political activity” exhibited 
by the traditional oppositional establishment leaders Rais, Wahid and Megawati in the 
face of the growing economic, political, and social crises of 1998 and suggests that 
their input was more rhetoric than effectively directing popular mass protest.940  
Decades of effective societal depoliticisation, and scant experience of using 
representative institutions and procedures to articulate their interests, had left sectoral 
groups unable to express themselves upwards through what should have been their 
logical leaders.941  Suharto’s weakening hold on power was only broken in the end by 
a combination of broadening mass protest, international pressure, and the divisive 
activities of elements within the military, some remaining aloof from the processes 
and others indirectly involved.942  It was left to the students, frustrated with the blatant 
on-going display of ‘elite politics’ against a back-drop of economic and political 
turmoil, to finally take the initiative and exercise their historical prerogative by 
steering anti-regime protest away from the campuses, unifying and coordinating it, 
and leading it in an irresistible mass expression on the streets.943    
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                       Organized mass politics have long been practiced in Indonesia and 
public gatherings and mass movements are viewed as a legitimate part of Indonesian 
culture.944  The early nationalist leaders drew the masses into their anti-colonial 
struggle with highly organized mass public meetings that heightened political 
awareness and support for the revolutionary anti-Dutch struggle.945  Sukarno, and 
later Suharto’s use of passionate oratory at public meetings and authorized mass 
gatherings around religious activities were often thinly veiled political affairs.  Some 
leaders in the more enlightened era of Keterbukaan and reformasi claimed that their 
supporters had become more mature politically, more ‘autonomous’, less dogmatic, 
and better able to consider alternative ideological and political affiliations than 
formerly but, as Hara concedes, more often than not political leaders merely used 
mass demonstrations to bolster fragile political positions against what they perceived 
to be the stronger positions of their opponents.946  Aware of its potential, the New 
Order had always taken care to control mass political participation by channelling it 
through its corporatist arrangements of the military, the bureaucracy, and the tightly 
circumscribed government political organ GOLKAR, all constrained by the 
ideological imperatives of the Pancasila-ist state.947  There is also some irony in the 
fact that while party politics have always tended to involve mass mobilization around 
religious and other sectarian symbols of unity controlled by establishment interests, 
the potential for socio-political unrest roused by mass mobilization getting out of 
control in fact posed the greatest single threat to the New Order establishment’s desire 
for the socio-political status quo.948  Suharto relied to a certain extent on opposition to 
his rule being ‘numbed’ by establishment fears of social unrest and political 
extremism.949  Mass mobilization actually posed a potential threat to both sections of 
the New Order socio-political establishment; those within the power frame (ABRI, 
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GOLKAR and ICMI) as well as those excluded from power (NU, other secular-
nationalists, reformists, and Islamic scripturalists).  Rather than uniting against him 
and contesting the legitimacy of his regime, Suharto’s resignation in May 1998 came 
about because a fear that mass unrest might explode across the archipelago and 
threaten their interests panicked the establishment elites into simply withdrawing their 
support for his continuing Presidency.950   
                    Two key aspects of the Gramscian hegemonic model - its over-riding 
ideological imperatives and its insistence that sustaining elite hegemony requires 
constantly realigning class interests – summarise the alternative approach of this 
research as a counter to the prevailing twin-crises explanation of the New Order’s 
failure in 1997/8.  The two aspects combine to explain both three decades of the New 
Order arranging Indonesian socio-political life and the circumstances that led to the 
regime’s demise.  The Gramscian approach focuses on the regime’s failure to sustain 
a legitimizing hegemonic representation of Pancasila and its derivatives as the New 
Order’s ‘binding glue’ of ideological legitimacy and the bloc’s failure to maintain its 
hegemonic alliance structure in the face of alternative and potentially counter-
hegemonic renderings of ideology that catalyzed a proliferation of non-negotiable 
demands and values from subordinate groups.  The over-riding thrust of the research 
implies that had the regime complied with the two key Gramscian imperatives and 
reacted with effective processes of hegemonic refurbishment and renewal, the 
consequences of the financial contagion that hit Indonesia in 1997, and with 
remorseless bottom-up socio-political pressures upon the New Order’s hegemonic 
alliance structure aroused by demands for reformasi dan demokrasi, might have been 
countered and mitigated.   
                   Viewing the New Order collapse through the schema of a historic bloc 
and its economic, political and ideological components as an alternative to the ‘twin-
crises’ account offers both the explanatory utility of an approach that focuses attention 
essentially on the explicit role the New Order attributed to Pancasila and its 
derivatives in sustaining a hegemonic arrangement of Indonesian socio-political and 
economic life and also enables conclusions to be drawn as to why the New Order’s 
hegemonic vision for Indonesian life failed.  The Gramscian model offers a working 
structure that enables contrasting Pancasila as represented by the New Order with the 
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contradictions that came to define the doctrine’s actual use.  Underpinned by the 
Gramscian imperative that sustaining and maintaining hegemony requires constantly 
realigning and readjusting elite interests, the model can also be employed to show 
how New Order alliance re-arrangements were inherently insensitive to explicitly 
expressed non-negotiable subordinate interests and values and how the New Order 
failed to comply with the requirements of a true Pancasila-ist economy.951  The 
historic bloc’s format that strongly focuses on the key role ideology was required to 
play in underwriting a regime’s moral and intellectual legitimacy demonstrates how 
the New Order failed to compromise its economic and financial policies to 
accommodate interests outside exclusive and pragmatic elite economic arrangements.  
From the perspective of the New Order political bloc, and the explicit ideological 
emphasis represented by Pancasila demokrasi. The model demonstrates the bloc’s 
reluctance to compromise elite alliance interests to accommodate subordinate non-
negotiable values.    
                     In Gramscian terms, sponsored by the dominant class, the New Order 
organic intellectuals maintained their authority over economic processes through to 
the mid-1990s.  But decision-making shortcomings became increasingly apparent 
between the explicit egalitarian requirements of a Pancasila-ist economy and growing 
economic disparity between the minority holding economic power that benefited from 
economic development and the vast majority of the Indonesian people.  The allocation 
and distribution of economic benefits and advantage and the continued legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the economic processes responsible for the New Order’s economic 
arrangement became increasingly inequitable and under growing challenge.952  In 
terms of Gramscian hegemonic legitimacy the New Order economic arrangement – its 
economic bloc – should have mediated the tensions and antagonisms evolving 
between the classes that possessed and benefited form the means of production and 
those that did not.953  From the mid-1980s reform-minded liberal economists 
challenged vested business interests and the activities of the powerful politico-
business families by questioning the economic status quo and called for deregulation 
and broad financial and economic reform.  The alliance of domination that underlay 
economic hegemony that legitimized New Order economic arrangements through 
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tacit promises of economic egalitarianism therefore progressively weakened as the 
mid-1990s unfolded and ultimately crumbled when the economic contagion swept 
through Southeast Asia from 1997.  The failure of the New Order to ameliorate the 
effects of the economic disasters of 1997/8 is therefore shown as directly attributable 
to the bloc’s shortcomings in complying with Gramscian imperatives.   
                      Notwithstanding serious economic deterioration from early 1997 the 
powerful regime-dominated techno-bureaucrats continued to exclusively prioritize the 
business interests of the ruling elites without allowances for the necessary 
compromises with subordinate interests that would legitimize bloc hegemony and 
were called for by a Pancasila-ist economy.  Rather than cope with the compounding 
and problematic changing economic realities elite power arrangements merely 
underwent pragmatic realignment that did little to ease increasingly unacceptable 
levels of societal misery and tension.  The New Order vision of hegemonic order 
initially exhibited itself through the nationalist/populist imperatives demanded in a 
Pancasila economy but in the face of economic deterioration the regime’s organic 
constituencies neglected to sustain hegemonic legitimacy.  The legitimizing 
imperatives of mass consensual participation had given way to sustained corruption 
and preferable economic advantage rather than economic egalitarianism and an 
equitable sharing of socio-economic benefit.  Moreover, economic policy differences 
that surfaced with the technocrat/nationalist economic debate954 were more to do with 
organic intellectual differences than any realization that more egalitarian and 
equitable economic strategies were necessary to sustain the economic arrangements’ 
legitimacy.  The economic bloc was failing in terms of ideological legitimacy and a 
profound inability to ameliorate glaring contradictions between systemic corruption 
and calls for economic and financial reform.955  While ideologically legitimizing 
policies of economic nationalism and economic egalitarianism and equity had 
originally defined the New Order economic vision the system had come to 
institutionalize a minority benefiting to the detriment of mass interests.956   
                     At the heart of New Order economic legitimacy, and paralleling the 
legitimizing imperatives of the Gramscian economic bloc, a Pancasila economy 
demanded economic and social egalitarianism and prosperity but by the time the bloc 
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began to come apart in early 1997 the system was ill-equipped in Gramscian terms to 
counter a growing hegemonic decay and obsolescence.  The Gramscian bloc defines 
itself through an ideologically legitimate hegemonic relationship between state, 
capital and society coupled with an understanding that sustaining the arrangement 
requires an ongoing renegotiation of hegemonic legitimacy in response to changing 
economic circumstances.  Meeting hegemonic requirements therefore required 
constantly co-opting subordinate as well as re-negotiating elite alliance consent but as 
the circumstances leading to the regime’s collapse show, the New Order economic 
bloc failed the ideal model of a legitimate Pancasila-ist economy in both aspects.  As 
well as neglecting key alliance partners, the leadership also became increasingly 
estranged from the non-compromisable values and interests of the masses, both 
essential pre-requisites to legitimate hegemonic order.957   
                       Viewing the New Order’s collapse from the perspective of a Gramscian 
political bloc focuses the investigation on the Suharto regime’s hegemonic 
relationship between ideology and their socio-political arrangement of Indonesian life.  
Hegemonic necessity requires organic influences disseminating elite decisions in a 
manner as to secure mass acceptance to a dominant order’s interpretation of ideology 
to underwrite the legitimacy of its political arrangements.  Hegemonic necessity also 
requires constantly re-negotiating alliance arrangements so as to absorb subordinate 
interests as necessary into the hegemonic arrangement.  Initially hegemonic processes 
gained a general mass acceptance to the legitimacy of the New Order’s right to rule 
through a political system defined by the regime as Pancasila demokrasi.  In terms of 
legitimate hegemonic socio-political decision-making, sustaining arrangements 
required not only gaining conformity to genuine political processes and democratic 
institutions, but also that processes functioned as both legitimate state activity and 
representative of mass subordinate interests and non-negotiable values.958  Sustaining 
political bloc cohesion required reconciling the clearly diverging interests of the 
bloc’s two most powerful socio-political constituencies, the military and Islam.  But 
as the 1990s progressed the two key resources became increasingly estranged from 
each other and the regime. Along with a growing disunity within the New Order 
establishment and broadening intellectual cleavages within the religious elites, 
growing mass demands for reformasi dan demokrasi placed bloc cohesion under 
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remorseless pressure and the bloc’s subsequent collapse was directly attributable to 
the inadequacy of the constraining Pancasila-ist socio-political system to continue 
channelling ‘upwards’ not only broader establishment interests but popular demands.   
                      The duality of coercion and consensus at the heart of a Gramscian 
political arrangement balances necessary domination through force with the 
consensual support of the subordinate masses through techniques of co-operation, co-
optation and compromise.  The political bloc’s arrangement must sustain hegemony 
through the normal outlets and institutions of public expression within a legitimate 
parliamentary environment, but it is essential that the necessary balancing processes 
that sustain the bloc’s legitimacy respond to conditions existing at any particular 
time.959  Corresponding socio-political arrangements must be constantly adjusted and 
reaffirmed to ensure that a coherent counter-hegemony based on an alternative 
rendering of ideology not be given space to emerge and challenge the political bloc’s 
hegemonic legitimacy.  Yet while the circumstances of regime collapse showed that 
the ideologically conforming alliance of interests that legitimized the New Order’s 
hegemonic socio-political arrangements came apart, an effective counter-hegemony 
was unable to form around a coherent alternative representation of ideology. 
                     Contributing an alternative analytical methodology to that of the ‘twin-
crises’ approach, the political component of the historic bloc model is therefore as 
compelling and valid as that of the economic bloc discussed above.  Gramscian 
consensus requires a conscious mass attachment to the ruling order and belief in the 
moral and intellectual legitimacy of socio-political leadership and the model offers a 
means of assessing the depth of that attachment.  In Gramscian terms, the degree of 
willing, consensual, support Pancasila demokrasi drew from the subordinated masses 
is questionable.  The model enables differentiation between levels of consent arrived 
at under the New Order through either tacit/co-optation or coercion and both Islam’s 
socio-political management by the regime and ABRI’s socio-political deployment as 
institutionalized by dwi fungsi exemplified the processes.  In both cases New Order 
secular-nationalist imperatives were prioritized but the ideological nature of the 
Gramscian model also provided useful indicators as to whether mass conformity was 
arrived at through a genuine expectation of benefits in terms of socio-political 
stability and economic development as opposed to a general fear of the consequences 
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of non-conformity.960  Nonetheless, it is in this area that limitations can be seen in the 
Gramscian model of genuine rather than tacit, acknowledged, societal consensus.  It 
should not be forgotten that the Suharto New Order was generally no less than a 
despotic, authoritarian, and certainly during its first two decades, a heavy-handed, 
military-regime that operated in an environment where the legitimate Gramscian 
consensual techniques of co-optation, compromise, were often institutionalized 
through corruption.   
                      The New Order ideological bloc, analyzed in the same manner as the 
economic and political blocs, offered similar explanatory utility through the 
imperative that matters of cultural and ideological belief systems are factored deeply 
into any analysis of hegemonic aspirations of legitimate mass subordinate consent.  
As discussed above, sustaining hegemony requires proliferating an ideological belief 
system widely throughout society to the extent that it is accepted as universally valid 
and that its norms and values legitimately express all, including mass subordinate, 
interests.961  The bloc’s usefulness, therefore, turns on how well it is able to be used to 
explain how effectively the New Order ideology Pancasila and its derivatives were 
consensually disseminated throughout Indonesian life and the role ideology played in 
the regime’s collapse.  In terms of an alternative to the twin-crises approach, the 
Gramscian historic bloc perspective with its economic, political, and ideological 
components, shows clear limitations and inconsistencies in the degree to which 
hegemonic ideology was accepted as morally and intellectually legitimate.  
Nonetheless, granted Gramsci’s requirement that there be a moral limit placed upon 
the legitimacy of excessive socio-political authority and force,962 quantifying the 
balance between consensus and coercion becomes little more than a matter of 
dialectics.      
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Conclusion 
 
1.  Introduction 
              The essential elements of the Gramscian model of hegemonic order tested 
in this thesis, in the context of Suharto’s Indonesian New Order, are those relating to 
Gramsci’s understandings of socio-politics: (i) hegemony,963 (ii) his typology of 
economic, political and ideological systems that form the historic bloc and signify 
hegemonic order,964 (iii) the role of organic intellectuals in maintaining moral and 
intellectual legitimacy by disseminating ideology into the nation’s mass 
consciousness on behalf of their sponsoring dominant class965 and, never far from his 
thoughts, (iv) the associated phenomena of hegemonic legitimacy, hegemonic decay 
and obsolescence, and counter-hegemony.966  Gramsci identified ideology closely 
with culture and believed that, when used to represent and promote the interests of a 
particular class, ideology could construct hegemonic substance from culture.  
Gramsci’s approach to socio-politics prioritises national unification through 
hegemonic processes that draw upon cultural formats represented as ideology against 
a background of order and discipline to manage and direct socio-political behaviour.  
The processes effectively become techniques of consent management with the ruling 
class the prime beneficiary.  But while the processes favour the leadership 
arrangement, they can only be effective when they convince society to acquiesce to its 
own subordination without the ever-present coercive techniques that remain available 
dominating those of consent.   
                    (i)  Gramscian hegemonic order evolves out of the moral and intellectual 
leadership (Gramsci’s legitimising direzione) that a class assumes by crafting and 
disseminating ideology to discipline, inform and govern the masses to acquiesce to 
the dominant class’s interests and values.  A regime is deemed to have achieved 
hegemonic status when a cultural and ideological belief system is articulated and 
proliferated throughout society so as to be organically acceptable and universally 
valued by the general population.  Gramscian hegemonic socio-political arrangements 
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also require that the authority the dominant group exercises be premised upon control 
over the state’s economic arrangements and processes.  Unlike other meanings of 
hegemony, Gramsci’s hegemony is not so much dominance through pure force as the 
organisation of consent through a balanced duality of coercive and consensual 
techniques that sustains legitimate political and ideological leadership.  Hegemony 
thus becomes a relationship between elite classes and subordinated social forces by 
which order is maintained through social interests consenting to a politically and 
ideologically negotiated system of top-down social alliances.  Unless such a class 
arrangement becomes a political force of national standing and is accepted by the 
broader society as ideologically legitimate, hegemonic order cannot be sustained.967   
                              When a dominant class aspiring to hegemony has diffused a concept 
of socio-political reality throughout society, informing all customs and religious and 
political principles with its moral and intellectual spirit, the ruling order’s norms and 
values are deemed valid and its hegemony legitimate.  Importantly, the resulting 
hegemonic order must derive from a combination and balancing of coercion and 
consensus through persuasion without the former dominating.  The essence of 
Gramscian hegemony, this duality of coercion and consent, depicts how a dominant 
group not only uses a necessary degree of force to overcome opposition but also how 
it gains subordinate groups voluntary and consensual support through the persuasive 
techniques of co-operation, co-optation, and compromise.  Hegemony must be 
exercised predominantly through parliamentary institutions so the implication is that 
society consents through the normal outlets and institutions of public expression to an 
appropriate level of force being used against it.  As Gramscian societal consensus is 
premised upon expectations of benefit and its allocation, there must also be a clear 
indication and understanding as to the permissible range of societal disagreement and 
challenge as well as acknowledgement that the institutions through which debate is 
channelled are legitimate.     
                   (ii)  Gramscian hegemonic legitimacy is negotiated across an historic 
period, or historic bloc, that integrates three constituent overlapping economic, 
political, and ideological elements.  The three forms represent blocs in their own right 
but are collectively over-layered by an ideological binding of national conformity and 
consciousness that reflects the ruling order’s moral and intellectual legitimacy.  To 
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legitimise hegemony’s ideas, values and politico-economic foundations, appropriate 
moral and intellectual leadership is framed and sustained by an exclusive rendering of 
ideology.   
                    (iii)  Organic intellectuals form an organic constituency responsible for 
maintaining the necessary processes that facilitate their sponsoring class’s hegemony 
by negotiating support from subordinate groups to what is in effect their own 
domination.  As well as close involvement in the demands of socio-political affairs, 
the organic constituency must also play a prominent role in economic production.  
Ideology is closely identified with hegemony in the Gramscian schema because it 
provides a determining discourse firmly institutionalised into the nation’s 
consciousness through the state’s socio-political and constitutional apparatuses.  
Traversing the historic bloc’s three constituent economic, political, and ideological 
forms, ideology becomes no less than a binding glue of consensus-specific moral and 
intellectual legitimacy.  The ruling class’s organic intellectuals are tasked specifically 
with managing the economically based processes that legitimise their sponsors’ 
hegemonic ideas and politics.968  Hegemonic ideology must be comprehensive and 
reflect more than economic interests: in the Gramscian schema, ruling order must 
transcend its own corporate interests if it is to extend socio-politically and appeal to 
the mass’s broader, subordinate, needs and aspirations.  It is the Gramscian organic 
intellectual’s function to spread hegemonic homogeneity across all socio-political and 
economic arrangements.  Hegemony functions when ideology is transposed into a 
world-view that is regarded as normal and natural by everyone from the controlling 
classes down through the subordinate classes and is legitimate when it is accepted as 
coherent and sufficiently flexible and mediating as to convince those ruled that their 
domination is consensual.  Without such consensus authority is merely precarious 
domination by force or pure authoritarianism.  Gramscian leadership is thus no less 
than the ruled acknowledging that the rulers’ exclusively derived ideology has 
assimilated subordinate values to represent a genuine unifying national interest.   
                      Gramsci’s organic constituency includes the functions of the bureaucracy, 
the military leadership and elements of the religious leadership that are prepared to 
accommodate the hegemonic order’s ideological inclinations and is best described as 
the producer and disseminator of ideology on behalf of its sponsoring dominant class.  
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The organic intellectual exercises its function by producing desirable socio-political 
and economic constructs on behalf of the hegemonic order, while the traditional 
intellectual969 performs potentially conflicting functions that generally owe their 
substance to alternative oppositional renderings of ideology based on history, 
traditional culture and communal life.  As well as constantly re-affirming their patron 
class’s ideological right to leadership, organic intellectual influence is also expected 
to resolve inevitable conflict and contestation between the values and ideals of the 
ruling and subordinate classes as well as between hegemonic and traditional 
intellectual values and interests.  Traditional intellectual constituencies are best able to 
take advantage of hegemonic decay and obsolescence because they are able to offer 
an alternative rendering of ideology that can be intellectualized into an emergent 
counter-hegemony.  As they generally stand between society’s masses and the 
legitimising institutions and symbols of the state, the traditional intellectual is aided in 
their ability to respond by their significant prestige and socio-political influence.   
                     (iv)  An important validating determinant of the model under scrutiny are 
Gramsci’s understandings of the consequences of alternative renderings of ideology 
combining to mount coherent counter-hegemonic challenge in response to hegemonic 
obsolescence and decay.  Sustaining hegemonic legitimacy requires not only 
maintaining influence over the plethora of interests that inform mass consciousness 
but, when necessary, responding to and assimilating them.  Should the dominant 
group cease to represent the values of the national will, and loose its ability to sustain 
the cohesive ideological alliances upon which its hegemony has been constructed, 
hegemony will loose its legitimacy.  Two issues are critical to sustaining bloc 
legitimacy: the first is that there be an appropriate response to hegemonic challenge 
and second, that hegemonic and ideological obsolescence and decay be ameliorated 
by refurbishing ideological legitimacy through legitimate socio-political institutions 
and processes.  Gramsci cautions that hegemony must never be taken for granted and 
should challenge and counter-hegemony occur, it will do so within the same 
legitimate institutions and processes.   
                   In responding to challenge, ideological refurbishment need not necessarily 
require creating a completely new ideological reality as an altered rendering of 
existing arrangements will suffice.970  According to the Gramscian model, to be 
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coherent an emergent counter-hegemony must therefore base itself on a re-arranged 
national consensus.  Counter-hegemony can emerge from numerous sources but 
generally indicates that an alternative version of ideology has successfully 
demystified the hegemonic order’s ideological subordination of the masses.  
Challenge can evolve from such issues as questioning the allocation of material 
benefits and challenging the permissible range of societal disagreement leading to a 
break-down in ideological consensus and cohesion and thus disagreement as to the 
legitimacy of the symbols and institutions through which societal consensus is being 
managed.  The key to success in withstanding a coherent counter-hegemonic 
challenge arising out of changing socio-political and economic realities turns on the 
effectiveness of the hegemonic order’s responsive realignment of consensual 
arrangements.         
 
1.1  Thesis Proposition 1: That the Gramscian historic bloc – through 
its economic, political and ideological forms – explains the Suharto 
New Order regime’s hegemonic domination.   
 
1.1.1  The New Order economic bloc. 
                    In Gramscian terms, to achieve its economic agendas, the leadership 
arrangements of the Suharto New Order economic bloc sustained hegemony through 
development and growth underwritten ideologically by the legitimising requirements 
of a Pancasila-ist economy.  The New Order’s Pancasila-ist economy’s premising of 
moral and intellectual legitimacy on goals of prosperity through an equitable 
nationalist economy and social egalitarianism (with the state existing for the 
collective well-being rather than the individual) offered as a counter to perceived 
Sino-Indonesian dominance of the economy an ideologically based alternative that 
would improve majority pribumi economic interests.  Pancasila’s fifth principle 
specifically provides for the state dominating an economic system built on social 
justice, economic and social egalitarianism and prosperity, yet economic development 
proved anything but equitable and just.971  Not withstanding legitimising endeavours 
to satisfy popular-nationalist demands through intensive state involvement in the 
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economy, ABRI’s economic affairs and the efforts of politically-connected pribumi 
economic elites, the fruits of development were primarily shared among 
predominantly Sino-Indonesian conglomerates and interests close to centres of power 
and patronage.   
                   As well as the state’s heavy involvement in the economy through the 
massive state owned enterprises, the nationalist imperatives of a Pancasila-ist 
economy were ideologically tightened by ABRI’s deep penetration into the New 
Order economy.  Initially acquired when the huge Dutch trading companies and 
corporations were nationalised by the Sukarno regime and turned into virtual military 
fiefdoms, ABRI’s vast corporate holdings expanded with the economy.  As the 
regime’s most powerful socio-political resource, ideologically bound to the people as 
guardians of the national interest, ABRI assumed an influential role legitimised by the 
Constitution over economic life.  Pancasila’s doctrinal derivative dwi fungsi 
legitimised deep military intrusion into the political structure down to governing at 
district levels that enabled the military to oversee the many rural development projects 
that reinforced regime legitimacy among the general population.  Pancasila and its 
derivatives also legitimised indirect military involvement in economic and industrial 
activity.  The Kekaryaan policy moved selected military personnel into senior 
positions in key non-military state and private enterprises ensuring not only 
opportunities for personal and material gratification and ABRI’s general financial 
well-being, but also provided that the regime had a direct, potentially coercive, hand 
in economic development.972  With trusted officers positioned to control all key 
aspects of the economy, including senior management of the vital state oil corporation 
Pertamina, important national strategic food supply and distribution agencies and 
major state-sector trading and financial institutions, the nationalist economic 
aspirations of a hegemonic Pancasila-ist economy were to a large extent satisfied.  
The co-operative welfare implications of the yayasan charitable foundations, strongly 
encouraged within the 1945 Constitution and often fronted by Sino-Indonesian 
businessmen on behalf of military partners, also strengthened the economic bloc’s 
egalitarian Pancasila-ist underpinnings.  ABRI’s ideologically-derived dual function 
dwi fungsi role confirmed both the institution’s socio-political and ideological 
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legitimacy and its powerful position within the New Order economic arrangement 
also provided a national-popular counter-balance to Sino-Indonesian influence.       
                   From the outset, in contradiction of Pancasila’s egalitarian tenets, pribumi 
business interests (by definition prejudicial to Sino-Indonesian economic interests) 
remained economically weak and were obliged to pursue business opportunity and 
advantage through participatory arrangements with either Sino-Indonesian interests or 
well-placed politico-bureaucratic and military opportunists.  Meeting the legitimising 
needs of the Pancasila-ist economy and its ideological imperatives required a careful 
balance between rationalising nationalist-populist pretensions through substantial 
state involvement in the economy and those of the alliance of elite interests that 
underwrote New Order economic authority.  Notwithstanding the prominent role of 
the state sector, the operating reality of the New Order economic arrangement saw the 
institutionalised and politically motivated allocation of bank credit, government 
contracts and concessions prioritising the interests of the politico-bureaucracy, their 
patrons and well-connected elites.  Ensuring the ongoing authority of the organically 
disposed techno-bureaucratic constituency was also integral to sustaining bloc 
hegemonic legitimacy.  In return for economic and political support highly 
empowered officials and functionaries favoured the New Order capitalist system with 
protection from reformist economic tendencies and preferentially dispersed the 
benefits of some three decades of highly successful state-promoted economic and 
industrial development.   
                    The majority of the Indonesian people were nonetheless better off under 
the New Order and acquiesced to the reality of economic inequity.  After the 
economic disaster and social hardships of the Sukarno era, Indonesia’s access to 
international finance and its burgeoning oil profits during the first decade of the 
developmental process provided the New Order sufficient resources to dramatically 
improve the general welfare.  Successful New Order economic development enabled 
substantially improved levels of education, increased efficiency in rice production and 
distribution (notwithstanding counter-poising high levels of corruption), improved 
social security and offered more opportunity for upward mobility, pecuniary 
advantage and comfortable retirement among not only the favoured bureaucratic elites 
but also the growing urban middle class.  Revenue surplus from Pancasila-ist 
economic development enabled the regime to subsidise heavily government and 
regionally targeted distribution policies heavily reducing poverty from some 60% to 
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less than 15% in the course of thirty years of New Order hegemony.973  An important 
consequence of development success was the New Order’s willingness and ability to 
greatly expand the Indonesian education system.  Heavy expenditure on building and 
staffing schools in the outer regions enabled millions of Muslim children and young 
adults to receive education opportunities up to secondary school level and beyond 
unimagined by their parents’ generations.  While the economic bloc was able to 
sustain itself through the devices of protection, monopoly, credit and preferential 
access to business advantage, it also therefore benefited from a highly disciplined, 
low-wage work force founded on state-funded education.  But heavy expenditure on 
grass-roots education had the direct consequence that by the late-1980s Islam was 
coming to present a more prominent and conspicuous element of modern Indonesian 
society than it had been during the early years of the New Order and heightened the 
consciousness of a growing class of Indonesian Muslims to the iniquitous position 
their indigenous majority held within the economy.     
                    In terms of Gramscian hegemonic refurbishment, the economic 
deregulation policies demanded by the dramatic drop in oil revenues during the mid-
1980s exemplified the model but deregulation and reform proved a bonanza for 
domestic capital and advantaged the Sino-Indonesian conglomerates and their 
connections over their proportionately fewer associates among the indigenous 
business community.  Although forced upon the state planners, the laisse-faire 
privatisation programmes of the late-1980s and early 1990s demanded by changing 
economic realities proved timely in terms of hegemonic refurbishment by offering the 
bloc an opportunity to refurbish ideological legitimacy and reinforce alliance 
arrangements with domestic capital to enable necessary re-alignments among the 
intra-elite alliance structure.  Gratefully embraced by the regime, privatisation 
programmes empowered the bloc with the legitimacy to adjust the reward structure 
and transfer commercial advantage among the constantly changing arrangement of 
strategically placed politico-corporate elites.  While the opportunities offered popular-
nationalist economic imperatives to rebalance Sino-Indonesian corporations more in 
favour of pribumi interests, the reality of politico-economic adjustment saw only a 
small minority of well-connected, predominantly Javanese, elites led by the President, 
his family and associates, gaining most from the economic opportunities and 
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resources that should have been deployed in terms of legitimate hegemonic 
refurbishment to strengthen indigenous economic interests.         
                    The shattered economy of the Sukarno era recovered rapidly under the 
New Order and economic growth of at least 5% was maintained for fifteen years until 
1982 when a downturn in the international oil market forced a period of economic 
reform but investments coming on stream from more than a decade of windfall oil 
profits and a modicum of prudent regulatory reform sustained growth of at least 7% 
thereafter until the late-1990s.  To varying degrees, and at appropriate times to satisfy 
the needs of hegemonic refurbishment in the face of changing economic 
circumstances, the bloc employed three general economic and industrial policy 
frameworks that each complied to varying degrees with the legitimizing exigencies of 
Gramscian hegemonic refurbishment and continuance.974  Economic nationalism 
conformed to the tenets of a Pancasila-ist economy by favouring ideologically-
populist state-led strategic industrial development, trade protection and extensive state 
investment in the economy, to sustain regime legitimacy as well as the authority of 
the organic techno-bureaucracy charged with allocating state resources and capital.  
Strongly Pancasila-ist economic populist initiatives forced upon the bloc by anti-
Sino-Indonesian xenophobia sustained the bloc’s popular legitimacy through 
subsidies on basic domestic commodities and the funding of regional and local 
development projects and programmes.  The third general framework of predatory 
bureaucratism remained constant throughout the New Order and as the prime 
empowering instrument of the bloc’s organic constituency was able to satisfy 
hegemonic imperatives by sustaining the alliance of elite economic interests vital to 
bloc cohesion.   
 
1.1.2  The New Order political bloc 
                       The New Order political bloc also exemplified prime characteristics of 
the Gramscian model by institutionalising and embedding the Pancasila political 
derivative Pancasila demokrasi as ideological discourse to legitimise necessary 
processes of balanced coercion and consensus.  Socio-political order and conformity 
was essential if the developmental agendas upon which New Order legitimacy rested 
were to be met. Socio-political expression outside permissible frameworks was firmly 
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proscribed by balancing ABRI’s coercive influence down through every level of 
society with participatory political processes that regularly rearranged and reasserted 
the moral and intellectual legitimacy of the New Order political system.  During the 
first decade of the New Order the regime deployed the military, its most powerful 
coercive resource, to first remove socio-political challenge from communism and then 
the socio-political alternative of a mobilised politika Islam.  A persuasive rendering of 
Pancasila, formulated into the military doctrine dwi fungsi guaranteed regime socio-
political and ideological oversight across the archipelago and the potentially divisive 
social force of Islam was assimilated into the alliance system through the highly 
prescribed parliamentary system.  The consensual aspect of hegemonic order found 
legitimacy in the 1945 Constitution and the ideologically defined, Pancasila derived, 
political process Pancasila demokrasi that formalised and tied political participation 
to an institutionalised system managing order and control at every level of national 
life.  Pancasila provided the New Order with a hegemonic ideology that not only 
legitimised the bloc’s political arrangement of national life but also both stabilised a 
divided society and provided a legitimate basis from which the nation could be 
mobilised behind egalitarian socio-political betterment and economic development.     
                   Ongoing Gramscian hegemonic refurbishment rearranged political 
processes as needed to assimilate potentially problematic subordinate values and 
interests and crafted sufficient socio-political compliance during the three decades of 
New Order hegemony that some 88% of the electorate regularly took an active part in 
the electoral process.  The first and most profound example of ideological 
refurbishment occurred with the rationalisation and reconstruction of the political 
party system in 1974 that separated mass political participation into the easily 
controlled groupings of the state party GOLKAR that compulsorily included all state 
employees, the PPP that combined Muslim interests, and the PDI that represented a 
broad grouping of secular-nationalists including Christians and other minority 
religions.975  GOLKAR guaranteed ABRI access to the legitimate political institutions 
of the state and with 20% of parliament’s seats and 40% of all senior government and 
administrative positions allocated to serving and retired military personal ABRI were 
guaranteed a constant high level of parliamentary influence.  The 1978 programme of 
Pancasila refresher courses, termed P4, reaffirmed the importance of ideological 
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unity and socio-political responsibility within the civil service.976  In 1984 the regime 
directive Azas tunggal compelled all mass organisations to acknowledge the bloc’s 
socio-political legitimacy and accept Pancasila as their organisations’ sole 
foundation.977  The acronym SARA, regularly referred to in the media, constantly 
reminded the people of the need for socio-political conformity by identifying the 
sensitive issues of race, ethnicity, and religion as to be publicly discussed or 
politicised under no circumstances.978   
                     Until an Islamic resurgence coincided with a global spread of liberal 
ideas and human rights at the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the New Order 
political bloc exhibited all of the processes of cohesion and socio-political control 
called for by the model.  But the subsequent loosening of the political system in 1991 
following the contradictory pressures imposed by ABRI resurrecting their 
Kewaspadaan doctrine of ideological tightening and the President’s Keterbukaan 
initiative calling for less restrictive socio-political debate, set the tone of a new socio-
political environment that highlighted growing fractures within Indonesian society 
and tested Pancasila’s validity as the binding glue of hegemonic legitimacy.979  With 
the formation of the modernist Islamic intellectual organisation ICMI and the 
assimilation into the bloc of a section of Islam prepared to accommodate the bloc’s 
secular-nationalist hegemonic constituencies and accrue socio-political influence and 
advantage, a critical questioning of socio-political consensus and bloc legitimacy took 
place.980   
                   As appropriate Gramscian hegemonic compliance would demand, the 
New Order leadership assembled a powerful organic constituency to consolidate its 
hegemonic representation of the state ideology Pancasila for mass consumption.  The 
ideological bloc thus formed was able to sustain class domination for some three 
decades by assimilating an all-encompassing compromise of subordinate views and 
interests into regime socio-political and economic agendas and sustaining a high level 
of national consensus, notwithstanding the problematic range of ethnic cleavages that 
had earlier threatened to tear the new Republic apart.  The behaviour of the New 
Order ideological bloc validated and conformed to Gramsci’s insights into hegemonic 
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consistency by offering the state ideology Pancasila as a set of potentially unifying 
principles that underpinned bloc legitimacy by both stabilizing divided society and 
providing a construct upon which egalitarian socio-political and economic 
development could be pursued.981  Through an exclusive rendering of ideology that 
encouraged belief in God (but not an exclusionary Islamic one thereby denying a 
deepening Islamisation of the Indonesian polity) the New Order ideological bloc 
exemplified the Gramscian model by consistently assimilating, moderating, co-opting 
subordinate views and only compelled and coerced ideological conformity when they 
believed they were confronted by threats to national unity.982   
                   Contesting the bloc’s organic constituencies (primarily the secular-
nationalist military and the techno-bureaucracy), in Gramscian terms, the 
irreconcilably fractured traditional intellectual constituency of mass Islam remained 
the prime source of potential counter-hegemony were it able to coalesce into a unified 
cohesive force.  Until the late-1980s, an adept progression of hegemonic 
refurbishments, assimilation and co-optation sustained a fine balance between the 
secular-nationalist orientations of the New Order Pancasila-ist state and the growing 
socio-political consciousness of Indonesia’s predominantly Muslim society.983  As the 
1990s unfolded, the abangan/santri separation reflecting degrees of Muslim piety, 
together with the influence of an Islamic intellectual divide between scripturalism and 
accommodation, caused increasing debate and raised growing doubt within society as 
to the legitimacy of the ideological bloc’s rendering of conformity that formed the 
basis of the New Order Pancasila state.984  Although Pancasila remained the 
exclusive instrument of New Order hegemonic discourse, alternative interpretations 
and renderings of the doctrine’s true meaning and intent found a basis for growing 
debate among a diverse range of social forces that included the military, the 
consequences of heightened Islamic socio-political consciousness, and a diverse array 
of secular-nationalist interests that traversed both.   
                  Revitalised Islam led to resurgent Islamic socio-politics and traditional 
influences attempted to capture Pancasila itself to challenge its exclusive use by the 
New Order as the intellectual and moral basis of hegemonic legitimacy.  The 
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ideological bloc was obliged to conform to Gramscian imperatives and renegotiate its 
legitimacy in the face of the changing situation by assimilating the accommodative 
stream of Islam represented by ICMI, into the hegemonic structure.985  But politika-
Islam had been polarised on the powerless peripheries of the ideological bloc’s 
influence for some twenty-five years and lacked the skills of compromise as well as 
the institutional means of a cohesive polity to coalesce into socio-political unity.  
While ICMI had intellectual access to some thirty million modernist Muslims, some 
thirty million traditionalist Muslims remained on the political periphery, outside bloc 
influence, and found voice in Wahid’s oppositional stance based on his inclusive, 
religiously neutral, secular-nationalist rendering of Pancasila.986  Hopelessly divided 
yet able to mobilise mass followings behind their various factions, Indonesian Islam 
troubled the establishment elites and the fear of sectarianism and a resurgent politika-
Islam linked to grass-roots mass society by the President’s Keterbukaan call for more 
socio-political openness, hardened the military’s own ideological/doctrinal stance, 
verbalised as Kewaspadaan, profoundly contradicting the bloc’s legitimising and 
unifying tenets.987  
 
1.1.3  The New Order ideological bloc  
                   The behaviour of the New Order ideological bloc in terms of the 
Gramscian model thus showed distinct shortcomings.  Islam’s prevalence and 
growing mass potential made Pancasila’s hegemonic secular-nationalist 
representation of the state ideology - the ideological pillar of the New Order bloc - 
increasingly unconvincing to the majority and the consensual aspects of hegemonic 
legitimacy came under growing question. The Gramscian model remained sound in 
terms of his insights into ideological legitimacy and refurbishment but in the New 
Order context, the hegemonic legitimacy of the ideological bloc became progressively 
more deficient as the assimilation of subordinate groups’ non-negotiable demands 
became increasingly contradictory.  Yet while a range of oppositional forces found 
common ground for intellectual challenge within alternative understandings of 
Pancasila’s legitimate role in national life, cohesive counter-hegemony around a new 
common rendering of ideology was unforthcoming and it fell to student-led mass 
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protest behind demands for reformasi dan demokrasi, only loosely identified with 
Pancasila and therefore unsustainable as a long-term, counter-hegemonic, movement 
to bring down the regime.  In Gramscian terms, the depiction of New Order 
hegemony as an ideological bloc concludes that Suharto’s dominance was unable to 
assimilate increasingly legitimate broader mass values and demands to the extent that 
hegemonic decay and obsolescence occurred and ultimately led to hegemonic failure. 
 
1.1.4  Proposition summary         
                    For some thirty years the New Order closely contrasted the Gramscian 
model by mobilising Indonesia behind hegemonic nation-building and developmental 
agendas through an exclusive regime representation of the state ideology Pancasila 
that called upon aspects of powerful cultural symbolism to underwrite moral and 
intellectual legitimacy.  The Gramscian schema’s processes of consent management 
expressed through Gramsci’s analytical construct the historic bloc and its three 
specific forms underpinned by the legitimacy of state ideology illustrate precisely the 
evolving machinations of the New Order socio-political and economic management of 
Indonesian life.  Drawing upon the Gramscian model of hegemonic order enabled a 
convincing explanation as to how each of the New Order historic bloc’s component 
elements instituted and sustained themselves through appropriate legitimising 
imperatives of limited coercion balancing consensual techniques of co-optation and 
elicited cooperation.  Persuasive techniques solicited key economic sectors behind 
regime economic agendas and society-friendly regional policies promoted 
development.  The organic techno-bureaucracy was provided sufficient coercive 
power to implement regime agendas as well as sufficient power of inducement and 
preferential allocation but in satisfying the consensual aspects of economic hegemony 
orchestrated a culture of patronage and corruption that came to define the New Order 
bloc and contradicted the egalitarian ideals upon which moral and intellectual 
legitimacy had been negotiated.  The demands of hegemonic management required 
ongoing renegotiation of alliance arrangements and interests in response to ever-
changing socio-political and economic realities but generally well-connected interests 
were the prime beneficiaries of development.  To a large extent the bloc complied 
with the need for economic reform but pragmatic adjustment policies generally 
prevailed over those that might threaten hegemonic alliance interests and with the 
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indigenous, predominantly Muslim masses benefiting the least, the legitimising 
requirement of the model were neglected.   
                   Because of its focus on crafting mass perceptions of ideology and culture 
to order socio-political life the Gramscian historic bloc’s political form, the political 
bloc, offered a highly appropriate means of explaining the New Order political 
leadership’s exclusive representation of ideology to underpin hegemonic legitimacy.  
The Gramscian schema enables a concise identification of the processes through 
which Pancasila’s political derivative Pancasila demokrasi formalised and tied the 
New Order political system to valid democratic institutions thereby legitimizing tight 
control over all levels of Indonesian social politics.  Pancasila and its derivatives 
pervaded all three forms of the bloc.  Through its self-proclaimed 
doctrinal/ideological derivative dwi fungsi, ABRI provided the political bloc’s 
coercive functions while potentially divisive socio-political forces complied with the 
compromises implicit in commitment to a Pancasila-ist, secular-nationalist state.  The 
Suharto regime also effectively contrasted the legitimizing tenets of Gramscian 
hegemonic order that the New Order political bloc respond to changing socio-political 
conditions and realities by re-negotiating and adjusting alliance arrangements with the 
subordinate masses through ongoing processes of hegemonic refurbishment.  Potential 
counter-hegemonic challenges built on alternative renderings of ideology from both 
communism on the left and politika Islam on the right were crushed during the first 
decade of the New Order, while hegemonic arrangements were still being established, 
and ABRI’s dual-function socio-political and security role ideologically 
institutionalized hegemony’s coercive imperatives into doctrine as dwi fungsi and 
politically through military domination of the regime political party GOLKAR.  
Amalgamating all political parties into manageable groupings in 1974, both forcing 
and consensualising all mass social organisations into acknowledging Pancasila as 
their raison d’etre through azas tunggal in 1984 and reaffirming civil servants’ socio-
political and ideological responsibilities through the P4 programme and SARA’s 
proscription of the issues around which political mobilisation could not occur, 
completed the ideological institutionalisation of Pancasila’s political form, Pancasila 
demokrasi.988     
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                    Hegemonic legitimacy requires the dominant class not only influencing 
and ordering broader economic and socio-political interests but also through moral 
and intellectual leadership sustaining consensus through ongoing response sensitive to 
changing mass interests and values.  Lacking this vital legitimising agreement, based 
on firm leadership and direction, the corporatist arrangements prevalent in East and 
Southeast Asia during the post-World War 2 era that linked government, business and 
labour, fell far short of Gramscian hegemony and merely represented precarious 
domination through authoritarianism.  Testing the Suharto New Order’s quest to 
legitimise its leadership and development agendas against the Gramscian model of 
hegemonic order therefore emphasises the prime importance of ideology in eliciting 
national consensus to the legitimacy of rule.  The Suharto New Order’s representation 
of Pancasila illustrated clearly the vital enabling behaviour of Gramscian hegemonic 
discourse as a means of accounting for the moral and intellectual basis of the all-
encompassing ideological bloc to legitimise hegemonic order.  As would be expected 
under the Gramscian model, the nation was compelled to acknowledge Pancasila’s 
tenets assimilated and moderated through an array of coercive, cooptive and 
persuasive processes.   As represented by the New Order, Pancasila’s tenets 
exemplified the Gramscian model by providing a formula that enabled ideological 
consensus to be crafted broadly across all of society’s subordinate groups including 
the potentially divisive strains and levels of Islamic observance as well as secular-
nationalist interests.  Contrasting the New Order with Gramsci’s insights into 
ideological legitimacy therefore provides a highly valuable and robust analysis that 
goes beyond mere authoritarianism in explaining the New Order’s deployment of 
Pancasila to legitimise socio-political and economic agendas.  By treating economics, 
social politics and ideological leadership as essential complimentary components of 
an integrated whole, Gramsci’s analytical construct, his historic bloc, provided a 
schema able to rationalize an understanding of the powerful influence of culture and 
religion upon Indonesian life under the Suharto New Order.   
 
1.1.5  Does the New Order economic bloc closely fit the Gramscian model?  
                      Gramsci’s economic bloc provides a close fit when used to explain how 
New Order economic agendas were hegemonically diffused through ideologically 
legitimizing Pancasila-ist imperatives and persuasive techniques to solicit key 
economic sectors behind regime agendas without coercion overplaying the consensual 
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techniques of co-optation, elicited cooperation and corruption.  The fit draws closer 
when the role of the organic techno-bureaucracy is understood in terms of their 
function implementing hegemonic agendas that balanced implicitly legitimate 
socially-friendly policies of economic egalitarianism with the interests of the well-
connected hegemonic classes.  That the consensual requirements of economic 
hegemony, and the needs for an ongoing rearrangement and realignment of elite 
alliance interests that could respond to changing socio-economic realities, spawned a 
growing culture of patronage and corruption favouring well-connected interests over 
those of the Muslim masses and questioned bloc legitimacy is less the fault of the 
model than the influences of New Order elite culture and behaviour upon the model.  
 
1.1.6  Does the New Order political bloc closely fit the Gramscian model?  
                       From the perspective of the political bloc, the fit with the model is less 
convincing particularly in terms of sustained hegemonic legitimacy.  Although socio-
political legitimacy required conscious mass acceptance of an hegemonic arrangement 
of the state doctrine Pancasila’s political derivative Pancasila demokrasi, formalised 
and tied to valid democratic institutions, ABRI’s appropriation and domination of the 
processes of ideological conformity tend to contradict the legitimacy implicit in the 
hegemonic model.  ABRI’s hegemonic organic role, although ideologically 
legitimised through dwi fungsi and politically formalized through the institution’s 
dominant role over the political system, and deemed an essential pre-requisite to 
socio-political stability and economic development, came with a level of coercion that 
tended to question whether national consensus to hegemonic New Order rule was 
derived from a preponderance of pure authoritarianism.  While the New Order 
political bloc prima facie exemplified the behaviour of the Gramscian model by 
rendering Pancasila’s legitimising tenets in such a way as to craft a broad mass 
consensus based on a pragmatic assertion of unity, hegemonically derived consensus 
effectively came at the cost of peripheralising the genuine political aspirations of the 
majority Islamic mass constituency.    
 
1.1.7  Does the New Order ideological bloc closely fit the Gramscian model?  
                       The New Order ideological bloc proved to be a closer fit to the 
Gramscian model than both the economic and political blocs.  Notwithstanding the 
New Order assigning politika-Islam to the periphery of the Pancasila demokrasi 
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political arrangement for some twenty-five years (until a pragmatic realignment of 
moral and intellectual legitimacy enabled more Islamic social and political influence 
from the early 1990s) a liberal form of Islam proliferated, generally amenable to the 
regime’s secular-nationalist unifying agendas.  Having removed the threat from the 
left of communism early in its rule, the New Order’s empowerment and 
institutionalization of Pancasila and its derivatives as a hegemonic discourse of moral 
and intellectual legitimacy had nonetheless successfully provided the bloc with the 
means of ameliorating the potentially destabilizing and primordial influences of 
politika-Islam and thereby closely fitted the model by reducing a potentially counter-
hegemonic ideological constituency to the status of a social force amenable to regime 
agendas.                 
 
1.2  Thesis Proposition 2: That Gramsci’s theories on hegemonic crisis 
and counter-hegemony explain, to a substantial degree, the hegemonic 
obsolescence and decay that led to the Suharto New Order collapsing in 
1997/8. 
                   This second proposition considers how effectively Gramsci’s theories on 
hegemonic decay and obsolescence account for the collapse of the Suharto New Order 
in 1997/8 and provide key insights and timely clarity to the issues involved in the 
circumstances of regime failure.  To comply with the Gramscian model the Suharto 
New Order would have had to refurbish constantly and effectively the hegemonic 
arrangements as necessary by assimilating the broader non-negotiable interests and 
values of a predominantly Muslim society and a wide range of secular-nationalist 
interests and demands into bloc legitimacy to avoid hegemonic decay and 
obsolescence and the likelihood of a coherent counter-hegemony surfacing around an 
alternative rendering of ideology.989  Gramsci was clear that an emergent successful 
counter-hegemony did not necessarily require replacing the hegemonic arrangement’s 
representation of ideology with a new and already formulated one but processes that 
transformed and rearticulated existing ideological/cultural elements into a 
comprehensive coherent reality, acknowledged by the masses, would suffice as long 
as they could be organized socio-politically and legitimately.990  The likelihood of a 
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counter-hegemony coalescing and emerging depended upon the hegemony’s ability to 
respond and refurbish itself ideologically in the face of challenges from changing 
socio-political and economic circumstances.   
                      Despite the New Order instituting processes of ideological 
refurbishment from the late-1980s to confront threats from both a resurgent socio-
political Islam and a dissatisfied military and also from the political and economic 
crises of the mid-1990s, hegemonic refurbishment ultimately failed.  In Gramscian 
terms, subordinate values and interests from the nation’s two most powerful socio-
political forces were inadequately assimilated into hegemonic arrangements resulting 
in hegemonic decay and obsolescence.991  Yet a coherent counter-hegemony, able to 
disseminate an alternative ideological package and win over the hearts and minds of 
the masses, failed to coalesce due to the inability of traditional discourse to 
compromise divergent stances and offer a unified constituency that demystified mass 
subordination to the bloc’s ideological legitimacy.992  A wide range of oppositional 
stances failed to unify into a coherent challenge because of their contradictory 
positions around differing understandings and renderings of Pancasila and its 
derivatives.  Hegemonic decay and obsolescence in terms of bloc legitimacy and 
potential counter-hegemony occurred through divergence and incoherence across each 
of the historic bloc’s overlapping economic, political and ideological forms.         
                     During the late-1980s and early-1990s, divergence and contradiction 
among the organic techno-bureaucracy over the demands of a modern internationally 
competitive economy increasingly defined the New Order economic bloc, elements 
within the military grew increasingly frustrated and concerned at the contradictions in 
their institution’s ongoing involvement in economic and corporate affairs with the 
valid demands of military professionalism, while the majority of the Indonesian 
people increasingly questioned the legitimacy of the New Order’s Pancasila-ist 
economy and ABRI’s involvement in it.993  Failure to sustain the legitimizing tenets 
of the Pancasila-ist economy both weakened the alliance of interests underwriting the 
bloc’s economic arrangement and also questioned the legitimacy of the validating 
social contract implicit in the relationship between the Pancasila-ist economy and the 
Indonesian people.  The egalitarian popular-nationalist tenets of the Pancasila 
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economy were largely being met through the state’s substantial involvement in the 
economy both directly through the state owned enterprises and indirectly through 
ABRI’S ideological and doctrinal legitimacy as guardians and protectors of the entire 
range of the national interests including the economy.  Pancasila’s economic 
nationalist imperatives were also claimed through an array of indigenous co-operative 
ventures and the somewhat dubious business interests of the President’s family, 
cronies, and favoured business associates’ pribumi credentials.  Although representing 
less than 4% of the population, the Sino-Indonesians were widely believed to control 
the economy so it was generally felt that in the interest of socio-economic equity and 
clearly in terms of ideological legitimacy, their hold over the economy needed to be 
reduced in favour of indigenous interests.   
                  Hegemonic response argued that the first family’s business empire, an 
inefficient state-supported and over-funded co-operative sector, ABRI and the SOEs’ 
commercial influence, and the state’s policies of subsidized credit programs aimed at 
strengthening indigenous commerce, needed to be understood as compensating 
attempts to assist pribumi commercial power gain sufficient expertise to ultimately 
compete with Sino-Indonesian commercial pre-eminence.  This cynical Pancasila-ist 
view, together with the deeply embedded culture that tied business to politics and 
allowed powerful politico-business interests to remain the prime beneficiaries of 
development and opportunity, seriously undermined the economic bloc’s hegemonic 
legitimacy.  When indigenous capital did manage to emerge and compete with Sino-
Indonesian conglomerates, success tended to involve association with the strongly 
secular, civil and military bureaucratic class rather than with the traditional Muslim 
petty bourgeoisie class notwithstanding they represented an overwhelming indigenous 
majority.   
                     While the privatization aspects of the financial and economic 
deregulatory reform and liberalization program of the late-1980s and early-1990s 
compromised the popular-nationalist tenets of the bloc’s Pancasila-based economy, 
privatization nonetheless offered profitable yet problematic hegemonic refurbishment 
opportunities for the regime.  Privatization was intended to move assets out of state 
control into the private sector so nationalist popular support was not ideologically 
strong and when major state assets were sold off, rather than go to indigenous co-
operative arrangements, they generally went to well-connected conglomerates and 
politico-business families further narrowing the concentration of economic power and 
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wealth notwithstanding a tightening of organic solidarity.  Banking system reform 
gave local and foreign banks more space to operate locally and permitted state-owned 
banks to be converted into private ownership generally away from indigenous 
influence.  While the reforms were intended to open the state sector to more liberal 
processes the conglomerates, major politico-business family interests and the 
President’s family and associates were the major beneficiaries of ideologically-
compromised reform processes that merely re-aligned the key players within the 
bloc’s hegemonic alliance structure.994  Effectively the reform and liberalization 
processes did little more than broaden the gap between the wealthy few and the 
disadvantaged majority thereby contradicting the egalitarianism and societal equity 
implicit in a legitimate Pancasila-ist economy.   
                    From the mid-1990s, despite growing economic inefficiency, organic 
techno-bureaucratic influence continued to prioritize the interests of the ruling elites 
to the detriment of subordinate interests and neglected the compromises essential to 
sustained hegemonic legitimacy.  The powerful techno-bureaucracy, together with the 
President’s family and associates continued to influence and dominate the New Order 
economic bloc un-sustained by any deepening in the system of rules, property rights, 
contractual procedures, and legitimate institutional structures.  Essentially, bloc 
cohesion and legitimacy was maintained by coping with the needs of market 
adjustment through socio-politically and ideologically problematic re-alignments 
among elite economic interests to the detriment of the subordinated, increasingly 
dissatisfied, majority.  But the former pre-eminence of the bloc’s ideologues and 
solidarity-makers over ideological coherence was being questioned by elements 
within the formerly subordinated techno-bureaucracy unimpressed by ideological 
symbol-waving and under increasing pressure both internationally and domestically 
for more than symbolic economic and financial reforms.995   
                   In terms of the Gramscian model, issues of equity and social justice, the 
concentration of politico-economic power among a corrupt minority, contradictions 
between ideologically inspired economic nationalism and the need to integrate with 
the global economy and tension between, on the one hand, a bureaucracy under 
external pressure to commit to fiscal discipline and, on the other, predatory capitalists 
seeking state protection or credit, were causing unacceptable levels of uncertainty and 
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social tension that increasingly contradicted bloc legitimacy.  The hegemonic 
legitimacy of the bureaucratic/corporatist social contract with greater Indonesian 
society that had bound bloc cohesion for some three decades was decaying and under 
threat from an emergent popular opposition led by an assemblage of traditional 
intellectuals focusing on the lack of economic egalitarianism, social justice and 
economic inequity threatening to reconstitute ideological legitimacy into a viable 
counter-hegemony by calling for a return to the tenets of a true Pancasila-ist 
economy.  Potential counter-hegemonic forces were putting voice to a growing 
distaste for a business culture that institutionalized political manipulation and 
corruption in total contradiction to the moral and intellectual legitimacy implicit in a 
true Pancasila-ist economy and demanded economic reforms that embraced open and 
legitimate market processes, prudent fiscal governance, and stronger legal regulatory 
and administrative frameworks.             
                   From the beginning of the 1990s, subsequent fragmentation and 
divergence within the New Order political bloc was not limited to elements of the 
powerful socio-political constituencies, the military and Islam, but included a wide 
range of conflicting and often contradictory secular-nationalist stances that placed 
added pressure upon bloc legitimacy.996  All socio-political positions found substance 
for debate within conflicting visions as to the validity of Pancasila and its derivatives 
in a changing socio-political environment and to varying degrees increasingly focused 
their voices of protest behind growing demands for more general reformasi dan 
demokrasi.  Debate within the officer corps polarized the institution that had formerly 
underwritten the bloc’s organic substance around the issues of military 
professionalism and the continued validity of dwi fungsi legitimizing ABRI intrusion 
into every aspect of Indonesian life.  A resurgent Islam and a diverse range of social 
forces debated Pancasila’s true meaning and intent while most of the nation 
questioned the illiberal nature of the nation’s political arrangements as prescribed by 
the New Order’s political derivative, Pancasila demokrasi.  While debate focused on 
the New Order’s representation of Pancasila and its increasingly dubious legitimacy, 
the over-riding issue informing most socio-political stances became the future status 
and influence of a resurgent mass based politika-Islam.997   
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                  The Suharto New Order defined, deployed and legitimized an exclusive 
Pancasila-ist range of democratic processes under the rubric of Pancasila demokrasi 
for some three decades in underwriting the socio-political hegemony defined by the 
New Order political bloc.998  Political processes had remained the exclusive domain 
of the New Order and Gramsci would recognize this as hegemony at work, as a self-
serving system of alliances intended to broaden popular appeal and enable consensual 
socio-political transformation from above.999  Discovering what is politically possible 
and workable in the context to which it must apply, identifying those issues that might 
best be the subject of compromise and isolating those which might be better deferred 
indefinitely, is not only the true purpose of democratic institutions but also clearly 
part of the Gramscian schema.1000  The New Order negotiated the necessary processes 
pragmatically but if such processes are to work they must operate within agreed, 
legally constituted frameworks of legitimacy.  Ideological legitimacy, the vital 
ingredient of the Gramscian hegemonic model, increasingly absented itself from the 
New Order political bloc legitimizing processes as defined by a regimist Pancasila 
demokrasi and became increasingly compromised by their exclusionary nature and the 
indefinite deferment of more liberal democratic participation.  Essentially the New 
Order political bloc’s hegemonic legitimacy decayed and the arrangement became 
obsolete because Pancasila demokrasi’s legitimizing tenets of unanimous, consensual 
democracy based on traditional Javanese values of consultation and consensus 
became unsustainable.   
                    The key issue in applying a Gramscian hypothesis to the hegemonic crisis 
brought about by New Order decay and obsolescence is found in the contradictory 
organic and traditional ideological responses to the deteriorating socio-political and 
economic conditions of the 1990s.  An appropriate Gramscian response would have 
broadened the political bloc’s popular appeal through top-down processes of 
hegemonic refurbishment to assimilate the non-negotiable values and beliefs that were 
emerging from throughout society and threatening to form a coherent counter-
hegemony, into organic legitimacy.  A serious crisis requires rebalancing socio-
political forces, adapting ideologies and, if necessary, restructuring state institutional 
practices.  In Gramscian terms, a class cannot sustain its hegemony if it confines itself 
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to its own class interests so it must lure to its cause groups outside its immediate class 
and, if necessary, appeal to their popular and democratic aspirations.1001  New Order 
power arrangements operated in a culturally traditional environment of compromise 
and trade-off1002 so constructing a successful counter-hegemony would not 
necessarily, as the Gramscian model insists, have required replacing the hegemonic 
world-view with a completely new and already formulated one.  Because the 
opposition was too fragmented to enable the appropriate concession-making, 
processes that simply transformed and rearticulated existing ideological arrangements 
would have sufficed but the necessary elements were not in place.1003      
                     In terms of the New Order ideological bloc, Pancasila’s secular-
nationalist tenets and their appropriateness in the context of a majority Muslim 
society, whose various leaderships were polarized around different theological stances 
that clashed with the secular-nationalist values and interests served by the bloc’s 
representation of Pancasila, caused growing debate and concern among elements of 
the officer corps.1004  Elements of modernist Islam were prepared to work with the 
President and the bloc through ICMI in return for socio-political influence1005 but 
traditionalist Islam and elements within the military, together with an array of 
uncoordinated reformist social groups, demanded an alternative interpretation of 
Pancasila be renegotiated that would represent a new and valid socio-political and 
ideological basis for the Indonesian state.  By so doing, in Gramscian terms, they 
challenged the solidarity and legitimacy of the bloc’s ideological foundations and in 
seeking the basis for counter-hegemonic challenge in variants of Pancasila, they 
threatened to capture as their own the bloc’s prime symbol of conformity.   
                      In line with the Gramscian imperative of hegemonic refurbishment as 
necessary, President Suharto introduced a major shift in the New Order’s ideological 
inclinations towards Islam from the early 1990s, believing that: (i) the relationship 
between the state and Islam needed updating, (ii) Islam represented a powerful 
electoral constituency that could balance his perception he was loosing ABRI’s 
support, and (iii) influential intellectual elements within Islamic modernism were 
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displaying a willingness to accommodate the tenets of the Pancasila-ist state.1006  But 
the prospect of any deeper Islamisation of the state was viewed by both traditional 
oppositional interest groups and elements within the military as threatening the 
explicit secular foundations of the Pancasila state that underpinned New Order 
ideological legitimacy.  Moreover, a range of voices both inside and outside the 
power structure were offering alternative renderings of Pancasila they believed to be 
more appropriate to the changing socio-political and economic environment, further 
undermining the New Order bloc’s ideological validity.1007  Sustaining Gramscian 
hegemonic order requires that ideological legitimacy be constantly reaffirmed and the 
President’s Keterbukaan call for more socio-political openness and discussion and 
ABRI’s Kewaspadaan doctrinal reassertion demanding increased ideological 
vigilance, while contradictory in general terms of ideological cohesion, represented 
model examples of the coercion/consensus balance implicit in the Gramscian schema.  
But Keterbukaan proved inconsistent.  While it provided for more open discussion in 
the more liberal environment of the early 1990s, debate as to Pancasila and the 1945 
Indonesian Constitution’s continued appropriateness as the unifying foundations of 
the state remained sacrosanct.  ABRI’s Kewaspadaan also reacted to new socio-
political realities but warned that the potential for inappropriate ideas challenging 
Pancasila and the Constitution required constant vigilance and if necessary firm 
action on ABRI’s part.  The Gramscian model shows how hegemony must never be 
taken for granted and that sustaining socio-political authority requires the bloc 
constantly employing the symbols and devices of ideological persuasion but while 
both Keterbukaan and Kewaspadaan fulfilled that purpose by alternatively adapting, 
compromising, and coercing legitimizing consensus the results were incoherent and 
socio-politically divisive.   
 
1.2.1 Summary 
                       In summary, Gramsci’s insights into hegemonic decay and 
obsolescence offer a compelling approach to interpreting the diverse range of forces 
opposing the New Order during the early 1990s and questioning its hegemonic 
legitimacy.  Gramsci’s model also shows how the impact of these diverse forces was 
too fragmented to form a coherent counter-hegemony.  By 1995 the New Order 
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appeared to have weathered most of the challenges and prior to the sudden and 
dramatic economic crisis of 1997 that catalyzed calls for reformasi dan demokrasi 
into mass popular mobilization, New Order ideological legitimacy was merely 
showing signs of hegemonic decay and obsolescence.  By the middle of 1997 the New 
Order historic bloc was faced with triple organic crises of economic, political and 
ideological hegemonic legitimacy.  By realigning elite alliance interests during the 
early 1990s the bloc had been attempting to respond to the era’s changing economic 
realities but growing opposition to ABRI’s intrusive role in the nation’s life and the 
endemic corruption and rentier culture that had come to define New Order economic 
arrangements had profoundly weakened the bloc’s ability to resist the effects of the 
regional economic and financial crisis.  Failure to legitimize an acceptable meaning of 
Pancasila demokrasi in the face of conflicting interpretations and demands for 
reformasi dan demokrasi in turn weakened the political bloc and contributed to the 
crisis of regime transition that led to the bloc’s disintegration with Suharto’s 
resignation.  The regime was reluctant to react to the changing socio-political realities 
with direct domination by force and relied upon a convergence of organic and 
traditional ideological responses to the new realities.  But the responses from Islam’s 
various intellectual streams proved contradictory, the fragmented military was 
ideologically impotent, and the alliance of class interests that had legitimized the 
Suharto bloc’s moral and intellectual leadership for some three decades came apart 
and deserted him.   
                    The Gramscian concepts of hegemonic decay, obsolescence and counter-
hegemony provide a highly compelling and fruitful three-faceted ideological 
methodology for explaining New Order collapse.  First, Gramsci’s insights into 
hegemonic decay and obsolescence explained the failure of the of the New Order bloc 
to satisfy the Gramscian prerogative of sustaining legitimacy comprehensively across 
each of its integral economic, political and ideological components.  Second, 
Gramsci’s model provided a coherent means of explaining, on the one hand, how the 
bloc’s failure to respond to crisis and hegemonic challenge offered the potential for 
cohesive counter-hegemony to emerge and, on the other, why a coherent counter-
hegemony failed to coalesce around an alternative rendering of ideological 
legitimacy.   
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1.3  Thesis Proposition 3: That the Suharto New Order’s representation 
of Pancasila as the ‘ideological pillar’ of the Indonesian state, to a 
large degree, fulfils the function of a Gramscian discourse of 
ideological legitimacy. 
             Gramsci’s hegemonic order - his historic bloc - existed when a fusion of 
mutually inclusive economic, political and ideological temporal arrangements had 
been drawn together by a distinctive representation of ideology to legitimize a ruling 
order’s socio-political objectives.1008  The legitimacy of the subsequent hegemonic 
arrangements derived from the top-down processes involved not only informing all 
aspects of national life but also acknowledged as universally valid by the general 
population.1009  The third proposition of this thesis is to assess the validity of the 
Suharto New Order’s representation of the official ideology of the New Order state, 
Pancasila and its derivatives, in these terms as Gramscian discourse of ideological 
legitimacy.   
               ABRI, the New Order’s most potent socio-political resource, carried the 
prime responsibility for realizing the coercive aspects of the regime’s socio-political 
objectives and the Pancasila derivative dwi fungsi, institutionalized as military 
doctrine, legitimized deep regime penetration into every aspect of national life.1010  
ABRI’s professed legitimacy through loyalty to both the Indonesian Constitution and 
sworn dedication to the state ideology provided the New Order a mass panacea for the 
potential ills of destabilising cultural and ethnic diversity.  Because the sacred 
soldiers’ oath demanded allegiance to ABRI’s role as a strict defender of the 
fundamental institutions of the state, the military’s position within the bloc was 
formally recognized.  Their deployment through Pancasila and dwi fungsi provided a 
nation-building artifice giving ideological articulation to the New Order’s moral and 
intellectual right to rule.  Moreover, the regime’s exclusionary representation of 
Pancasila as the state’s ideological and philosophical basis (dasa negara) and its 
enabling function as an intellectual and moral leitmotif of socio-political exclusion 
and control guaranteed that ABRI could never be apolitical enabling its coercive 
intrusive powers to ensure that participatory parliamentary institutions offered 
                                                           
1008 Chapter 1, section 1.5, p. 33. 
1009 Chapter 1, section 1.4, pp. 28-32 and section 1.5, pp. 32-34. 
1010 Chapter 2, section 3.2.1, pp. 78-79 and Chapter 5, section 3.1.1, pp. 199-203. 
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minimal threat to regime authority.  From its inception Pancasila carried the clear 
function of providing an enabling discourse that legitimized ABRI’s self-appointed 
roles as both defenders of a non-communist, non-Islamic, united, secular-nationalist, 
Pancasila-ist Indonesian state and the ruling order’s socio-political objectives.   
               To realize the consensual aspects of hegemonic order, a second 
Pancasila derivative Pancasila demokrasi provided a legitimizing discourse that 
formalized New Order socio-political objectives into an electoral arrangement by 
placing the regime’s political organ GOLKAR in a commanding parliamentary 
position that de-legitimized potential mass-based political opposition.1011  To ensure 
politika-Islam remained on the political peripheries Muslim political aspirations were 
channelled through the carefully scrutinized PPP until the 1990s when the President 
granted an accommodative section within modernist Islam access to the power 
framework through a new Muslim modernist intellectual association ICMI.1012  The 
final step in institutionalizing ideological conformity and realizing the New Order’s 
socio-political objective of a secular state came with the 1983 azas tunggal initiative 
that called upon all mass organizations to acknowledge Pancasila as their principle 
raison d’etre.1013  
               As the ideological pillar of the New Order’s socio-political arrangement 
of national life, Pancasila provided a highly useful and appropriate culturally-based 
enabling discourse, but there can be antagonistic dimensions to appropriating 
ideology as a tool for manipulating mass consciousness.1014  Harnessed to capture the 
human imagination and compel social action, ideology can be a powerful instrument 
but can also be presented to institutionalize systemic falsehoods that advance the self-
interested agendas of powerful and malevolent forces.  When closely identified with 
culture, ideology can also evoke powerful symbolism and the Suharto New Order 
proved adept at crafting mass consciousness into acceptance of regime legitimacy 
through a representation of Pancasila that drew upon persuasive cultural origins.  An 
organic intellectualization of ideology was able to translate effectively into a cultural 
ideal that legitimized hegemonic leadership broadly across all spheres of the nation’s 
life but Marx’s observation – one of many embraced by Gramsci – that socio-political 
consciousness reflects primarily the ideas of the ruling class questions both the 
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processes the New Order employed to legitimize its hegemony as well as the general 
utility of the Gramscian model.   
               There are difficulties in trying to quantify the level of hegemonic 
consensus assimilated by the masses through the New Order bloc’s representation of 
ideology.  The idea of consent in terms of the agreement of the ruled suggests that 
governments have the general right to exercise authority over society but in the 
modern era the notion has come to indicate more the manner in which citizens are 
obliged to give their consent to the way they are organized socio-politically.  Consent 
tends to indicate more procedural correctness through a broad range of democratic 
institutions that draw citizens into conforming to what are often imposed political 
processes.  Granted the high degree of psychological acceptance implicit in the socio-
political arrangements imposed upon the nation by the New Order’s organic power-
brokers, and notwithstanding the actual liberality of the institutions and practices 
employed through Pancasila demokrasi, hegemonic order constructed round 
Gramsci’s predominantly consensual schema might still be considered authoritarian.  
Although New Order hegemony varied in form and degree of conformity and 
consensus, social and political behaviour might merely have derived from a fear of the 
consequences of non-conformity.  Conformity might simply have been a habitual way 
of achieving goals in which case consensual participation or even unquestioning 
adherence became an established form of national participation arising out of pure 
pragmatism or because it was simply inconvenient not to comply.  There may even 
have been no realistic or sensible socio-political alternative means readily available to 
pursue normal individual goals of material acquisition, prestige, or power.  Yet 
Gramscian consensus does remain distinctive in that it alone implies conscious socio-
political attachment to core fundamentals and that the idea of moral and 
intellectual/ideological legitimacy remains firmly rooted in cultural legitimacy.  
Quantifying conscious attachment therefore poses the main difficulty with both the 
Gramscian model and the New Order behaviour model but does not reflect a serious 
shortcoming into the practical use of Gramsci’s general insights into hegemonic 
legitimacy.   
               The Gramscian model of ideological legitimacy serves the Indonesian 
context well and demonstrating the bloc’s representation of Pancasila as hegemonic 
discourse provided the Suharto New Order with considerable moral and intellectual 
credibility.  Yet notwithstanding some three decades of relative socio-political 
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stability, an average of 7% GDP increase between 1974 and 1997 that contributed to 
economic and social well being for the majority of the people,1015 the reality of New 
Order behaviour fell well short of the Gramscian ideal.  Individual rights were limited 
in favour of the collective interest, belief in one God (but not exclusively Islam’s) was 
firmly prescribed, and although an egalitarian economic system was propounded, that 
was intended to benefit all of society progressive inequity shared the benefits and 
advantages of social progress and economic development.  But these results were not 
entirely the fault of the model, rather the consequences of the New Order example not 
meeting the Gramscian imperatives of ongoing assimilation of broader legitimate 
interests.1016  The Gramscian model nonetheless proved robust in its usefulness in 
clarifying the consequences of a state-driven representation of ideology coming under 
growing disputation from a diverse range of subordinate sectarian interests.  Until the 
early 1990s the New Order bloc matched the Gramscian model by replicating its 
essential legitimizing coercive/consensual balancing in its assimilation of non-
negotiable subordinate views and interests into its moral and intellectual 
constituency.1017  But while Pancasila offered an ideal unifying formula for avoiding 
mass socio-political mobilization around sectarian issues, by polarizing the majority 
Muslim masses on the powerless peripheries of socio-political influence, the Suharto 
bloc’s representation of its ideological pillar during the 1990s denied the vital 
Gramscian imperative of necessary subordinate ideological assimilation of non-
negotiable values and resulted in a progressive decline in bloc legitimacy that 
degenerated into hegemonic obsolescence and decay.   
                Gramsci intended his model of hegemonic order to be a means of 
reconciling disparate socio-political issues into a consensual arrangement by imposing 
a dominant group’s world view upon society’s subordinate classes and groups, taking 
in when necessary some of their non-negotiable values and demands but nevertheless 
giving the impression that the world-view accepted, represented broad consensus.1018  
Such an approach was logical and viable if the newly-empowered Suharto New Order 
was to institutionalize the national stability, unity and consensus, necessary for 
economic and social development as a foundation for legitimacy built upon socio-
political and economic betterment.  A plurality of societal interests threatened 
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destabilizing socio-political differences so reproducing elite consensus legitimately 
across all levels of society offered the only means of attaining social cohesion and 
socio-political agendas.  Positions of power can only be embedded and built upon 
when socio-political differences are ameliorated through negotiated social contracts 
that require national elites and subordinate interests remaining tightly integrated 
through common interest.  The alternative to contrived arrangements of this sort 
would likely be regime breakdown and when state elites become divided over socio-
political and economic direction, anti-democratic and extremist forces are more likely 
to take control.   
             Essential to contrasting the broad-based popular legitimacy implicit in the 
Gramscian with the Indonesian context is determining whether the Suharto historic 
bloc represented mere supremacist rather than hegemonic consent and whether there 
generally existed mass legitimizing consensus.  New Order leadership reflected, 
prima facie, a collective view that legitimately represented socio-political aspirations 
in comparison to the post-independence chaos of the Sukarno era.  Open dissent to the 
New Order was virtually absent by the early 1980s, and it was not the case that 
Indonesian indigenous socio-political culture had historically exhibited a strong 
tradition of individual rights of any kind because the interests of individuals had 
traditionally been subordinated to those of family or community.1019  But if it were to 
unify Indonesia’s diverse society, a binding glue of ideological and moral legitimacy 
such as Pancasila needed to be more than a mere pragmatic regime arrangement of 
symbols elaborated as unifying practices and institutions to channel and contain the 
demands of potentially destabilizing social diversity.  Gramsci was aware that the 
dualities of coercion and consent could become weapons by which a single-party state 
might simply mould the people to its own ideology and that the level of consensus 
crafted might merely be the minimum necessary to compel compliance.   
                New Order hegemony did evolve beyond pure coercion.  Pancasila 
persuaded, exchanged and co-opted (all legitimate instruments of power in democratic 
systems) and legitimized New Order rule by underwriting sufficient stability to enable 
broad, albeit approved, socio-political participation within an authoritarian 
framework.  The leadership empowered an organic techno-bureaucracy with the 
legitimizing imperatives of the Pancasila-ist economy to select and adapt economic 
                                                           
1019 Chapter 3, section 1.3, pp. 107-110. 
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policies that provided three decades of successful economic development that to a 
great extent enhanced regime legitimacy.  Socio-political and economic development 
was patently inequitable but Suharto’s New Order forged a high level of national 
support and a minimum of resistance.  The Gramscian model confirms the Suharto 
New Order as more than a mere self-perpetuating patronage system that only 
benefited those prepared to comply and marginalized those who opposed its 
leadership.  By exclusively representing the state ideology Pancasila and its 
derivatives over some twenty-five years the New Order historic bloc clearly exhibited 
and sustained sufficient of the national popular legitimacy implicit in the Gramscian 
model of hegemonic order to ameliorate most socio-political challenge.  By ruling out 
extreme options and calling for religious tolerance and social equity Pancasila’s five 
pillars were more than a vague yet admirable means of rationalizing a plural society 
out of potential socio-political chaos and the New Order was able to elevate the 
doctrine’s tenets to the status of an ideology that offered a middle-of-the-road model 
for societal consensus and unity.  As an alternative to social and political divisions of 
virtually unmanageable proportions it is difficult to perceive any path other than the 
regime’s appropriation of an ideology such as Pancasila to legitimize its socio-
political objectives of unity, stability, and social and economic development.  Clear 
parallels are thus apparent between the New Order’s ongoing representation of 
Pancasila as a ‘binding glue’ of hegemonic legitimacy and Gramsci’s schema by 
which ideology is represented to legitimize strong moral and intellectual leadership.  
Treating the New Order’s representation of the state ideology Pancasila and its 
derivatives as a discourse of hegemonic legitimacy is also seen to offer previously 
lacking ideological and cultural explanatory clarity to the rise and decline of the 
Suharto New Order.                               
 
1.4  Thesis Proposition 4: That the Gramscian model of hegemonic 
order, with its emphasis on ‘ideology and culture’ substantially explains 
Indonesia during the post-Suharto era in the context of the global 
spread of liberal democratic ideals and resurgent socio-political Islam.              
                     Finally, evaluating the Gramscian schema of hegemonic order in the 
Indonesian context would be incomplete without considering its usefulness in terms 
of the model’s emphasis on ideology and cultural tradition towards both a better 
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understanding of Indonesia’s socio-political future in the post-Suharto era, the 
likelihood of more democratic participation and contestation and the more general 
issue of socio-political legitimacy based on a sustained level of authoritarian 
domination in the contemporary era of Islamic socio-political resurgence.  This thesis 
has been based on a representation of the Suharto New Order as a steeply ascending 
pyramid of power dominated by a strong Executive at its peak and a politically active 
military spread above and within a decision-making techno-bureaucratic process 
directing a pattern of hegemonic state/society relationships legitimized by the state 
balancing co-optation and responsiveness with repression and coercion.1020  What is 
specific about this Gramscian perspective of the arrangement is that in legitimizing 
the socio-political agendas of their hegemonic relationship with national life, the New 
Order represented an exclusive, culturally-specific, rendering of the state ideology 
Pancasila.1021  Valuable insights into understanding post-Suharto socio-politics in the 
context of the contemporary global spread of liberal democratic ideas paralleling an 
antagonistic resurgent socio-political Islam can be drawn from two specific aspects of 
the Gramscian schema.   
                     The first aspect is that the model facilitates analysis into how effectively 
a rendering of ideology was disseminated into the Indonesian national consciousness 
to promote sufficient national unity and socio-political stability to legitimize the post-
Suharto ruling order’s socio-political agendas.  The socio-political order arrived at 
thus will be deemed legitimate if society’s subordinate classes can be found to have 
accepted the state’s moral, political and cultural values as legitimately representing 
the nation’s best interests.1022  The second aspect relates to the Gramscian legitimizing 
imperative of balanced coercion/consensus without the former dominating and 
whether in the post-Suharto context a Gramscian form of hegemonic order or simply 
authoritarian rule could have evolved.  Coercion balanced with consent (without the 
former dominating) is the very essence of Gramscian hegemony, but Gramsci is also 
clear that physical force can be used against a dissident minority so long as the 
majority agrees that its use is in the national interests.1023  This issue is vital when 
considering whether the balance of physical force and consensus is appropriate to a 
Gramcian model or whether domination is mere authoritarianism.  The contribution of 
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the model’s emphasis on ideology to better understand socio-politics in post-Suharto 
Indonesia depends, therefore, on whether the solidarity negotiated between the new 
elite arrangements and subordinate groups1024 resulted from the general population 
accepting the new ruling order’s ideological belief systems and values as universally 
valid and representing the nation’s best interests overall.1025   
                     Applying the Gramscian model of hegemonic order that strongly stresses 
the roles of ideology and culture in legitimizing socio-political and economic agendas 
has offered robust and valuable insights into the rise and fall of Indonesia’s Suharto 
New Order.  But the schema also offers a highly adaptable tool with which to evaluate 
solid arguments for the legitimacy of authoritarian rule in the contemporary world of 
competing interests among ethnically pluralist societies, and the particular context of 
the impact of a contemporary global resurgence of socio-political Islam upon 
Indonesia, the world’s largest Islamic society.  In terms of contrasting the Suharto 
New Order with Gramscian hegemonic order that incorporates rule through balanced 
coercion and consensus based on a universally accepted state ideology such as 
Pancasila, the critical issue is the appropriate balance in the essential duality that 
represents Gramscian hegemonic legitimacy.  Notwithstanding Gramsci’s insistence 
that coercive techniques not dominate consensual processes, assessing an appropriate 
balance poses the major difficulty with the Gramscian model yet the modern state’s 
general inclination towards oppression and the use of force suggests that coercive 
processes can be substantial and still comply with the model’s methodology of direct 
and positive moral and intellectual leadership, Gramsci’s direzione.1026  Testing the 
Suharto New Order as a contemporary capitalist democracy against Gramsci’s 
insights provides no definitive solution to the problem of quantifying the duality’s 
appropriate mix, but the exercise offers three strong arguments in favour of the 
judicious level of domination, or certainly uncompromisingly firm leadership, implicit 
to legitimate Gramscian hegemonic order.   
                     First, New Order hegemony involved more than simple coercion and 
oppression.  The definitive consensual aspects of New Order hegemony, persuasion, 
co-optation and even corruption, are all valid components of material exchange and 
typical conventions of socio-political and economic power in the contemporary Asian 
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versions of a democratic polity.  During the first three decades under the New Order, 
in terms of overall reduced poverty levels and increased education, most Indonesians 
benefited from a socio-politically assertive Pancasila demokrasi that clearly 
prescribed the permitted limits of behaviour and those issues requiring firm regulation 
if necessary national cohesion and stability was to achieved.   
                     Second, the relatively participatory form of democracy attempted in 
Indonesia under Sukarno during the 1950s was an unmitigated failure and many 
Indonesians remembered how ethnic conflict around religious and regional/cultural 
issues threatened national chaos and socio-political disaster during the first two 
decades of independence.  Representative democracy did little to resolve the problems 
arising out of ethnic and cultural diversity at that time so with the socio-political 
environment of the late-1980s and early 1990s highlighted by a dynamic Islamic 
socio-political resurgence that emphasised antagonistic religious and ethnic 
differences, there was little to suggest that a more participatory form of democracy 
would be beneficial to the national interest.   
                     The third argument in favour of the degree of domination implicit in 
Suhartoism as hegemonic order is that the New Order dramatically transformed 
Indonesian society with pragmatic socio-political processes that achieved the desired 
social good of ensuring sufficient stability and unity to enable national development.  
A cohesive counter-hegemony legitimised by a coherent alternative rendering of 
Pancasila and its derivatives failed to surface to coalesce into a new hegemony during 
the increasingly antagonistic socio-political and economic environment of the 1990s.  
Indonesia merely entered into a period of growing economic crisis and problematic 
political transition to a chorus of demands for more liberal democracy and reform 
articulated as reformasi dan demokrasi that represented in Gramscian terms decaying 
hegemony.  Modernisation theory argues that capitalist economic development can 
stimulate profound cultural and socio-political change, encourage more social 
pluralism and thus the prospect of more democratic contestation and participation, so 
notwithstanding three decades of Suhartoist hegemonic domination, the foundations 
may have been laid to sustain and ultimately institutionalise the reformasi dan 
demokrasi that brought the New Order to an end.  The New Order’s firm adherence to 
Pancasila’s secular-nationalist tenets also went a long way towards contributing to 
the more uniform and pious Islamic socio-political culture that evolved during the last 
decade on Suharto’s leadership.  That the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims have 
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shown during the post-Suharto era a disinclination towards an Islamic state or 
theocracy suggests that the ideological legitimizing processes of secular-nationalism 
that underwrote New Order hegemony laid the foundation for a more cohesive and 
uniform society than might have been expected when Suharto departed.     
                  It remains to be seen whether the Suharto New Order’s Pancasila-ist 
arrangement of Indonesian life can outlive its creator or whether it disappeared with 
him.  The answer, and critical in terms of ongoing socio-political stability in 
Indonesia, depends upon how effectively the New Order institutionalized Pancasila’s 
unifying tenets during their 32 years of domination and whether past processes of 
organization and procedure were adaptable and coherent enough in organizing 
institutional value and stability that will survive both the economic collapse and 
regime transition.  The New Order power pyramid was clearly damaged by these 
developments but it was the alliance of establishment interests underwriting bloc 
legitimacy and cohesion deserting the President following a period of progressive 
hegemonic decay and obsolescence that led to the ultimate failure of New Order 
hegemony.  The potent office of the Presidency has been severely weakened since 
Suharto departed and, although still politically active, ABRI have been publicly 
discredited by media revelations of their past human rights indiscretions.  Yet the 
formerly organic decision-making processes centered about the bureaucracy and its 
accompanying pattern of state/society relations that combined co-optation and 
responsiveness with endemic corruption that provided the ruling elites’ primary 
sources of material acquisition, remain in place.  Although weakened by new 
economic realities, the demands of international institutions such as the IMF and 
newly empowered economic reformists, the former elite-driven processes of the 
Suharto era remain in essence unchanged.  Time will tell whether the new socio-
political arrangement will coalesce around a new re-constituted typology of the 
Gramscian hegemonic model based on a re-negotiated rendering of ideology thereby 
providing a new unifying and consensual ideological legitimacy.  A re-constituted 
representation of Pancasila will suffice, either one imbued with re-negotiated secular-
nationalist tenets, or one informed by non-negotiable Islamic values and interests 
more broadly representative of the faith’s diverse intellectual streams and degrees of 
piety and practice.   
                        
 367
2.  Summary    
                           Using Gramsci’s hegemonic perspective, with its emphasis on ideology 
and culture, to test the ideological legitimacy of the Suharto New Order’s 
establishment and subsequent collapse, has provided valuable clarity to the largely 
neglected subject of the relationship between ideology/culture and socio-political 
legitimacy within Indonesia’s diverse ethnically pluralist society.  The Gramscian 
approach has enabled a clear contrast between two possible modes of socio-political 
control in the context of the Suharto New Order: domination as pure physical 
coercion and hegemonic direction as ideological power derived through consensus 
and political support.  Gramsci’s socio-politics, focusing on processes of organic 
intellectual discourse employing ideology in crafting mass consensus to the moral and 
intellectual legitimacy of hegemonic order, also provided an explanatory model 
highly attuned to Indonesia in the contemporary age of resurgent socio-political Islam 
paralleling the questionable utility of the liberal democratic ideas spreading across the 
globe since the end of the Cold War.  Testing Gramsci’s hegemonic theories against 
the rise and fall of the Suharto New Order bloc showed that while the regime 
validated Gramscian hegemonic imperatives of ideological consensus to legitimize 
socio-political agendas, the bloc ultimately failed through progressive hegemonic 
obsolescence and decay notwithstanding belated efforts during the regime’s final 
decade to assimilate broader interests into its ideological constituency.  Gramsci’s 
insights also provided originality in that as well as demonstrating how hegemonic 
obsolescence and decay occurred across the entire spectrum of New Order 
domination, his methodology enabled isolating each of the bloc’s mutually inclusive 
economic, political and ideological components for individual analysis.     
                     Progressive New Order hegemonic decay, obsolescence and ultimately 
regime collapse occurred because organic moral and intellectual inadequacies during 
the 1990s failed to resolve key Gramscian imperatives: sustaining hegemony required 
constantly adjusting and refurbishing the ideological legitimacy of both prime class 
interests and those of the subordinate masses in response to changing socio-political 
and economic realities.  The Gramscian model requires that ideological legitimacy 
adjusts to demands from below as well as those of parallel elite alliance interests and 
when ideological influences and values are appropriated and assimilated from below, 
the ruling arrangement must take particular care to absorb those issues potentially 
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problematic in maintaining prime bloc socio-political and economic agendas.  
Essentially, remaining hegemonic required the New Order convincing the general 
population that the cultural and belief systems the regime had articulated throughout 
society for some decades remained, through their flexibility, morally and 
intellectually valid.  By failing to comply with the imperatives of consensually 
derived hegemonic refurbishment when opposition arose and crisis occurred the New 
Order demonstrated the inadequacies in performance of which Gramsci clearly 
warned.  As a consequence the New Order succumbed to an array of contradictory 
renderings from both organic and traditional sources that challenged the ideological 
legitimacy the regime had sustained over some three decades around its exclusive 
rendering of Pancasila as the official state ideology.    
                    This thesis has shown that the Suharto New Order displayed all of the 
key characteristics of the Gramscian model of hegemonic order and in terms of the 
regime collapse the Gramscian imperative of sustaining consensual ideological 
dominance also convincingly explains the New Order’s failure.  The model has 
provided a highly appropriate means of explaining contemporary socio-politics in the 
culturally and ethnically dynamic society of post-Suharto Indonesia and provided 
clarity in interpreting the ideological and cultural challenges similar societies are 
likely to face as well as offering a versatile methodology with which to analyse the 
potential for societal instability.  But are there limitations to the model?  Gramsci’s 
account of hegemony has been criticized as a theory of politics appropriate to a fully 
developed capitalist state because his theories evolved out of his analysis of the 
peripheral, ‘developing’, capitalism experienced by Italy during the 1920s and 1930s 
undergoing a period of ‘organic crisis’.  But the economy the Suharto New Order 
inherited, the product of centuries of exploitive Dutch colonialism, independence and 
economic bankruptcy under President Sukarno’s administration, could hardly be 
described as that of a ‘developed’ capitalist state.  Moreover, from the late 1980s New 
Order Indonesia also entered a period that continued until the Asian economic crisis 
of 1997 and regime collapse in 1998 and can well be described as Gramscian ‘organic 
crisis’.  
                   Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’ was not formulated in a single, neat 
statement but developed in different ways across a decade of thought connected by a 
range of phenomena specific to the socio-political and economic conditions of early 
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twentieth century Southern Europe.  When working with Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony it is necessary to use it first and foremost in the general sense that he 
intended the concept to underpin the organization of mass popular consent.  
Gramsci’s model of socio-politics is also difficult to interpret and different 
interpretations can lead to contradictions.  Nonetheless, although Gramsci’s approach 
to social politics and his notions of hegemonic order were developed during a 
particular historic period, as discussed earlier,1027 economic development in 
Gramsci’s Italy and Suharto’s Indonesia were both based on state-control over 
monopoly and investment capital and socio-political stability arrived at through 
pragmatic firm leadership.  Gramsci’s approach is accused of hinting strongly at 
authoritarianism but in such terms there are close parallels between both fascist Italy 
of Gramsci’s day and Suharto’s New Order Indonesia where culture and ideology 
dominated the foreground of socio-political contestation.  Rather than relying upon a 
stable socio-political and economic environment existing, the model’s value is in its 
robustness in explaining how socio-political contestation based on a hegemonic 
rendering of culture and ideology is able to provide socio-political stability in a 
potentially destabilizing mass environment.      
                     The Gramscian model’s major shortcoming is its failure to consider the 
influence firm leadership based upon charismatic, individualistic, executive 
management - unchallenged in authority - might have upon hegemonic socio-political 
and economic arrangements.  Gramsci’s analysis of hegemonic order paid little heed 
to individual leadership, focusing instead on the strategies of a hegemonic alliance of 
groups and classes united through the endeavours of a dominant elite committed to 
the ideological/cultural organization of mass consent.  The ‘modern Prince’ that 
Gramsci derived from his study of Machiavelli did not represent charismatic, 
dynamic, individual leadership but the careful, calculated approach to state-building 
that he believed hegemonic order needed to adopt and could only be achieved through 
the efforts of a mass-based political movement.  Gramsci had little regard for a single 
charismatic individual forging the necessary collective will upon which hegemony 
could be constructed and believed that in modern societies social movements could 
only be organized and disciplined for the purpose of political direction through 
political parties and pragmatic alliances.  Gramsci’s ‘modern prince’ is hegemonic 
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order in an organic collective entirety so his model makes little sense of 
individualistic leadership.  Thus the model can only view Suharto’s swing towards 
Islam during the early 1990s, when he initiated the decision to provide previously 
proscribed politika-Islam with increased socio-political influence and more space to 
debate contemporary issues, as an historic bloc making essential pragmatic 
hegemonic adjustments in the face of changing socio-political realities and the need to 
assimilate a potential ideological challenge.     
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